[Note: This posting is a continuation of a report on
the development of a civics unit of study.
This unit is directing students to formulate informed positions on a
governmental topic: ground rules
overseeing tort law. It is being
developed in real time. Writer wants to
identify his basic source of information, the Great Course’s course, Law School for Everyone.[1]]
When it comes to legal
causation, the last topic this history of tort law is reporting, the courts
hold approximation as a determining, key concern. The Palsgraf
v. Long Island Railroad[2]
case illustrates how approximation works – or how far down the chain of events does
factual causation stretch –in determining liability for a negligent act in a tort
claim. In that case, a chain of cause
and effect occurrences borders on the bazar.
Here
goes that chain: two men in 1924 are
running after a train at a railroad station.
One gets on but the other struggles to make it. A railroad employee helps by extending his hand
out. The struggling man grabs the hand
and another man on the platform also helps but what is important is not whether
the teetering man makes it, but that in the jostling he drops his package. Unfortunately, the package has explosives in
the form of fireworks. Upon hitting the
tracks, they explode.
So
far, the plaintiff of this case is not involved in these events. She, Helen Palsgraf, happens to be standing some
distance away. She is not injured
directly from the fireworks; her clothing doesn’t catch fire from a spark or
she is not hit by flying debris.
Instead, she stood under these scales and the explosion caused a shock
wave that then loosens the scales causing them to descend on Palsgraf and they injured
her.
Was
the negligence of the teetering passenger or the railroad employees liable for
Palsgraf’s injuries? That was Palsgraf’s
claim in a tort case against the railroad company and the trial court agreed. That decision was further supported by the Appellate
Division. But when the case reached New
York’s highest court, the Court of Appeals, it overturned the lower courts’
decisions and found that the harm in this case was too far down the chain of
causation.
Yes,
one could readily trace a “but for” chain between the explosion and Palsgraf’s
injuries, but there was a certain aspect missing, and this being the situation,
the New York court found the link between the explosion and the harm as being too
far. The missing ingredient that subsequently
helped establish the standard that today helps courts determine whether a
factual causation link is viable or not is foreseeability.
That
is, can one determine that there was a foreseeable consequence to a negligent
act? If so, then an actionable claim can
be successful – the chain of causation is recognized. If not, the chain is broken – the chain is
not recognized in a tort claim. The New
York Court of Appeal determined that the negligent acts causing the fireworks
to explode was too remote from the injuries because that consequence was an
unforeseeable result.
Another
case, Madsen v. East Jordan Irrigation,[3]
also illustrates, in 1942, this standard. And it also, as with Palsgraf, is a case involving explosives. Without reviewing the facts of that case – having
to do with mother minks eating their young – both cases have ultrahazardous, explosive
products initiating the harm – which is usually subject to strict liability. Again, the plaintiff did not prevail and, as
with the railroad platform case, what was missing was a foreseeable
consequence.
Does
that mean that all harm must be foreseeable for it to be actionable in a tort
case involving negligence? No. The courts have also adopted an “eggshell-skull”
rule. This rule holds that if one is
responsible for a negligent act that is generally innocuous or reasonably
considered unharmful, but in a specific case turns out to be harmful, the
perpetrator of the negligence is held responsible and liable to make the victim
whole.
In
other words, a light tap on a shoulder that somehow turns out to result in
serious harm, illustrates an “eggshell-skull” event, and such claims have been
found to be successful in tort cases. The
reader is referred to an 1891 case, Vosburg
v. Putney,[4]
that illustrates this limitation to the foreseeable standard. But generally, the foreseeable standard does help
courts determine how far a chain of causation can go in terms of determining liability.
That
completes this blog’s review of legal causation and with that it concludes this
history of tort law. The history,
presented in this blog, summarized three tensions within the nation’s treatment
of tort law. The three are strict
liability vs. negligence, misfeasance vs. nonfeasance, and factual causation
vs. legal causation. These tensions were
described and explained as the product of the nation’s common law or case law
history.
[1] Edward K.
Cheng, “Torts,” Law School for Everyone
– a transcript book (Chantilly, VA: The
Teaching Company/The Great Courses, 2017), 230-445.
[2] “Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad,” Case
Briefs, n. d., accessed October 17, 2018, Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 248
N.Y. 339 (N.Y. 1928), accessed October 17, 2018, https://www.casebriefs.com/blog/law/torts/torts-keyed-to-dobbs/negligence-the-scope-of-risk-or-proximate-cause-requirement/palsgraf-v-long-island-r-co/
. Another case resolved with a Judge
Benjamin Cardoza opinion.
[3] “Madsen v. East
Jordan Irrigation, 1942” Case Briefs, n. d., accessed October 18, 2018, https://www.casebriefs.com/blog/law/torts/outline-torts-law/strict-liability-outline-torts-law/case-overviews-66/22/
.
[4] “Vosburg v.
Putney,”
Case Briefs, n. d., accessed October 18, 2018, Vosburg v. Putney, 86 Wis. 278,
56 N>W> 480, 1893 Wisc. LEXIS 133 (Wis. 1893), https://www.casebriefs.com/blog/law/torts/torts-keyed-to-epstein/intentionally-inflicted-harm-the-prima-facie-case-and-defenses/vosburg-v-putney/
.
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