When
evaluating an explanation of something – anything – one is
naturally concerned with how extensive the explanation is. But an
explanation, no matter how “factual” it purports to be, usually
can't help to at least hint at an editorial comment. That is, the
explanation nudges us toward forming a moral or biased position over
the topic. Let us say I write that the reason the Trayvon Martin
jury found George Zimmerman not guilty is that the state didn't prove
his guilt. Many readers would be disposed to believe that I hold
racist attitudes or that I pine for the “good old days” when
people knew their places. Whether you, the reader, are a racist –
a person who attributes human qualities on the basis of socially
designated racial categories – or anti-racist, you will likely feel
I am either a sympathizer or an antagonist to your beliefs,
respectively. This is especially true of such topics as the trial
where there are emotional positions either way. Each side of this
case has built a narrative of what is believed to have gone down that
night in which the teenager, Martin, was shot and killed.
One
story centers on the idea that a well-conditioned youth pounced on an
innocent man who was following the youth to find out what he was
doing. Was the young man stalking about with criminal intent? That
was, it is believed by Zimmerman's defenders, to be the concern of
the neighborhood watchman. When pounced upon, punched in the face,
and with his head being driven down to the concrete sidewalk,
Zimmerman pulled out his gun – legally carried – and shot the
youth in self-defense. This incident demonstrates why we need “stand
your ground” laws.
The
opposing narrative holds that this youth, with Skittles and a drink,
was just walking around the neighborhood – in which he lived, at
least part-time – and was accosted by this over-zealous, want-to-be
cop. Tempers escalated, an altercation ensued, and, because of his
prejudices, Zimmerman pulled out a gun and killed the young man. He
might have believed Martin was about some criminal intent, but this
was due to his bigoted attitudes.
The
details of both of these narratives are sketchy at best since the
only witness is the defendant. His story has not been consistent on
all counts which his defenders claim is normal given the trauma of
the incident but, to his detractors, demonstrates he is not telling
the truth. What we know for sure is that a young person is dead at
the hand of an armed man and that this youth was unarmed. We also
know that the shooter had head and facial injuries that were not
serious and that he had bits of grass along his backside and that his
clothing on his backside was moist at the time he was questioned at
the scene of the incident. Zimmerman is recorded voicing prejudicial
comments when he called the police and he was instructed by the
police person on the phone to not follow the young man. We know
Martin was shot through the chest – one fatal shot. Except for the
exact location of the incident, all the other “facts” were bits
of interpretive analysis by “experts” of the physical evidence.
This
case is ideal for the purposes of teaching about several federalist
principles. One is local involvement by citizens; two, is the
principle of equality and to the degree that citizens hold other
citizens within a sense of “partnership” in a federal
arrangement; three, the adversary model of trials in our judicial
system, and four, the belief in innocence until proven guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt – of particular interest here would be the
relatively high bar such a standard represents.
For
example, if I were teaching this topic, I would stress that a “not
guilty” verdict does not mean that the members of the jury
necessarily believe the Zimmerman narrative, but only that the Martin
narrative was not proven by the prosecution beyond a reasonable
doubt. This latter point is important because common punditry on TV
seems to emphasize that the jury did not believe the state's
contention against Zimmerman. This is not necessarily true. Using a
lower standard of belief, the jury might very well believe in what
the prosecution presented. But when they applied the “beyond a
reasonable doubt” standard, they could not in good conscience
accept that narrative. This understanding is essential if we are to
hold to our belief in the reasonable doubt standard. This whole
concern points out how unnatural it is for us to live by such a
standard. We naturally want to either believe or disbelieve in a
narrative. But, as Plato reminds us, belief lies somewhere between
ignorance and knowledge. We should remember, in all of this, that it
is possible to be wrong even when we believe in something beyond a
reasonable doubt. The history of overturned convictions provides
testimony to this probability.
I
am glad to see that the case has been the stimulus for a national
consideration of our attitudes toward race. I appreciate President
Obama's language the other day emphasizing that the trial is over and
that it was conducted according to our established procedures. Given
this and given the fact that the trial has generated such an
emotional response, we should take the time and effort to discuss our
racial beliefs and attitudes. If the shooter were black and the
deceased white, would we honestly believe in the narrative we have
chosen to believe? This is a good test of how non-racial our
attitude is about the case. As a matter of fact, a good way to
introduce the topic in a classroom is to present a news report of the
event with the race of the subjects reversed and see how students
initially react to the shooting. Perhaps some time needs to pass for
this bit of classroom trickery to work.
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