SO YOU SAY YOU LIKE SOMETHING

One recurring message of this blog is the distinction between the natural rights view of liberty and that of the liberated federalism view. At the risk of sounding repetitive, I summarize the difference with the following comparison: the natural rights view states that liberty means a person has the right to choose his/her course of action as long as the choice does not hurt someone else or deprive someone else of the same prerogative. On the other hand, for the liberated federalist position, the view of liberty lies in the right of the person to do what the person believes he/she should do; that is, the right to be a moral person. Given that even the most selfish and self-centered person tends to believe he/she is not immoral, then what does it mean to believe in having the right to do what one should do? What, in practical terms, distinguishes what one wants to do from the right thing to do?

This is a more complicated question than it appears to be. To answer, one needs to delve into moral theory. To begin with, and this is a topic I have previously addressed, one assumes that individuals truly have the ability to make such choices – that we truly have free will. I will not address this prerequisite condition here, but assume that, yes, for practical purposes, we do have free will or enough of a free will to make our question over the right thing to do worth asking. I will begin addressing the “right thing to do” question here by reviewing some basic ideas associated with moral thinking.

Let us start with the connection between values and morals. While morals have to do with the good, what we value is simply those things we want in the form of things or conditions either now or in the future. We can judge prior conditions according to our values, but we can't change what has already happened. So, from the perspective of determining behavior – the “to do” part of our concern – we are interested in how values affect us in the present or in the future. Yes, we can value that which is immoral. Few, though, actually see what they value as immoral; we have the ability to rationalize our choices to convince others and ourselves that what we want is moral. But alas, just look around; what people rationalize as good is often not moral. So, given the possibility that our values are not moral, if we strive to be moral, we need to analyze our values in an objective fashion. It helps to garner the opinions of others, especially those who do not have an interest in what we are reviewing, and listen to what they think of our choices. That's why I like the ethics column in the New York Times Magazine – I recommend it. As for this posting, let's look at some basic ideas concerning values.

Maurice P. Hunt and Lawrence E. Metcalf¹ (later in Byron G. Massialas and Jack Zevin²), identify three types of value assertions. Let me present them in the following three statements:

• A person likes something (P likes X) because that something leads to or acquires something else or provides a state of being. This line of thinking is judged to be rational.
• P likes X because that something is entailed in something else, such as a philosophy, an ideology, or a religious belief. While one might question the rationality of the “something else,” the value in question, “X,” is also considered a rational choice.
• P likes X because P simply likes X. This is judged to be irrational.

Let me comment on each of these. Briefly, the first of these ways of valuing is considered utilitarian in nature. A person likes or does something because it will lead to a goal or object he/she cherishes. For example, this might take the form of a student valuing his/her attendance at college because the education the student is receiving will lead to a degree and, in time, to a better job, higher pay, higher levels of work satisfaction. At least, those are goals that education can facilitate. In the second statement, the person seeks, ultimately, an association between what is valued and, to some predetermined sense of goodness, an ideal or a set of ideals. These philosophic, ideological, or religious ideals are non-empirical in nature. For example, a person likes his/her neighbor because the person is a member of a religion that holds such sentiments as moral (or not having them as immoral) and, as such, an emotional state one should hold. Both the first and second statements are considered logical systems in that they relate to some consequence. Behaving in accordance with the resulting value position leads to something, something that is desired. But the third statement is something else.

The third statement is illogical for it has no reason for existence except for its implied bias. For example, why does a person favor vanilla ice cream? He/she does so for no particular reason; the person just does. For an educator who is trying to deal with some controversial issue in discussion, a student who utters such a value statement and can't provide a reason should not be uncontested when such a value leads to social conditions that affect others. For example, if the question arises of who should win the upcoming election and the student says Jones but cannot give a reason, that student should be further pushed to come up with a reason. After all, the winner of an elected position will have a role in determining public policy that will affect many other citizens. But if the assertion does not affect others, then the student's comment need not be challenged. We all have our irrational preferences. I do like vanilla ice cream – especially with a little Grand Marnier poured over it – but when it comes to Wendy's Frosties, I'll go for the chocolate.

But I digress. The thing is that different social studies theorists have favored one approach to valuing over the other. In my next posting, I will briefly review two of them. For this posting, I want a review of these approaches to valuing so that we might come to a better sense of what it means to “do what one should do.” There is no greater responsibility a civics teacher has than to get his/her students to seriously question their motives about their social actions. In choosing a liberated federalist view to guide a teacher's strategies in the classroom, the teacher is taking a more proactive approach than that encouraged by the natural rights view. By leaving it up to the individual to decide what is moral without at least some reflection, is simply unjustified and irresponsible. My contention is that under a natural rights regime, the effort to get this sort of reflection is simply too muddled and undirected. It leads to instruction that is too apt to be without any guidance whatsoever. To pursue such instruction is at best naïve and at worst abandoning one's responsibilities. On the other hand, liberated federalism has guidance baked into its elements – most notably, in its professed value hierarchy.³

1Hunt, M. P. and Metcalf, L. E. (1968). Teaching high school social studies: Problems in reflective thinking and social understanding. New York: Harper and Row, Publishers.

2Massialas, B. G. and Zevin, J. (1967). Creative encounters in the classroom: Teaching and learning through discovery. New York, NY: John Wiley and Sons, Inc.

3I have written extensively in this blog of a proposed moral code I developed. See, for example, posting, Implementing Federalist Moral Code in the Classroom, December 16, 2011. The proposed moral code is based on federalist ideas and ideals.