JUDGING THE NATURAL RIGHTS VIEW, VII

An advocate of natural rights continues his/her presentation[1] …

With the last posting, this blog introduced the functional-structural model by Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell.[2]  That posting identified two functions – two elements of that model – that Almond and Powell highlight; they are interest articulation and interest aggregation.  Before going on with the other functions that this model deems important, a word on the other half of the model needs to be described, at least initially.

          Along with functions, it draws students’ attention on certain structural elements with their processes.  So, in the case of interest articulation, individuals or groups may engage in those processes that communicate the information they wish to convey to advance their demands and/or supports.  On rare occasions, some individuals are so powerful on their own that they find it more effective and profitable to operate by themselves.[3]  Usually, though, people find it more effective or even necessary to work the system through group affiliations.[4] 

These groups are known as interest groups or pressure groups.  Often, groups represent the interests of some economic or social constituency.  The bond between and among individuals involved can be occupation, socioeconomic class, education, or some other basis.  In Almond and Powell’s model there are four types of groups.

The first type is what they call anomic interest groups.  Anomic groups are so designated because of their spontaneous and informal nature.  Usually engaged in unstructured arrangements and activities, from unplanned demonstrations to violence, and assassinations (at times more structured groups participate in activities that are meant to seem spontaneous but are not and as such are not anomic group activities). 

Their activities – anomic groups – become more prevalent from time to time.  One such time was the anti-Vietnam demonstrations of the 1960s and more recently, Black Lives Matter demonstrations fall under this classification.  The current polarized political environment promises to encourage such activities and of course, the January 6, 2021, attack on the US Capitol has the outer appearance of such behavior, but there are investigations going on – including by a Congressional Committee – looking into how unspontaneous that demonstration was.

The second type of groups in Almond and Powell’s model is the non-associational interest groups.  These groups lack ongoing structures or set ways of making their wants heard.  They do have some bases of common interests such as class, race, ethnicity, or geographical localities.

Because they lack organization, they are usually not effective in the competition of placing their demands on political systems.  Without appropriate organization, problems these groups face have to do with how to handle internal dissimilarities among their memberships that can and often do overwhelm their similarities.

Institutional interest groups are Almond and Powell’s next type of faction.  These groups do enjoy significant levels of organization and their prime reason for existence is to pursue some aims other than interest articulations.  Examples of institutional interest groups include the churches, the bureaucracies, political parties, and the military. 

It is interesting to note that some of these groups are in government.  Another characteristic of these organizations is that interest articulation is not undertaken or accomplished by the rank and file of these organizations, but by “internal” factions (internal to the overall groups) or cliques.

When interests set up structures for the purposes of interest articulation with usual sophisticated organizations and permanent positions, then Almond and Powell consider these arrangements to be associational interest groups.  These types engage in very sophisticated, professional activities to assure success in their interest articulations. 

They hire full-time professional staffs to carry out these activities.  Some of America’s most successful institutional interest groups include such groups as American Medical Association.  Factors that tend to affect the level of success that these groups experience are wealth, appropriate skills in organizing efforts, a sense of togetherness, and a sense of purpose.

After demands are articulated to systems, the very important function of interest aggregation must take place if systems are going to be viable.  Central to this function are the activities of political parties – the main funneling entity within the system.  Through the processes of choosing candidates, with their platforms, a great deal of aggregating of demands takes place. 

When candidates propose a set of ideas and plans that they say will go into effect if elected, to be attractive to a significant number of voters, a great deal of aggregation has to take place.  This function is clearly performed, for example, when the major political parties develop their respective platforms at the national conventions every four years.  There, representatives of major interest groups try to influence the final platform statements.  Of course, this function does not stop with pre-election activities. 

The function is an ongoing concern in political systems.  The legislative phase of policy formation continues this aggregating function as well as during the execution of laws.  At all stages of governmental processes, decisions are made in which diverse interests of respective groupings are aggregated.

This model identifies three interest aggregating styles.  These styles – designated as different manners or modes by which particular structures carry out these functions – are pragmatic bargaining, absolute-value orienting, and traditionalistic preserving.  These styles, to a degree, draw readers to consider political systems other than that of the US.

In the pragmatic bargaining style, participants are willing to compromise and arrive at accommodations.  Noted for a subdued emotional tone, extreme or highly ideological demands tend to be disposed of or overwhelmed.  In two-party systems like that of the US, this style prevails.  American political parties can be seen as coalitions of diverse interest groups and serve to assist the compromising processes of diverse demands of various groups.  Consequently, these parties are referred to as brokerage parties.

In multiparty systems, usually a different style prevails.  In those situations, they tend to be more ideologically motivated and pursue more uncompromising positions.  That is, they follow an absolute-value oriented style.  Of course, under this style, compromises are much more difficult, if not impossible, to achieve.  Also, totalitarian one-party systems are noted by an absolute-value orientation, but only single positions are tolerated or exist at viable levels.

But again, in multiparty systems, the prevailing absolute-value oriented style tends to make politics more unstable and stressful.  This is especially true when coalition arrangements are formed when no party gains the majority in legislative bodies – such as parliaments.  History has shown that in those situations, governments have difficult if not impossible abilities to institute broad policy endeavors.

Almond and Powell next identify a style that was more prevalent in premodern systems in which customs and traditions determined policies.  These traditionalistic systems are found where there are low levels of institutionalization of separate political practices and structures.  The political practices and structures that exist tend to be intermixed with other social institutions. 

The political orientations of involved participants tend to be diffused by these other institutional orientations.  Other institutions, such as religion or kinship, tend to have more pronounced roles in the business of articulating or aggregating demands than the political system.  Other elites very possibly have higher status in social and political matters than political authorities do. This sort of system seems to be a good part of the story with America’s involvement in Afghanistan.

The next posting will begin with the application of these styles in American history.  Their leanings match three subcultures that Daniel Elazar identifies as characterizing the American system.  Such a review helps students apply some color or granulation to the study of governance, politics, and of course civics.  Otherwise, that study would be overly objectified and lack a lot of the drama these aspects of life inherently have.

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[1] This presentation continues with this posting.  The reader is informed that the claims made in this posting do not necessarily reflect the beliefs or knowledge of this blogger.  Instead, the posting is a representation of what an advocate of the natural rights view might present.  This is done to present a dialectic position of that construct.  This series of postings begins with “Judging Natural Rights View, I,” August 2, 2022.

[2] Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston: Little, Brown. 1966).

[3] Well-endowed factions – in terms of money or other assets – cannot only be successful on their own, but they need not share in any spoils that success might render.  See E. E. Schattschneider, The Semi-Sovereign People:  A Realist’s View of Democracy in America (New York, NY:  Hole, Rinehart and Winston, 1960).

[4] In his recently published book, From Immaturity to Polarized Politics, this blogger argues that the current political landscape in America will influence even well-endowed political actors to seek and establish political alliances with other citizens.  See Robert Gutierrez, From Immaturity to Polarized Politics:  Obstacles in Achieving a Federated Nation (Tallahassee, FL:  Gravitas Civics Books, 2022), available through Amazon.