MORE ON AN ACTION MODEL

This blog is currently addressing an instructional model that outlines a series of phases – admittedly intuitive phases – that defines the action in the historical dialogue-to-action approach to civics.  Here is a shortened version of the model:

Phase One:  Reflecting one’s interests and concerns, identify issue

Phase Two:  Investigate local aspect of issue

Phase Three:  Identify local relevant agents

Phase Four:  Set up information gathering protocol

Phase Five:  Gather information

Phase Six:  Review various action options

Phase Seven:  Perform action[1]

Phase Eight:  Coalesce information in a report

Phase Nine:  Submit report and provide evaluation of the experience

Anyone of these activities, which have been pointed out earlier in the blog, need to be set up by gathering from studied groups relevant information regarding some problematic issue.  Too much for the average person to undertake?  Perhaps, life is full of responsibilities leaving little time for such activities; but a civics course can promote a more engaged ideal. 

A course of study that adopts the HD-to-A model needs to allow enough time for students, individually or in groups, to carry off such an action component.  What follows is what this blog has described before:

The course can assign an experiential project as a course-long assignment – perhaps taking the place of a final exam.[2]

So, while the units of a HD-to-A civics course can address action components, a course-long assignment can implement class instruction lessons.  They also can include activities more associated with students’ school experiences:  participating in debates or other deliberations over a social and/or political issue relevant to student lives and starting an educational plan that leads to an occupation that has public value – and that includes teaching. 

This writer is aware of a couple of organizations that are dedicated to advance students in the pursuit of these types of activities.  They are The National Action Civics Collaborative (NACC) and SOS Outreach.[3]  The writer is not recommending membership in these organizations.  His knowledge of them is limited to his awareness that they exist and is mentioned here to be of assistance.

          But before leaving this concern there is one area of special interest.  As Theodore Sizer points out, the school site can do more to teach democratic values than any other source.[4]  They can do more to impart a commitment to social capital and civic humanism.  Sizer further offers the following:  “Students learn much more from the way a school is run,”[5] and “… the best way to teach values is when the school is a living example of the values to be taught.”[6] These quotes hint at the type of concerns over which students could investigate and deliberate. 

And what can students address?  This can include every day concerns such as student discipline, the school’s physical maintenance, social problems among students like bullying, instances of sexism or racism, or, with deference for expert input, questions concerning curriculum.  In choosing actual policies in which students could have a say, a teacher or perhaps an administrator needs to give that choice some reflection.[7]

This review ends with addressing a distinction related to dialogue.  Whether students discuss, argue, or participate in a debate, they should be able to see a fundamental difference between history courses and civics courses that use historical information.  That is, history can be used for one of two purposes:  forensic uses or deliberative uses. 

Forensic questioning asks:  what happened, why did it happen, and what should have happened?  This form of questions is suitable in historical studies and, as these questions indicate, the study or dialogue emphasize the past.  Deliberative questioning, on the other hand, asks:  based on past events or developments, what is likely to happen, why will it happen, and what should happen?  A civics course deals with policy questions and, therefore, has a future, deliberative orientation.[8] 

The historic dialogue-to-action (HD-to-A) approach has students review the historical record relating to an issue. The conditions of that issue reflect some social reality in which a federalist value is being, to some degree, defiled.  Those involved use history to decide what should be done to solve or ameliorate the issue.  That is a future oriented process and the reader – those who have opted to review the following elements of logical argumentation – should keep that aim in mind.

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[1] This phase is added from the original list.

[2] This option of substituting a report or other work product is suggested also at the unit level of the course by calling on some work product being used to substitute for a unit test.

[3] “Civic Education,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

[4] Theodore R. Sizer, Horace’s Compromise:  The Dilemma of the American High School (Boston, MA:  Houghton Mifflin, 1984).

[5] Ibid., 120.

[6] Ibid., 122.

[7] Further, when one talks of a school-wide effort, the supportive philosophy needs to be widely shared among that school’s faculty and staff.  If a teacher, who wants to engage in experiential learning strategies, stands alone in terms of these ideas in a faculty, he/she needs to be conscious of that fact and plan accordingly.  But, if he/she is committed to apply this experiential learning approach, with a bit of creativity, this writer believes the opportunities are there in most schools. 

[8] Jarrod Atchison, The Art of Debate – A Transcript Book.

EXPERIENTIAL LEARNING

In this blog, an effort has been to encourage curricular change in the subject area of civics.  In the main, the blog has argued that that change center not so much on instructional processes – its sequence – but on its content – its scope.  But in addition, it has also recognized the “establishment’s” response to the deficiencies in civics.  That would be the NCAA’s publication, Preparing Students for College, Career, and Civic Life.[1]  That publication does commit to an instructional process.

And that would be to promote an inquiry approach.  So, to align with this effort on the part of the NCSS, this blog has described and explained an instructional process it calls historical dialogue-to-action (HD-to-A).  To this point, the blog seeks to make a connection:  dialogue (in the form of discussion, argument, or debate) leads to collaborative or communal action. 

And, in addition, whether the instructional process a teacher opts to use is inquiry or didactic, mostly depending on lectures, the blog would argue that a civics course of study should, at least, encourage students to know about and perhaps engage in action one can classify as political engagement.  Instruction should promote the principle that good citizenship and that includes citizens acting toward what is perceived to be the common good.

But one needs to be careful.  Dialogue does not necessarily lead to action and, if it does, it does not necessarily lead to the action one would judge beneficial or logically derived from such talk.  In other words, talking usually serves as a precondition, but other factors play a role in getting people to act in ways that advance what a group – federated or not – wants to accomplish.

          And action, irrespective of its aim, functions to institute a new or maintain an old condition, be it a social, political, and/or economic one.  Change theory serves up a relevant insight.  Those, that study this area of behavior, readily confirm that change or social action can be very complex.[2]  In terms of change, those who are dedicated to facilitating change need to be conscious of that complexity and understand that there is no sure recipe for success.

What a dialogue allows a person to do is voice concerns over obstacles standing in the way of implementing a plan.  Students, within the context of a dialogue, can review their own feelings, those of their fellow students, and those of the community or other significant people who would be involved in such an effort.  These are essential elements of a responsible change strategy.

With that context, this posting shares some ideas of what kinds of actions students can initiate and work to accomplish.  Based on the work of various researchers, the argument for students being actively involved in developing and implementing political-action plans have been made by respected change experts.[3] 

Those scholars have provided examples that have been subject of research addressing political issues such as poverty and racial relations.  Educators have also found value in the instructional benefits action – change efforts – have had on the learning process.  This is in the tradition laid down earlier by John Dewey. 

To summarize Dewey’s concern, most of what schools usually do – exposition and “book learning” – isolates students from real life and that lacks in the potential to instill “the spirit of service.”[4]  At this point, the reader should appreciate the centrality of this concern to federation theory.  The literature of educational studies, such as those that focus on action-learning, usually calls this type of learning experiential learning or experiential education. 

Educational researchers offer empirical evidence to suggest that experiential education succeeds in many of the aims that federation theory highlights.[5]  That is, by students going out and dealing with the people affected by social and governmental policy and practice, they more readily engage emotionally and develop a sense of self in relation to the concerns they are investigating and upon which they are acting. 

Experiential education should not replace classroom instruction, but it can have a place in a civics course.  And in doing so, a teacher needs to be observant of what students are learning in the field.  For example, they can ask:  are students, through such experiences, only heightening existing student biases or having them question those biases?  This is a legitimate concern.

Pamela J. Conover and Donald D. Searing offer an insightful description of this concern:  “while most students identify themselves as citizens, their grasp of what it means to act as citizens is rudimentary and dominated by a focus on rights, thus creating a privately oriented, passive understanding.”[6]  To usher students out of this self-serving and unengaged social view, nothing is more effective than political participation.

But it needs to be focused on relevant, local concerns and accompany it with legitimate questioning that centers student attention to the relevant facts.  Teachers should aim to get students to think of governmental and political realities around them by looking at what immediately affects them and those who live near-by.  Not from a selfish point of view but guided by federalist values. 

More specifically, some activities, such as voting and giving money to political campaigns or to favored advocacy groups, do not do enough; students need to engage in political action aimed at enhancing social capital and civic humanism.  And that, in turn, calls on direct communication and other interactions with those who experience the issue in question.

William Damon, the Stanford educator, further concludes that nothing is more effective in terms of moral education than programs “that engage students directly in action, with subsequent opportunities for reflection.”[7]  And, in a relatively open society, students have a multitude of opportunities to exploit such learning experiences.

These actions can include:  showing up for and taking part in political meetings; scheduling and putting on political meetings which can be platforms to express political opinions or demands; organizing and carrying out fund drives; canvasing an area to gather signatures in support or against bills or other initiatives; seeking to attain membership on political boards; joining or starting a political club; and/or performing political theatrics.

In the next posting, this blog will pick up on these ideas and re-list the HD-to-A action model it introduced in the previous posting.

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[1] National Council for the Social Studies, Preparing Students for College, Career, and Civic Life (Washington, D. C.:  NCSS, 2013), accessed April 16, 2018, https://www.socialstudies.org/c3.

[2] For example, see Kenneth D. Benne, “The Current State of Planned Changing in Persons, Groups, Communities, and Societies” in Planning of Change, eds. Warren G. Bennis, Kenneth D. Benne, and Robert Chin (New York, NY:  Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1985), 68-82.  This is but one article in this classic collection of articles regarding change theory. AND a recent work provides case data on successful national efforts – e.g., anti-smoking movement.  See Leslie R. Crutchfield, How Change Happens:  Why Some Social Movements Succeed While Others Don’t (Hoboken, NJ:  John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2018).

[3] “Civic Education,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2013/2007, accessed on October 1, 2017, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/civic-education/ .

[4] Ibid.

[5] For example, Janet Eyler, “The Power of Experiential Education,” Association of American Colleges and Universities, n. d., accessed December 11, 2018, https://www.aacu.org/publications-research/periodicals/power-experiential-education .

[6] Pamela J. Conover and Donald D. Searing, “A Political Socialization Perspective,” in Rediscovering the Democratic Purposes of Education, eds. Lorraine M. McDonnell, P. Michael Timpane, and Roger Benjamin (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2000), 91-124, 108.

[7] “Civic Education,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.  This source offers a useful summary description of various action options that educators can apply to a civics course.  Interested reader can find this source at https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/civic-education/ .

TURNING TO ACTION – A MODEL

This blogger is conscious that he has served up rather lengthy postings in his last two offerings.  So, this one should be a bit shorter.  It is very short.  As a matter of fact, it is only a couple of word processor pages long and meant to further introduce an instructional concern.  Specifically, it will further develop an instructional approach the blog introduced in the posting, “A Definite Crisis.”[1] 

That approach calls on civics teachers to do two things:  have students engage in historical dialogue relevant to a state of affairs that offends federalist values and, based on that dialogue, plan and implement an action project.  That earlier posting called this approach, historical dialogue-to-action.

To give an overview of what HD-to-A calls on students to do, the following model is offered, and a subsequent posting will further describe and explain what this model is promoting.  Here is the model:

Phase One:  Reflect on one’s interests and concerns relating to an “anti” federalist condition within one’s polity.  That could be one of various topics (for example this blog has highlighted the opioid crisis, tort law, and foreign trade’s effect on job availability).

Phase Two:  Investigate how that issue/topic/problem area is experienced locally.

Phase Three:  Identify local agents (government officials, media personnel, victims or perceived victims of the concern).

Phase Four:  Set up appropriate information gathering protocol such as interview sessions of affected people or identify relevant recorded information sources (literatures, recorded testimonies, media reportage, etc.).

Phase Five:  Gather information.

Phase Six:  Review various action options (this blog has listed such options[2]) as a final work product, e.g., canvasing an area to gather signatures in support or against bills or other initiatives or organizing and running meetings of interested parties and citizens.

Phase Seven:  Coalesce information in a report that can include written materials, tapings (such as interviews, visitations to relevant sites, or of the action taken), and a set of recommendations for further action.

Phase Eight:  Submit a report over the action taken and be able to describe, explain, and defend its findings in terms of how comprehensive it is and what it advocates.

As can be noted, the model is not that far from a logical progression that any citizen could intuitively devise when considering an active role within a polity.  Actual use of the model would probably not be so sequential as phases might overlap – that’s just how people operate their affairs.

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[1] See posting, “A Definite Crisis,” Gravitas:  A Voice for Civics (June 15, 2018), accessed March 5, 2019, https://gravitascivics.blogspot.com/2018/06/a-definite-crisis.html .

[2] See “The Action Part of the Deal,” Gravitas:  A Voice for Civics, October 6, 2017, accessed March 5, 2019, https://gravitascivics.blogspot.com/2017/10/the-action-part-of-deal.html .

IMPLICATIONS RELATED TO SELF-CREATION

Of recent date, civics teachers have a new challenge.  That is to explain what it means to have a president of the US claiming he is a nationalist.  What does that mean?  Is it a good thing or a bad thing?  Is it a position that advances the interests of the US, especially in the long run, or is it a precursor to serious international tensions, like those that led to World War I?  One of the identified reasons for that global conflict was the nationalism that existed early in the twentieth century.

          As a government teacher, this writer presented and reviewed the political spectrum.  He drew a horizontal line on the board (they were green then) and then marked the line with five short vertical lines equally spaced.  Going left to right, each vertical line was labelled as follows:  socialism/communism, liberalism, neutral, conservativism, nationalism, fascism/Nazism. 

Without going over the whole explanation, he generally distinguished main ranges of ideas that separated the left end of the spectrum from the right end.  The point was, as one went out from the middle, the distinguishing beliefs became stronger.  So, as one goes from the center of the spectrum or continuum, the beliefs become so strong, a qualitative difference takes hold.

For example, there is an orientation toward an international bias or concern on one end of the line stretching toward a parochial bias or concern on the other end.  On the left, internationalism is so strong, the socialist notion of a global alliance of labor is a central tenet of communism.  On the other end, nationalism is so strong it is defined as a racial allegiance under Nazism.

Nationalism, not necessarily fascism but akin to it, can be seen as a palatable attachment to an “us” versus a “them.”  There is a “we,” as a superior segment of the world population, against a “them,” an inferior (in some sense) segment of that global population.  Nazism, a form of fascism, extends this notion to a racial level where there is a belief the national group is basically represented by a single racial grouping.  That was the case under Hitler.

One can, with the rise of nationalism, both here in the US and in various European nations, question what is going on.  Are these countries revisiting these earlier, hateful conceptions?  While the work of Friedrich Nietzsche was distorted by the Nazis, a bit of his work can be considered when one wants to understand what nationalism is promoting and, in that earlier time, became useful to that ruthless regime. 

Central to Nietzsche’s ideas was his claim that religion no longer provides a sense of morality a people, a nation, or a polity can count on.  Religion used to provide that external standards of morality, but no longer.  After all, God had died.  Jonathan Glover,[1] in his study of twentieth century moral development, addresses this turn, this “crease” in history. 

He simply states, “In our time, the problem is how to accept [Nietzsche’s] skepticism about a religious authority for morality while escaping from his appalling conclusions.”[2]  The conclusions are not of concern here, instead this posting addresses how Nietzsche's ideas provide some insight to nationalists’ arguments.  And out of necessity, to do this, one needs to begin by reviewing Nietzsche’s basic argument.

          In terms of Western devotion to religious authority, one sees its institutionalized status being established in Europe during the middle ages – the age of nobility.  But religiosity undermined the very basis of power upon which those nobles’ positions rested.  And to understand, one needs to go back further in history.

With the fall of the Roman Empire, any centralized source of power in Europe was destroyed.  This left the chaotic situation in which politics depended on local power holders – i.e., the barbarians who settled after their series of invasions of the former Roman territories and exploited their positions of power.  But how to maintain their power was a real concern.  These barbarians saw it necessary to utilize the already established psychic allegiances of the local populations in devising their approach to ruling these conquered peoples.

          Chief among these was the allegiance to Christianity (and with it, the Judeo traditional beliefs that had been incorporated into Christianity).  This Judeo-Christian religiosity entailed a morality – a view of goodness and evil.  The nobles, while benefiting from a more compliant, subjected people by adopting this view of morality, sacrificed a basic tenet of their power to an undermining set of beliefs. 

Their power was established through an expression of will – i.e., these barbarians’ force of will to dominate.  It made them the superior and their subjects, the inferior.  But by adopting a morality of the inferior, they undermined their own basis of power.  As Glover describes it:  “The values of the barbarian noble caste, these more complete human beings, were subverted and replaced by the ‘moral’ values of people inferior to them.”[3] 

And of particular harm, the process diminished values of power and strength – values of the superior – toward compassion and love – values of the inferior.  The obvious implication is that with this development, the superior nobles disempowered themselves by opting to adopt the conquered peoples’ value systems. 

          And this tradition of powerlessness can be traced to Christian forebears, the Judaic people.  There is a history of a conquered people who, up to the time of Nietzsche, had lost their very homeland.  These enslaved people preached those very values:  the virtues of the weak and poor – that of losers.  And yet, what seems to be a Nietzschean recognition, one no longer can see this irony as an irony because the religious values of the weak have won – they are mostly assumed among people as what should be the moral basis of a civilized people.  Go figure!

          But this problem does not seem to deter Nietzsche; he poses two basic questions:  In terms of good and evil, what value do these qualities afford societies?  And, should moral values support abundance, will-to-action, courage, certitude, and the future or should they reflect impoverishment, distress or indeterminateness, and degradation or deterioration? 

Nationalism assumes one chooses – virulently – the former set of values or dispositions.  It also sees values of community (especially beyond immediate settings), collaboration, even partnership (beyond those established for immediate, short-term purposes) as weaknesses undermining the will of the lone actor seeking his/her desires.

One, with these biases established within one’s understanding of Nietzsche’s message, can begin to see how individualistic nationalism can be.  External moral commitments lead one to hand over to “metaphysical” views – these include the views of religion and science – one’s opportunity to self-create. 

On the other hand, if one refuses to adopt such debilitating ideas then one can take on an approach to life that reflects how all of existence – outside human society – goes about the business of existence.  This includes animal life and physical forces.  Each of these entities just do their/its thing with no regard to moral concerns.  This, as it is applied to people, almost takes on a Lockean view of pre-societal humans.

As for meaning to life or existence, those who seek it or believe they have found it, assume a set of beliefs about the world.  Yet, Nietzsche didn’t believe in any transcendent or intrinsic meaning to life or existence.  If one does away with any “objective” meanings, then in life one is free to create – called self-creation – one’s own life. 

“Self-creation is how the ‘will to power’ expresses itself in human life and Nietzsche sees the will to power throughout nature.”[4]  A “do your thing” sense is upped to the ultimate degree.  Not for the world in general, but for that part one inhabits.  In that world, not much concern is extended to a common good, the common takes care of itself as it competes with other common or collective entities.  One nation acts as a single entity through the efforts of that leader who willed him/herself[5] to power in an amoral environment.

This theme needs a bit more words to describe it.  They will be offered in the next posting.  But for now, what is described here can give one a sense of how nationalism seems to be an outgrowth of an individualism that defies any external standards.  With each person taking on a totally free sense, all interactions become competitions and zero-sum calculations take on the common way to engage with others.  Any sense of binding with others undermines the strength of one’s will to action.  This is true at the individual level and at the national level.

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[1] Jonathan Glover, Humanity:  A Moral History of the Twentieth Century (New Haven, CT:  Yale University Press, 1999).  This posting’s analysis is based on Glover’s account of Nietzschean philosophy.

[2] Ibid., 11-12.  The quote uses the British spelling of skepticism.

[3] Ibid., 12.  In no way does this writer accept this historical view.

[4] Ibid., 13.

[5] It should be pointed out, Nietzsche had little expectation for women; he saw them weak, religious, and irresolute.

NIETZSCHEAN POWER OF THE WILL

Of recent date, civics teachers have a new challenge.  That is to explain what it means to have a president of the US claiming he is a nationalist.  What does that mean?  Is it a good thing or a bad thing?  Is it a position that advances the interests of the US, especially in the long run, or is it a precursor to serious international tensions, like those that led to World War I?  One of the identified reasons for that global conflict was the nationalism that existed early in the twentieth century.

          As a government teacher, this writer presented and reviewed the political spectrum.  He drew a horizontal line on the board (they were green then) and then marked the line with five short vertical lines equally spaced.  Going left to right, each vertical line was labelled as follows:  socialism/communism, liberalism, neutral, conservatism, nationalism, fascism/Nazism. 

Without going over the whole explanation, he generally distinguished main ranges of ideas that separated the left end of the spectrum from the right end.  The point was, as one went out from the middle, the distinguishing beliefs became stronger.  So, as one goes from the center of the spectrum or continuum, the beliefs become so strong, a qualitative difference takes hold.

For example, there is an orientation toward an international bias or concern on one end of the line stretching toward a parochial bias or concern on the other end.  On the left, internationalism is so strong, the socialist notion of a global alliance of labor is a central tenet of communism.  On the other end, nationalism is so strong it is defined as a racial allegiance under Nazism.

Nationalism, not necessarily fascism but akin to it, can be seen as a palatable attachment to an “us” versus a “them.”  There is a “we,” as a superior segment of the world population, against a “them,” an inferior (in some sense) segment of that global population.  Nazism, a form of fascism, extends this notion to a racial level where there is a belief the national group is basically represented by a single racial grouping.  That was the case under Hitler.

One can, with the rise of nationalism, both here in the US and in various European nations, question what is going on.  Are these countries revisiting these earlier, hateful conceptions?  While the work of Friedrich Nietzsche was distorted by the Nazis, a bit of his work can be considered when one wants to understand what nationalism is promoting and, in that earlier time, became useful to that ruthless regime. 

Central to Nietzsche’s ideas was his claim that religion no longer provides a sense of morality a people, a nation, or a polity can count on.  Religion used to provide that external standards of morality, but no longer.  After all, God had died.  Jonathan Glover,[1] in his study of twentieth century moral development, addresses this turn, this “crease” in history. 

He simply states, “In our time, the problem is how to accept [Nietzsche’s] skepticism about a religious authority for morality while escaping from his appalling conclusions.”[2]  The conclusions are not of concern here, instead this posting addresses how Nietzschean ideas provide some insight to nationalists’ arguments.  And out of necessity, to do this, one needs to begin by reviewing Nietzsche’s basic argument.

          In terms of Western devotion to religious authority, one sees its institutionalized status being established in Europe during the middle ages – the age of nobility.  But religiosity undermined the very basis of power upon which those nobles’ positions rested.  And to understand, one needs to go back further in history.

With the fall of the Roman Empire, any centralized source of power in Europe was destroyed.  This left the chaotic situation in which politics depended on local power holders – i.e., the barbarians who settled after their series of invasions of the former Roman territories and exploited their positions of power.  But how to maintain their power was a real concern.  These barbarians saw it necessary to utilize the already established psychic allegiances of the local populations in devising their approach to ruling these conquered peoples.

          Chief among these was the allegiance to Christianity (and with it, the Judeo traditional beliefs that had been incorporated into Christianity).  This Judeo-Christian religiosity entailed a morality – a view of goodness and evil.  The nobles, while benefitting from a more compliant, subjected people by adopting this view of morality, sacrificed a basic tenet of their power to an undermining set of beliefs. 

Their power was established through an expression of will – i.e., these barbarians’ force of will to dominate.  It made them the superior and their subjects, the inferior.  But by adopting a morality of the inferior, they undermined their own basis of power.  As Glover describes it:  “The values of the barbarian noble caste, these more complete human beings, were subverted and replaced by the ‘moral’ values of people inferior to them.”[3] 

And of particular harm, the process diminished values of power and strength – values of the superior – toward compassion and love – values of the inferior.  The obvious implication is that with this development, the superior nobles disempowered themselves by opting to adopt the conquered peoples’ value systems. 

          And this tradition of powerlessness can be traced to Christian forebears, the Judaic people.  There is a history of a conquered people who, up to the time of Nietzsche, had lost their very homeland.  These enslaved people preached those very values:  the virtues of the weak and poor – that of losers.  And yet, what seems to be a Nietzschean recognition, one no longer can see this irony as an irony because the religious values of the weak have won – they are mostly assumed among people as what should be the moral basis of a civilized people.  Go figure!

          But this problem does not seem to deter Nietzsche; he poses two basic questions:  In terms of good and evil, what value do these qualities afford societies?  And, should moral values support abundance, will-to-action, courage, certitude, and the future or should they reflect impoverishment, distress or indeterminateness, and degradation or deterioration? 

Nationalism assumes one chooses – virulently – the former set of values or dispositions.  It also sees values of community (especially beyond immediate settings), collaboration, even partnership (beyond those established for immediate, short-term purposes) as weaknesses undermining the will of the lone actor seeking his/her desires.

One, with these biases established within one’s understanding of Nietzsche’s message, can begin to see how individualistic nationalism can be.  External moral commitments lead one to hand over to “metaphysical” views – these include the views of religion and science – one’s opportunity to self-create. 

On the other hand, if one refuses to adopt such debilitating ideas then one can take on an approach to life that reflects how all of existence – outside human society – goes about the business of existence.  This includes animal life and physical forces.  Each of these entities just do their/its thing with no regard to moral concerns.  This, as it is applied to people, almost takes on a Lockean view of pre-societal humans.

As for meaning to life or existence, those who seek it or believe they have found it, assume a set of beliefs about the world.  Yet, Nietzsche didn’t believe in any transcendent or intrinsic meaning to life or existence.  If one does away with any “objective” meanings, then in life one is free to create – called self-creation – one’s own life. 

“Self-creation is how the ‘will to power’ expresses itself in human life and Nietzsche sees the will to power throughout nature.”[4]  A “do your thing” sense is upped to the ultimate degree.  Not for the world in general, but for that part one inhabits.  In that world, not much concern is extended to a common good, the common takes care of itself as it competes with other common or collective entities.  One nation acts as a single entity through the efforts of that leader who willed him/herself[5] to power in an amoral environment.

This theme needs a bit more words to describe it.  They will be offered in the next posting.  But for now, what is described here can give one a sense of how nationalism seems to be an outgrowth of an individualism that defies any external standards.  With each person taking on a totally free sense, all interactions become competitions and zero-sum calculations take on the common way to engage with others.  Any sense of binding with others undermines the strength of one’s will to action.  This is true at the individual level and at the national level.

---

[1] Jonathan Glover, Humanity:  A Moral History of the Twentieth Century (New Haven, CT:  Yale University Press, 1999).  This posting’s analysis is based on Glover’s account of Nietzschean philosophy.

[2] Ibid., 11-12.  The quote uses the British spelling of skepticism.

[3] Ibid., 12.  In no way does this writer accept this historical view.

[4] Ibid., 13.

[5] It should be pointed out, Nietzsche had little expectation for women; he saw them weak, religious, and irresolute.