Friday, January 1, 2021

HYPOTHESES IN THE MAKING

 

[Note:  From time to time, this blog issues a set of postings that summarize what the blog has been emphasizing in its previous postings.  Of late, the blog has been looking at various obstacles civics educators face in teaching their subject.  It’s time to post a series of such summary accounts.  The advantage of such summaries is to introduce new readers to the blog and to provide a different context by which to review the blog’s various claims and arguments.  This and upcoming summary postings will be preceded by this message.]

[Further Note:  Phew, it’s over.  Happy New Years!!]

Earlier in this blog,[1] this writer presented a listing of findings from a Pew Research Center report that offered demographic information comparing the electorate in 1992 and 2016.[2]  The goal was to observe changes the electorate had experienced during the intermittent years.  While that is helpful in understanding the nation’s politics in and of itself, it also suggests reasons for the polarization the nation is experiencing.

          While this posting reviews those changes in summary, the review will spur this writer to offer some hypotheses that will be tested by the information offered by another Pew publication[3] – which will serve as the topic of this blog’s next posting.  But, at minimum, this first Pew offering can stand on its own and provide the reader some insight.

          In terms of ethnicity and race (as a combined factor), the nation has gone through some changes:  non-Hispanic whites make up a smaller percentage of the electorate (by 14% points), Hispanic share has doubled (5% to 9%), blacks increased (10% to 12%), mixed-race grew (1% to 5%), and total non-whites went up (16% to 26%).  Whites’ share of the electorate fell to 60.7% and is projected to be below 50% by 2045.

          Just these limited numbers explain quite a bit and the demographic shifts spell out advantages for the Democratic Party as that party is constituted today.  That is, that party garners the bulk of non-white populations around the country.  Surprisingly, the Pew report states that the Republicans have also gained among these groups but not to the extent that Democrats have.

               In terms of age, the nation is older, and the older set has shifted from being more pro-Democratic to being more pro-Republican.  Americans are better educated and educated people who tended be Republican in ’92, tended to be Democratic in ’16.  When one mixes education with ethnicity/race an interesting change is highlighted, whites with college degrees increased as a proportion of the electorate.  And Democrats with no college dropped significantly (55% to 32%).  Bottom line, Democrats have benefited from changes in educational attainment numbers.

          Then there is the effect of religion on politics.  Those who do not consider themselves as belonging to a religion significantly went up (8% to 21%).  This change seems to have benefited Democrats.  Religious affiliation maintained its numbers among Republicans.  Summarily, Pew observes that Republicans are strong among evangelical Protestants or white Catholics during those twenty years but overall, they account for a smaller portion of the electorate.

          With the easy ability to categorize so many groups according to identity factors such as race, ethnicity, and religion – and to some degree age – with political parties and all that that represents, one can surmise that these factors add to polarization.  And that is the most prominent hypothesis one can make from this information.

          This posting ends with a statement that more specifically captures this hypothesis: 

… [F]or those voters who are concerned over identity issues, the growth of more recent immigrant population – including first generation Americans – less white-based/traditional religiously affiliated people, and an increase in non-religiously affiliated people, life seems to be becoming more secular, less white, and more urban.  In 1992 the US urban population was 76% and in 2016 it was 82% (82.5% in 2019).[4]  Conservative, white, religiously prone people in the US, one can guess, are feeling more and more threatened.

To test these hypothesized relationships, this blog, as stated above, will relate another Pew research report, “Urban, Suburban and Rural Residents’ Views on Key Social and Political Issues,” that Pew issued in 2018.  That will be the topic for the next posting of this blog.



[1] These findings are reported in the posting, “Some Demographics in Election Years,” Gravitas:  A Voice for Civics (a blog), September 1, 2020.  The reader can see the actual percentage amounts the findings here indicate.

[2] “1.  The Changing Composition of the Political Parties,”  The Pew Research Center (September 13, 2016), accessed August 31, 2020, https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2016/09/13/1-the-changing-composition-of-the-political-parties/ .

[3] Kim Parker, Juliana Menasce Horowitz, Anna Brown, Richard Fry, D’Vera Cohn, Ruth Igielnik, “2.  Urban, Suburban and Rural Residents’ Views on Key Social and Political Issues, Pew Research Center:  Social and Demographic Trends (May 22, 2018), accessed January 1, 2021, https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2018/05/22/urban-suburban-and-rural-residents-views-on-key-social-and-political-issues/ .

[4] See “Urban Population (% of Total Population) – United States,”  The World Bank, n.d., accessed December 30, 2020, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS?end=2019&locations=US&start=1978 .

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