To date, this blog, in
introducing the construct, liberated federalism, has reviewed three of its
elements: covenant or compact, equality,
and communal democracy. Readers are
invited to review the last set of postings dedicated to this construct and if they
have not read them, are encouraged to do so.
These reviews have relied on Philip Selznick’s work and his treatment of
those elements.[1]
The last of the Selznick elements is the covenant of
reason. This covenant refers to the
tacit cultural agreement to a participatory socialization, i.e., a taught
morality based on reflection and engagement.
Authority under this type of morality must be justified with reasons
which would be exercised by those involved.
This includes authority (legitimate role) in relation to processes or
methods, and to ends. The challenge lies
around the ends.
What objective standards can there be for reasoned
ends? That is the challenge concerning
ends. Ultimately, the commonwealth must
decide upon those standards, and this presupposes “… a shared resolve to prefer
and perfect dialogue and deliberation.
To this extent an element of historicity, of givenness and
self-formation, is inevitable and indispensable. But the covenant of reason is peculiar in
this, that it is reflexive and self-critical.”[2] That means all aspects of decision-making are
subject to such criticism, even the decisions that formulate the ends as well
as means.
And in that vein,
Selznick identifies three sources of resistance in fulfilling needed support of
“reasoned” ends and means.
·
One, they rely on
normative reasoning – what people decide is worthy of pursuing.[3]
·
Two, there is the
argument that one should not aggregate a person’s goals and wants into communal
rationality – its ambitions, aims, and goals.
Communities are their own entities, not a collection of individuals.
·
And three, the concern,
especially in natural rights guided nations such as the US, is that individual
rights are endangered when communities endorse a certain set of moral choices. Yet if one ranks communal welfare above
individual preferences, the former should prevail when optional policy is
considered.
Intrinsic with the
liberated federalist perspective is the concern of congealing, to some degree,
the diverse interests and purposes of a modern society. The liberated federalism construct is not a
call for complete integration of diverse groups; it is not a desire to
eliminate divisive forces in the private sector and it is not expecting
unquestioning civic virtue.
Liberated federalism
anticipates and encourages a multiplicity of interests in a healthy community. Thomas Jefferson warned the nation of the
lack of interests and factions; that if a lack exists, tyrannical rule is more
likely, if not guaranteed.[4] The search for a common good, according to
this perspective, is to be done within such an environment of diverse interests,
not against it. Yes, what is
contemplated – and acted upon – is a level of nuance, complexity, and, what’s
the word, reality.
This view or element has
a number of aspects; this posting will describe the first aspect and the
posting to come will review two others.
The first aspect of the covenant of reason element is the critique of
preferences. This aspect is an
expectation that choices will be subject, under the liberated federalism
perspective, to critical review.
Surely, in the present
market conditions, consumers are not called upon to justify their choices. Voters can make their choices in a similar
manner without giving reasons for their preferences even though their choices
have social consequences. These
arrangements are generally approved of by the assumption that people know what
is best for themselves during normal life.
But there should be only the
expectation that one’s choices are an indication of what is desirable either
for the individual or the community; it is not a conclusive claim. What is wanted should be subject to critical
view. By such a review, one understands
that ultimately choices fall under a subjective domain; therefore, their
justification does not make claims in the objective domain.
But once aims, goals, or
targets are identified, objectivity can and should be utilized. An “I want so and so because it will lead to
so and so” statement is subject to objective analysis and judgment. In the first instance, objective standards
can be applied if the expected consequence is likely to occur or there is a probability
that it will. In the second instance, the
application of standards by which one judges whether these aims are being
realistically pursued can be subject to objectivity.
Objectively derived
standards, i.e., standards divorced from the immediate condition can be applied
to determine if the consequence(s) is/are desirable for the person or the
community. Do behaviors realistically
strive toward those aims that have been identified? Do they approach communal desires is a
question one can approach from an objective view. This critical function should be obvious, but
the application of economic and rationale models has obfuscated this benefit of
reflective morality, Selznick points out.
That brings that first
aspect, critique of preferences, to an end; next will be claims of conscience,
the next aspect of covenant of reason, and then the third aspect, treatment of
individual interests will be addressed.
With those two aspects “covered,” readers will be sufficiently prepared
for the liberated federalism model.
[1] Philip Selznick, The
Moral Commonwealth: Social Theory and
the Promise of Community (Berkeley, CA:
University of California Press, 1992).
[2] Ibid., 525.
[3] While such goals, aims, targets are beyond objective
review, they are not beyond moral review.
What a people want should be questioned as to the goodness or evilness,
the rightness or wrongness.
[4] Thomas Jefferson, “From Revolutionary to Statesman/Notes
on the State of Virginia,” in Great American Political Thinkers, Volume I,
edited by Bernard E. Brown (New York, NY:
Avon Books, 1983), 307-331.
No comments:
Post a Comment