TALKING MORALITY

Topics that don't get much attention in our civics or government classes are, one, how citizens interact with each other and, two, how citizens should interact with each other. Part of the reason for this is that the language used in these courses has to do mainly with the structural makeup of our governmental institutions and of those institutions that interact with government. So these courses have units of study on such topics as the presidency and political parties and lobbying organizations. But on how citizen A treats citizen B or how citizen A should treat citizen B, there is little said. George Lakoff,¹ I believe, gives us one way to look at and talk about these very basic civic concerns.

Before describing Lakoff's proposed language, let me point out another obstacle in treating one of these topics. By addressing how citizens should treat one another, civics broaches the subject of morality. As I have pointed out before, this gets touchy – should our public instruction be about promoting moral messages? I have made it clear and have presented a justification for my position that yes, we do need to deal with moral questions in the classroom and that that treatment should be guided by a federalist moral code. Summarily, that code holds that, as a trump value, goodness lies in behavior and policy that advance societal welfare. This blog has dedicated significant space to describing and explaining this code and the reasons I have for promoting its use.

So, therefore, the language one adopts to deal with these two topics – how citizens interact and how they should interact – has a descriptive challenge and a normative challenge. Lakoff begins his treatment by pointing out that much of our moral thinking and visualizing is dependent on metaphors. Why? Because morality is not a tangible entity. It is ephemeral, but has definite and practical implications in our lives. It is a qualitative aspect of life and it is essentially difficult to mentally conceive of it directly. Metaphors allow us to give this quality a more definite sense and with it a language by which to communicate its elements and its effects on us. A metaphor Lakoff identifies in order to visualize and talk about morality is wealth.

By using wealth, we can first give morality a quantitative dimension. And we can also use the extended metaphor of bookkeeping to relate that aspect of morality which has to do with either doing someone a good or a harm – central attributes of morality. So, for example, we can say that if I do you a good, you might perceive the result of such a good as placing the burden of a debt on you. Now think about the last time someone did something good for you. Chances are you felt a sense of obligation to that person and were disposed to return that favor with a favor so as to balance the books. Of course, this is all a metaphor, but it does reflect actual emotions. It also brings into play, through the language the metaphor activates, moral considerations. Lakoff, in his analysis, focuses on two moral principles this language permits: the positive-action principle and the debt-payment principle.

The positive-action principle is the general notion that morality is adhered to by people doing good things for each other. We should do favors, look after each other, help those in need, be charitable in both our treatment of others and how we refer to one another, and be disposed to be generally helpful and supportive of others. You can probably think of other ways a person can live up to the positive-action principle. The debt-payment principle, on the other hand, refers to the moral disposition to pay back. This might be to return a favor for a favor or to pay back a harm with a harm. This is carrying the bookkeeping metaphor to its logical extension. If someone does you a good, imposing a debit on you, you are called upon to return an equally valued good; but if someone does you a harm, imposing a credit on you, you are in position to say, “I'll make him/her pay” for the harm done to you. Now this type of language opens discussion to such modes of interaction between people that can be described as reciprocation (a good for a good), retribution (an authoritative harm for a harm – as when a person is punished by a governmental entity for committing a crime or a parent punishes a child for misbehavior), revenge (a non-authoritative harm for a harm – as when a person spreads a damaging rumor about someone who hurt his/her reputation). The language can also be used to talk about altruism, turning the other cheek, Karma sense of universal justice (“what goes around, comes around”), and the like.

In terms of federalist concerns, this language opens a way of talking about those interactions that promote societal welfare and those interactions that hurt or diminish societal welfare. It also points to the development of augmenting conflicts in society – language that can describe the development of cycles of revenge (for example, the Hatfields and the McCoys). The language itself is fairly neutral as to which course of action should be followed, but does highlight certain implications and realities that one sees as resulting from certain social policies of groups, organizations, and government. For example, if large corporations use their financial resources to funnel income to advantaged groups, how are such policies viewed? Are they seen as an unjustified, inflicted harm on those not advantaged? And if so, will those latter groups seek retribution or revenge? What factors influence the reaction of these latter groups? These are moral questions due to the fact that they relate to societal welfare. But these are not just moral questions; they are also practical ones. The answers to them relate to the interests of those involved.

1Lakoff, G. (2002). Moral politics: How liberals and conservatives think. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.

SOME IDEAL REALITIES

How does a teacher during a time when excessive individualism and self-centered views prevail¹ get students to consider a more idealistic view of politics and governance? By adopting federation theory, as this blog proposes, to guide content choices in our civics and government curriculum, a teacher is being asked to introduce an overall idealistic vision. That is, a teacher would plan lessons that have students consider idealistic options in regards to both personal political behavior and governmental policy. One way to get such an educational aim off the ground is to present lessons that hit upon the more practical aspects of such a view. William A. Galston² provides help in devising such instruction.

Initially, it is useful to consider a main concern of federation theory. That is, this more communal view of politics and governance is centered on the idea that good governance is about trying to attain and maintain the common good. Of course, seeking the common good oftentimes flies in the face of trying to advance self-interest. It also questions a governmental/political construct that promotes individual aims and self defined values, such as the case with the prevailing construct – the natural rights perspective. Galston points out three types of factual conditions that highlight our need to consider this central concern of federation theory. He begins by pointing out that the very commonness of these facts almost make them invisible to us. We assume them in calculating our plans to advance our interests. Yet, as we consider them – as we should from time to time – we can more realistically understand and appreciate their importance in our ability to successfully fulfill our aims.

The first of these factual conditions is the existence of inherently social goods. Certain highly prized aspects of life demand social venues and modes of being in which those aspects take place. The venues or modes of behavior are social goods. For example, there is humor that demands a social arrangement (trying telling a joke to yourself). The same can be said for most games. But, life itself demands the existence of social goods (we are all vulnerable in some way or other all the time, but especially during certain segments of our lives such as in infancy or advanced age). Of course, we are social beings where even the most introverted person needs social outlets at times.

The second factual condition is our dependence on social linkages. We formulate, quite naturally, an array of social linkages. As just mentioned, we are social animals by nature and our interconnectedness sets our reality in such a way that the well-being of some will affect the well-being of others precisely because we are linked. Along with Galston, many writers have pointed out the ironic truth that oppression, for example, does not only claim a toll only the oppressed, but on the oppressor as well. Oppression eats away at our very humanness. Our enlightened self-interest is served when we meet our obligations within these social linkages. This is observed when we submit, for example, to socially responsible behavior such as when we voluntarily follow health mandates like vaccinating our children from infectious diseases. Yes, the rich oftentimes try to use their wealth to de-link themselves; they might pay for private security, for example. But sooner or later such strategies fall short when underfunded social services such as police cannot keep up with rising social problems like crime rates. We see this in some poorer countries where kidnappings are a chronic problem. The establishment and maintenance of a healthy economy, from which we all benefit, counts on law-abiding communities either locally or nationally.

The third factual condition is what Galston calls “the good of the common.” The common life takes place in either physical or technologically created places. Our behaviors within these places, either if one behaves by oneself or in social groupings, will very likely affect the quality of a particular place to serve its designated function. Places usually need to be clean enough, safe enough, accessible enough, and resourced enough to meet the needs of those who want to use them. This calls for socially responsible behavior by those who use these places.

Social goods, social linkages, and common places are not an exhaustive list of factual conditions that are practical aspects of the common good. Ironically, Galston points out, our very conflicts trying to determine what exactly constitutes the common good is very much an aspect of the common good – the very debates that oftentimes challenge the prevailing vision of the common good are part and parcel of that good. Educators can use these realities to create case study accounts that students might analyze to identify, appreciate, and even debate either how the conditions support or challenge our social and individual interests. Take the condition, social goods, as when a teenager abuses a social media by posting inappropriate material – should there be mechanisms that restrain that practice? Should terrorist groups be able to publish directions on how to build a bomb? How does bullying affect a school's ability to fulfill its purposes? Should children be seen as the sole responsibility of parents or do communities have a responsibility or even a sense of “ownership” over all of their children? Each of these questions can serve as a topic for a lesson – a lesson that has the student delve into our social realities and our concerns for the common good from a practical perspective.

1Twenge, J. M. & Campbell, W. K. (2009). The narcissism epidemic: Living in the age of entitlement. New York, NY: Free Press.

2Galston, W. A. (2013). The common good: Theoretical content, practical utility. Daedalus: Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 142 (2), Spring, pp. 9-14.