To restate a claim that the last posting
offered, “Reality is the source of individual man [or woman] transcending to
what is self-defined and intuitive: ‘the perspective of knowledge as they
radiate from the self.’”[1] So does George Santayana describe the thrust
of Ralph Waldo Emerson’s version of transcendentalism. The concern that that posting expressed is
that this view significantly diminishes the disciplinary effect of Calvinism on
Americans during its early history. The
result was that a division emerged in how they saw good and evil, right and
wrong.
This
division of perception materializes in what Daniel Elazar[2]
describes as two competing views of social relations: the marketplace view, in which relationships
among people are primarily defined in terms of bargaining arrangements when
individuals seek self-interest, and a commonweal where all citizens have
undivided interests.
Within
this division, Elazar identifies three political subcultures commingling within
the American landscape. They are the
individualistic, moralistic, and traditional subcultures. Overall, the individualistic subculture
presently holds the dominant view in the minds of Americans. It parallels the market mentality central to
the nation’s economic system. But the
other perspectives, up until the turn from the last century, were (and still might
be) strongly shared by people living within certain, areas of the country.
This posting zeroes in on a conceptual
framework by which to consider these subcultures which will, in turn, be
described in the upcoming postings; that is before outlining these subcultures,
the reader should keep in mind that the reason for this review is to get a
handle on how moralistic beliefs are socialized within the American political
culture. And, in turn, those beliefs provide
what civics education more efficiently should encourage, i.e., good
citizenship. After all, that is a moral
issue.
In that, George Lakoff offers two models for
socializing moral standards: the strict
father morality and the nurturant parent morality.[3] Lakoff writes of the strict father morality,
In
short, good parents set standards, good children obey their parents, disobedient
children are bad children, good parents punish disobedient children, punishment
makes disobedient (bad) children into obedient (good) children, and parents who
don’t punish are bad parents because they produce bad children by not punishing
them when they disobey.
In general, the concept of moral authority within communities
is patterned on parental authority within families. The general metaphor looks like the
following:
· A Community is a Family.
· Moral Authority Is Parental Authority.
· A Person Subject to Moral Authority Is a Child.
· Moral Behavior by Someone Subject to Authority
Is Obedience.
· Moral Behavior by Someone in Authority Is
Setting Standards and Enforcing Them.[4]
While one can readily find this view of
morality and parenting among various American (and other nations’) institutions
– athletic teams, the military, law enforcement, business, religion, and others
– the general thrust is to link moral claims, biases, and other forms of
thinking to moral authority. A metaphor
of a moral order emerges and in that, there are various forms depending on
exactly how it is viewed. And various
forms may appear in each society and there are overarching elements to this model
that cover those various forms.
So, in each one there is an instance of
dominance that can be stated as “A” has legitimate control over “B.” “The moral domain, creating a corresponding
hierarchy of legitimate moral authority”[5]
ensues. Since it is recurring, the
legitimacy of such a view analogizes the following: God is dominant over the world and humans;
humans are dominant over nature; adults over children; and men over women. In more common language, the following
results: God is morally in authority
over humans; humans over nature; adults over children; and men over women.
As offensive as that might sound to readers
(hopefully, most of them), one has to recognize that these beliefs still have
currency among many within the citizenry.
And one should keep in mind that variations are possible. So, there might even be a feminist version in
which this strict role is shared by both parents. And of course, such a view can expand outward
to include views of one race having legitimate dominance over another.
Lakoff summarizes, “Race, sex, and religion
are, however, very much involved in cultural dominance and so they enter into
possible versions of Moral Order.”[6] His general categorizing of this view strikes
true as one looks around and searches for why some portray what otherwise seems
unreasonable in a republic.
It points out that adopted political models –
especially to the degree they are not in line with the natural tendencies of
people – demand active political socialization.
By doing so, it helps secure a populous being logically in line with its
basic, underlying values. In part, it
demands a proactive civics program in its schools if for no other reason than
to point out the inconsistencies.
What of the other model, the nurturant parent
model? Lakoff writes,
Nurturance
presupposes empathy. A child is
helpless, it cannot care for itself. … We [see] that there are a number of
forms of empathy – absolute, egocentric, and affordable. … Empathy is rarely
simple or straightforward or pure. … [T]here are complexities of nurturance
that mirror the complexities of empathy.
Nurturance also involves rights and duties;
it inherently involves morality. A child
has a right to nurturance and a parent has a responsibility to provide it. A parent who does not adequately nurture a
child is thus metaphorically robbing that child of something it has a right to.
… [That would be] immoral.
In conceiving of morality as
nurturance, this notion of family-based morality is projected onto society in
general.
The conception of morality as
nurturance can be stated as the following conceptual metaphor:
· The Community Is a Family.
· Moral Agents Are Nurturing Parents.
· People Needing Help Are Children Needing
Nurturance.
· Moral Action is Nurturance.
This
metaphor has the following entailment, based on what one knows about being
nurturant toward children:
· To nurture children, one must have absolute and
regular empathy with them.
· To act morally toward people needing help to
survive, one must have absolute and regular empathy with them.
· Nurturance may require making sacrifices to
care for children.
· Moral action may require making sacrifices to
help truly needy people.
If
one’s community is, further, conceptualized as a family, a further entailment
follows from this metaphor:
· Family members have a responsibility to see
that children in their family are nurtured.
· Community members have a responsibility to see
that people needing help in their community are helped.[7]
And all this empathy presupposes a level of
self-nurturance. One needs to be healthy,
well-employed, and sustaining meaningful and positive relationships with other
significant friends and family members.
Consequently, a balance needs to be kept with empathy being felt outwardly
and inwardly toward the community and toward oneself. To place in balance these two domains is not
selfish; it is just being responsible for what it takes to live out a nurturing
role.
A
final concern – in terms of this review – one needs to proactively establish
and maintain healthy social ties. That
is, to be moral means to actively sustain social ties, to sacrifice when
needed, to honor the duties that such ties demand, and to view those ties as
the source of moral duties toward keeping them cogent and vibrant.
And
with these two models, strict father morality model and nurturant parent
morality model, one can apply them to the three political subcultures Elazar
identifies: the individualistic, the moralistic, and the traditionalistic. Through these analyses, one can apply Lakoff’s
models and derive the social necessities one needs to meet in applying the
elements of the various subcultures. By
doing so, one can delve further into each.
[1]
George Santayana, “The Genteel Tradition in
American Philosophy,” The Annals of America, vol. 13 (Chicago, IL: Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc, 1968), 277-288,
281.
[2]
Daniel J.
Elazar, American Federalism: A View from
the States, (New York, NY: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1966).
[3]
George
Lakoff, Moral Politics: How Liberals
and Conservatives Think (Chicago, IL:
The University of Chicago Press, 2002).
[4] Ibid., 77.
[5] Ibid., 104.
[6] Ibid., 106.
[7] Ibid., 116-118.
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