The last series of
postings presented, described, and explained the components of a liberated
federalism model. The components are the
community, the entities, and the association.
This is an idealistic model – how governance and politics should take
place – and its normative quality is defined by federalist values. Those values revolve around the concern for
societal welfare. Its function is to
help guide civics educators in their choice of instructional content.
What
remains in this presentation of the model is to comment on how it is
“activated.” The model focuses on an
event, when a polity is confronted with a political challenge. What this and the following postings will
address is the substantive issues that usually pose the political challenges an
association is likely to encounter, especially when the association is a
government.
This
model was initially deemed to be a synthesis mostly between the constructs of
the natural rights perspective (with its cherished regard of liberty) and the
critical theory construct (with its regard for equality). Both liberty and equality are highly regarded
values in the federation theory values structure. In both cases these values are defined
differently by federation theory.
Previously, this blog distinguished how liberty is defined by federation
theory – as the freedom to do what one should do.
With
this posting, this account presents what equality means to federation
theory. The theory agrees with critical
theory that more political challenges emanate from concerns over equality issues
than from other issues. Even issues that
on the surface seem unrelated to equality, upon a closer analysis, can be
traced to an equality concern. For
example, issues regarding the environment.
Much
of the abuse of the environment stems from vested interests being allowed to
follow policy streams that do damage to the environment. Such is the case with pollution being the
by-product of manufacturing, mining, and other business activities that enhance
profits. Equality issues are issues that
relate to either uneven distribution of societal assets based on economic
activity or other bases for unequal treatment such as racism, sexism, ageism,
or on prejudices stemming from sexual preferences.
What
follows is a review of how the construct views equality. Federation theory has a definite position
concerning this issue. This is an
account of how the construct defines it, how it sees its importance, and how it
determines its social implications. This
posting addresses the first of these concerns; following postings will look at
the other two concerns.
Definition – Equality, according
to federation theory, refers to the belief that despite inequality in talent,
wealth, health or other assets, the entailed value calls for equal
consideration of all persons’ well-being, that all have an equal right to
maintain their dignity and integrity as individual persons. As such, equality has a normative quality
since it reflects a respect for being human beyond the biological aspects.
Philip Selznick quotes
Bernard Williams on this point:
That all men [and women] are human is, if a tautology, a useful
one, serving as a reminder that those who belong anatomically to the species homo sapiens, and can speak a language,
use tools, live in societies, can interbreed despite racial differences, etc.
are also alike in certain other respects more likely to be forgotten. These respects are notably the capacity to
feel pain, both from immediate physical causes and from various situations
represented in perception and thought; and the capacity to feel affection for
others and the consequences of this …[1]
Factually, Selznick points
out, the judgment is made from the behaviors of humans, that homo sapiens are equal in their ability
to make moral choices. There exists no
elitist standing in this regard; each is humbled by this leveling attribute;
each is subject to moral indiscretions; each can realize fully his or her own
capacities as a person.[2]
These attributes, assuming
the person in question is of normal mental capacity, are what lead to
meaningful self-respect and a sense of empathy that allows each to reach out to
others.[3] In terms of the formulation of the compact
that initiates the existence of a federalist arrangement, be it a community, an
association, or a government, the fact that all entities can equally consent to
its creation, does allow for them to be federated.[4]
Importance – In this newer
version of federalism, equality takes on two forms: baseline equality and equality of treatment
or what this writer calls regulated condition.
Equality, as identified in one of its basic national covenants – the Declaration of Independence – is a
requisite to any resulting covenant or compact including any subsequent
constitutional agreement.[5] This is so because equality has a strong
moral component in both religious and secular thinking and its absence has
proven highly deleterious to social relations.
If nothing else, experience
has shown the evil that follows its disregard, particularly in relation to
ensuing travesties to human dignity and to the conceptions of personhood. Please note that with federation theory,
equality and individualism take on mutually supportive functions. This relationship will become more meaningful
as baseline equality is reviewed in the next posting.
More ambitiously, equality
acts to encourage a collective to make decisions from an idealistic frame of
mind, to formulate reflected and felt policy, including its constitution. That is, the people committed to a covenant
or compact are strongly encouraged and enabled to formulate a constitutional
model that reflects deeply held cultural proclivities. While a federated union does not insist on a
singular cultural basis for all social interactions, it does depend on a
cultural foundation of support for its basic constitutional values.[6]
Remember, at the
constitution forming stage, a people are coming together to form a union from a
basis of consent, not coercion or tradition.
And beyond the formulation of a constitution for governance, the same
sense and value motivate the creation and maintenance of a commonwealth or
society (the community) in question.[7] That is these constitutional values have a
wide berth within the polity.
What is being promoted is
more an ideal than a legalistic concept.
Yes, there are legal aspects to this as in “rights to human dignity,”
but part of the problem with the natural rights perspective is to reduce all
political ideas to contractual ones. It
loses the more generalizable relations and emotions that are unavoidable in
political relationships.
When applied to civics, a
contractual view of the subject matter becomes sterile and unapproachable. As one reads about baseline equality and
regulated condition, what is being described is not so much mandatory
relations, but idealistic ones that can organically form if citizens begin to
see each other as partners in a commonwealth.
Equality fulfills a central
function within the overall conceptual structure of federation theory. By moral equality, Selznick postulates the
principle that all persons have the same intrinsic worth by identifying two
levels of this attribute: baseline
equality and regulated condition.[8] As noted earlier in this account, within this
construct, equality is a means by which a community can be formulated using a
federal organizational form.
Equality provides a “path
to community” in which the members of a formulated union are held to be equal
in certain important aspects: moral
decision-making, dignity, participation, and consent. These qualities are not contractual, they are
constitutional; they constitute the nature of the entity.
This blog has presented five
different views regarding equality that have been held by Americans. These five views are genetic elitism, earned
elitism, equal condition, regulated condition, and equal results. This set of views is important, it is a
context the nation’s history has provided and should be kept in mind since all
of them have adherents in the nation’s current political mix. None of them have been forgotten.
Federation theory
incorporates a regulated condition (equal opportunity/limited reward) view of
equality or what Selznick calls equality of treatment. Here is a description of this view that can
also serve as a definition for a regulated condition:
Individuals who enjoy superior human assets (e.g.,
intelligence, physical dexterity, humor, etc.) do so because of effort for the
most part, but also are “blessed” in having been exposed to favorable
conditions – a la the concerns
expressed by philosopher John Rawls.[9] Their superiority entitles them to above
normal consideration, but limited only to areas associated with their earned
accomplishments. This view can be
summarized by the phrase, equal opportunity/limited rewards.
Any
entitlements (rewards) are time limited as a recipient must continue to
demonstrate his or her worthiness and said rewards, other than status, must be
purchased. Monetary rewards –
compensation or other forms of income – are paid in exchange for the
individual’s labor and are calculated by reasonable standards to represent that
labor’s contribution to the welfare of the society.
Reward
relies generally on market forces but can be manipulated (regulated) to reflect
what is deemed as the accrued social contribution by the individual and other societal
needs. This regulation is carried out
through mostly taxes or minimum wage provisions. This orientation allows the individual to
negotiate his compensation, but this process is regulated in some fashion –
either by law, by custom, or some other expectations which are broadly accepted
as being legitimate.
As stated above, this
orientation of equality holds that some individuals enjoy superior human assets
due to their efforts but only in part. It takes on the arguments of Rawls –
especially the notion that individual assets are to a great degree the product
of factors beyond the control or responsibility of the individual.[10]
By doing so, the role of
community is highlighted and nurturing forces are recognized as having a
significant effect on what a person can accomplish. Notice that there is no ascribing worth or
higher or lower status due to race, nationality, ethnicity, age, gender, or
sexual orientation.
Also, any special
considerations, based on income or class, are purchased in an open, albeit
regulated, market arrangement. There are
two forms of this equality: baseline
equality and regulated condition. These
will be described and explained in the next postings.
[1] Philip Selznick, The
Moral Commonwealth: Social Theory and
the Promise of Community, (Berkeley, CA:
University of California Press, 1992),
483-484.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Donald S. Lutz, The
Origins of American Constitutionalism (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1988).
[5] Ibid.
[6] Robert
Gutierrez, “A Case for Centered Pluralism,” Curriculum
and Teaching Dialogue 5, no. 1 (2003):
71-82.
[7] Phillip Selznick, The
Moral Commonwealth: Social Theory and
the Promise of Community.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Chandran Kukathas and Philip Pettit, Rawls:
A Theory of Justice and Its Critics (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990).
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