In the last few postings, I have been developing a view of
argumentation that sees it as a process by which to seek the truth. That is, if one is about formulating a
legitimate, moral argument, that process, by its very nature, is one that seeks
the truth. When one starts the process
without prejudging the result, has emotions under check, and is about searching
the facts through experience, then one is looking for what is real. This process can be adopted for classroom
instructional purposes. It can also be
one in which legitimate efforts at persuasion are attempted. Therefore, we have a dual purpose process in
which one can pursue one or both of these aims.
I have indicated that in these efforts, to be honest and effective,
there are disciplines or concerns that the process should effectuate. In the past several postings, I identified
the following disciplines: order, principle,
and experience. This posting looks at
prudence.[1]
One practices prudence in two domains. One domain has to do with the disposition to
distinguish between rules as abstract ideals and the practical application of
rules in real situations. The other has
to do with keeping moral aims targeted when pursuing policy.
Imprudent behavior occurs when one blindly imposes a rule in
a way that disregards all the particular conditions a situation presents and
applies the rule in a mechanical way.
Such imprudence forgets the reason(s) for the rule in question.
By looking at the purpose of a rule,
and its value premises, judges make good their commitments to principled
decision; by examining particular circumstances they take account of the
inescapable uniqueness of human situations.
This is not a retreat from reason but a distinct mode of deliberation.[2]
For a rule to work, they must take into account the
particular issues involved within the situation(s) in which the rule is to be
applied. A problem with ideologues and detached
bureaucrats – in many cases – is this lack of prudence that leads to
ineffective policy implementation and judicial tyranny. I am presently reading Ken Follett’s last
novel of his historical series of the twentieth century – Edge of Eternity. He amply
describes this imprudence when in his narrative he tells of the actions of the
Soviet government in Russia. Their blind
rule-following often wrecked lives unnecessarily and, ironically in hindsight,
can go far in explaining why the Soviet government no longer exists.[3]
The other domain follows.
It simply points out that in considering means and ends in the content
of an argument, one should coalesce the two.
By that, I mean that both support the other in that both are true to
moral standards. These in turn need to
be transparent and defensible by submitting and explaining, when requested,
these standards to moral critique. I
suggest the standards, when it comes to public policy, be federalist moral
standards.[4] When so informed, one can judge how effective
the advocate of an argument is in exercising the discipline of prudence.
[1]
Based on the “five pillars of reason” offered by
Philip Selznick – see citation below.
[2]
Selznick, P.
(1992). The moral commonwealth: Social
theory and the promise of community.
Berkeley, CA: University of
California Press. Citation on pp. 60-61.
[3]
To be true to Follett’s narrative, often the
motivations of some of the characters who act in such a way also include
personal ambitions that rationalize their action by citing rules
indiscriminately.
[4] I recently supplied my list of federalist values
which provide the moral foundation for that construct. See the posting, Experience, posted May 5, 2015.
