A Crucial Element of Democracy

This is a blog by Robert Gutierrez ...
While often taken for granted, civics education plays a crucial role in a democracy like ours. This Blog is dedicated to enticing its readers into taking an active role in the formulation of the civics curriculum found in their local schools. In order to do this, the Blog is offering a newer way to look at civics education, a newer construct - liberated federalism or federation theory. Daniel Elazar defines federalism as "the mode of political organization that unites separate polities within an overarching political system by distributing power among general and constituent governments in a manner designed to protect the existence and authority of both." It depends on its citizens acting in certain ways which Elazar calls federalism's processes. Federation theory, as applied to civics curriculum, has a set of aims. They are:
*Teach a view of government as a supra federated institution of society in which collective interests of the commonwealth are protected and advanced.
*Teach the philosophical basis of government's role as guardian of the grand partnership of citizens at both levels of individuals and associations of political and social intercourse.
*Convey the need of government to engender levels of support promoting a general sense of obligation and duty toward agreed upon goals and processes aimed at advancing the common betterment.
*Establish and justify a political morality which includes a process to assess whether that morality meets the needs of changing times while holding true to federalist values.
*Emphasize the integrity of the individual both in terms of liberty and equity in which each citizen is a member of a compacted arrangement and whose role is legally, politically, and socially congruent with the spirit of the Bill of Rights.
*Find a balance between a respect for national expertise and an encouragement of local, unsophisticated participation in policy decision-making and implementation.
Your input, as to the content of this Blog, is encouraged through this Blog directly or the Blog's email address: gravitascivics@gmail.com .
NOTE: This blog has led to the publication of a book. The title of that book is TOWARD A FEDERATED NATION: IMPLEMENTING NATIONAL CIVICS STANDARDS and it is available through Amazon in both ebook and paperback versions.

Friday, April 5, 2013

STUDENTS INQUIRING INTO MORAL QUESTIONS

I have, in this blog, argued that a civics curriculum should adopt a naturalist approach to value/moral content – that, by doing so, civics instruction can avoid blatant promulgation of a definite political agenda. In other words, such instruction can be said to not indoctrinate students to particular politically biased content. Understandably, parents and citizens, in general, should be concerned with a public school curriculum that attempts to foster a particular brand of politics. But this approach is not without its perils.

Complete neutrality is beyond possibility. I write this due not to our innate biases as educators. Yes, that is a factor, but the extent of the problem is more fundamental. When one goes about designing an organized set of ideas by which to write a curriculum, decisions have to be made. Two central areas of decisions have to do with the curriculum designer's views on learning and on content. My focus here is the effect that decisions have on content. As currently practiced, most teachers simply adjust to the content perspective offered by the textbook they are handed. This book in turn is chosen – the term is adopted – through a fairly sophisticated process which in our country is run by the state government and the local school districts. Many interested parties provide input from the community. In terms of civics, as I have pointed out many times, the mostly unquestioned consensus is to adopt texts that are guided in their selection of content by a perspective I have called the natural rights construct. That construct heavily supports a strongly based commitment to individualism at the expense of communal biases. I have tried to document how this current choice became prominent about sixty years ago when, in the post World War II years, the nation abandoned the traditional federalist view that had been prominent since the beginning of the nation.

I have argued that we should now abandon this self-serving individualist view for a more updated version of federalist thought – the liberated federalism construct. As part of this other proposed view, resulting classroom materials should be based on a set of values whose aim is to strengthen communal ties, but which includes an element promoting a strong, participating individual. That view of individualism does not short-shrift the person's self interests, but situates them within the context of equality and communal necessities which in turn advance societal well-being.

I have also argued that when it comes to values education, a curriculum should count on a consequentialist, as opposed to a precept, view of values. That is, the good should be defined by the consequences of action, not by some preconceived claim of goodness and evil. By counting on consequences, one is more strongly directed to implement an instructional strategy that has students conduct moral inquiries.

With what questions should such inquiry be concerned? Let me review some concerns that are suggested by Philip Selznick.1 First, what personal qualities are useful, if not needed, to carry out such inquiries? Here the concern is the dispositions of individuals, associations, and communities. What is needed to carry out a values inquiry is a desire for the genuine, stable, and enduring as opposed to the superficial and intolerant. Second, what is the functional balance in a given moral challenge between the particular elements of the situation under analysis and its representative quality of universal moral concerns? While each situation has particular factors affecting moral choice, it, by necessity, has recognizable moral deficiencies so judged by universal standards. Such standards are reflective of conditions that undermine communal well-being. History tells us that dishonesty, vented anger, abuse, and the like are the types of behaviors that lead to fractured social structures. Third, what insights do related fields – social science, history, moral philosophy – tell us about what is moral or what is the least evil in the situation studied? For example:
A social science of moral ordering draws on a rich tradition of philosophical thought, from which it gains a steady focus on the core values at stake in moral experience, especially responsibility, autonomy, integrity, reason, fairness, equality; and on recurrent perplexities and tensions, for example, those affecting the determination of obligation and self-interest, formal and substantive justice, moral and social equality.2
Fourth, how does the situation provide us the opportunity to advance and balance our views concerning the real and the ideal? We need to abandon any attempt to disengage our beliefs and emotions from either reality or idealism – both are essential for promoting self or communal well-being. While there is a distinction between the two, to claim we are concerned with one without the other or that we favor one over the other is foolish and narrow-minded.

But as one goes through these questions, one needs to hold fast to the notion that what one is calling on students to do is to inquire. Built into the questions a teacher would ask is the question of whether or not the inquiry itself is legitimate. The initial questions need to be justified and open to critical review. In a word, nothing is taken for granted or as reflecting an intolerance of intellectual curiosity.

1Selznick, P. (1992). The moral commonwealth: Social theory and the promise of community. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 
 
2Ibid., quotation on p. 37, emphasis in the original.

Monday, April 1, 2013

PARAMETERS ON RELATIVISM

When I was a freshman in college, I had a course in social science that introduced me to the concept of cultural relativism. I was assigned the classic anthropology book, Patterns of Culture, by Ruth Benedict. That's quite a fact given that Benedict died in 1948 (the book was published in 1934) and, despite how old some people think I am, I started college in 1966. For a book to be used as a basic text so many years after its published date says something for the work. The book and the course had quite an impact on me. Given my long Catholic school background with its and my definite views of good and evil highly lodged in Western thought, the idea was jarring that much of what I held as solid truth was now being described, by implication, as just our culture's way of viewing things. As a young man very interested in his freedom and his attempts at establishing himself as his own person, the force of a concept such as cultural relativism affected me greatly.

While I still hold much stock in the importance of understanding that a lot of what we hold as valuable is determined by the varieties of our culture, when it comes to ideas and practices, I have mellowed in my attachment to all that cultural relativism implies. In no area have I been more reticent to accept all of its implications than in the more specific notion of moral relativism. The idea that all we hold as moral is just a matter of the particular developments of our culture seems shortsighted. And I believe that there is evidence to demonstrate this conclusion.

George Lakoff writes about the relationship between moral experience and moral imagination.1 But before explaining his analysis, let's play a word game. I would like you to look over the following list of words and suppose there is a chart following the list. Your job is to fill in the imaginary chart by mentally picking one of the terms in the list for each cell of the chart. The chart is a 2 by 12 chart; that is, it has two columns and twelve rows. I would produce the chart but my experience in trying to do such a thing on this blog tells me that the resulting chart will not look like one single chart but a succession of smaller charts. Hence, I am counting on your imagination.

The words/terms are filthy, rich, poor, beautiful, sick, hostile/isolated, strong, upright, weak, free, healthy, uncared for, imprisoned, sad, whole, cared for, lacking, clean, ugly, light, dark, fallen, communal, and happy. And the two columns of the chart are entitled good (the left column) and evil (the right column). So go ahead; see what you can do with this “challenge.” I'll wait.

Okay, time's up. You probably noticed after a little reflection that the terms can be matched up as opposites. So, for example, there is happy – sad. I would bet that your chart would match the following pairs with the first term under the title good and the second under the title evil:
rich – poor
beautiful – ugly
strong – weak
upright – fallen
free – imprisoned
healthy – sick
whole – lacking
cared for – uncared for
clean – filthy
light – dark
communal – hostile/isolated
happy – sad
Of course the order makes no difference. Now suppose we did this silly challenge with subjects from around the world. I don't know for sure, but I believe that by and large the chart would be filled in exactly the same way. It is this belief that leads Lakoff to make the observation that our moral experiences are mostly universal. Sure, there are qualifications to associating each of the terms in these pairings or as being norms of goodness and evil. For example, “[a] wealthy child may not get the necessary attention of its parents ...”.2 But in a general sense each of the terms is linked, either positively or negatively, to the notion of “well-being.” And it is this universal desire or, perhaps, need, to seek “well-being” that sets the experiential realities that motivate how our moral perspectives develop and make them parallel in their projections around the world. It explains how there is so much overlap between the moral tenets of the world's major religions. For example, honesty seems to be universally prized as moral among these religions. It can very well be that particular practices and processes have evolved within the moral imaginations of various cultures and have manifested themselves in very distinctive ways. One of the things I learned in that course so many years ago was that there are five major institutions that are universal: family, religion, economy, government, and education. This fact says a lot about the human condition and indicates that certain values are morally held among all cultures; for example, the value of obeying legitimate authority.

Lakoff points out that to make sense of these needs, moral experiences are thought of as metaphors or as metaphorical morality, such as the stories that illustrate moral claims to which people can relate. This is what he concludes:
What we learn from this is that metaphorical morality is grounded in nonmetaphorical morality, that is, in forms of well-being, and that the system of metaphors for morality as a whole is far from arbitrary. Because the same forms of well-being are widespread around the world, we expect many of the same metaphors for morality to show up in culture after culture – and they do.3
And if all this is accurate, we have the basis to think of morality in secular terms. This is good, since it opens up the whole topic for instruction in our public schools.

1Lakoff, G. (2002). Moral politics: How liberals and conservatives think. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.

2Ibid., p. 42.

3Ibid., p. 43. Emphasis added.