The context of this posting was adequately given in the first few
paragraphs of the last posting. To
repeat that description, here is how that posting began:
The
last series of postings presented, described, and explained the components of a
liberated federalism model. The
components are the community, the entities, and the association. This is an idealistic model – how governance
and politics should take place – and its normative quality is defined by
federalist values. Those values revolve
around the concern for societal welfare.
Its function is to help guide civics educators in their choice of
instructional content.
What
remains in this presentation of the model is to comment on how it is
“activated.” The model focuses on an
event, when a polity is confronted with a political challenge. What this and the following postings will
address is the substantive issues that usually pose the political challenges an
association is likely to encounter, especially when the association is a government.
After that introduction,
the posting went on to describe how federation theory views equality. It offered the following definition for
equality: a belief that despite
inequality in personal attributes, such as talent and other resources, each
person is entitled to equal consideration of his/her well-being, that all have
an equal right to maintain their dignity and integrity as individual persons. As such, equality has a normative quality
since it reflects a respect for being human beyond the biological aspects.[1]
The posting goes on to
state that equality, as an element of federation theory, has two forms: baseline equality and equality of
treatment. The purpose of this posting
is to provide a definition for the first of these forms, to make a statement as
to its importance, and to indicate the social implications baseline equality
form has.
Definition – Baseline equality
relates to liberty. Oftentimes, equality
and liberty are presented as opposing ideals, but as federation theory defines
them, equality is related and gives context to liberty. In terms of baseline equality, this aspect
refers to the minimal level of equality to which each person is entitled. This aspect is constitutionally defined. In relation to this is the jurisprudential
development of the Fourteenth Amendment
regarding its provision of equal protection[2] and to some degree, due process
provisions is relevant.
Importance – This notion of
equality adds to the value of liberty.
Its addition is limited to the notion that liberty need not be fixated on
the concept of the individual sovereignty.
As noted earlier in this blog, individual sovereignty is the way the
natural rights construct defines liberty.
Federation theory instead links liberty to a certain reality, one that
is based on the observation that we are all mutually dependent on a communal
existence.
Natural rights’ definition
of liberty invites individuals to adopt any value orientation, be it based on
religious beliefs, communal concerns, or self-interest; individuals are free in
law and expectations to choose whatever basis to determine how they will define
their lives, especially in terms of moral commitments. Hence, that construct sees the individual as
sovereign.
Many, if not most, people
use a basis of short term self-interest to make these life-defining
decisions. This leaves the interests of
the community wanting, which hurts the health of the commonwealth and in the
long run the interests of the individual.
This is not a logical result of individual sovereignty, but it is the
actual result one can readily see in societies that adopt the natural rights
perspective as the dominant view of governance and politics.
Social Implication – Under
natural rights’ view of liberty, such a result is determined to be just the way
things happen to be. Perhaps there is a
degree of regret, but it is believed among its adherents to just be the price
one pays for liberty. And that view
leads to policy biases that shy away from communal based policies; these more
socially oriented policy choices are judged as intrusive to individual
prerogatives.
Federation theory uses
another basis, a more communal perspective.
One might ask: is it a
collectivist perspective or a socialistic view?
Selznick writes concerning the effects of historical actions in relation
to the rights of the individual and the interests of the commonwealth:
The constitutional doctrine of equal protection does not ignore or
erase differences of talent, achievement, contribution, or good fortune. It is not a device for leveling gradations or
for making society more homogeneous. It is, however, a path to community. Equal protection speaks above all to
membership, and membership presumes that all who belong share a core
identity. This identity is wholly
compatible with rich diversity so long as that diversity does not undermine
equality of membership. The most serious
threat to such equality is division based on moral stigma. Whatever its source, whether it be a certain
racial or ethnic origin or level of native intelligence, the effect of moral
stigma is to rank some people as intrinsically less worthy than others. Vindication of moral equality, in the face of
strong impulses toward moral hierarchy, is the primary mission of equal
protection of the law.[3] (Emphasis in the original)
With such a view of equality, the individual is free – he or she
has liberty – to do what he or she should do.
And when one considers what
one should do, one introduces a moral approach at least in terms of civic
affairs. Within a community, the
expectation is created that all members can fully participate or else there can
be no meaningful commonwealth.
Self-interest is not forgotten, but it is tempered with a realization of
a communal reality of mutual interests that does make itself felt if only
eventually.
This view is counter to the
individual sovereignty view espoused by the natural rights construct. A distinction should be made between those
self-interests based behaviors that offends contractual arrangements (an agreed
exchange of something for something else) and those that offend understandings
within a compact arrangement (an agreement based on a solemn pledge to create
and/or advance a collective, an association).
Many see the former view
leading to the behaviors causing the 2008 financial crisis. Those actions were moral and legal under a
natural rights view, they did not offend contractual obligations; but they did
offend the federalist provisions of mutual interests and acted against the
common good for short-term profit.
Selznick continues that
there is not just an expectation of being protected against abuses of power,
but equality includes a whole range of duties and rights attached to
membership. While these rights and
duties might be bound by limited resources and options – an individual might
not possess those levels of assets that others have – they are what make
membership meaningful.[4]
That is, the level of duties
and rights are affected by the amount of assets and resources a person has at
his/her disposal. Generally, the more
someone benefits, the more his/her duty is.
Rights for the advantaged citizen might be further restrained by being
subject to certain policies such as a progressive tax rate.[5]
In terms of federation
theory, this notion of liberty needs to be fleshed out. For one thing, in everyday life, one would
not be able to distinguish it from the natural rights view of liberty. In most cases, one is not talking about a
sort of liberty that deprives a person from making life-defining decisions or
from enjoying the added entitlements a higher income or wealth level can afford.
What is being promoted is a
public expectation that first takes seriously what can reasonably be demanded
from citizens. This public sphere also
provides a language that can be utilized to legitimately evaluate how effectively
citizens meet the obligations and duties of being citizens. And this evaluation considers the various
benefits citizens can secure.
A rule of thumb that apply
to this sense of liberty is to simply state that everyone can pursue his/her
self-interest if a person does not define those interests in such a way as to
counter the common good. Admittedly, at
times that might call for significant reflection. Why? Because often such judgements are
difficult and complex.
They are often not even a
function of law, but of social norms and other expectations. For example, many of the super-rich today
have chosen to bequeath their fortunes to charitable efforts after their deaths. Should this be a federated expectation? It is a legitimate question to ask under the
tenets of federation theory.
The next posting will
address the second form of a federated equality, equality of treatment or what
this account prefers to call regulated condition.
[2] Mark V. Tushnet, “Equal
Protection,” in The Oxford Companion to
the Supreme Court, ed. Kermit L. Hall (New York NY: Oxford University Press, 1992), 257-259.
[3] Philip Selznick, The
Moral Commonwealth: Social Theory and
the Promise of Community, 489.
[4] Ibid.
[5] As the
nation has become more ensconced in a natural rights perspective, calls for a
flat tax have become more strident.
