One
of the more difficult things a civics or social studies teacher does
is to conduct a discussion that becomes contentious. When dealing
with young people, debates solicit comments that reflect emotional
positions. These positions, in turn, often mirror the beliefs of
parents. When those beliefs also, for one reason or another, satisfy
the aesthetic proclivities of the student, then this generates a lot
of emotion directed toward defending the position. While I am not
stating that students might not have rational reasons for their
arguments, chances are that for many students, these stated
conclusions have little or no thought-out bases for them.
This
kind of thing doesn't happen every day. The issue under discussion
in a particular lesson has to meet certain conditions before the
class will engage in this kind of arguing. From my personal teaching
experience, I remember being almost overwhelmed when I introduced the
issue of abortion one day. Opinions came quickly and furiously with
not much tolerance for opposing ideas. This was the case on both
sides of the question: should abortions be allowed under the law?
My training called for me to ask, in response to a stated position, a
Socratic question or two in order to get the student to reflect
rationally on his or her position. The aim was not to convince
students of a particular position, but to have them reflect on
whatever their position was. I tried. But I have to admit that I
was not very successful in getting much reflection that day. What I
did get was a lot of heated, unfounded conclusions with contempt for
those who did not agree.
Needless
to say, I had better days. I think, though, that one thing that
could have helped me or any teacher in a similar situation was to
understand the various ways that arguments could be organized.
Philip Selznick1
identifies two ways: the use of axiomatic rationalism and the use of
positivist rationalism. I will make some comment on axiomatic
rationalism in this posting and address positivist rationalism in a
future posting.
Axiomatic
rationalism, in its purest form, relies on ideas and the mind to
search for the truth. This is opposed to relying on real experience.
Let me demonstrate. Do you believe individuals have rights? If
your answer is yes – and I would be shocked if it weren't – why
do you say yes? An argument for this position which relies on ideas
and does not refer to reality would be arrived at by a continuous
string of whys until the respondent finally says that's just the way
he/she feels about it. Logic takes you just so far. There comes a
point at which one has to rely on a postulate or assumption about
life or the nature of the real. Every ideology or philosophical
system at some point has to ground itself in such an unprovable
postulate or assumption. Take Marxist belief in dialectical
materialism. Yes, Karl Marx traced a history of mankind to make the
point that all social development was based on class warfare, but was
the case really made? Could it not be the fact that changes in our
social history have been the result of other conflicts – those of
ethnicity, religion, cultural proclivities, and the like or by non-
conflicts such as innovations like social media? But if one allowed
for these other factors to be considered as fundamental ones and as
influential in a manner outside an economic perspective, the whole
Marxian ideology falls apart. The extent to which one needs to
accept dialectical materialism in order to be a Marxist is quite high
and that type of commitment is using axiomatic rationalism in the
end.
Let
me provide another example. I have made the point that currently our
nation holds as the primary political construct the natural rights
construct. One of the philosophical writers who provides a thought
out argument supporting this construct is the late Robert Nozick. In
answering the question I offered above – do individuals have
rights? – he gives a well thought out argument supporting the yes
position one would expect. He does such a good job that he lays out
an entire defense for libertarianism. Yet, his argument relies on a
fundamental assumption; that is, each of us is a separate being with
a sacredness attached to that separateness. Due to that sacredness,
it is unjust to take from some to benefit others as with welfare
programs that are run by government through their coercive power to
tax in order to pay for such programs. But why should we believe in
this notion of sacredness as Nozick defines it? Why can't a sense of
sacredness just as easily be used to defend welfare in the sense that
the needy, because of their sacredness, deserve the basics of life?
This simplifies the argument, but my contention is that at some point
Nozick has to rely on an unprovable assumption. As Selznick writes:
The
postulational method is at best pseudo-naturalist. It may
invoke aspects of experience and may claim empirical support for
various presuppositions, generalizations, and conclusions. But the
postulates are not truly open to scrutiny, and the conclusions rest
on chains of reasoning insulated from patient study of variables and
contexts.2
So
what does a teacher take away from all of this? He or she should
spend some time organizing a discussion so that statements of fact –
those that relate to experiential reality – are distinguished from
postulates and assumptions. Students can have exercises that have
them do this kind of analysis for given arguments. For example, take
a famous historical document – such as the Declaration of
Independence – divide it among small groups and have students
go through the sections they have and determine which are statements
of reality and which are postulates and assumptions. Nowhere in the
document, for instance, is the statement, “all men are created
equal,” proven or subject to scrutiny – it's self evident.
Perhaps being able to make such distinctions should be a prerequisite
to engaging in normal discussions and debates. At least then
students can have an intellectual tool necessary to distinguish
between statements not based on evidence – but perhaps on raw
emotion – and conclusions not based on reasoned arguments.
1Selznick,
P. (1992). The moral
commonwealth: Social theory and the promise of community.
Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
2Ibid.,
p. 49.
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