DIALOGUE

With this posting, I conclude describing and explaining the five disciplines I deem to be essential in productive argumentation – productive, that is, along federalist values.  To sum up:  I have borrowed from Philip Selznick’s[1] “five pillars of reason” to devise this set of disciplines.  My intent is to encourage educators – and other interested parties – to see argumentation from two perspectives:  one, the typical view of argumentation as a means of convincing others of a point of view; and two, as a process that can be used to seek the truth.  These disciplines, when combined with relevant skills, can be utilized in classroom instruction as a means of having students conduct inquiries over issues, especially if those issues are spurred by concern over federalism.[2]  To date, the disciplines reviewed have been order, principle, experience, and prudence.  This posting will look at dialogue.

When considering prudence, one point highlighted was the concern over the ends of arguments; that is, when considering a contested point of policy or view, one should be cognizant of the ends the argued means are meant to target.  Oftentimes, ends seem to be assumed; many times, those assumptions differ in that the ends they represent differ.  We can often detect these variances by the language each side uses.  For example, in the debate over abortion, one side will use terminology that speaks of the killing of babies.  The other side does not counter this reference directly; instead it will speak of a woman’s right to control her body.  Neither side directly contradicts the other’s claim because such language gets to the ends of the argument.  The anti-abortion side has as its unstated ends its desire to please a deity.  The other sees this battle as one prong in the war for women’s equality.  Instead of getting into all that, argument tends to avoid such “messy” aspects and just assumes, in its arguments that its ends are above reproach.

But it is here that participants should argue and they should do so through dialogue.  We engage in such dialogue not necessarily to secure agreement.  We engage in this process to seek truth by seeing other perspectives, other trains of logic, and other instances of devout and honest commitment.  It humanizes those with whom we disagree and it does so not by avoiding strenuous debate and passionate exchanges but by engaging in them.  That is part of it:  the passion, the emotions, and the rhetoric.  And yet, we can do all of this with civility.  But civility presupposes a general environment of basic trust that those with whom we disagree are honest, generally moral, and pursuant of the common good.  Therefore, we can’t have dialogue – not of the type described here – with everyone.  As a matter of fact, dialogue, while it can be attempted in usual argumentation, will probably occur infrequently.  Why?  We don’t live in a society in which federalist values are generally seen as ideal.  But this does not preclude us from holding them collectively – or even individually – as an ideal that we can strive toward.  And so, one so disposed, can seek dialogue, attempt it, and engage in it whenever possible.

But even if dialogue were readily experienced, this does not mean such argumentation will lead to agreement.  Some opposing ends have been with us since the beginnings of civilized life, if not before.  It would lead, though, to greater understanding, empathy, and respect among us all.

Although the risks are real, there is a place for the prophetic spirit, for passion and rhetoric, in communicative inquiry.  Without confrontation, unspoken assumptions may never be truly exposed to criticism and debate.  People may not really listen.[3]

And what of the demands of the classroom?  How does this dialogue work there?  The classroom can prove to be a very demanding area.  First, students are a captive audience.  What is presented to them is mostly not of their choosing.  A process that relies to any degree on argumentation, much less the process I am suggesting, needs to be cautiously approached.  Arguments over ends – what is usually treated as assumed contentions – will come to a screeching halt if the appropriate build up is not laid out.  Premature attempts at such arguments can easily devolve into shouting matches.  If that happens, those who will cease to listen will be the students who are sitting before the teacher who is attempting to promote such dialogue.

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[1] Selznick, P.  (1992).  The moral commonwealth:  Social theory and the promise of community.  Berkeley, CA:  University of California Press.

[2] For those new to this blog, the blog is, in part, dedicated to promoting a mental construct in the guidance of curricular content in the subject matter of civics.  That mental construct I entitle federation theory.  The accompanying remarks introducing the postings of this blog gives the reader an overall description of what federation theory is.

[3] Ibid., p. 62.

PRUDENCE

In the last few postings, I have been developing a view of argumentation that sees it as a process by which to seek the truth.  That is, if one is about formulating a legitimate, moral argument, that process, by its very nature, is one that seeks the truth.  When one starts the process without prejudging the result, has emotions under check, and is about searching the facts through experience, then one is looking for what is real.  This process can be adopted for classroom instructional purposes.  It can also be one in which legitimate efforts at persuasion are attempted.  Therefore, we have a dual purpose process in which one can pursue one or both of these aims.  I have indicated that in these efforts, to be honest and effective, there are disciplines or concerns that the process should effectuate.  In the past several postings, I identified the following disciplines:  order, principle, and experience.  This posting looks at prudence.[1]

One practices prudence in two domains.  One domain has to do with the disposition to distinguish between rules as abstract ideals and the practical application of rules in real situations.  The other has to do with keeping moral aims targeted when pursuing policy.  

Imprudent behavior occurs when one blindly imposes a rule in a way that disregards all the particular conditions a situation presents and applies the rule in a mechanical way.  Such imprudence forgets the reason(s) for the rule in question.

By looking at the purpose of a rule, and its value premises, judges make good their commitments to principled decision; by examining particular circumstances they take account of the inescapable uniqueness of human situations.  This is not a retreat from reason but a distinct mode of deliberation.[2]

For a rule to work, they must take into account the particular issues involved within the situation(s) in which the rule is to be applied.  A problem with ideologues and detached bureaucrats – in many cases – is this lack of prudence that leads to ineffective policy implementation and judicial tyranny.  I am presently reading Ken Follett’s last novel of his historical series of the twentieth century – Edge of Eternity.  He amply describes this imprudence when in his narrative he tells of the actions of the Soviet government in Russia.  Their blind rule-following often wrecked lives unnecessarily and, ironically in hindsight, can go far in explaining why the Soviet government no longer exists.[3]

The other domain follows.  It simply points out that in considering means and ends in the content of an argument, one should coalesce the two.  By that, I mean that both support the other in that both are true to moral standards.  These in turn need to be transparent and defensible by submitting and explaining, when requested, these standards to moral critique.  I suggest the standards, when it comes to public policy, be federalist moral standards.[4]  When so informed, one can judge how effective the advocate of an argument is in exercising the discipline of prudence.

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[1] Based on the “five pillars of reason” offered by Philip Selznick – see citation below.

[2] Selznick, P.  (1992).  The moral commonwealth:  Social theory and the promise of community.  Berkeley, CA:  University of California Press.  Citation on pp. 60-61.

[3] To be true to Follett’s narrative, often the motivations of some of the characters who act in such a way also include personal ambitions that rationalize their action by citing rules indiscriminately.

[4] I recently supplied my list of federalist values which provide the moral foundation for that construct.  See the posting, Experience, posted May 5, 2015.

THE FUNCTIONS OF EMOTIONS IN ARGUMENTS

Readers of this blog are aware that I am presently reviewing a set of disciplines essential to truth-seeking argumentation.  Engaging in arguments, due to the exacting nature of these disciplines and associated skills, is a form of seeking the truth.  The disciplines, what Philip Selznick[1] calls “the pillars of reason,” are order, principle, experience, prudence, and dialogue.  In my last posting, I described the discipline of experience and that discipline revolved around staving off the allure of emotions in arriving at legitimate conclusions.  This can be difficult.  But to further this demand or discipline by assigning no role to emotions can be detrimental in seeking the truth as well.  There is a legitimate role or function that emotions play.  Let me explain.

To begin with – as I have mentioned a time or two in this blog – all desires or aims, such as truth-seeking, begin with an emotion.  You have to desire the truth before you seek it.  And so one must nurture this emotion because oftentimes the truth can be hurtful or fear provoking; we often tend to shy away or avoid it.  Therefore, building the emotional commitment for the truth is something that takes, for most of us, a conscious effort and diligence.  Once in place and part of one’s makeup, it is hard to see how one abandons such a commitment because in the long run it will probably serve one better than the alternative of deceiving oneself or others.

The second relevant factor in this concern is that, along with all the experiences one must mull over in seeking the truth, the fact that we and those around us experience emotions is something, in itself, with which we must reckon.  It is not only another factor, but one that is central to our social world.  Our ability to empathize with the feelings of others – that is, our ability to see the factual reality of the role emotions play in the lives of all us – is essential in understanding why the social world is as it is.

And the third relevant factor is that not all argumentation is geared toward seeking the truth; in fact, little of it is.  Most argumentation is initiated for the purposes of convincing others of points of view revolving around all sorts of concerns.  These concerns can be from selling commercial items to soliciting some favor or benefit.  The use of rhetoric comes into play; that is, the art of the manipulation of language and at times illogical phraseology that either hooks onto emotions or to some illogical train of argumentative points that sound logical but are not.  So, for example, a person might say something against an argument by stating that some historical villain believed in that argument; therefore, it must be wrong to believe it. Even the worst villain or noted fool can be right some of the time.  But if your goal is to convince someone of something, then appealing to his/her emotions is something one might have to do but, if done, it should be done in a moral way; it should not be done in a dishonest or conniving way.  To be dishonest in argument can be as offensive as any slight that merits revengeful consequences and can undermine the bonds that tie citizens together.

Emotions play a role in argumentation and one should be aware of that role.  What a teacher of civics should do is train students to be able to detect their uses and even instruct them as to how they can be used, not in truth-seeking – other than in denoting their role in social behavior – but in the use of honest rhetoric for the common good.

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[1] Selznick, P.  (1992).  The moral commonwealth:  Social theory and the promise of community.  Berkeley, CA:  University of California Press.

EXPERIENCE

For the sake of public discourse in our public institutions, reasoned argument needs to be based on experience.  This is opposed to argument based in whole or in part on inspiration.  Religious argument can be based on inspiration, but in a public setting, religious argument does not suffice.  By public, I mean those settings sanctioned or sponsored by the state, such as our public schools.  It also cannot be based solely on emotions.  One cannot reasonably just say, “Well, I simply feel that way.”  Conclusions have to be based on the experiences one has had or on those experiences others report.  Both inspirations and emotions can inform one as to his/her position on some question, but then that person, in order to be reasonable, must cite experiences.

I mention this because I am presently reviewing a set of disciplines, ala Philip Selznick,[1] that a person needs to adhere to in order to argue reasonably.  To date, I have listed the disciplines of order and principle.  This posting – a short one – addresses experience.  I am reviewing these disciplines because I believe that civics educators, in particular, and educators in general should have students engage in argument.  In the case of civics, the question before students is:  what is appropriate public policy either in the case of formulating new policy or reviewing already implemented policy?  People do not agree on these types of questions because people have varied interests and public problems and issues can be quite complex.  And unlike the physical world, mistakes do not become so readily knowable or apparent.  It is amazing how often certain social conditions need to be experienced and certain reactive policies tried before we humans can detect the errors of past policy attempts.  For example, in the case of economic downturns, should the government engage in austere policies or promote, through public spending and borrowing, stimulus policies?  Even though we continuously seem to go through economic cycles with serious downturns, we still have strenuous debate as to what the appropriate public policy should be.

So with that, I am arguing that good argument should adhere to certain disciplines.  In this posting, the focus is on the discipline of experience.  Experience can be managed in several ways.  Science provides us a way that is much disciplined.  When engaging in science, there are accepted and unaccepted ways of handling and recording experience.  While the actual practice of science need not follow such a rigid protocol, reporting and analyzing the results of those activities does demand a high degree of order and strict implementation of logic.  But there are other forms of experiences that are also valid and often more efficient.  Take the person who has worked at a job or career for a long period of time, say years.  He or she develops a sense of what the job is about and, in the process and almost at a subconscious level, forms intuitive insights.  That person can tell you something is right or wrong about something related without being able to articulate why it is right or wrong.  Such insights usually prove to be spot on.  Related to such abilities are examples of heuristic thinking.  These are “rules of thumb” one develops from not so formal processes, but purely from unreflective observations.  I wrote about these mental processes in the posting entitled, Framework.   They usually prove to be correct.  But no matter how formal one is, arguments based on experiences have the advantage over inspiration or emotions in that they can be tested.  One can replicate experiences or, better still, pre-replicate and experiment as the character in the movie, Castaway, does.

We will see in later postings that when formulating an argument, one specific skill will be to cite factual information.  This will be basically the reporting of experiences – they are the “wherefores” before the “therefores.”

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[1] Selznick, P.  (1992).  The moral commonwealth:  Social theory and the promise of community.  Berkeley, CA:  University of California Press.

PRINCIPLES

With this posting, I continue my effort to present to educators a way of viewing and judging arguments.  This is particularly aimed at civics educators, but I think it can be helpful to all educators and the general public.  In this endeavor, I am using the ideas of Philip Selznick.[1]  He offers us a list of qualities – disciplines – by which to denote a well-crafted argument.  They are order, principle, experience, prudence, and dialogue.  The last posting reviewed order.  This posting will expand on principle.

At times, some might argue that the emphasis of pragmatic thinking radicalizes the practical and therefore, accuses it of being principle-less.  The whole notion is that pragmatism in its arguments utilizes means that will lead to ends and will, when attained, render those ends as new means to further sought after ends and on and on.  Under such a mode of argumentation, there are no ultimate ends and thus no principles.  Selznick argues that this is but a parody of pragmatist philosophy.  He points out that its main proponents, John Dewey and William James, were much ensconced in seeking ultimate goals, in ultimate principles.  And those principles had to do with moral foundational ends such as justice.  They pursued those values – ends – that facilitate cooperation.  As I have argued, a pragmatic way to view principles of justice and fairness, liberty and equality are as essential qualities that allow, in continuous fashion, productive interaction between people.  It is when these qualities are not kept, that the motivation for discord occurs and, if not remedied, encourages serious discord that can be sustained. 

But these are not the usual sought after ends.  In civic or governmental operations, usually we are engaged in seeking more immediate ends, such as whether we should construct a street or fix a water main or provide some governmental service.  It is only when we string together a long lists of “shoulds,” logically tying one to the other, that we arrive at justice and fairness.  It is in this light that I present federalist theory with the trump value of societal welfare and key instrumental values such as liberty and equality.[2]  These are ultimate or near ultimate ends. 

And these types of values – though often not at a conscious level or somewhat taken for granted – are the ends that govern and guide us as to which issues are important and which resolutions are legitimate.  Therefore, principles which include these are essential parts of good argument and when judging whether an argument has merit or not, one can ask about these ends, particularly when they are not stated or immediately discernable.  In other words, they are thought of when “something smells rotten in Denmark.”

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[1] Selznick, P.  (1992).  The moral commonwealth:  Social theory and the promise of community.  Berkeley, CA:  University of California Press.

[2] These are values I have identified in previous postings.  By way of reminding you, here is a listing of these values:

•       Trump Value:  Societal welfare (as experienced through societal survival and advancement)

•       Key Instrumental Values:  constitutional integrity (liberty), equality, communal democracy, democratic pluralism and diversity, compacted arrangements, critical and transparent deliberation, collective problem-solving, earned trust, loyalty, patriotism, expertise

•       Operational Values (partial listing):  political engagement, due process, legitimate authority, privacy, universality of human rights, tolerance, non-violence, teamwork, consideration of others, economic sufficiency, security, localism3

As can be noted, lower level values are logically derived from higher level values.  These values, other than the trump value, are not presented as a definitive set of values, but the code is fairly tied into the trump and instrumental values as central to its theoretical base – federalist theory.

ORDER

As I indicated in my last posting, I want to dedicate a few postings to the structure of good arguments.  Why?  When one considers the study of government and civic affairs, much of it is involved with making and judging arguments.  Most of that is about what constitutes good policy; should the government do this or that?  So something a civics teacher should try to instill in students is the wherewithal to determine whether a particular argument is sound and reasonable.  As Philip Selznick[1] points out, this does not mean that arguments should follow the tenets of rationalism in which all but reason is used to construct and accept an argument.  There is room for emotions in good arguments but, as the following will indicate, one needs to be disciplined in the use of reason and emotions as well as relying on religious or other philosophic beliefs.  I have often mentioned that some argument or position is a radicalization of some theory or ideology; that is, that the particular belief or claim of knowledge is held to be true and should trump all other considerations.  The problem with such arguments is that they assume perfect knowledge, something we humans have proven to be quite deficient.  “Ain’t nobody perfect.”

In the last posting, I related the “five pillars of reason” according to Selznick.  These I labeled the disciplines of good argumentation and they are order, principle, experience, prudence, and dialogue.  I briefly defined each in that posting.  With this posting, I want to begin expanding on the meaning and significance of each, starting with order.

Good arguments do rely on reason – the quality in which one attempts to consider evidence in a dispassionate way.  What that basically means is that one has to put a considered restraint on emotions, the rhetoric of others – and of oneself – and any preconceived biases or inclinations.  This denotes a slowing down or allowing enough time to reflect, to put things – ideas or objects – in logical order.  Selznick quite rightly points out that this discipline needs to be extended not only to the consideration of means toward some ends embedded in some argument, but to the ends themselves.

One of the problems of ideologies is that they tend to proffer their vision or belief of the right/correct life and yet, under such a posture, ideologies fall short of reflecting life or other aspects of realities in what one would deem totally true.  There is always some mistake as to what is claimed to be reality.  This is not only the case of some belief based on religion or some philosophy (such as Marxism), but also on belief based on science.  We simply don’t know it all.  So the discipline of order must account for this: a structural imbedding of doubt and of thinking and having to decide in terms of probabilities, not certainties.  And even when the knowledge proves to be sound, it offers a view of what is that is less than totally consistent and dependable or totally free of obstacles.  Selznick writes:

People are “reasonable” and show “good sense” when they accommodate their goals to what the world is like.  They seek change within a framework of limited alternatives and necessary trade-offs.  This ambient order, properly understood, is not an alien system of domination.  It is the world to which we belong, on which we depend, of which we are integral parts.[2]

Order leads us to think in terms of frameworks, not technical manifestos or social architecture.  It also avoids discrete values or goals, such as profits or payloads, as be-all aims of any effort.  One sees this type of offense when considering the modern corporate structure in which the goal of maximizing profits for shareholders becomes the trumping goal for just about any business decision a corporation makes – such as providing sub-living wages to workers.  This reflects the type of thinking in which rationality is divorced from reason.

In federalist theory, I have argued that the trump value of that normative theory is societal wellbeing.  Is this not a case in which rationality outstrips reason?  I believe not.  First, societal wellbeing is not a discrete value; it is a general value subject to interpretation.  The argument allows for diverse options and part of this theory in guiding civics curricular choices is not to indoctrinate students, but to facilitate those inquiries that might lead to benefits of our common welfare.  The student so led, though, must be encouraged to practice and gain proficiency in the exercise of order in such endeavors.

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[1] Selznick, P.  (1992).  The moral commonwealth:  Social theory and the promise of community.  Berkeley, CA:  University of California Press.

[2] Ibid., p. 58.

INTRODUCING THE DEMANDS OF REASONED ARGUMENT

Philip Selznick[1] provides a useful list of qualities upon which reasoned arguments are based.  He calls them the five pillars of reason.  The qualities are order, principle, experience, prudence, and dialogue.  I will explain each, but first I want to share how I see these qualities.  They are the disciplines of reason.  When confronted with an argument, one can use these qualities to judge the viability of the argument.  I also see reasoned arguments as being the product of implemented skills.  For these, I look to a model developed by Stephen Toulmin[2] in which he divides a reasoned argument into the following elements:  evidence, warrant, support for warrant, qualifiers, reservations, and conclusion.  Each element presupposes a person be able to perform a task – to activate a skill – to accomplish it.  More on this later but for now, I want to zero-in on Selznick’s qualities.

In this posting, I am defining each quality.

Order:  This discipline calls on a person to be able to functionally objectify the information relevant to the essence of an argument.  In turn, this discipline calls on the person to keep in check any emotions, rhetoric, or prejudices or inclinations that hamper an objective seeking, analysis, and determination as to the value of the information.

Principle:  This discipline calls on a person to keep in focus ultimate goals of the argument formation process.  “Reason is end-centered:  the fate of comprehensive or long-term objectives is always to be kept in mind, always open to intelligent assessment.”[3]  This discipline needs further elucidation as hinted at below under the definition for prudence.

Experience:  This discipline is the willingness to subject formed hypothesis to experience – empirical information.  This experience comes in varies forms but is most explicit when derived from experimentation.

Prudence:  This discipline calls on a person to demand a critical review of any derived theories or models against ongoing experience.  It is what Selznick calls “practical wisdom” and while reason is end-centered, it favors the continuum of means and ends as when one looks beyond rules to the reasons for those rules.

Dialogue:  This discipline calls for a person to honor diversity of ends in terms of both goals and understandings held by others.  This honor is acted upon by engaging with others in mutual efforts by honest agents toward seeking truth and/or prudent policy.

I will, over the following postings, delve into each of these disciplines and then meld them with the skills – ala Toulmin – of reasoned argumentation.

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[1] Selznick, P.  (1992).  The moral commonwealth:  Social theory and the promise of community.  Berkeley, CA:  University of California Press.

[2] Toulmin, Stephen.  (1969).  The uses of argument.  London:  Cambridge University Press.

[3] Op cit.  Selznick, p. 59.