[This
blog is in the midst of a series of postings that aims to share with the reader
a history of the nation – albeit highly summary in nature – from the
perspective of a dialectic struggle.
That is the struggle between a cultural perspective that emphasizes more
communal and cooperative ideals of federalism and the individualistic
perspective of the natural rights construct.
The
general argument this blog has made is that federalism enjoyed the dominant
cultural position in the US until World War II, and after a short transition,
the natural rights view has been dominant.
Whether one perspective is dominant or the other; whichever it is, that
fact has a profound impact on the teaching of civics in American classrooms.]
This posting and the next take on a challenge that
bloggers should avoid. It’s going academic. And the main focus is to not only be definitional
– as to the meaning of federalism – but also to distinguish it from two other obscure
terms, consociationalism and Jacobinism.
The purpose for this madness is for the reader to more readily
understand what one means by using the term republic by comparing three forms of
this type of governance.
By way of contextualizing, federalism doesn’t just mean
something that sounds appropriate for some organizations to name themselves as
in “The Federation of” whatever (such as workers, builders, teachers,
etc.). And it means more than a
governing arrangement that has a central government and state governments. It is a whole way of seeing how a people
should or could be governed through their own auspices.
It would be interesting to test Americans and
see how they define the relationship between a central government and that of
the states. This writer worries that in
the minds of most in this federated nation, people see states more like
provinces than sovereign entities. Yes,
states, by being part of the US system, have relinquished certain sovereign
powers but have retained others.
But
this is getting into the weeds without defining the outer boundaries of what
federations are. And in getting at this,
this blogger relies on a name the readers of this blog have encountered many
times. That is the name, Daniel J.
Elazar, and with the help of Arend Lijphart, Elazar provides his readers with
basic definitions – in political science speak – of the above terms. And in doing so, Elazar does what many
contemporary political scientists hesitate to do.
He
writes,
For
those who are willing to take … [a] normative step or at least to recognize the
normative implication of the term [federalism], it may also be empirically
useful in describing what is, after all, a universal phenomenon of particular
significance in our age of highly complex governmental structures,
relationships, and processes.[1]
And key is the use of the term,
“intergovernmental relations,” since such a concern is universal among all
nations.
They all have, perhaps with the exceptions of
city-states (Monaco comes to mind), cities, county like divisions, provinces,
states, and other regional designations with constitutionally defined powers
and limitations. Therefore, every nation
needs to find the procedural modes of operation by which to govern between and
among these entities, hopefully in coordinated fashion.
A
comparative term, therefore, that one can use to assist in comparing political
systems is “intergovernmental relations” that focuses on how and why these
entities “mix it up” – which can be cooperative, competitive, communal, and/or
collaborative – in either conducting both long range governance and in engaging
in the politics of the day.
And
here a more common term comes into play.
One can ask how democratic the system under analysis is or simply
highlight the level at which the majority of citizens has its way to determine governmental
policy. Reminder (for long term readers
of this blog): federalism argues for instituting a qualified majority
rule. It, federalism, mainly sees pure
democracy as problematic in that it easily leads to the majority oppressing or
exploiting a minority.
In
the US, for instance, and this is currently very much an active issue, its
people’s migration to the urban centers, if the system were a purely
majoritarian democracy, would lead to the abuse of rural populations. So, the system holds certain constitutional
protections for the less densely populated areas.
They include having equal representation among
the states in the US Senate, the Electoral College provision, and the
prohibition of the central government governing certain local affairs that
don’t have constitutional protections – usually in the form of individual rights
– such as in running public school systems.
Of note, many believe that these anti-majoritarian provisions have
tilted the system too much to protect this minority and they, in turn, are
abusing the majority.
So,
at an ideal level of concern, systems that shy away from pure majoritarianism
need to be conscious and directed toward respecting whatever level of democracy
they choose to pursue or have established within their constitutional makeup. And once one leaves the direct democracy
model of an ancient Athens, representation comes into play. That is, the people don’t directly choose their
policies, but their representatives do and that makes such systems
republics.
But a question remains: how dispersed will power be within such
republics? How respectful will a given
system be in honoring the prerogatives of local governments or local
populations? Elazar identifies three
levels of dispersion. The most
centralized system is Jacobinism and that can be found in France. The purpose here is to point out that that
system has the authorities in Paris having a strong hand in what policies will
be implemented from a national to a local level – at least that has been that
nation’s traditional approach to governance.
But
there has been of late a movement to allow for more localism in France’s
governance, a movement of the last forty years or so. Here is a general description of how localism
has gained that respect in this Jacobin oriented system:
While
local government in France has a long history of centralisation, the past 20
years [as of the writing of this source in 2003] have brought some radical
changes. … In France there are three main tiers of local administration: the commune, department and region. These are both districts in which
administrative decisions made at national level are carried out and local
authorities with powers of their own.
Legally speaking, a local authority is a public-law corporation with its
own name, territory, budget, employees, etc. and has specific powers and a
certain degree of autonomy vis-à-vis central government. In addition, there are France’s overseas
territories and regional bodies (collectivities territoriales) with special
status (Paris, Marseille, Lyon, Corsica, Mayotte and Saint-Pierre-et-Mequilon).[2]
Apparently in France, there have been popular
demands to soften its Jacobinism, although this description does not indicate a
less majoritarian character of that nation’s polity.
The
next level – one of more dispersion – is consociationalism-style democracy and
is exemplified by the Netherlands. That
nation is a constitutional monarchy (the head of state is a King or Queen with
constitutional powers – albeit limited), but instead imparts the bulk of governmental
powers on ministers.
That is, the key characteristics that consociationalism-style
arrangements exhibit are a grand or overall coalition, proportional
distribution of power, mutual veto power, and autonomy dispersed to segmented
territories. But the most defining element is the executive power-sharing
arrangement, usually in the hands of an executive committee of what are called
unionist or national ministers as exists in the Netherlands. They
can be more proactive policy makers than are allowed in federalist systems, but
less so than in Jacobin-style systems.
That is, “consociational systems are dependent
upon concurrent majorities, generally aterritorial in character. Both [consociationalism and federalism] involve the systemic building of more
substantial consensus than in simple majoritarian systems [i.e., Jacobin-style
polities].”[3] Therefore, both are not as proactive systems
as simple majoritarian systems can be.
While much more can be said of these first two
forms – Jacobinism and consociationalism
– the purpose here is to
merely introduce the reader to these other two republican forms of governance
so as to better judge federalist systems in regard to majoritarian power
arrangements and dispersion of power. It
turns out these two characteristics are related to each other. The next posting will finish this review of
these three forms of republican governance by focusing on federalism. It will emphasize how federal systems deal
with dispersion and majoritarian rule.
But before leaving this posting, a reminder: the topic of republicanism and how Americans
were to define it became an issue with the New Nationalism that Theodore Roosevelt
introduced at the beginning of the twentieth century (see the last posting, “A Split in the ‘Bigness’
Debate,” January 18, 2022). His proposal not only flew in the face of
what Louis Brandeis – a more federalist advocate – favored but countered the
historical foundation that the nation assumed its political culture to be.
[1]
Daniel J.
Elazar, Exploring Federalism
(Tuscaloosa, AL: The University of
Alabama Press, 1987), 17.
[2] Nick Swift and Guy Kervella, “A Complex System Aims
to Bring French Local Government Closer to the People,” City Mayors
Government (June 23, 2003), accessed January 20, 2022, http://www.citymayors.com/france/france_gov.html . British
spelling used except for French terms.
[3]
Elazar, Exploring Federalism, 20.
No comments:
Post a Comment