THEY’RE NOT LOCKEAN

A lot of political, social, and economic waters have gone under the metaphorical bridge since John Locke gave us the first concise argument of liberalism – the liberalism that promotes a moral code based on natural rights.[1]  In that code, liberty is its trump value.  This view has been viewed by many, including myself, as encouraging, or at least enabling, a level of individualism that is counterproductive to the long term interests of a society.  Since our society has opted to adopt this view as its predominant perspective, I have tried to point out how such a collective decision has deleteriously affected the welfare of our nation.  Of course, not all theorists agree with this assessment.  One such thinker is Richard C. Sinopoli.[2]  What I find as is the case of these defenders is a good deal of reference to John Locke.  The problem is that he wrote in the late 1600s, and a lot has happened since then.

Let me contextualize my comments a bit.  I agree with some of what Locke had to offer.  His analysis of rights was necessary at a time when the chief enemy of federalist ideals was the lingering class of those privileged groups who inherited their privilege from the feudal legacy that still existed, albeit seriously challenged.  By advancing a sense of a social contract, it bolsters the federalist call for a binding covenant or compact to establish a polity.  The “natural” aspect of rights, as Locke wrote of them, in its way, leads one to assume a form of equality.  The binding process relies on free consent, a central quality of a covenantal or compacted union.  As such, individuals who so agree are consenting to the provisions of the agreement and swear (affirm) to such an allegiance.  The theoretical parting of the ways has to do with what the legalistic boundaries of such arrangements are.  Liberalism, legally (if not socially), gives the individual a license to pursue any course of action he/she chooses short of offending or prohibiting others from the same options.  Under this regime of constitutionalism, one is free to adopt whatever morality one chooses:  one can follow a strict Calvinistic code, a pragmatic code, or a licentious code.  The only limit, legally, is that one does not interfere with others’ choices.  Laws are, in part, limited to guaranteeing such ground rules.  I write “in part” in that the view allows laws to maintain security – a good question is:  does liberalism promote, tolerate, or ban compulsory military service?  Those laws that guarantee rights tend to be negative laws; i.e., laws that tell us what we cannot do legally – such as, steal.  They avoid, almost to total exclusion, positive laws; i.e., laws that tell us what to do – such as serve in a socially geared program such as the Peace Corps.  I write “almost” since we do find a few exceptions such as insisting people send their children to school if they are under a certain age.  The general disposition of this view when it comes to laws is:  let people do what they want to do.

I have two reactions.  One, Locke was not so “live and let live” in his outlook.  I would argue that what I just expressed above is the product of general liberal ideals being in effect after several centuries of political, social, and economic history.  Locke was highly opinionated about how people should live their lives and he extended such concerns over the content of laws.  For example, he argued for “working schools” for the children of the poor so as to strip them of the idleness which plagued their parents – why else would they be poor?[3]  He wrote as a champion of the burgeoning class of entrepreneurs who were burdened by the privileges of the idle nobility and of the idle poor.  He promoted laws that would favor business interests and found any inherited advantages as anathema to the common good.  But this moral disdain has been compromised beyond recognition, at least as it pertained to legal matters (and I would maintain, many social matters as well).  Today, the bias is, as good businesspeople would be inclined to cater to consumer whims, do your own thing and, by the way, my product will help you do it.  The forces of consumerism have not been limited to social domains, but have been extended to legal matters.  The one example I listed above, the mandated requirement of education, is currently under severe attack and I see charter schools as seriously undermining the whole ideal of meaningful education for the masses.

Sinopoli offers three incidents or arguments people offer to undermine liberalism’s concern for the common good.  One, people who are socialized to believe in rights – their view of rights having a mystical quality of being ordained as a natural condition – tend to adopt a “rights illusion.”  That is, they view rights as the whole of morality as I have argued that proponents have done, to a great degree, in our contemporary times (since World War II).  Two, people who come to believe they have a right will pursue it because they have the right at the expense of others’ welfare.  And three, those who meet with success tend to minimize or completely refute the role the community (society) has played in their success.  Sinopoli contends that the conditions these arguments reflect are not essential consequences of liberalism – as a matter of fact, these tendencies can be found in other systems.  But since they do exist under liberalist regimes, they should be addressed.  I will in the future review his treatment of these arguments, but for now, let me point out that Western nations, particularly the US, have significant portions of their populations that share in these tendencies and that their frequency is increasing.  I offer the trend in our political discourse as primary evidence.[4]

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[1] Not a liberalism espoused by progressive Democrats.

[2] Sinopoli, R. C.  (1992).  The foundations of American citizenship:  Liberalism, the constitution, and civic virtue.  New York, NY:  Oxford University Press.

[3] Kramnick, I.  (1992).  John Locke and liberal constitutionalism.  In K. L. Hall (Ed.) Major problems in American constitutional history, Volume I:  The colonial era through reconstruction (pp. 97-114).  Lexington, MA:  D. C. Heath and Company.

[4] For example, the surge of Trump in the polls and his popularity among primary Republican voters is, to a great degree, attributed to the attention the media has afforded this candidate.  The media outlets, one can argue, are not allocating that attention due to Trump’s positions on issues, but due to the number of readers and viewers his outlandish behavior has attracted.  The media is in the business of securing ratings or selling print.  Trump is a godsend, albeit not, a priori, anymore apt to secure the common good than any one of the other candidates.

INTERNAL DEBATES

I have described in previous postings the call for teachers to deal with moral questions – to center student inquiries on dilemmas that pit competing values against themselves – as a complex “ask.”  In this vein, I want to further this idea.  Basing my thinking on the work of Jonathan Haidt,[1] there seems to be a dual mental operation going on:  there is an inbred (natural) disposition to be concerned with the fate of others while there is a socialized manner of seeing relevant conditions through the cultural lenses in which an individual is situated.  It is generally accepted in the field of psychology that we, as humans, have an inbred empathy “gene.”  Rationalism simply sees this “gene” as the result of simple calculations:  we don’t hurt others because we don’t want to be hurt in turn.  Regardless, empathy disposes us to be able to relate to others and eases the path toward cooperation, so essential to survival.  But that does not exclude the effects of our social environment.  In a reported research study, Haidt reports a fairly universal view that kicking a defenseless dog is immoral, but whether or not a husband has the right to beat a disobedient wife tends to be culturally defined.  To be clear, I find both behaviors despicable, but the examples show the complexities involved.

One such complexity is the dual character of the mind.  As Haidt unequivocally states, “the mind is divided into parts that sometimes conflict.”[2]  We have popularly referred to this duality as the conflict between heart and head.  That is, it has to do with the often recurring battle between reason and emotion.  Western thought has favored reason over emotion – that the former is more important than the latter.  Let’s look into this.

Haidt doesn’t mince words; he refers to this bias as the “rationalist delusion.”  This discussion is a bit tricky.  To begin, while our cultural philosophic tradition bolsters reason, it does not override our cultural proclivity to develop allegiances based on our emotions, our passions.  We see this, for example, in terms of religion or religious claims over morality.  Once adopted and ensconced within our emotional commitment, morality can blind us to what is real.  Our emotions can and often do hinder our ability to objectively see what’s out there.  When this happens, rational calculations can be short-circuited.  Such calculations consist of weighing the relative rewards and costs (pains) that a choice presents.  So, as in the case in which one is considering two options and one will probably result in overall greater costs but offers a particular reward that is considered highly prized in the short run, the temptation to go for the short term reward might be overwhelming.  In such a case, passion rules, at least that is what we see happening more often than not.  We admire those who can overcome such temptations because it is rare.  We call it sacrifice; but only when such a choice is beneficial to others.  A business partner who bypasses a tempting offer that would be detrimental to his/her partners is such a case. 

In our tradition, Plato called for the dominance of reason in our calculations; David Hume pointed to the dominance of passion.  I believe our calculations originate with passion; even to be objective or reasonable presumes a passion to be so as is the case of our hero who chooses long term benefits over short term rewards.

To pick up with our inheritance as opposed to our development, whether there are some inherited configurations of biases and skills that dispose us to see things in certain ways or develop certain talents, be they intellectual, entrepreneurial, artistic, or athletic or whether we are born with little or no predetermined proclivities, issues concerning our responsibility to be accountable do not go away.  As such, we need to exert energy at being as responsible as possible for what we do.  This is the case regardless of how much our nature, as opposed to our nurture, is involved.

Are we blank slates at birth totally open to any influences or is there such a thing as human nature that limits or enhances certain avenues of behaviors and feelings?  This line of questioning can be and is controversial.  For example, are such proclivities influenced by sex, race, nationality, or age?  If so, how do such natural factors affect behavior or the quality of behaviors – how good we are or can become?  Our ignorance of such factors, whether they exist or not, leads to the conclusion that no prejudicial attitudes toward a person’s ability should be held.  Federalism insists on no such a priori test being administered under its values of equality and constitutional integrity.  But of course, not all of us are willing to be so disposed.

Whatever your notion is concerning this question about the extent of nature verses nurture, I would suggest humility.  We know of occasions when extremism in this type of thinking, of believing that inherited qualities determine the worth of anyone, have led to very costly consequences.  Hitler’s belief in such thinking in the extreme, of course, was enormously disastrous.  In our own history, such thinking led to slavery, along with the deplorable treatment of various national and ethnic groups.  Beyond racism, there have been sexism, discrimination of the aged, and of alternative sexual preferences among consenting adults. 

Unfortunately, we can still detect remnants of such prejudicial thinking in our national scene. The problem is that passion can easily be engendered over relevant questions and affect our ability to see or understand the truth.  Irrespective of on which side of the debate one falls, there is supportive evidence on both sides.  This demands a level of dispassion so one can see things as they are, but passionate for justice so that each can be attributed his or her due. 

We do know – despite what religious zealots might claim to the contrary – that we are the product of an evolutionary process.  We need to study the results of that process unencumbered by unreasonable passion, but not to the point that we fail to see that even such a desire reflects a passion for the truth.  Yes, our ability to seek truth will always be slanted, but our knowledge of such a potential bias is the first step toward accounting for it.  As stated above, all this is complex and, at times, counter-intuitive.  It is this arena within the mind – our reason battling our passions – that teachers need to be aware of and which presupposes appropriate training.  Such training should be geared toward instilling a passion for the truth and an objectivity in its pursuit.  To be aware of any tendency away from these distinct goals, either within themselves as educators or among their students, is an essential quality of an effective educational setting.

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[1] Haidt, J.  (2012).  The righteous mind:  Why good people are divided by politics and religion.  New York, NY:  Pantheon Books.

[2] Ibid, p. 27.