JUDGING LIBERATED FEDERALISM, XI

 

In the last posting, this blog introduced the last of four elements constituting the mental construct, liberated federalism.  Along with covenant or compact, equality, and communal democracy, the fourth element is covenant of reason.  This blog is sharing three aspects of this last element; the last posting addressed the first of these, critique of preferences.  This posting will turn to the other two:  claims of conscience and treatment of individual interests and, as with the other ideas concerning liberated federalism, it will rely on the theorizing of Philip Selznick.[1]

          As for claims of conscience, the liberated federalist perspective holds that an integral attribute of human dignity is the ability and rights to formulate the substance of one’s conscience.  But this right is not given blanket approval irrespective of its content.  A challenging distinction must be made.  This perspective holds that any set of beliefs is subject to a review of its justification in terms of existing moral systems.

          This does not mean that a particular set of such beliefs needs to precisely reflect an existing system; one can vary from such systems, but its premises should meet reasonable standards.  Beyond this test, there is a certain level of insulation granted to the person or group who has formulated these beliefs.  The risk is to abet evil beliefs.

          Toleration of diverse beliefs should not preclude vigilance against such evil.  Activities based on such evil, short of illegal ones, should be allowed, not out of a concern for dignity of those who harbor such beliefs, but out of a concern for the “slippery slope.”  When actions or beliefs are prohibited, where do the prohibitions end?  Hard rules need to be set up for this eventuality to protect society against the temptations to abuse rights in this area.

          In terms of the broader arenas of private interests, what elicit reflective morality?  For example, is the business world beyond any realistic expectation for decision making that is based on moral concerns or, as various commentators have pointed out, are American businesses restrained only by the fear of being caught in illegal activities? 

The liberated federalist perspective first recognizes the essential role that self-interest plays in the success of capitalism.  Self-interest is seen as a dispassionate view about what beneficial assets are possessed by a party and the potential opportunities presented to that party.  Self-interest is to maintain and advance those assets and opportunities.  As a disciplined motivator, it is a source of energy that capitalistic systems assume to be needed for success.

          But there is a difference between short-term self-interest and long-term self-interest.  Short term self-interest accounts for immediate benefits and costs.  It is analyzed by marginal analysis (that this blog described when reviewing the natural rights view).  Particular gains are usually the goal, and the consequences are narrowly defined. 

Long-term self-interest considers benefits and costs from a longer time perspective.  As such, the relevant concerns consider a wider range of benefits and costs.  The practical concerns of moral behavior are more readily taken into the calculations.  Interest in trust and cooperation, as long-term assets, become more viable.  That is, reflective morality, based on self-interest, has an opportunity to take place in the long term.  The challenge is to encourage the discipline needed to think in the long term.

          The Madisonian model stated that numbers of factions are important.  A few factions, say one or two of them, are likely to be in political environments that allow them to become highly powerful.  But when many compete, these factions do so for power assets preventing a few of them from taking control, and this is relevant to advancing the common good. 

It, the model, did not count on Americans being disposed to consider long term self-interest and relying on such consideration to encourage or be a source of desirable behavior.  Instead, Madison argued that the competition of factions in an extended republic (with many factions competing in their respective markets) was to yield outcomes with the highest possible good.

          The liberated federalist perspective does not dismiss a Madisonian solution as totally dysfunctional to that stated end.  As a back-up structural arrangement, it performs well.  But it cannot substitute for a generally socialized value that supports people, including businesspeople, engaging in long term self-interest calculations.  Such a socialized message depends on strong institutions at the local level, such as family, church, and schools.  Such a message should be an integral part of government and civic instruction at the secondary level.

          The next, and last aspect of the covenant of reason has to do with individual interest and the common good.  Is the community – common – good simply the sum total of individual goods?  Or is the common good of the community something beyond that total?  Due to the nature of people, “[p]ersonal well-being requires moral competence, which includes loyalty, trust, and other group-centered virtues, and it depends on group participation, nurture, and support.”[2]

          As such, the community is a real thing, apart from the individual, and it imposes vivid opportunities and restraints.  The individual might calculate to act against the interests of the community, as in avoiding taxes which pay for services from which the individual does not directly benefit.  But the long-term interests of that individual are served with an aspirational context of social integration in which there is connection between the person and a coherent social order (a long-term concern).  Individuals need to be instructed to be aware of these benefits. 

The coherent social order or common good is in the interest of individuals, but it is an attribute of the community or commonwealth.  As just indicated, it relates more to long-term concerns rather than immediate payoffs or costs.  In this, one can appreciate the difference of liberated federalism to more simplified forms of federalism (e.g., parochial/traditional federalism) or surely the natural rights view (both constructs extensively described and explained in this blog).

In addition to the Selznick elements that this last series of postings has reviewed, one general contribution of Daniel Elazar should be added; that is the cultural commitment to federalist values that one finds in the US.  This blog has repeatedly observed that this nation has drifted from a thoroughly federalist cultural position which was prevalent in this nation from its early history to the years after World War II.  But there are still remnants found today.

Of course, and serving as a very central example, the nation still has a structural proclivity for federalist arrangements in the nation’s government (central-state arrangement) as well as other institutions.  One of the major themes of this account of the succession of dialectic struggles is to regain, at the cultural level, a firmer commitment to the moralistic stance associated with federal-republican thinking.  In an ideal liberated federalist condition, therefore, a cultural commitment to federalist values would be a prominent quality.

These then are the elements of a liberated federalist model.  These elements need to be juxtaposed in order to comprise the resulting model.  The model proposed in the next number of postings will be presented as a fundamental construct for governmental studies at the secondary level.

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[1] Philip Selznick, The Moral Commonwealth:  Social Theory and the Promise of Community (Berkeley, CA:  University of California Press, 1992).

[2] Ibid., 536.

JUDGING LIBERATED FEDERALISM, X

 

To date, this blog, in introducing the construct, liberated federalism, has reviewed three of its elements:  covenant or compact, equality, and communal democracy.  Readers are invited to review the last set of postings dedicated to this construct and if they have not read them, are encouraged to do so.  These reviews have relied on Philip Selznick’s work and his treatment of those elements.[1]

          The last of the Selznick elements is the covenant of reason.  This covenant refers to the tacit cultural agreement to a participatory socialization, i.e., a taught morality based on reflection and engagement.  Authority under this type of morality must be justified with reasons which would be exercised by those involved.  This includes authority (legitimate role) in relation to processes or methods, and to ends.  The challenge lies around the ends.

          What objective standards can there be for reasoned ends?  That is the challenge concerning ends.  Ultimately, the commonwealth must decide upon those standards, and this presupposes “… a shared resolve to prefer and perfect dialogue and deliberation.  To this extent an element of historicity, of givenness and self-formation, is inevitable and indispensable.  But the covenant of reason is peculiar in this, that it is reflexive and self-critical.”[2]  That means all aspects of decision-making are subject to such criticism, even the decisions that formulate the ends as well as means. 

And in that vein, Selznick identifies three sources of resistance in fulfilling needed support of “reasoned” ends and means. 

 

·       One, they rely on normative reasoning – what people decide is worthy of pursuing.[3] 

·       Two, there is the argument that one should not aggregate a person’s goals and wants into communal rationality – its ambitions, aims, and goals.  Communities are their own entities, not a collection of individuals. 

·       And three, the concern, especially in natural rights guided nations such as the US, is that individual rights are endangered when communities endorse a certain set of moral choices.  Yet if one ranks communal welfare above individual preferences, the former should prevail when optional policy is considered.

 

Intrinsic with the liberated federalist perspective is the concern of congealing, to some degree, the diverse interests and purposes of a modern society.  The liberated federalism construct is not a call for complete integration of diverse groups; it is not a desire to eliminate divisive forces in the private sector and it is not expecting unquestioning civic virtue. 

Liberated federalism anticipates and encourages a multiplicity of interests in a healthy community.  Thomas Jefferson warned the nation of the lack of interests and factions; that if a lack exists, tyrannical rule is more likely, if not guaranteed.[4]  The search for a common good, according to this perspective, is to be done within such an environment of diverse interests, not against it.  Yes, what is contemplated – and acted upon – is a level of nuance, complexity, and, what’s the word, reality.

This view or element has a number of aspects; this posting will describe the first aspect and the posting to come will review two others.  The first aspect of the covenant of reason element is the critique of preferences.  This aspect is an expectation that choices will be subject, under the liberated federalism perspective, to critical review. 

Surely, in the present market conditions, consumers are not called upon to justify their choices.  Voters can make their choices in a similar manner without giving reasons for their preferences even though their choices have social consequences.  These arrangements are generally approved of by the assumption that people know what is best for themselves during normal life.

But there should be only the expectation that one’s choices are an indication of what is desirable either for the individual or the community; it is not a conclusive claim.  What is wanted should be subject to critical view.  By such a review, one understands that ultimately choices fall under a subjective domain; therefore, their justification does not make claims in the objective domain.

But once aims, goals, or targets are identified, objectivity can and should be utilized.  An “I want so and so because it will lead to so and so” statement is subject to objective analysis and judgment.  In the first instance, objective standards can be applied if the expected consequence is likely to occur or there is a probability that it will.  In the second instance, the application of standards by which one judges whether these aims are being realistically pursued can be subject to objectivity. 

Objectively derived standards, i.e., standards divorced from the immediate condition can be applied to determine if the consequence(s) is/are desirable for the person or the community.  Do behaviors realistically strive toward those aims that have been identified?  Do they approach communal desires is a question one can approach from an objective view.  This critical function should be obvious, but the application of economic and rationale models has obfuscated this benefit of reflective morality, Selznick points out.

That brings that first aspect, critique of preferences, to an end; next will be claims of conscience, the next aspect of covenant of reason, and then the third aspect, treatment of individual interests will be addressed.  With those two aspects “covered,” readers will be sufficiently prepared for the liberated federalism model.

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[1] Philip Selznick, The Moral Commonwealth:  Social Theory and the Promise of Community (Berkeley, CA:  University of California Press, 1992).

[2] Ibid., 525.

[3] While such goals, aims, targets are beyond objective review, they are not beyond moral review.  What a people want should be questioned as to the goodness or evilness, the rightness or wrongness.

[4] Thomas Jefferson, “From Revolutionary to Statesman/Notes on the State of Virginia,” in Great American Political Thinkers, Volume I, edited by Bernard E. Brown (New York, NY:  Avon Books, 1983), 307-331.