A Crucial Element of Democracy

This is a blog by Robert Gutierrez ...
While often taken for granted, civics education plays a crucial role in a democracy like ours. This Blog is dedicated to enticing its readers into taking an active role in the formulation of the civics curriculum found in their local schools. In order to do this, the Blog is offering a newer way to look at civics education, a newer construct - liberated federalism or federation theory. Daniel Elazar defines federalism as "the mode of political organization that unites separate polities within an overarching political system by distributing power among general and constituent governments in a manner designed to protect the existence and authority of both." It depends on its citizens acting in certain ways which Elazar calls federalism's processes. Federation theory, as applied to civics curriculum, has a set of aims. They are:
*Teach a view of government as a supra federated institution of society in which collective interests of the commonwealth are protected and advanced.
*Teach the philosophical basis of government's role as guardian of the grand partnership of citizens at both levels of individuals and associations of political and social intercourse.
*Convey the need of government to engender levels of support promoting a general sense of obligation and duty toward agreed upon goals and processes aimed at advancing the common betterment.
*Establish and justify a political morality which includes a process to assess whether that morality meets the needs of changing times while holding true to federalist values.
*Emphasize the integrity of the individual both in terms of liberty and equity in which each citizen is a member of a compacted arrangement and whose role is legally, politically, and socially congruent with the spirit of the Bill of Rights.
*Find a balance between a respect for national expertise and an encouragement of local, unsophisticated participation in policy decision-making and implementation.
Your input, as to the content of this Blog, is encouraged through this Blog directly or the Blog's email address: gravitascivics@gmail.com .
NOTE: This blog has led to the publication of a book. The title of that book is TOWARD A FEDERATED NATION: IMPLEMENTING NATIONAL CIVICS STANDARDS and it is available through Amazon in both ebook and paperback versions.

Tuesday, April 28, 2015

PRINCIPLES

With this posting, I continue my effort to present to educators a way of viewing and judging arguments.  This is particularly aimed at civics educators, but I think it can be helpful to all educators and the general public.  In this endeavor, I am using the ideas of Philip Selznick.[1]  He offers us a list of qualities – disciplines – by which to denote a well-crafted argument.  They are order, principle, experience, prudence, and dialogue.  The last posting reviewed order.  This posting will expand on principle.

At times, some might argue that the emphasis of pragmatic thinking radicalizes the practical and therefore, accuses it of being principle-less.  The whole notion is that pragmatism in its arguments utilizes means that will lead to ends and will, when attained, render those ends as new means to further sought after ends and on and on.  Under such a mode of argumentation, there are no ultimate ends and thus no principles.  Selznick argues that this is but a parody of pragmatist philosophy.  He points out that its main proponents, John Dewey and William James, were much ensconced in seeking ultimate goals, in ultimate principles.  And those principles had to do with moral foundational ends such as justice.  They pursued those values – ends – that facilitate cooperation.  As I have argued, a pragmatic way to view principles of justice and fairness, liberty and equality are as essential qualities that allow, in continuous fashion, productive interaction between people.  It is when these qualities are not kept, that the motivation for discord occurs and, if not remedied, encourages serious discord that can be sustained. 

But these are not the usual sought after ends.  In civic or governmental operations, usually we are engaged in seeking more immediate ends, such as whether we should construct a street or fix a water main or provide some governmental service.  It is only when we string together a long lists of “shoulds,” logically tying one to the other, that we arrive at justice and fairness.  It is in this light that I present federalist theory with the trump value of societal welfare and key instrumental values such as liberty and equality.[2]  These are ultimate or near ultimate ends. 

And these types of values – though often not at a conscious level or somewhat taken for granted – are the ends that govern and guide us as to which issues are important and which resolutions are legitimate.  Therefore, principles which include these are essential parts of good argument and when judging whether an argument has merit or not, one can ask about these ends, particularly when they are not stated or immediately discernable.  In other words, they are thought of when “something smells rotten in Denmark.”



[1] Selznick, P.  (1992).  The moral commonwealth:  Social theory and the promise of community.  Berkeley, CA:  University of California Press.

[2] These are values I have identified in previous postings.  By way of reminding you, here is a listing of these values:
       Trump Value:  Societal welfare (as experienced through societal survival and advancement)
       Key Instrumental Values:  constitutional integrity (liberty), equality, communal democracy, democratic pluralism and diversity, compacted arrangements, critical and transparent deliberation, collective problem-solving, earned trust, loyalty, patriotism, expertise
       Operational Values (partial listing):  political engagement, due process, legitimate authority, privacy, universality of human rights, tolerance, non-violence, teamwork, consideration of others, economic sufficiency, security, localism3
As can be noted, lower level values are logically derived from higher level values.  These values, other than the trump value, are not presented as a definitive set of values, but the code is fairly tied into the trump and instrumental values as central to its theoretical base – federalist theory.

Friday, April 24, 2015

ORDER

As I indicated in my last posting, I want to dedicate a few postings to the structure of good arguments.  Why?  When one considers the study of government and civic affairs, much of it is involved with making and judging arguments.  Most of that is about what constitutes good policy; should the government do this or that?  So something a civics teacher should try to instill in students is the wherewithal to determine whether a particular argument is sound and reasonable.  As Philip Selznick[1] points out, this does not mean that arguments should follow the tenets of rationalism in which all but reason is used to construct and accept an argument.  There is room for emotions in good arguments but, as the following will indicate, one needs to be disciplined in the use of reason and emotions as well as relying on religious or other philosophic beliefs.  I have often mentioned that some argument or position is a radicalization of some theory or ideology; that is, that the particular belief or claim of knowledge is held to be true and should trump all other considerations.  The problem with such arguments is that they assume perfect knowledge, something we humans have proven to be quite deficient.  “Ain’t nobody perfect.”

In the last posting, I related the “five pillars of reason” according to Selznick.  These I labeled the disciplines of good argumentation and they are order, principle, experience, prudence, and dialogue.  I briefly defined each in that posting.  With this posting, I want to begin expanding on the meaning and significance of each, starting with order.

Good arguments do rely on reason – the quality in which one attempts to consider evidence in a dispassionate way.  What that basically means is that one has to put a considered restraint on emotions, the rhetoric of others – and of oneself – and any preconceived biases or inclinations.  This denotes a slowing down or allowing enough time to reflect, to put things – ideas or objects – in logical order.  Selznick quite rightly points out that this discipline needs to be extended not only to the consideration of means toward some ends embedded in some argument, but to the ends themselves.

One of the problems of ideologies is that they tend to proffer their vision or belief of the right/correct life and yet, under such a posture, ideologies fall short of reflecting life or other aspects of realities in what one would deem totally true.  There is always some mistake as to what is claimed to be reality.  This is not only the case of some belief based on religion or some philosophy (such as Marxism), but also on belief based on science.  We simply don’t know it all.  So the discipline of order must account for this: a structural imbedding of doubt and of thinking and having to decide in terms of probabilities, not certainties.  And even when the knowledge proves to be sound, it offers a view of what is that is less than totally consistent and dependable or totally free of obstacles.  Selznick writes:
People are “reasonable” and show “good sense” when they accommodate their goals to what the world is like.  They seek change within a framework of limited alternatives and necessary trade-offs.  This ambient order, properly understood, is not an alien system of domination.  It is the world to which we belong, on which we depend, of which we are integral parts.[2]

Order leads us to think in terms of frameworks, not technical manifestos or social architecture.  It also avoids discrete values or goals, such as profits or payloads, as be-all aims of any effort.  One sees this type of offense when considering the modern corporate structure in which the goal of maximizing profits for shareholders becomes the trumping goal for just about any business decision a corporation makes – such as providing sub-living wages to workers.  This reflects the type of thinking in which rationality is divorced from reason.

In federalist theory, I have argued that the trump value of that normative theory is societal wellbeing.  Is this not a case in which rationality outstrips reason?  I believe not.  First, societal wellbeing is not a discrete value; it is a general value subject to interpretation.  The argument allows for diverse options and part of this theory in guiding civics curricular choices is not to indoctrinate students, but to facilitate those inquiries that might lead to benefits of our common welfare.  The student so led, though, must be encouraged to practice and gain proficiency in the exercise of order in such endeavors.



[1] Selznick, P.  (1992).  The moral commonwealth:  Social theory and the promise of community.  Berkeley, CA:  University of California Press.

[2] Ibid., p. 58.

Tuesday, April 21, 2015

INTRODUCING THE DEMANDS OF REASONED ARGUMENT

Philip Selznick[1] provides a useful list of qualities upon which reasoned arguments are based.  He calls them the five pillars of reason.  The qualities are order, principle, experience, prudence, and dialogue.  I will explain each, but first I want to share how I see these qualities.  They are the disciplines of reason.  When confronted with an argument, one can use these qualities to judge the viability of the argument.  I also see reasoned arguments as being the product of implemented skills.  For these, I look to a model developed by Stephen Toulmin[2] in which he divides a reasoned argument into the following elements:  evidence, warrant, support for warrant, qualifiers, reservations, and conclusion.  Each element presupposes a person be able to perform a task – to activate a skill – to accomplish it.  More on this later but for now, I want to zero-in on Selznick’s qualities.

In this posting, I am defining each quality.

Order:  This discipline calls on a person to be able to functionally objectify the information relevant to the essence of an argument.  In turn, this discipline calls on the person to keep in check any emotions, rhetoric, or prejudices or inclinations that hamper an objective seeking, analysis, and determination as to the value of the information.

Principle:  This discipline calls on a person to keep in focus ultimate goals of the argument formation process.  “Reason is end-centered:  the fate of comprehensive or long-term objectives is always to be kept in mind, always open to intelligent assessment.”[3]  This discipline needs further elucidation as hinted at below under the definition for prudence.

Experience:  This discipline is the willingness to subject formed hypothesis to experience – empirical information.  This experience comes in varies forms but is most explicit when derived from experimentation.

Prudence:  This discipline calls on a person to demand a critical review of any derived theories or models against ongoing experience.  It is what Selznick calls “practical wisdom” and while reason is end-centered, it favors the continuum of means and ends as when one looks beyond rules to the reasons for those rules.

Dialogue:  This discipline calls for a person to honor diversity of ends in terms of both goals and understandings held by others.  This honor is acted upon by engaging with others in mutual efforts by honest agents toward seeking truth and/or prudent policy.

I will, over the following postings, delve into each of these disciplines and then meld them with the skills – ala Toulmin – of reasoned argumentation.




[1] Selznick, P.  (1992).  The moral commonwealth:  Social theory and the promise of community.  Berkeley, CA:  University of California Press.

[2] Toulmin, Stephen.  (1969).  The uses of argument.  London:  Cambridge University Press.

[3] Op cit.  Selznick, p. 59.

Friday, April 17, 2015

DUE SENTIMENTALITY

A recurring concept used in this blog has been social capital.  I have borrowed the idea from the writings of Robert D. Putnam.[1]  I described it as follows:  “[Putnam] defines social capital as a societal quality characterized by having an active, public-spirited citizenry, egalitarian political relations, and a social environment of trust and cooperation.”  This posting focuses on the latter part of this quote, “a social environment of trust and cooperation.”  I want to put a bit of substance in that notion.  How does this environment come about?  Is it basically a feel-good, fluffy image that is beyond the realities of modern life? Or is it an ideal that is, if beyond complete attainment, something we as a people can strive for and make progress toward?  This blog is dedicated, to a great deal, on the assumption that this quality is a viable goal and that civics education is one tool in that effort.

It is helpful to think about how to conceptualize trust and cooperation.  I have, in several postings, expressed the idea that trust is not something that is freely given.   On more than one occasion, I have stated that trust is something that should be earned; one should not just trust whomever one encounters, but should reserve it for those who have demonstrated that they are trustworthy.  Let me describe this notion using the language of George Lakoff.[2]  He employs a metaphorical concept from accounting:
When you do something good for someone, you give something of positive value to him [or her] and what you get in exchange is “credit.”  Credit for acting morally can accumulate.  It is a form of capital. …

To place your trust in someone morally is to give him [or her] advance moral credit, credit he [or she] will repay you by acting morally.  If someone that you place your trust in acts very immorally, then you “lose trust” in him [or her], that is, you lose the moral credit that you gave him [or her] in advance as prepayment for acting morally.  He [or she] is “discredited” and “morally bankrupt.”  “Trust” is a prepayment of moral credit for future moral action.  But in general, people do not trust just anyone.  To be trusted, a person has to “build trust,” to establish a history of being trustworthy, a moral credit rating.
This accounting metaphor is helpful; it provides a mental handle on what is at stake and what is the potential of generally being able to build this “trust capital.”  But is the exchange just that, an exchange?  I believe that in addition to this mental give and take, there is more.

And this, in a small way, is what distinguishes a natural rights way of viewing social intercourse from viewing it from a federalist perspective.  At the risk of citing another past reference, I have pointed out that all behaviors begin with an emotion.  We must feel we want something before we actually act to get it – a sentimental angle.  And in this, we see that by limiting our view of trust to an exchange, we do not answer what motivates one to engage in such an exchange.  I have described the natural rights view as a good fallback way of thinking; it functions well if one has limited information or understanding of a social arrangement or of a collective.  But it does not give us much insight into how one encourages the exchanges referred to above.  For that, we need to address the elements of social infrastructure which generate the essential social forces that would result in increased justified trust to emerge.  One such element is the institution of liberated federalism in our civics and government classes.  Hopefully, this blog encourages this.



[1] Putnam, Robert D.  (2000).  Bowling alone:  The collapse and revival of American community.  New York:  Simon & Schuster.

[2] Lakoff, G.  (2002).  Moral politics:  How liberals and conservatives think.  Chicago, IL:  The University of Chicago Press.

Tuesday, April 14, 2015

I HAVE A DEAL FOR YOU

There is a lot to disagree with in the writings of Karl Marx, but his analysis of capitalism is fairly comprehensive and he does offer useful insights.  One is that in capitalism, as well as in any of the prevailing economic systems of past eras, the basic principles of that system will permeate all the institutions that make up the social infrastructure of a society.  Back in the middle ages, for example, the doctrines of the Catholic Church, which supported the feudalistic system, permeated all the institutions of European societies.  Today, the prevailing economic system is capitalism and we have a similar intrusion.  We see this in how different aspects of life have taken on the structure and processes of markets.

In terms of the concerns of this blog, the mental construct that promotes and supports this bias toward markets is the natural rights construct.  It is this construct that bolsters the idea and ideal that each of us as individuals can pursue those things we determine as valuable.  A worthy bias but one that, when radicalized, can be shortsighted and detrimental to legitimate communal interests.  A noted writer, Michael J. Sandel, looks into this ever increasing trend in our national social intercourse.

In his book, What Money Can’t Buy:  The Moral Limits of Markets, he reports on the questionable practices that have developed in this area.  Early in the book, he offers several examples of what some might consider inappropriate market offers; let me share a couple of these:
·        A prison cell upgrade:  $82 per night.  In Santa Ana, California, and some other cities, nonviolent offenders can pay for better accommodations – a clean, quiet jail cell, away from the cells for nonpaying prisoners. …
·        The services of an Indian surrogate mother to carry a pregnancy:  $6,250.  Western couples seeking surrogates increasingly outsource the job to India, where the practice is legal and the price is less than one-third the going rate in the United States.[1]
People have suggested paying students to do their assignments, and if you apply your imagination, you could probably come up with questionable and, in some cases, distasteful market exchanges.

This is a topic I want to revisit in the future.  In the meantime, let me ask you to keep your eyes and ears open to note such cases.  Overall, I would say that each questionable marketization of a product or service that falls beyond the limits we have had in place is a case which undermines certain degrees of obligation or other senses of sanctity in those areas we hold to be sacred or otherwise important.  When you can sell something, it becomes akin to a commodity.  We got rid of slavery, but are we ready to give up on other honored advantages?  As Sandel points out:  “Today, the logic of buying and selling no longer applies to material goods alone but increasingly governs the whole of life.  It is time to ask whether we want to live this way.”[2]



[1] Sandel, M. J.  (2012).  What Money Can’t Buy:  The Moral Limits of Markets.  New York, NY:  Farrar, Straus, and Giroux.  Citation on p. 3.

[2] Ibid., p. 6.

Friday, April 10, 2015

WILLING TO SUSPEND A QUESTIONING DISPOSITION

If I were to get my “druthers,” the nation would, in its civics classes, adopt the liberated federalist construct to guide the choices of content.  It would be a content filled with stories and issues that would have students engage in questions over how collectives, as opposed to individuals, make a difference in the formulation and implementation of public policy.  It would have students make valuations of public actions that affect the common welfare of the nation, as opposed to public policy that affects the private interests of individuals and/or factions.  It would certainly have students be offended by claims of ideologues who unquestionably accept versions of the truth, be it based on political, economic, and/or religious belief systems.  No; liberated federalism would strive to have students be of a critical disposition; more questioning than accepting, more dubious than accommodating – not in a disrespectful way, but in a loving or, at least, respectful way.  Given this, I believe Daniel C. Dennett[1] asks a very interesting and important question.

Let me share with you how he asks it:
I put it this way.  Suppose that we face some horrific, terrible enemy, another Hitler or something really, really bad, and here’s two different armies that we could use to defend ourselves.  I’ll call them the Gold Army and Silver Army:  same numbers, same training, same weaponry.  They’re all armored and armed as well as we can do.  The difference is that the Gold Army has been convinced that God is on their side and this is the cause of righteousness, and it’s as simple as that.  The Silver Army is entirely composed of economists.  They’re all making side insurance bets and calculating the odds of everything.

Which army do you want on the front lines?  It’s very hard to say you want the economists, but think of what that means.  What you’re saying is that we’ll just have to hoodwink all these young people into some false beliefs for their own protection and for ours.  It’s extremely hypocritical.
Wow!  I must say, when you put it that way, I take pause.  How critical do I want the next generation to be?  The concern entailed in Dennett’s question puts the basic premise of liberated federalism into a very uncomfortable light.

Of course, when Dennett mentions economists, he could as easily have said scientist or philosopher or political theorist or thinking citizen.  It could be anyone who is open to new information, to divergent arguments, to unorthodoxy.  It surely is not someone who buys into a view of final truth.  It is not someone who cannot distinguish between faith and knowledge where faith is that position between knowledge and ignorance.

I have a faith.  It is that we can encourage students to be skeptical yet motivated by a love for the common good so that he or she can be called on to sacrifice for the betterment of the commonwealth and be sufficiently obedient when the demands and the reality of a troubling time call for it.



[1] Dennett, D. C.  (2013).  The normal well-tempered mind.  In John Brockman (Ed.) Thinking: The new science of decision-making, problem-solving, and prediction (pp. 1-17).  New York, NY:  Harper Perennial.  Citation on pp. 16-17.

Tuesday, April 7, 2015

A NEED FOR A MORAL TIME

As the years go by, the twentieth century is beginning to recede in our collective memories.  Yet the turns we collectively made during that century are still making their effects quite clearly felt every day.  None are more daunting than the attacks cast upon our moral traditions.  From the effects that the writings of Friedrich Nietzsche had to the rise of atheistic, totalitarian regimes to secularization of our political discourse, we no longer hold the Judeo-Christian tradition with the reverence we once ascribed to it.  I am not passing judgement here over any of these effects, events, or transitions, but I want to point out the gravity of this turn.  I would claim that for most of us, when it comes to moral questions, we don’t go first to religious sources to determine what we consider moral and what we consider immoral.  Yes, some of us do, but the majority of us take on a more practical view than a biblical one.  When one asks, for example, should I pay my employees a living wage or should I fluff off a legitimate demand of an employer or should I support public policy that insures health care for all our fellow citizens, these are questions that I see most people respond to from a self-interest point of view.  While for most, God might not be dead, His attributed admonishments about responsibilities concerning the fate of others have become just so much background noise.

I have in this blog argued that we, through most of our national history, transformed from a more theistic foundation – a Puritanical foundation – to a secular perspective.  The transformation was slow, but completed in the years after World War II.  It was in those years that the natural rights construct became our prevalent view of government and politics.  Here, the language of liberty took dominance.  With that bias, the focus became one promoting the notion that everyone was free to determine what beliefs and values one was to hold.  Historically, there was a bit of irony involved.  When one considers what all the twentieth century had already offered up, one would think that certain moral commitments should have taken hold.  Let’s get a sense of this situation; Jonathan Glover[1] writes:
The problems have come from events, the twentieth-century history of large-scale cruelty and killing is only too familiar; the mutual slaughter of the First World War, the terror-famine of the Ukraine, the Gulag, Auschwitz, Dresden, the Burma Railway, the Hiroshima, Vietnam, the Chinese Cultural Revolution, Cambodia, Rwanda, the collapse of Yugoslavia.  These names will conjure up others.  Because of this history, it is (or should be) hard for thinking about ethics to carry on just as before.[2]
Has our rejection of religious based morality, to the degree it has happened, been a reaction to this history of misery and destruction?

I don’t have any great insight.  My only observation is that our civics curriculum that has adopted a natural rights perspective to guide its content and led to an abandonment of any systemic moral education cannot be anymore ill advised.  We cannot go back to the Puritanical days; we are too materialistic, too diverse.  But we can study moral questions.  Unlike Nietzsche, I don’t look at our Judeo-Christian tradition as a sign of weakness or a lack of will; I see it as the height of practicality.  I also see it as very much in sync with the basic moral claims of all the major religious traditions.  I saw an interesting film recently.  Focus is a film that illustrates how con artists work.  The basic technique to steal your money is to divert your attention.  There is a series of scenes in which a small army of pick- pockets and other con men and women make hay during Super Bowl week at the site of the big game.  What I took away was that you cannot beat them by thinking all you need to do is be conscious of where your valuables are.  You need to avoid such places or attend but put an empty wallet in your back pocket – perhaps with a note inside saying, “not here.”  Similarly, morality is a way to avoid the great problems in life, especially in one’s dealings with others.  Moral behavior in our social interactions tempers the motivations of others to do us harm.  One might have something someone else wants to take, but if you treat people right, at least you are providing some discouragement toward others taking advantage of you.  More positively, you can very well encourage conditions of coordination and cooperation.  It can lead to our federating ourselves with others.



[1] Glover, J.  (1999).  Humanity:  A moral history of the twentieth century.  New Haven, CT:  Yale University Press.

[2] Ibid., p. 2.