A while ago, I shared with
you a portion of a TV show[1]
in which a parent returns home at an unexpected time. The parent walks in on his daughter who is
engaged in a compromising activity with her boyfriend. Of course, an argument ensues, mostly between
the parent and the daughter – the boyfriend is allowed to escape – and that
argument is conducted in the language of rights. I believe Richard C. Sinopoli[2]
would judge the incident as an example of a selfish disposition found in societies
and causing deleterious effects. He
would also claim that such events are not exclusive to liberal societies, but
for some reason, are highlighted in that many feel that liberalism causes or
enables such behavior. The general
problem is characterized by people seeing a good deal of our conflicts as
expressions – or a lack of expression – of morality because the conflict is
misconceived as offending a “rights illusion.”
That illusion is: “[b]ecause
rights are such an essential aspect of a liberal political morality, they may
be taken to represent the whole of morality.”[3] Sinopoli gives another example. That situation is of a “barbecuer” who
barbecues close to his property line much to the distress of his neighbor. The distress is not only the irritation
caused by the smoke and smells suffusing over the neighbor’s property, but also
that the smoke negatively affects the neighbor’s flowers. Two points:
one, the “barbecuer” is not breaking any contractual arrangements or offending
any of the rights of others and his behavior offers an example of what is
acceptable, at least from a rights perspective; he is behaving in a perfectly
allowable manner. And, two, beyond that,
he is offering an example of what “good” behavior is. If he continues to distress his neighbor,
that’s just too bad; he is acting within his prerogatives.
Obviously, I am being
a bit facetious; even the most diehard libertarian would not deem such behavior
as good. But under the natural rights
view, why would this person be immoral or, if not immoral, exhibiting behavior
one would consider less than good?
Liberalism doesn’t give us a clue.
Let me point to another basis by which to judge what is going on with
both the parent and the “barbecuer.”
Once the discussion in
a complex society shifts to rights, the mind takes on a contractual frame of
reference. I have written about
contracts as those agreements in which two or more parties agree to some
exchange: I’ll do x, if you do y. If you don’t do y, I do not need to do x. I might do x anyway, assuming the contract does
not prohibit me from doing it, but that would be at my discretion. Other than the provisions of any contractual
agreements I might be a party to, I am free to act as I choose. I would point out that the vast majority of
interactions one has with strangers falls under the provisions of law or
contract. Think about it; if you’re walking
in a mall and see all the people around you, you are under the provisions of
the contractual arrangement that governs the mall. Now let’s see these interchanges from another
perspective. What if instead of a
contract, the people involved are still under the provisions of an agreement,
but the agreement is not a law or a contract, but a compact. Here, agreement does not refer to specific
events such as barbecuing or how sons and daughters will behave in the house or
anywhere else. Instead, the agreement
establishes relationships that are governed by general principles such as
respect, reciprocal tendencies, trust, and, in well-functioning relationships,
some degree of affection. And this
relates to what I have referred to before:
how do you see – define – fellow citizens that are not family, friends,
or others in which there exists no special relationships? Sure, a parent has a special relationship
with a daughter, but not with a neighbor.
What is best here? In a society
in which the natural rights perspective dominates, we tend to fall into the
contractual mode of exchange. In a
federal perspective, we tend to fall into the compacted mode of exchange, an
exchange mode in which the object is to seek a win-win outcome without a
punitive response for non-compliance.
Compacted agreements can have punitive provisions, but these are usually
for serious offenses against the compact.
What is sad to me about the prevalence of a rights view is how often
even family conflicts – where there are special relationships – surge toward
contractual language.
Let me confess to
“sinning” along these lines. The other
day I wrote a check for a significant amount of money. I was paying the fees to attend a series of
social events to which I am looking forward.
I needed to send the payment to another city so I placed the check in an
envelope and along with two other pieces of mail took the envelope to my mailbox. Sometime later, the mail truck came by,
stopped at our box, and left our mail. I
went out to get the mail and noticed our mailman didn’t pick up our outgoing mail. This perturbed me, so I took our outgoing
mail and walked up the block to meet the truck as it was coming down the other
side of the street. I, unfortunately,
through my tone, expressed my displeasure even though the mailman apologized. I turned and walked back to my house. Guess what?
My payment got lost in the mail.
I don’t bring this up as an example of someone not meeting his/her
contractual obligation; I’m not sure that is the case. It could just have been a coincidence – mail
gets lost, albeit seldom. But, perhaps
if I had taken a different approach, a more compacted approach, I would have
avoided paying a $32 stop payment fee.
Just saying.
No comments:
Post a Comment