This
next posting compares lists of beliefs that make up the political subcultures that
began to develop in America as early as its colonial days. Specifically, it will compare the moralistic
beliefs that were derived from the Calvinist tradition and the individualistic
beliefs that are derived from the transcendental tradition. These two traditions were reviewed in the last
posting.
There is another tradition, but that is
limited to the southeast states of the old Confederacy. What has resulted, though, is an intriguing
story of tension among these beliefs making it more difficult to form a
national political culture. Despite this
tension, a national political culture has emerged. In part, that has been made possible by one
of these traditions becoming a dominant set of values and norms.
For most of the nation’s history, the
moralistic subculture was dominant. This
was true until the years following World War II. Since then, the individualistic subculture
has become dominant. Dominance does not
equate with the elimination of other cultural biases. One can still find strong expression of each
of the three prominent belief systems. A
review of these beliefs is useful as the beliefs help explain why the nation’s
politics take the form that they do.
The moralistic subculture, formed in
the New England colonies, spread westward across the northern most tier of
states stretching to the Pacific Ocean.
If one would want to see a current display of this subculture, pay
attention to the weeks leading up to the Iowa caucuses during the next presidential
cycle. By doing so, one can detect the
characteristics Daniel Elazar identifies in this subculture:
1.
Belief that politics as a profession is
a calling of great moral standing. One
who chooses this line of work can contribute toward the betterment of the
commonwealth.
2.
Belief that strong institutions are the
foundation of a good society. Through
these institutions, society focuses on securing a healthy commonwealth. Individuals and their welfare, ambitions, and
contributions are measured and given meaning by what they accomplish within
these institutions.
3.
The commonwealth recognizes good
citizenship through public duty. It
defines this duty in terms of efforts within public politics and should exhibit
honesty, selflessness, and a sense of commitment for the common good (akin to
what this blog has cited as social capital – a la Robert Putnam). This
subculture holds as anathema the idea that a public career is a means for
self-advancement.
4.
The subculture places an emphasis on
local political engagement. It does so
because it is through local, community based action that people more readily
engage in face-to-face politicking. By
this type of action, engaged citizens become more disposed toward improving
conditions and their activity takes on a moral character.[1]
Naturally,
this type of interaction comes closest to what Tocqueville [2]
in a previous posting depicts as typical politics in the early years of the
nation’s history.
Of the three subcultures, the
moralistic provides the most supportive line of thinking and feelings aligned
with the federation theory construct. It
did and still does have influence among certain sub-groupings of many
Americans. The last President who
frequently used the language of the moralistic tradition was the New Englander,
John F. Kennedy – e. g., “Ask not what your country can do for you; ask what
you can do for your country.”
The most distinctive element of the
moralistic subculture, as compared with the individualistic subculture, is that
one places emphasis on the community, the collective, as opposed to the
individual. As this writer states this,
it occurs to him that one can readily jump to the conclusion that the
moralistic subculture is a collectivist philosophy, perhaps something like
socialism.
It is not. The federalist construct identifies the
significance of the collective in the form of a community, and argues that good
and functional social policy must respect its existence and address its
demands. It is what some constitutional
historians call civic humanism.
The next account of these
subcultures is of the one that has become dominant today. Mostly stretching
westward from first the mid-Atlantic colonies, the individualistic subculture
prevailed and still does so today.
Why? Because it best reflects our
capitalist biases as it mirrors and supports the marketplace and that subset of
colonies led the way to developing the nation’s first organized market
facilities of any size and wealth.
Elazar identifies the following
characteristics for the individualistic political subculture:
1.
Politics, its activities and beliefs,
is defined as part and parcel of the ubiquitous marketplace. Those engaged in
politics are basically involved in trading favors to accomplish social goals.
They are active in this exchange and are motivated by a desire to advance their
political careers and expect to be adequately compensated for their
participation.
2.
Citizens are mostly involved in
pursuing their individual interests. For
the most part, they are concerned with private interests, not communal or
public ones. Community action should be limited to minimal concerns and should,
therefore, be unusual and practiced only in extreme situations.
3.
Political action should be aimed at
specific problems. Political programs and ideology should be strongly avoided.
4.
Actual politics is generally a dirty
business and should not be the business of most citizens. The necessary
politicking should be left to those professionals who have chosen this
loathsome profession. Some corruption is probably unavoidable and acceptable if
it is kept to reasonable levels. Whether the public exerts the effort to clean
out “city hall” depends on calculations measuring the costs and benefits of
doing so. In this atmosphere, only
overwhelming public clamor will result in new government initiatives.
5.
Obviously, political activity by
citizens is not encouraged. The subculture does not seek out core causes of
social, economic, or political problems, and only reluctantly addresses the
symptoms of such problems.[3]
James McGregor Burns has described this type of political leadership as “you
scratch my back, I'll scratch your back” or transactional leadership.[4]
The mid-Atlantic political culture has
been exemplified, through the history of those states that stretch from the
Atlantic seaboard to the Pacific coast until today; that is, these populations,
in the main, live out these cultural traits.
There are areas of the country that fall outside this broad region that
also exhibit these cultural traits; for example, areas of south Florida. This is due to significant migrations within
the country.
The third political subculture
identified by Elazar is the traditional subculture of the southern colonies and
then the southeastern states. It is
characterized by a general cultural orientation that supports an elite class (southern
plantation owners and their families).
This power position should be secured by establishing a caste system in
which political, economic, and social status is mostly determined by conditions
of birth. It was also heavily embroiled
in racist politics.
Of course, this subculture and its
beliefs was significantly responsible for the Civil War. The subculture, a pre-industrial view,
supports and maintains a strict social and political hierarchy. Under their paternalistic control, elites can
accomplish good things, but goodness is basically defined by elitist interests.
Political parties, for example, are of
little value and basically are used to recruit those who perform the legalistic
requirements of governance necessary to maintain essential governmental
services – such as policing services.
Politics is more a function of personal relationships.[5]
Due to mostly historical events,
prominently among them the South losing the Civil War, this subculture is
judged to be the least viable of the three.
Limited to the southeastern states (the old Confederacy), the subculture
has been, to a great degree, regarded with less legitimacy in the rest of the
country.
Elazar, if alive today, would be
perhaps a bit surprised, however, by how some southern thinking seems to be
making a comeback. For example, because
of Texas prominence in the choice of textbooks used in our classrooms, – due to
the size of its population and therefore its position in the textbook market –
recent demands by Texas education officials regarding these books’ content
might have significant influence on what texts around the country may contain.[6]
For the purposes of this blog, though,
the main issues of excessive individualism are an expression of the tension
between the moralistic subculture and the individualist subculture. It is the result of the bifurcation between
these two belief systems that a newer set of beliefs might evolve; a synthesis
might emerge.
[1] Daniel J. Elazar, American Federalism: A View from the States, (New York, NY: Thomas
Y. Crowell, 1966).
[2] Alexi de Tocqueville, “Political Structure of
Democracy,” in Alexis de Tocqueville: On
Democracy, Revolution, and Society,
ed. John Stone and Stephen Mennell (Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press, 1980/1835), 78-101.
[6]Tim
Walker, “Don’t Know Much about History:
Controversial Changes May Be in Store for Your Textbooks, Courtesy of
the Texas State School Board,” National
Education Association, accessed September 14, 2016.
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