HAIR'S BREADTH

Being able to buy public policy affects a polity in many ways. It tends to make policy reflect the short term interests of those who can make the purchase at the expense of others. It affects trust levels since even if the policy is aimed at the common good, the citizenry will suspect the motives behind the decisions that generate any policy. Once the belief that policy choices are up for bidding, then the job of governance by those in positions of power will be that more difficult, and reliance on coercive means will tend to become more the mode of ruling. So, with this in mind: What constitutes bribery? And is bribery different from political donations? Some claim the difference is miniscule – a hair's breadth of difference. I want to address this difference in upcoming postings. I want to describe how such a small difference has allowed people of means to have what some describe as undue influence over those who determine public policy. And while there is influence directed by those with money over those with political authority, those who have political authority also engage in practices that at times can exert undue influence over those who make political donations. Here, in this posting, I want to more or less introduce this topic.

Let me begin by stating what to many has become obvious: money, always the lubricant of politics, has become even more of an issue as the gap between the rich and the not so rich has grown over the last several decades or so. Dave Meslin, in a Ted Talks production,¹ addresses the belief that citizens of prosperous democracies tend to become selfish, stupid, and lazy. He rejects this belief and points out that the reason many citizens choose to be uninvolved in the political processes of the nation or even of the locality in which they live is because prevailing practices by governments or other political entities set up obstacles to such involvement. He lists seven obstacles and explains them. I want to focus on the second one he mentions and labels “public space.” Here, the point is that in order to be able to engage in meaningful political speech, speech that can compete with speech of those who can purchase large quantities of public space, in the form, for example, of advertising space, one needs a significant number of financial resources. In addition, this obstacle takes the form of having direct access to political decision-makers, in the form of lobbying efforts, which also call for enormous amounts of money. This, in effect, results in regular folks, as they attempt to compete against monied interests, having almost insurmountable disadvantages systemically placed against them.

So, due to this imbalance, a system has evolved in our nation, not by necessarily evil people, but by engaged people who have definite political goals and who also have the use of big bankrolls to pursue those goals. This system entails a definite process, not one of “bribing” public officials, per se, but of well-heeled political participants making political donations to those politicians or political parties that “see” things as they do.

Again, none of this is new. Probably the most famous effort to overcome this obstacle occurred during the Progressive period. During the beginning of the twentieth century, due to the enormous wealth of industrial corporations, public policy developed not to advance the interests of the people, but to almost solely advance that of the monied class – the industrialists. The citizenry became so disgusted that it began electing into office, from local to national, politicians that became known as Progressives. Probably the most famous was the Republican, Theodore Roosevelt, although the Progressives came from both major parties – Democrat Woodrow Wilson was also a Progressive – and from a variety of interest groups. “Yet,” as Lawrence Lessig writes of that time, “one common thread that united these different strands of reform was the recognition that democratic government in America had been captured.”² Today, as if on cue with the conditions of almost exactly a century ago, we again face the challenge of tackling a form of widespread corruption – a corruption born of a mutual, reciprocating relationship between those with money or access to money and policymakers.

There are differences today. To begin with, the nature of the public space has changed. That change has been the product of technology, as in the case of mass media and social media. As a result, monied interests have far reaching means to get their speech out there. They have the resources to make sure their speech is professionally produced and, as a result, more convincing and effective. And, in addition, we have a degree of banality on two levels: one, a certain enabling by the citizenry that has allowed an economy of dependency between the monied and the politicians to form – perhaps as a result of the changes during the last century – and, two, the nature of the goals many of the monied players seek. That is, they seek to have policy that gives them increased income they cannot attain under market conditions – for example, as in the case of special tax loopholes or subsidies. We call these attempts “seeking rents.”

This corruption – and it is a form of corruption – is mostly legal.³ There is no, for the most part, concrete quid pro quo: something, money, for something else, favorable votes in a legislature, for example. Instead, the system at work operates from understandings between the givers and the receivers. These understandings take the form of, to various degrees, vague expectations and tend to be created, nurtured, and maintained over time. It is a gift economy that has evolved. It is made up of no specific demands, but a relational understanding that is dependent on continued support by policy decisions that are favorable to those who furnish the resources.

All this is usually quite legal. Yes, it is a hair's breadth of difference between this practice and out and out bribery, but it is a difference nonetheless – of significant importance.

1See the Internet site: http://www.ted.com/talks/dave_meslin_the_antidote_to_apathy.html .

2Lessig, L. (2011). Republic lost: How money corrupts Congress – and a plan to stop it. New York, NY: Twelve, Hatchette Book Group. Quotation on p. 5. Many of the ideas in this posting originate with Lessig's work.

3Sometimes it is illegal as some participants have crossed the line. People have gone to prison.

CONVOLUTED DIVISION

As I reviewed the state of civics education and of social studies education earlier in this blog, I mentioned the internal debate within this professional area. That is, there has been a debate in which some practitioners have promoted a curricular position known as critical theory and another one promoting the curricular position I have called natural rights construct. In addition, there are other views. In some states, for instance, there has been a renewed interest in what educators call social reproduction. This third position has been ostensibly incorporated by the natural rights proponents, but really is more of a traditional position. This latter curricular construct champions a social studies' role that encourages patriotism and loyalty toward our political system. Following this curricular thought, social studies content would include celebratory material of our political history. It emphasizes those stories that reflect the glorious events in which Americans, both the leaders and exceptional citizens, have demonstrated heroic efforts to advance a democratic agenda. The aim is to instill those aspects of our cultural heritage that are seen as worthy of being incorporated by our young students and necessary in order to maintain or even increase levels of patriotism among our citizens. The goal is to encourage the development of good citizenship through some form of admiration, if not worship, of the sacrifices and other heroic actions of those who have come before us. In general, the reproductive approach, in its more extreme form, is akin to nationalism – a belief that can be summed up by the cry, “My country, right or wrong, my country.”¹

I write that this perspective has been somewhat accepted by natural rights advocates but, let me add, I believe that that acceptance is more out of convenience. In theory, natural rights advocates should be antagonistic to this more traditional view because those who want to instill an unquestioning devotion for the American system, as the traditionalists favor, are arguing for instilling values. As such, natural rights advocates should see such efforts as trying to deny or circumvent the process by which students would develop their own value orientation. In the extreme, traditional approach would deny students their liberty to choose their beliefs by having them be subject to a type of indoctrination. If this is true, why would natural rights advocates be amenable to accepting this approach? They are because, at a time when reform is in the air, the alternative source for reform would be those promoted by critical theorists. Quite frankly, reforms offered by traditionalists are a far better option to prevailing, in-field educators than those offered by educators who are, to varying degrees, influenced by Marxist ideals. And, due to the language that is used by traditionalists, it is easier for the natural rights advocates to manipulate the efforts of the traditionalists than it would be of the critical theorists. Let me give you an example.

Early in my teaching career in Florida, I was mandated to teach, by state law, a course called “Americanism vs. Communism.” This course was conceived in the mode of traditional thought. To quote the 1961 law: “The course shall lay particular emphasis upon the dangers of communism, the ways to fight communism, the evils of communism, the fallacies of communism, and the false doctrines of communism.” The law went on to state that instruction should emphasize “the free enterprise – competitive economy of the United States of America as the one which produces higher wages, higher standards of living, greater personal freedom and liberty than any other system of the economies on earth.” And yet, because of the way the course was taught, it fell far short of the aims held by the authors of the law. In my school, we used a text produced by Time-Life corporation which gave a fairly honest and well-balanced explanation of Marxism. This ideology was not presented as some sinister theory that aimed at depriving freedom from people, but as a view that reacted to conditions that existed in industrial economies in the late 1800s before the more tempering public policies, such as programs like the New Deal, had taken effect. Students, by and large, were encouraged to view socialism as perhaps an extreme answer to very real problems and that the true enemies of liberty and democracies were the totalitarian policies of such leaders as Stalin and the other leaders in the Kremlin. The material gave ample legitimate, historical evidence to back up its claims. I am not saying that the material promoted socialism, far from it, but it did encourage a more balanced view than the indoctrinating effort I believe the law envisioned when it was written.

Basically, the educators who were called on to put this law into effect were influenced by natural rights beliefs. The reason natural rights educators could pull off this switch is because the language that traditionalists used had been somewhat vague. Face it: while the law is fairly straightforward as to its aim, it has to use the language of democracy. After all, the danger the law claimed to address was the threat communism posed to democratic governance. So that language opens the door to an approach in which one can claim democratic approaches call for entertaining all points of view and that includes the views of the extreme left. So, a course that in effect puts the language of the law into operation can very easily follow a strategy that has students investigate, from a more open process, the tenets of Marxism, the history of its development, its turn toward totalitarianism, and the course of the Cold War. In such an approach, the course of study can be far from an indoctrination and actually be a course that is interesting and fun to teach and to take.

On the other hand, critical theorists push for a curriculum that is open-ended to begin with, but they push their aims not by spelling out a set of content, as in the case described above. Instead, they concentrate on questions that would guide what they want students to consider and investigate. These questions are aimed at having students look into those aspects of our polity, society, and economy that “exploit” the lower classes. I write the word, exploit, in quotes because exploitation is defined by them in Marxian terms; that is, exploitation occurs when economic results have the wealth and income of upper classes grow faster than those of other classes. Those who are on the short end of such a comparison, according to this view, are being exploited. Critical theorists, who see class conditions in this way, are fairly clear in their bias and they easily see that the questions that should be addressed are those that almost exclusively identify, investigate, and explain those incidences of exploitation.

Where do teachers fall in this divide? Let me refine what constitutes the divide. The divide, when seen as that between traditionalists, those who favor social reproduction and cultural heritage, and critical theorists, those who favor social reconstruction, have teachers expressing a definite view. They express overwhelmingly consistent antagonism for the critical position. Kathleen Hall Jamieson reports the following:

Evidence from a 2010 survey of social studies teachers … a random sample of 866 public high school teachers and an oversample of 245 Catholic and private high school instructors, 83 percent viewed the United States “as a unique country that stands for something special in the world”; 82 percent thought pupils should be taught to “respect and appreciate their country but know its shortcomings”; and only 1 percent wanted students to learn “that the U.S. is a fundamentally flawed country”.²

They overwhelmingly see the US as basically a good place but are not shy in having students question the extent of that goodness. They entertain such events and conditions that demonstrate the flaws the nations should address. And they see that fundamentally, as opposed to Marxist, the nation is not a flawed country. I believe these findings are a justification for a claim I made early on in this blog. That is, teachers by and large are advocates of the natural rights position. This is not for many of them a reflected choice, but one in which they adopt the biases of the prevailing political culture of the US and of the institutional culture of most schools. It is this background or context that make manipulation of traditional language possible and likely to continue. Also, there is no “danger” of critical theorists having much influence over what is taught in our schools.

1Perhaps this is an overstatement, but there those believers in nationalism who would advance a curricular position that I am describing as traditionalist.

2Jamieson, K. H. (2013). The challenges facing civic education. Daedalus: Journal of the American academy of arts and sciences, 142 (2), Spring, p.70. Emphasis added. The research referred to in the quote was published in 2010 and conducted by Hess,Schmidt, Miller, and Schuette in a publication published by American Enterprise Institute.

RIDERLESS HORSE

I was in Brother Malachy's English class at La Salle High School in Miami. Some time after lunch, I was probably thinking of the upcoming weekend when the first word came. That weekend would start a bit earlier as my school let us go home upon hearing of President Kennedy's death. So began that weekend that extended through Monday as my school somehow obtained enough TVs so that we could all see and hear the events of the funeral that culminated at Arlington Cemetery. And with that, we were focused on one presidential role that is often glossed over or downright ignored. That is the role of head of state – our ceremonial representative who personifies us as a people. When our head of state dies, probably more so when he is willfully killed, we all become somehow less; we all grieve over our loss.

There were many issues that vied for this space today. Probably the change in the Senate's rule concerning the filibuster would have won out. But I could not let this posting pass without commenting on the 50^th anniversary of the assassination. That is all you need to say, the assassination, to know the reference even though there have been others of notable importance since then. Perhaps its importance lies in the fact that our lives as Americans seem to have begun to so drastically change since then. I will not go on about it – who am I? For all of you who were alive back on that fall day in 1963, I'm sure you have your own memories and emotions as valid as any expressed in any media. I have nothing to add of note. But one cannot just go through today as if that day, this date, is like any other – it's not. So a moment of reflection, of recollection, of respect, is well in order. As you go about your business today, look around at your fellow citizens and know that today is one of those days for collective recognition of our common fate. We are a people, after all.

PHILANTHROPY ON STERIODS

This blog has dedicated quite a bit of space to the concentration of wealth and income that has characterized our national economy. The reason for this attention is that as a federalist – at least in terms of that construct's philosophic commitments – I am concerned with the level of inequality in our society. To remind you, federalism is a belief construct that perceives an ideal national polity as being formulated by the consent of citizens who come together and formulate, first, a society, and second, a government. That, I have argued, is what our founders believed in and it is reflected in not just our Constitution but in a long line of founding documents that can be traced all the way back to the Mayflower Compact.¹ Implicit in such societal arrangements is the belief in the equality of those adults that agree to either form the basic arrangements or are involved in maintaining them; that is, you and I. And, due to the realities of economic and political life, the level of equality a nation enjoys can only be considered meaningful if the variance of wealth within the nation is not so vast so as to allow any group or class to wrestle political control. Given this foundational context, I have argued that we are presently coming awfully close to a ruling class whose control is made possible by their overwhelming wealth and income.

I have, in way of supporting this claim, offered, over the history of the blog, some statistical data. In this posting, let me add to this data: the gap between the average compensation for corporate CEOs and the typical worker is 200 to 1. This has been expanded since the financial crisis hit in 2008. But the developing expansion predates the crisis all the way back to the seventies. A quarter of century ago, the gap was 30 to 1. And when we compare our disparity today to that of some other advanced countries, we have further reasons to question the necessity or advisability for our current gap. Japan, for example, has a gap between corporate CEOs and the typical worker of 16 to 1. On the other hand, there are other advanced countries that seem to be taking up our trend as a model. For example, Great Britain now has the type of disparity in wealth and income that resembles their wealth distribution of the Victorian age – a time known for its exploitative practices. And yet, as Joseph E. Stiglitz asks: have our current CEOs increased their productivity so much so as to justify such increases in their compensation both in relative and absolute terms? Not only is this not the case, but there have been those instances, well documented in the press, where corporate leaders have received additional compensation though their businesses have suffered serious hits during our recent recession.²

What brought all this to mind is the report on the CBS show, 60 Minutes.³ The report was on how there now exists a billionaires' group whose members are committing to donate at least 50% of their wealth to charitable organizations or other socially demanding endeavors such as efforts in advancing education, attacking poverty, limiting or eliminating disease, and the like. Members commit to make their donations now, over time, or upon their deaths by willing the money to charitable or non profit organizations. The initiative has gained enough steam that Forbes magazine is going to dedicate an issue to the group's efforts.

The question was asked during the 60 Minutes report: do these donations result, either through design or as the natural result of their efforts, in these rich individuals controlling and/or exerting undue influence over policy that relate to these areas of need. At the risk of being cynical, do some of these efforts really mask strategies in which the donors will lend up creating markets for the products they produce and sell? Given the examples of those involved, I would find such cynicism unfounded, but in some cases I can see the potential for such a connection. Be that as it may, the Forbes representative, Randall Lane, addressed this question concerning influence. He said, governments are proving unable to address these areas of need, where as, these private individuals can act to address them without the “baggage” that hamper governments. One cannot argue with the claim that our government, at least, is getting to a place where little to nothing is being initiated that really addresses many of these desperate needs. Politics is the apparently stifling obstacle that is preventing anything from getting done or even being addressed.

But, as far as these business people getting involved, be assured, the answers these entrepreneurs will develop or support will reflect the business biases that made them successful. I know that in education, these approaches are proving deficient. Why? They are lacking because business views of problems are excessively reliant on positivist thinking. That is, they tend to be behavioral, mechanistic, and reductionist. For example, the most recent push in education, led by Bill and Malinda Gates, has been for a core curriculum – in the extreme, a one size fits all approach designating what teachers need in order to do their jobs and how they should do them. This I have pointed out is a silver bullet approach that reduces the complex craft of teaching and curricular content to a fixed set of materials and processes for the vast array of conditions and populations that make up our educational institution. While I am not against promoting a set of minimal standards that is aimed at guaranteeing a floor of expectations – a limited goal – a serious effort to instill a unified curriculum won't work as an overall solution.⁴ Yet standardization has been a hallmark of American business.

Don't get me wrong; I welcome the contributions. Philanthropy should be encouraged from all sectors. It is possible: they can give, fail, learn from their mistakes, and try again. They might hit upon workable solutions. I wonder though, do they really have the resources to solve some of these problem areas. According to the telecast, combined, these wealthy individuals can pony up two trillion dollars. Even if this were to be an immediate payment, is that enough to solve hunger, disease, ignorance and the rest? I doubt it. But let them try. I just hope that the ultimate results are not the lose of a very important element of our republican polity and us becoming closer to a full fledged plutocracy, albeit, a generous one.

1See the work of Donald S. Lutz, for example Lutz, D. S. (1988). The origins of American constitutionalism. Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press.

2Stiglitz, J. E. (2012). The price of inequality: How today's divided society endangers our future. New York, NY: W. W. Norton and Company.

3Rose, C. (reporter). (2013). The giving pledge: A new club for billionaires. 60 Minutes, aired on November 17.

4For an interesting take on the core curriculum proposal see what a young man had to say about it. For access go to http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2013/11/15/this-could-be-one-of-the-best-cases-ever-made-against-common-core-no-one-expected-it-to-come-from-a-high-school-student/?utm_source=facebook&utm_medium=story&utm_campaign=ShareButtons to gain access to the cite.

AN UN(c)ONSTITUTIONAL RULE

There is now a “rule” in the House of Representatives that I believe to be unconstitutional. No, it does not violate the formal provisions of the US Constitution, but it does violate the rationale that our Founding Fathers expressed for the way they set up our central government. A little background context will help us understand why the Hastert Rule offends our constitutional architecture.

Let's start with Aristotle. He pointed out that there are three types of constitutions: the rule of the one (monarchy or dictatorship), the rule of the few (aristocracy or oligarchy), and the rule of the many (democracy). Each, according to the great philosopher, has its advantages and its deficiencies. Skipping what those are, let me just point out that the Founding Fathers decided that we needed a mixed constitution comprised of a president (rule of the one), a Senate (rule of the few), and a House of Representatives (rule of the many); that is, by having each of these elements we can benefit from the respective advantages each type of constitution provides.

One of the advantages is that representatives could congregate in the Congress, talk to their colleagues and share the wishes of their constituents, their hometowns, neighbors, and friends back home, and by doing so, provide a voice for these constituents at the seat of power. From this process, policy emerges. But the process needs to reflect the will of the majority, at least in the House of Representatives – so as to be that portion of the government in which the “many” are heard. The majority will more than likely reflect the will of like-minded individuals and the institution of political parties facilitates this kind of melding of the minds and the formulation of majority positions, but not always. Actually, there are times when majorities are formulated by groups of factions and from representatives who usually disagree on most issues. For example, right now there is an initial impetus to oppose the death penalty between what we call liberal or progressive politicians and libertarians. Usually, these two groups of politicians are known for their antagonism toward each others' positions, but here is one area in which they agree. Now, I don't know whether there are enough liberals and libertarians to form a majority, but there is the possibility that if not today, maybe eventually. This potential is exactly what the Founding Fathers foresaw and I believe hoped for. But the Hastert Rule makes such an eventuality almost impossible.

Why? The Hastert Rule calls for limiting the bills that come before the House for a vote to those that are supported by a “majority of the majority.” Let me explain. The Constitution calls on each chamber of Congress to form its own rules. The formal rules of the House state that the Speaker has the role of placing on the voting agenda those bills he or she feels should be considered by the membership. So, if the Speaker is against a bill, it will not come up for a vote unless 218 members sign a “discharge” petition – a very unlikely development. In effect, this role gives the Speaker a great deal of power. An informal rule – one not voted on by the membership – states that the Speaker will not call up a bill that is not supported by a majority of the members who make up the majority party in the House – presently, the Republican members. This, in effect, can give as little as one quarter of the members veto power over any considered policy option – a far cry from the rule of the many. That is what the Hastert Rule allows. The Democrats have never implemented the Hastert Rule when they held the majority, but Republicans have, although there have been a few occasions when the present Speaker has brought up a very limited number of bills that didn't have a majority of the majority's support. The Hastert Rule is named after a former Speaker, Dennis Hastert, but it was in effect under a previous Speaker to Hastert, Newt Gingrich.

Whatever its origins, the rule counters a constitutionally conceived quality: the possibility and, hopefully, the likelihood that Congress, particularly in the House, would have rolling coalitions that form over particular issues and policy considerations. These coalitions would form over one area, dissolve, and then other coalitions would form over other considerations. In each, there would be a different collection of members. This reflects a more congregational atmosphere in our Congress and would give meaning to its name: a congress, not a parliament. The Hastert Rule belies this entire conception and, as such, it is un-constitutional with a small “c.”

With the Hastert Rule, the result has been to stifle legislation and, when added to the rules in the Senate – where any one senator can hold up many of the Senate's procedures or a minority can easily “filibuster” pending legislation, – we are going through a time when our Congress seems not to be able to get anything done. Ironically, the party that calls for constitutional purity seems to be the party apt to engage in this “unconstitutional” practice.

HONOR OR INTEGRITY

In the somewhat classic film, Jezebel, a southern aristocrat challenges another character to a duel due to something said – a perceived affront to the aristocrat's reputation. This situation is common enough in old films about our early national history and then there is the very real duel we were all told about between Aaron Burr and Alexander Hamilton – again, over some unsavory comments. Of course, such scenes, either in real life or as depictions in movies are pretty much things of the past. While I believe most of us are relieved by such a development – although we had a prominent politician refer to dueling when his good name came into question recently – I think it is still interesting to ask: what changed in our way of thinking that has made dueling no longer acceptable at any level? This question is relevant to civics in that the change(s) reflects basic belief shifts that affect our civic sensitivities.

In a word, the change has mostly to do with how we view reputation. It used to be that reputation was a product of how we were essentially seen by others. Our reputation had to do with the expected behaviors associated with our standing in society and that, in turn, was derived from the positions we held and the roles we fulfilled within the institutions of which we were a part. Today, this view of reputation has been degraded and in its stead we have a sense of reputation as being a derived function of our usefulness, often in terms of business activity. The first view spoke of honor; the second view speaks of integrity.¹

Words we associate with honor are goodness, glory, distinction. Words we associate with integrity are dependable, ethical, unimpaired. These are not mutually exclusive terms; a person can have both honor and integrity – perhaps the title of this posting should have used the word “and” instead of “or.” The issue arises when the terms are used interchangeably or when they are treated as synonyms. The first, honor, is linked to a person's intrinsic substance, an element that goes toward his or her character or lack of character. The second has more of a practical bent.

Honor is attained by holding and keeping in good standing the roles one has in relation to the institutions one is in such as family, vocation, church, gender, and the like. Honor is also more definitive in terms of expectations. For example, fathers and mothers have definite roles that are well-established within cultural norms and one's honor is unequivocally ensconced in expectations regarding the behaviors and dispositions within the context of those roles. That is why when one's honor was questioned, satisfaction called for an extreme response such as dueling.

As for integrity, while one can attach expected behaviors to people of integrity, they are more situational and apt to be less rigid. When assessing the costs of someone lacking integrity, the talk is not of the person's moral standing, but of the effect the damage has caused others. The question is not so much about the moral shortcomings, but the costs the affected parties will bear. I admit the difference can be very subtle, but I believe the distinction is real and is reflected in such civic realities as judicial reasoning.

Consider cases relating to defamation. Michael Sandel points out that in cases when one party is found to libel or slander another, it is not enough to prove the libelous or slanderous statements were printed or said, not enough to prove the statement is untruthful, not even enough to prove maliciousness; rather, one needs to prove actual harm in concrete terms; what the lawyers call special damages. The terms most likely to be considered are those that are financial in nature or can otherwise be monetized. And while hitting the pocketbook can be painful, it is not the same as bringing into question our sense of value as a connected person within our community. In other words, having our integrity questioned is a far cry from hearing, “Meet you at sunrise; will it be pistols or rapiers?”

I am not advocating a return to dueling, but I do believe it would be good for our commonwealth that we find a way to reintroduce in a meaningful way a notion of honor, at least be able to give it more importance. Yes; honor is a term bandied about, but does its current meaning really affect behavior? My sense is that it does not, at least to any meaningful degree. I remember once saying to a business person on the phone who was treating my mother, then over 80 years old, in an unscrupulous way, “Shame on you.” The response was laughter. We should hold each other to expectations that certain institutional roles entail desired behaviors and that those among us who fail in meeting those expectations are, in proportional terms, dishonorable. They do deserve to feel shame, at the very minimum. I saw Anthony Weiner on a TV show recently and of course his escapades were brought up. Whether sincere or not, his body language communicated shame – I hope that was truly the emotion he was experiencing. It does not mean one cannot work toward redemption – it could be that was what Mr. Weiner was working toward. It does not mean we should change our legal perspectives regarding defamation and the like. But it does mean we can communicate, without embarrassment or hesitation – once the facts of a case are known – how disappointed we are when individuals don't live up to their responsibilities, and that communication should matter! It also behooves us to review what our institutional expectations are. Are they petty? Or perhaps they might be regarding immaterial or unsubstantial issues. We should reserve such judgments to important matters. Like what? How well are kids being taken care of? How honest are our business practices? Do we have a meaningful and useful safety net to help and provide opportunity for those who are running into hard times? Are those in power or with excessive wealth taking advantage of their position to further their interests at the expense of the common welfare? These are the types of issues that affect how well people live, how they can contribute to society, and how they can go about fulfilling their potential. Society depends on non-legalistic institutional processes to inhibit unwanted behaviors – such as infidelity in marriage or irresponsible parenting behavior or abusive practices in the workplace – and it also counts on them to promote those behaviors that are desired. As a social mechanism, we should reflect on what we say and do as we utilize these mechanisms. And while we are about that, we should see if we can develop a healthy sense of honor and recognize it in those who are worthy and withhold it from those who are not.

1The distinction made in this posting relies on the work of Michael J. Sandel. See Sandel, M. J. (1996). Democracy's discontent: America in search of a public philosophy. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

“PLEASE PLEASE ME”

Does the title of this posting sound familiar? It has a special place in my memory; it was the title of the first Beatles song I ever heard. My limited research indicates that the song was released in the UK in 1963 – a year before Beatlemania hit the US – and reached number one there. In the US, the song was also released but did not do very well, but I remember hearing it and liking it. A friend of mine really liked it. I invoke the title not to go down memory lane – although there is nothing wrong with that – but to point out that its message succinctly summarizes how many of us feel about government policy. Most of us just want the governmental action to please us, individually, and we care little for what the effect has on the country. Some of us, myself included, think this is unfortunate, but that is the way it is. This self-centered sentiment is behind the famous quote of Ronald Reagan's when he was running for president against President Jimmy Carter: “[a]sk yourself, are you better off now than you were four years ago?” This is a far cry from asking: “are we, as a nation, better off than we were four years ago?” This latter question is just too collectivist for some; it is just too ethereal for many.

Which leads me to think: is all this talk about patriotism on the part of so many just so much hot air? Is it more accurate, when it comes down to brass tacks, to see our fellow citizens' views as mainly concerned with “us and ours.” Okay, this might just reflect human nature and one should not get high and mighty about it. Historically, Americans have sacrificed plenty – for whatever reason – and that sacrifice has resulted in great rewards for all of us. The sacrifices of the “Greatest Generation” come easily to mind. But in practical terms, when creating public policy, one needs to be very conscious of the limits and context in which we expect a public, and that includes the American public, to be willing to sustain sacrifice in order to arrive at the common good. Heck; we even have currently a public philosophy, stated proudly and boldly, that it is a virtue to be self-centered.

Much of this blog has been dedicated to this apparent reality. I have never stated that the purpose of this blog has been to promote a belief in which people can be expected to or actually sacrifice their self interests in order to advance societal welfare. As Tocqueville pointed out, citizens should pursue their self interest, but it should be a self interest better understood. People should have an understanding that takes into account such factors as to how our social realities will in the short term or, more likely in the long term, affect how well we can live. It helps to have an active and robust ideal sense of what should be and that sense should take into account the welfare of others – both locally and nationally, if not globally. The ability to feel this way requires, if one gives credence to psychologist Lawrence Kholberg's theory on moral development, ever higher levels of maturity.

I have in the past indicated a dual mental approach to this tension between selfish tendencies and selfless needs. I have written about having a “real” perspective in which one acknowledges the need to be protective against the selfishness of others while maintaining an ideal disposition to seek out and promote a more communal reality around us. The first is an expectation; the second, when one is comfortable enough, is a hoped for – and willing to work toward – potential. Unfortunately, prevailing political perspective promotes the first and sees the second as merely sweet sentiments in which only young children can believe – such as believing in Mr. Roger's Neighborhood.

Of course, I am referring to the natural rights perspective and I want to particularly focus in this posting on that perspective's reliance on positivism as its main method in seeking the truth. In regard to this link, Philip Selznick¹ provides us with an important insight. To approach it, let me start with a question: what is the general welfare? I think this is an important question in that our constitution identifies promoting it as one of our purposes in forming a national government. So it seems that getting a handle on what that means is a fundamental civic responsibility. I will note that however you define it, the inclusion of this aim indicates that we are instructed by our founding fathers to think idealistically and not to limit our political pursuits to self interest – ill understood. But how are we to discuss this question? What language should we use? I am not asking whether we should use the English language. But each view of politics promotes a certain use of words, symbols, and phraseology – its own language. And the prevailing view, the natural rights perspective, is no exception. The language it utilizes is the language of positivism. So when we ask what general welfare is, we, without reflecting, tend to employ positivist language. When we do, we are, according to Selznick, limited. That is, that positivist language strives to be definitive and to exclusively see political and other social elements that are amenable to being measurable. “In the ethos of positivism, all the great moral ideals – love, justice, the common good – are remorselessly subjected to a nominalist solvent. No such idea has meaning, none has practical worth, save as it is reduced to some definite indicator.”² For example, Selznick provides the following progression: well-being becomes happiness which in turn becomes pleasure. The aim is to identify some associated factor that can be observed and measured – pleasure can be measured by asking people how pleasurable something is or whether it is more or less pleasurable than something else. And all of this leads to a further development in that the language of positivism blends nicely with utilitarian views of morality.

Of course, utilitarian views are grounded in self interest. Things are considered good or evil in terms of how people view those things: do they like them or not? And on that basis, morality is defined as being that state in which the most “good” for the most number is achieved. I have defended, in this blog, some elements of this line of thinking, but overall, its reliance on self interest ultimately dooms this view of morality, especially as it pertains to judging the individual actions of people. Governments, by necessity, have significantly more leeway when it comes to this type of moralizing – in the tradition of “render unto Caesar …” – but there are limits and one limit is the example government extends to citizens. So, for example, the practice of the death penalty, even if it can be proven that executing murderers does overall reduce the incidence of murder – which has not been proven – what of the example the state provides in killing some of its citizens? But I digress a bit; the issue here is that positivist language steers clear from the qualitative and that in order to reach a truer understanding of reality, in order to avoid approximations (well-being vs. pleasure) of the truth, our language has to discuss, describe, and analyze in the realm of the vague and speculative. Why? Because reality is that complex and “resists” the definitive. Perhaps when it comes to government, our mantra should not be “please, please me,” but instead be “do right by us.”

1Selznick, P. (1992). The moral commonwealth: Social theory and the promise of community. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

2Ibid., p. 51.