An aim of this blog, in large measure, is to convince the
reader to believe two claims: one, that
federation theory is the best available mental construct to guide the nation’s civics
curriculum, at least in terms of content, and two, that the reader should
actively engage in the promotion and implementation of this construct. The blog has dedicated a lot of space to
describe and explain federation theory (one can see above the introductory
remarks for an overview of the theory) and has attempted to give practical
advice about how to change curriculum.
In terms of
this latter attempt, the blog has pointed out that change in how an
organization thinks and functions is difficult, complicated, and a long-term
project. This is true if the change is fundamental
and what is sought is what is known as transformational change. Transformational change is not what most
politicians such as Donald Trump are after; they speak in terms of
transactional change.
Transactional change is based on
external motivation. That is, a person
agrees to change his/her behavior in exchange for something the person wants –
a higher paycheck, higher status, a better parking space in the parking lot. On the other hand, transformational change
relates to people changing some behavior not for a reward (or to avoid a
punishment), but due to an internal motivation, some change in attitudes or
values. That makes it hard to accomplish.
There is some recent research that
sheds light on an aspect of such a dynamic.
The New York Times reports on
the work of Robb Willer and Matthew Feinberg,[1] two
sociologists who study what it takes to succeed in convincing people to support
specific policy proposals, especially if the proposals are associated with an
opposing political ideology. For
example, how does one convince a conservative to support same-sex marriage or
convince a liberal to support increased military spending?
Actually, this aspect is not
complicated, but it is difficult to pull off.
Per these researchers’ findings, what is needed is presenting arguments
that frame the newer policy choice in terms of the subject’s, not the proponent’s,
values and attitudes. Here is what one
of the researchers had to say:
In one study, we presented liberals
and conservatives with one of two messages in support of same-sex
marriage. One message emphasized the
need for equal rights for same-sex couples. This is the sort of fairness-based message
that liberals typically advance for same-sex marriage. It is framed in terms of a value – equality –
that research has shown resonates more strongly among liberals than
conservatives. The other message was designed
to appeal to values of patriotism and group loyalty, which have been shown to
resonate more with conservatives. (It
argued that “same-sex couples are proud and patriotic Americans” who “contribute
to the American economy and society.”)[2]
On the other
side, liberals were swayed to support military spending with arguments that
point out the role the military plays in offering opportunities, education, and
training to low income, minority enlistees.
With a larger military, such offerings can be extended and taken
advantage of by more low income individuals.
This is very much in the liberal “wheelhouse.”
What is the
lesson here? The lesson is that when one
wants to convince others of a behavior or policy shift that on the face of it
counters existing values and attitudes, if one frames the change in terms of
existing values and attitudes by those who are to be changed or convinced of
the change, success is more likely to happen.
When this premise was tested against external rewards, reframing did
better.
As mentioned,
this sort of strategy is difficult to implement. One reason for this is reflected by another
finding of this research. Liberals and
conservatives alike were found to be reluctant or unable to think of arguments
and presentations that solicit values and attitudes of those who initially
opposed the proposed change. In other
words, liberals think liberally, not conservatively, and conservatives think
conservatively, not liberally. These two
claims seem to be true even when the subjects are asked to do otherwise.
This research
used a variety of policy change proposals.
It was found that not all liberal or conservative policy positions were
amenable to such reframing; some did not lend themselves to these language
manipulations. This writer can speculate
that a national healthcare program such as the Affordable Care Act is such a
policy area.
So, perhaps what one can say with the
new administration coming in is that Democrats, who wish to cooperate with it,
should see what areas the Trump team wants to pursue that they also want to
advance (infrastructure spending) and
which ones Democrats want and can be reframed in language that touts Republican
values and attitudes. For those latter
proposals, part of the strategy should be to frame the debate, at least in
part, in Republican language. For the
rest, from the Democratic perspective, game on!
As for changing a curriculum in a
school, one similarly is confronted with people who initially are disposed to
disagree with what is being proposed.
This research by these sociologists suggests certain steps a change
agent needs to take if he/she hopes to be successful.
First, he/she needs to discover the
values and attitudes the target subjects have.
The agent not only needs to know what these dispositions are, but also gain
a sense – an accurate sense – of how much vitality they have, how centered they
are to the person being asked to change.
Second, these values and attitudes
need to be considered and the language by which they are or can be expressed
must be discovered or developed.
Sometimes, these values and attitudes are held at a subconscious level
or they are opaque. This language task is
difficult to achieve, but unaddressed commitments do not disappear or lose
their influence.
And third, an appropriate language
needs to be formed and, where possible, employed to voice the desired aim or
goal with words that are amenable to the listener. Here, the communicator might be tempted to be
dishonest and manipulative. If he/she
is, untold damage can be done to the whole project. Dishonesty is seldom forgiven or forgotten.
As the Times article points out, this research points out an almost
obvious message that people are more apt to agree with what they already
agree. The challenge is in the
implementation.
[1] “The Key to Political Persuasion,” The New York Times (November 11, 2015),
accessed December 30, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/15/opinion/sunday/the-key-to-political-persuasion.html?_r=0
.
[2] Ibid.
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