COMPLICATING PUBLIC INFLUENCE

Does the American government do what Americans want it to do?  In an earlier entry, “Is the Love Real?” (January 12, 2016), this blog reported findings from research conducted by Paul Burstein.[1]  That researcher looked at how much the American federal government followed what Americans wanted it to do in terms of 60 issues.  Here is what that posting reported:

Of the sixty policy proposals, public opinion polls were silent on 40% of them.  Of the 60% that had polling information, Congress seems to abide by public sentiment 50% of the time.  As for the “silent” 40%, there is no reaction to whether the proposals should be considered, much less as to whether the policy proposal should be adopted or discarded or adopted in a modified fashion.  As for soliciting the attention of interest groups, they responded to only three of the 60 proposals.  Again, the indifference is sufficiently palpable.

But should one be surprised?  Most of what government does is of little concern to most Americans.  Should an Interstate plan call for this or that routing option or should it implement a certain maintenance schedule?  Who cares unless one owns property in the affected area?  In short, this question of how reflective governmental policy is of citizen desires is not that easy to answer.

In Burstein’s account, he goes go on to cite opposing findings among social scientists.  James A. Stimson published his findings in 1995 that argue not only does public opinion influence policy decisions, but there is nothing else that matters.  Some other researchers agree, but still other ones disagree.  Agreeing, in an earlier, 1993, article, is Robert Erikson (who this writer found himself in his class back in the late 1960s on the campus of Florida State University – surely, he does not remember the encounter). 

Yet, citing a review article by Jeff Manza and Clem Brooks, Burstein informs the reader that political sociologists don’t agree.  They don’t just disagree; they don’t even consider this factor in their research.  Actually, Burstein doesn’t clarify whether political sociologists ignore this factor due to their opinion that it does not fall within their theoretical concerns or that they find, through their research, it doesn’t matter.

Burstein summarizes both camps with the following:

… on balance, there is great support for the view that public opinion consistently influences policy, sometimes very strongly, not only in the United States, but in other countries as well, over time and on a wide range of issues … [According to Soroka and Wlezien] “in major policy domains … the people ultimately decide” what policy will be, especially on issues the public cares about.[2]

This finding is not limited to the United States, but to advanced countries in general and that includes, surprisingly, the Russian Federation as well. 

          Elsewhere in this blog, a recurring message has been that Americans in general have decreased their level of engagement with politics and governance.  This lack of involvement serves to encourage this writer to write this blog; he feels it indicates that his fellow citizens are not sufficiently exhibiting federalist values, of acting in accordance with the obligations of a partnership – it’s like missing the board meetings of a company.

          So, reading that governments do follow public wishes in general, maybe citizens not engaging in an ongoing fashion is not that important.  This then needs to be further looked at and this blog will do so in the future.  A question for now is:  what specifically should be asked of how this influence is determined and measured?  While there is general agreement with this more generalized sense that public opinion matters, a more telling question might be:  how do they influence public policy?

          Researchers have turned their related concerns to an array of circumstances in which that influence is exerted.  That is, they are looking at intervening factors affecting this relationship.  For example, do political power holders effectively manipulate the perceptions of the public?  When this blog picks up this topic again, it will look at the process of advocacy.  Burstein offers information in that concern.

          Whatever that research reports, hopefully the reader agrees that this notion of public influence enjoys a central place in why and how civics teachers should teach their subject matter.  This writer can report that the textbooks used in their central role in determining what is taught say little over this concern.

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[1] Paul Burstein, American Public Opinion, Advocacy, and Policy in Congress:  What the Public Wants and What It Gets (New York, NY:  Cambridge University Press, (2014).

[2] Ibid., loc. 224 (Kindle edition).

POWERING AS A CONDUIT

This blog, as a recurring concern, attempts to share ideas regarding power.  Politics revolves around the use of power; this social mechanism is central to any understanding of politics.  And this blog, in its treatment of power, relies on Robert Dahl’s definition, power is a condition in which one party, person or collective, convinces some other party or parties to do something they would not do otherwise.[1]  In addition, to further this perspective of power, this blog has also relied on the work of John French and Bertram Raven’s “bases of power.”[2]

          As stated earlier (posting, “What Power,” November 28, 2017), French and Raven identify five bases:  coercion, reward, legitimate, expert, and referent power.  That posting pointed out the problems associated, first, with coercive power – its likelihood of engendering resentment and a desire to extract revenge – and second, with the other bases, of generating feelings of being manipulated. 

At times this can not only engender motivations to not comply openly or under some subversion, but if compliance is elicited, for it to be done with low levels of competency.  All these negative consequences usually result in the power holder policing the “compliance” in any subsequent acts.  Policing can further engender negative feelings and, to the degree it does, it generates costs – sometimes, significant costs.

Finally, the earlier posting offered “three faces” of power offered by Joseph S. Nye.  Using Nye’s words:

First Face:  [Party] A uses threats or rewards to change [Party] B’s behavior against B’s initial preferences and strategies.  B knows this and feels the effect of A’s power.

Second Face:  [Party] A controls the agenda of actions in a way that limits [Party] B’s choices of strategy.  B may or may not know this and be aware of A’s power.

Third Face:  [Party] A helps to create and shape [Party] B’s basic beliefs, perceptions, and preferences.  B is unlikely to be aware of this or to realize the effect of A’s power.[3]

As described, progressing from one face to the next, certain attributes take hold and chief among them is that the subject is less likely to know he/she is being subjected to a power interaction.  And before one castigates all of this as something evil or sinister, one should remember that parents exert power all the time and smart parents strive to use the above “Third Face” strategy.

          Nye goes on to write of the importance of social networks in the implementation of power.  Networks function in various ways.  Two functions of importance are their role in communication and in furthering the legitimacy of power holders.  People understand the importance of communication – after all, how does one know what he/she is expected to do if he/she is not told – but might find legitimacy a more subtle quality.

          Beyond legitimacy as a bases of power, legitimacy refers to how the power holder is viewed.  One can disagree with a specific power play, but that does not in itself debase the legitimacy of the power holder.  What bolsters that legitimacy are many factors, among them is the existence of institutional networks that provide the foundations upon which the society resides.  And in this, Nye situates the above “faces.” 

He writes:

Another reason not to collapse all three faces of power into the first is that doing so diminishes attention to networks, which are an important type of structural power in the twenty-first century.  Networks are becoming increasingly important in an information age, and positioning in social networks can be an important power resource.  For example, in a hub-and-spokes network, power can derive from being the hub of communications.  If you communicate with your friends through me, that gives me power.[4]

So, beyond legitimacy, the faces enhance all the bases of power by creating functional roles if extended and institutionalized, the power becomes indispensable or perceived as such.

          And upon further reflection – and based on ample case studies – when holes develop in these networks, when direct communication is hindered or ruptured, the ability to provide bridges in those gaps can result in newer or novel bases for power relations.  Used in this fashion, the possibility of forming federated relations becomes possible.

          That is, such formulations can allow for third face strategies to take hold.  They can target information flows that encourage or permit innovation, cooperation, and collaboration, to further institutionalize more communal power relations.  How?  By “plugging” network holes.  This is what Kenneth Boulding called “integrative power.” 

In turn, this helps establish power friendly, social landscapes that, in turn – according to relevant research – furthers the use of empathy and social intelligence.  And when that happens, would-be power holders are more effective in their attempts to solicit compliance than when they rely on force, deception, or terror. [5]

          Examples of theorists Nye cites in backing this view include Hannah Arendt – “power springs up among men when they act together” – and John Ikenberry – “American power after World War II rested on a network of institutions that constrained the United States but were open to others and thus increased America’s power to act with others.”[6]  While it is a stretch to categorize such efforts as being federated ones, it does encourage one to see it as taking steps in that direction.

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[1] Robert Dahl, Who Governs:  Democracy and Power in an American City (New Haven, CT:  Yale University Press, 1961).

[2] John R. P. French, Jr. and Bertram Raven, “The Bases of Power,” in Current Perspectives in Social Psychology, ed. Edwin P. Hollander and Raymond G. Hunt (New York, NY:  Oxford University Press, 1967), 504-512.

[3] Joseph S. Nye, Jr.,  The Future of Power (New York, NY:  PublicAffairs), 14.

[4] Ibid., 17.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Ibid., 18