Currently, the issue de
jour of the Republican race for president is whether Republicans want a
nominee who is willing to negotiate and compromise with the Democrats or one
who is true to conservative principles and refuses to compromise. Senator Ted Cruz said that if you want a
candidate who is willing to compromise with Harry Reid and Nancy Pelosi, then
Trump is your nominee. Donald Trump
claims he is willing to negotiate with those Democratic leaders, but that he
will get good deals for conservatives. He
says conservatives can believe him because he has made his fortune making good
deals and even has written the second best book ever – second to the Bible (I
wonder if he really believes that) – The Art
of the Deal. This concern reflects a
basic constitutional principle, one that I described earlier in this blog.
It is a principle that relates to the whole question of how
much power the central government should have.
Another way to voice this concern is to ask: how little power will local governments – the
governments closer to the people – have?
Republicanism is what the founding fathers wanted to maintain in the new
constitution of 1787. That is, the
founders wanted the power to ultimately reside with the people, but that the
actual decisions concerning governmental policy be made by representatives of
the people. Initially, this designation
was made to distinguish republican governments from monarchies. A philosopher who wrote about republican form
of government was Charles de Montesquieu, who believed that for republics to
work there needed to be a high degree of agreement among the citizens who lived
under such a government. This agreement
reflects a communal familiarity among the citizens, a deep level of sympathy
and commonality. Without such agreement,
policy disputes would not only arise, but also be bitter and rancorous. The polity would lose the necessary levels of
cohesion, resulting in the system splintering.
To assure this did not happen, republics needed to be relatively small
states since “bigness” would mean more and more diverse interests or
factions. Such diversity would eat away
at any sense of “we’re in this together.” As such, policy would be next to impossible
to formulate and therefore, needs would go unmet. If the United States (with a capital “U”)
were to succeed, the founders would have to find a way to solve this inherent
problem of preserving a republican form of government in a large polity setting
– as the one they were forming with the new constitution.
Of course, our structural federal arrangement was the answer,
where local governmental entities would govern local concerns and the central
government would be limited to handling the national concerns. The problem, because of historical forces
beyond anyone’s ability to halt or even modify very much, is that more and more
concerns in the subsequent years became national. And even the Constitution of 1787 (and how it
has been amended since) contains basic principles that have nationalized many
issues that one might consider local in nature.
Take the regulation of marriage. Marriage is an institution that serves to
anchor one of our basic institutions, the family. It is the marriage ceremony that contains the
agreement on which a family is based. By
its nature, this sounds and is a local issue.
I would say, for the most part, marriage is still legally treated as a
local issue. But our national
constitution states that there will be equal protection under the law and that
includes state law (Fourteenth Amendment). So, unless the state has a legitimate
interest, it cannot discriminate in its laws.
For example, given that homosexuality is a natural occurrence and there
is no deleterious aspect to state interests in anyone being homosexual, there
is no legitimate state interest affected by gays or lesbians getting married in
same sex arrangements. This is what the
Supreme Court just settled. But this has
angered many people who feel, for religious reasons, that same sex marriages
are an affront to God. Hence, a national
policy is viewed by these people as overstepping the prerogatives of local
governance. Under such a situation, to
many, the republican principle is breached and undermines the whole
constitutional arrangement.
With this and other local-national disputes, Ted Cruz’s
pledge to not engage, as president, in “deal making” and, thereby, compromise
on principle, attracts many voters such as those who have been angered by the
gay marriage decision of the Supreme Court.
The problem is that our system of government, as determined by our
republican solution, depends on deal making, on compromising. We have a federal system and that depends on
more than just having state and national governments; it also demands that our
representatives meet and hash out policy decisions by giving and taking in not
a parliament, but in a congress. It is a
congress in which our representatives congregate and through majority vote
determine what should be done. They even
have rules in Congress – that I don’t fully agree with – in which it takes more
than a majority to agree on new laws (in effect now, it takes sixty, as opposed
to fifty-one senators to agree before legislation passes that house of
Congress). Therefore, for a Cruz
approach to work – where legislation would get done – you would need a parliamentary
system in which the majority party or a majority coalition could secure passage
of what it wants. In our system, you not
only have to get pending bills through two houses of Congress, but then have to
get the president to agree and, at least, not veto it. If the president vetoes pending legislation,
proponents of the bill need to muster up super majorities (two-thirds vote) in
each house to make it law. Just so you
know, a Cruz approach would guarantee that nothing will get done for another
four years. If this happens, given what
we are now experiencing, this will increase levels of frustration and anger
among the citizenry and promise that our future politics will be even more bizarre
than they are now and perhaps more dangerous.