JUDGING LIBERATED FEDERALISM, XV

 

This blog, which is in the midst of presenting a political model for the purposes of guiding civics curricular efforts, is set to offer the model’s second component.  The first is the community and the second is participating entities.  The model is entitled liberated federalism.  This posting describes and explains this second component.

          Entities can be persons, groups, associations (both within and without government), local governments, state governments, regional organizations of states, the national government, or arrangements, including the United States and other nations.  One can ascribe to these entities ideal attributes.

          First, entities have constitutional integrity, i.e., they have moral worth which endows them with dignity and integrity as autonomous actors in the political arena.  They can make decisions, act upon those decisions, and be held accountable for the consequences of those activities.  They, therefore, have rights.  Entities, in terms of this model, are participants in some enterprise in which an arrangement with other entities has been formulated.

          Arrangements are formulated for some purpose or purposes.  The entity is in relation with other entities within the arrangement under the auspices of some agreement.  The agreement can take the form of a verbal statement, a contract, or a compact or covenant.  Each entity has certain attributes within the context of the arrangement.

          These attributes are:

 

·       Status refers to the degree to which the entity can be considered an elite.  Leaders of the arrangement have high status; followers have lower status, non-active participants, usually, have even lower status. 

·       Conscience refers to the individual’s or collective’s ideal domain which contains the notions of desirable states in terms right and wrong behavior.  Of most relevance are the desirable feelings of right and wrong associated with the reasons for the arrangement.

·       Skills include listening, communicating, physical dexterity and athleticism, researching, and political (such as lobbying) skills, and other personality traits relevant to the role of the entity.  Personality can include humor, friendliness, tolerance, accepting disposition, assertiveness, and decisiveness.

·       Roles include leadership roles, followship roles, and other strategic positions.  This can lead to inquiry as to the appropriate types of roles that a particular arrangement should have and what kinds of entities should fill them.  Primary in determining which roles and the kinds of entities that should fill them would reflect the purpose of the arrangement.

 

Deserving special note is the attribute of character – a more encompassing attribute – that is, it deals with conscience.  It is considered not from its content but from its depth.  One asks in terms of character:  is the conscience of the entity one that is the product of a reflected process?  How well and thorough was that reflection?  And does the entity have the courage of conviction to act according to those reflected ideals?  These are the concerns of character.

          Again, associated with conscience but to a more specific level, is what the interests of the entity are. This practical attribute is the list of relevant values, both of material and non-material types, held by the entity.  This attribute is also concerned with whether the interests are short or long term.  A moral perspective is more concerned with long term interests.[1]

          Within an arrangement there can be any number of entities.  Theory can be developed, and study can be conducted to determine the optimal number of entities, given the purposes of an arrangement (beyond the scope of this account).  But whatever the number, there needs for a relationship to exist among the entities.  Federalist unions require that the entities, despite their varying statuses, enjoy equality among them.

          Donald Lutz points out that a basic characteristic of American federalism was a belief in the equality among parties that joined compact-al or covenantal associations and based on each member’s abilities to give consent. This notion can be expanded so that, as part of an extended republic, all states were given equal standing when joining a federal union of the United States.  Not all states enjoyed the same status, but all were equal under the auspices of the association.[2]   In like manner, the entities depicted in the model enjoy the same equality.

          The relationship among the entities also has communal links tying them together.  The links can include the elements of the agreement, emotional ties, shared resources, shared interests, and mutual respect.  All or any of these links would make the entities closer and more committed to accomplishing the purposes of the arrangement.

          Again, this relation has to do with what Selznick calls reciprocal advantage.[3]  This concern includes an understanding that a communal sense among the members of an arrangement increases the chances of success; it is sensitive to the whimsical nature of fortune and fate, and it avoids the disruption that a lack of dignity and integrity can cause any collective (communal) effort.

          The last aspect of the model associated with the entities is the relationship between them and the arrangement.  The entity has the obligation and duty to extend to the arrangement loyalty, trust, skills, and knowledge.  Of course, the nature of the arrangement will dictate the exact nature of these obligations and duties.  But loyalty, trust, skills, and knowledge have the very practical consequence of making success and long-term satisfaction of interests appreciably more likely.

          Any arrangement in which its member entities do not meet these obligations and duties to a minimal degree would find it very difficult to meet the purposes of its existence.[4]  This point is important in that it, in terms of day-to-day life, focuses on a basic difference between liberated federalism and the natural rights view.  The former, liberated federalism highlights these obligations and duties and the latter, natural rights, mostly dismisses them as merely the product of individual choices among the populace.

          Picking up on this attribute, in return, the arrangement has certain responsibilities to the individual entities; first, to guarantee the equal standing that an individual entity is entitled to.  This responsibility should be addressed by the arrangement’s policies, by-laws, and other governing attributes, and by the treatment of the entities in the arrangement pursuing its goals.

          Second, in cases when an entity is lacking relevant resources and skills, the arrangement, in relation to its resources and purposes, should make special allowances and possibly distribute some helpful subsidies in order to “level the playing field” among the entities.  Public schooling can be seen in this light.  Selznick writes of derivative rights that one can and should associate with equal treatment.[5]

          And that ends this account’s coverage of the first two components of the liberated federalism model, the community and participating entities.  That leaves the last component, the studied association.  The next posting will begin addressing that component as it serves as the center of this model’s concern.  For the purposes of civics education, the studied association is the US government, a state government, or governmental arrangement at the local level (e.g., city government).

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[1] Philip Selznick, The Moral Commonwealth:  Social Theory and the Promise of Community (Berkeley, CA:  University of California Press, 1992).

[2] Donald S. Lutz, “The Fundamental Orders of Connecticut, 1639,” in Roots of the Republic:  American Founding Documents Interpreted, edited by Stephen L. Schechter (Madison, WI:  Madison House, 1990.

[3] Selznick, The Moral Commonwealth.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid.

JUDGING LIBERATED FEDERALISM, XIV

 

At present, this blog has been reviewing a model of governance and politics not suitable for political science research, but for guiding curricular efforts in the study of civics and American government.  The model is entitled liberated federalism and is composed of three main components:  the community, participating entities, and the studied association.  The model is ideal – how things should work, and in which societies should strive to achieve its proposed relationships.

          The last posting shared two conditions the model points out that the community should exhibit:  “functioning community” and “cultural commitment to federalist values.”  This posting will move on to a third condition; it will describe and explain a “set of functioning and interacting institutions.”

          This condition transcends governmental or formal settings and extends to the social sector of a community.  This has a universal quality as Robert Putnam describes the viable political role the social associations in Italy have played in the northern provinces of that nation.  They have made the social life of those areas enjoy more civic minded communal environments.[1]  This condition, in turn, played a vital role in allowing the regional governmental structures of those provinces to be significantly more successful than those of the southern ones, at least until the last years of the last century.

          Such social arrangements allow and promote the levels of trust and friendliness necessary to encourage social capital:  a community marked by citizens willing, in a spirited fashion, to take an active part in citizenry duties, believe in egalitarian relations, and maintain a trusting and cooperative mode of political intercourse.  Again, this condition is applicable to different levels of society, from small associations to the national community.

          The fourth condition of an ideal community is “community with a moral primacy.”  The inclusion of this condition refers to the reality that societies are made up of kinships, relationships, and historical patterns that define the natures of these communal elements.  Inherent in these conditions are moral attributes that transcend the public and private social context that entangle the individual.  The creation of laws, in Lockean terms, is meant to perfect these realities.

          This morality is the basis of the society’s claim to being “civilized” as Philip Selznick would point out.[2]  This moral primacy of a community, at times, enforces its position on the fates of individuals.  As stated earlier in this blog, conscription during war time is such a case.  Most often, there is an on-going tension, especially in environments where the natural rights perspective holds predominant sway between the claims of rights by the individual and the community’s claim to moral primacy.

          While parochial/traditional federalism perspective – an earlier version of federalism that was dominant in the US until the years after World War II – gave theoretical respect to the claim of the individual, the history of the early republic is filled with cases where the majority engaged in tyranny in different forms. 

There was not a more compelling case than the mistreatment of African Americans with the institution of slavery and the highly discriminating practices which are practiced to this day, but there were also the ample examples of the mistreatment of the indigenous population, Jews, Catholics, women, and other minorities being the victims of such tyranny.[3]

          The liberated federalist model differs in that the balancing of individual rights and the concerns of the majority are given high priority.  It favors judicial review, although it questions certain decisions the courts have rendered as being too much in favor of individuals.  The fulcrum for balancing the claims is shifted from the strong individual position, which is currently the case under the natural rights view, to a more communal position in which the individual is expected to play an active role and is central to federalist thinking.

          Under the liberated federalist model, the individual is not left to his or her devices to engender the high levels of cognition necessary to formulate a moral system of thought.  The nation’s recent history under such a regime suggests that the result is an individual bewildered by the moral questions of the time.  This federalist perspective, on the other hand, expects individuals to engage in communal moral questions by an active participation in such issues.

          These types of experiences provide the opportunities to develop morally:

 

Without appropriate opportunities and supports, the quest for moral well-being may be confused, frustrated, and aborted; the telos [the sought after ends] may be experienced as dim and incoherent rather than clear and compelling.  Therefore, the injunction to follow nature must be sustained by a worked-out theory of what the natural end-state is and why it is worthy of our striving.[4]

         

Due to the centrality within the liberated federalist perspective of developing a moral person, rights become paramount.  Selznick goes on to point out that morality is a product only within a free person, one who chooses, through rational decision-making, to do moral things.

          And one can add, with the strength of the current natural rights view, it would seem extremely impractical to attempt to retreat to a time when there was callous disregard for individual rights.  The lasting contribution of natural rights is the clear foundation it laid down for enduring respect for individuals and their rights.

          Of particular concern is the treatment of ethnic minorities.  The argument is made in this account that federalist arrangements are a viable and promising way of handling significant ethnic diversity.  These arrangements allow heterogeneous populations to work out functional and viable interactions by allowing each group to maintain its purposes, that its members acquiesce, through respect and appropriate behavior, those values that legitimize the union of a community and define its basic procedures – or what one can call the US’ Constitutional formula.

          In terms of an arrangement that encompasses the union of a nation, such an acquiescence entails seriously felt value issues, but this is judged a matter of national cohesion on which the system of toleration depends.  For example, immigrants who come to this nation from non-modern, traditional societies will most likely bring with them values that are antithetical to values central in a modern industrial economy.[5]

          Alex Inkles writes on this point:

 

One fact seems unmistakable; indeed it seems to come as close to being a law as anything to be observed in social science.  As individuals move up the scale of individual modernity, whether judged by objective status characteristics or by psychological attributes, they regularly become more informed, active, participant citizens.  With exceptional regularity, increasing individual modernity is associated with voting, joining public organizations and participating in public actions, interacting with politicians and public figures, taking an interest in political news, and keeping up with political events … [S]tudies in the United States … found modernity to be strongly associated with lack of alienation and non-anomic feelings.[6]

 

Inkles, though, goes on to point out that while an individual’s behavior in an industrial-bureaucratic system might be somewhat affected by a participatory environment in the political realm, it does not necessarily have implications in other social realms.  In most cultural concerns, there is no legitimate reason to sacrifice cherished beliefs, customs, or norms.

          The point is that under a federalist arrangement that heavily encourages individual participation in political processes, it would not interfere with the individual in his or her dealings in other realms of his or her living arrangements and, therefore, other connections as ethnic affiliations can be (even encouraged) to be maintained.

          As a matter of fact, the alliance to subcultural groups could promote associational memberships that are seen as desirable in a federalist atmosphere.  When those groupings, in turn, see the advantages of the entailed equality inherent in federalist arrangements, they might more readily favor the political values upon which such arrangements are founded or at least give them lip service as they provide the basis for their legitimate participation in the communal democracy.

          These activities are seen under the liberated federalism model as meaningful, as they are described in transcending language.  That meaningfulness is enhanced as real political gains are experienced, and demands are satisfied.  And with that, this account completes its review of the component, community.  It will next address participating entities.

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[1] Robert D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work:  Civic Tradition in Modern Italy (Princeton, NJ:  Princeton University Press, 1993).  While this citation is dated, this recent quotation from a travel site indicates the differences between north and south Italy are pretty much still the case:  “They’re so different that you might as well be comparing two entirely different countries!”  See “North Italy vs. South Italy:  A Complete Comparison (n.d.), accessed July 22, 2023, https://travelsnippet.com/europe/italy/north-italy-vs-south-italy/.

[2] Philip Selznick, The Moral Commonwealth:  Social Theory and the Promise of Community (Berkeley, CA:  University of California Press, 1992).

[3] For example, see Isabel Wilkerson, Caste:  The Origin of Our Discontent (New York, NY:  Random House, 2023).

[4] Selznick, The Moral Commonwealth, 151.

[5] Dinesh Bhugra and Matthew A. Becker, “Migration, Cultural Bereavement and Cultural Identity, World Psychiatry, 4, 1 (February, 2005), accessed July 22, 2023, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1414713/.

[6] Alex Inkles, Exploring Individual Modernity (New York, NY:  Columbia University Press, 1983), 21-22.

JUDGING LIBERATED FEDERALISM, XIII

 

The last posting of this blog reviewed the “structure” of a liberated federalism model – a graphic representation of that model can be found in this blogger’s book, Toward a Federated Nation.[1]  This posting will begin to describe and explain the various relationships the model identifies in an ideal community that is guided by federalist values.

          The first component, the community, should ideally have the following condition, a “functioning community.”  That is a community where a certain tolerance of divergence and inclusion exists.  On the one hand, to engender a level of legitimacy for collective action, there should exist among the members of the community a general level of congruence in opinions, values, and goals.  In the US, that should especially pertain to constitutional values and beliefs.  The word to emphasize here is “general.”

          On the other hand, minorities should be respected and encouraged to participate in the actions of collective endeavors.  Of course, this tolerance – or better still, an invitational demeanor – and inclusion should include feelings of legitimacy for societal processes by which the minority can strive to be the majority or prominent minority, particularly in terms of political aims and goals.

          In short, a community is established that conveys the feeling of “the people as a whole.”  As such, there is an aversion to a raw majority rule as being sufficient to reflect the will of the people.  More of a consensus, at least among those affected by any policy proposal or implementation, should be sought and secured before collective action is initiated.

          The second condition is that there should be a “cultural commitment to federalist values in the community.”  Daniel Elazar argues that within the United States there are areas that have inherited a federalist, moral perspective from the tradition established in the New England colonies.[2]  In that tradition, localism is of prime importance and uniformity on a national basis is at least questioned before being justified.

          Pietro S. Nivola questions this quality in America today.  He writes,

 

In America, where examples of religiously or ethnically distinct jurisdictions are mild ones, like Utah and Hawaii, it seems hard to argue that the nation’s fifty states represent keen territorial diversity, and that they are the secret to this country’s cohesion. Put more generally, the sub-national entities of an increasingly mobile and assimilative society such as ours tend to demand less independence than they once did, and how much of it they get may not make as much difference for national unity.[3]

 

It is the claim here that one is treated to sufficient news items in the evening news broadcasts showing concerned citizens vehemently appearing at local city commission meetings and local school boards, making their demands known, to totally dismiss local authority in setting effective policies.  This account favors Elazar’s judgment on this point.

          And with that localism, one is delving into a certain moral stand.  To state the general beliefs of this moralistic perspective – one that this blog has pointed out as one of the three political subcultures Elazar identifies – they are:

 

1.     A political career is seen as a great calling.  It is the opportunity to do things for the betterment of the commonweal.

2.     The emphasis is on the commonweal, i.e., the search for the good society.  There seems to be the claim that individual welfare, ambitions, and efforts only make sense through the individual’s work within institutions.  Strong institutions lead to the advancement of the good society.[4]

3.     The values of honesty, selflessness, and commitment are emphasized.  In addition, citizens are admonished that it is their duty to participate in the public politics of the community.  They reject the notion that politics is the opportunity for some to advance their self-interests and/or their careers.

4.     The community bias leads to localism.  A good society is a function of people getting involved and sharing in the responsibility to improve their local communities.

 

The moralistic subculture does place on the citizenry certain moral expectations.[5]

          While this value is stated in terms of the general community, its concepts are equally applicable to more localized settings as in the community of a family, a business, a school, or any other arrangement.  If these qualities are sufficiently satisfied in any arrangement, one can consider that arrangement an association.  Ideally, arrangements should be associations and that claim is strengthened only by how important the arrangement is judged to be.

          Here, one can step back and consider that most references to federalism have had to do with its structural elements, and when applied to the US, they usually mean the relationship between the central government and the state governments.  But Elazar prominently points out that federalism is a more encompassing concept or construct.  He writes about the federalism’s processes and that they revolve around such concerns as community and individual participation or engagement in governance and politics.[6]

          Overall, federalist values do support and encourage an active citizenry not only from the perspective as when one’s self-interests are engaged, but also from the view that there exists a set of duties and obligations entailed with a citizenry that calls for such involvement.  Such a perspective relies on a palpable sense of partnership among the US citizenry.  To upgrade this notion beyond some platitude, one needs to appreciate the role civics education should play, for this goes beyond sterile roles that people hold, and verges on culturally based sentiments.

          The next posting will address the other two communal conditions that a federated community extols:  “set of functioning and interacting institutions” and “community with a moral primacy.”  Readers are reminded that what is being described and explained is proposed as ideal qualities that civics education should promote.

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[1] Robert Gutierrez, Toward a Federated Nation:  Implementing National Civics Standards (Tallahassee, FL:  Gravitas/Civics Books, 2020).  The illustration is on page 230.  The book is available through Amazon and other online book sellers.

 [2] Daniel J. Elazar, American Federalism: A View from the States (New York, NY: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1966).

[3] Pietro S. Nivola, “Why Federalism Matters,” Brookings (October 1, 2005), accessed July 19, 2023, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/why-federalism-matters/.

[4] See Robert N. Bellah, Richard Madsen, William M. Sullivan, Ann Swidler, and Steven M. Tipton, Habits of the Heart:  Individualism and Commitment in American Life (New York, NY:  Harper and Row, Publishers, 1985).

[5] Elazar, American Federalism.

[6] Daniel J. Elazar, Exploring Federalism (Tuscaloosa, AL:  The University of Alabama Press, 1987).

JUDGING LIBERATED FEDERALISM, XII

 

With the four elements of a liberated federalist model described and explained over the last series of postings, this posting begins the description and explanation of the model itself.  To remind readers, the four elements are covenant or compact, equality, communal democracy, and covenant of reason.  Readers are encouraged to visit those postings – if not read already – and become familiar with these elements.  But for now, this blog will proceed with addressing the model.

          This blogger would like to emphasize that what follows in no way attempts to offer a model suitable for initiating professional federalist studies in political science.  Instead, the model is meant to provide a starting point, a source of ideas and questions that would be suitable for designing curricular content regarding the study of government and politics at the secondary level of American schools.

          The model is made up of three main components:  the community, participating entities, and the association.  A visual representation of the model is depicted in a graphic rendition and can be seen in this blogger’s book, Toward a Federated Nation.[1]  Unfortunately, the platform upon which this blog appears is not amenable to including that illustration, but the book’s rendition is well displayed, and the book is inexpensive (available through Amazon).  In any event, readers will be able to understand what follows without having the graphic version before them.

          In general, the model attempts to place the interactive elements and their aspects in relationship to each other.  The model is normative in that it presents an ideal set of relationships.  The model is also non-specific regarding levels of political activity.  That is, the model can be applied to local, state, regional, or national arrangements, both within and without government.

          The model is also situational, depicting situations in which political actors are confronted with politically challenging conditions.  Therefore, the community, participating entities, and the association are represented by different symbols.  There are outer boxes, made up of dashed lines and that symbolically enclose the community in which featured associations exist – these can be the government or other arrangements such as churches, schools, corporations, non-incorporated businesses, etc.

          An ideal community is characterized by the attributes identified along the boundary of the model, i.e., they are a functioning community holding cultural commitment to federalist values to a significant degree, a set of functioning and interacting institutions, and a community with moral primacy.  Of course, these are ideal characterizations and worthy, in real life, to pursue their eventuality to whatever degree possible.  They will be further explained in upcoming postings.

          Participating entities can be persons, arrangements (any organized groups), or associations within the community in which the studied association exists.  For example, that could be a labor union as a participating entity in the national community ruled by the US government, which in this example is the association under study.

The center of the model has an enclosed area that represents the association under study.  From that center, arrows emanate to the entity boxes and represent those bonds that ideally characterize the relationship between those persons, arrangements, or associations with the studied association.

          The characteristics of those bonds are preferred qualities such as equality and communal links.  Each entity ideally should extend to the studied association loyalty, trust, skills, and knowledge.  In exchange, the entity ideally should expect from the association equal standing and, if needed, allowances so that the entity can viably participate in the expected processes with the studied association.

          To further characterize each entity, it should be afforded constitutional integrity.  That affirmation refers to the individual or group rights that protect the integrity of each entity.  In terms of how the entity defines his/her/its station within the relationships denoted in the model, there are the following types of held qualities:  status of entity, its conscience, and its practical attributes.  These last elements identify the relevant assets and designations that the entity brings to the association. 

The large, central enclosure, the association, has in its encompassing character (or designation of its type) reference to its founding agreement which would be in the form of a compact, covenant, or charter.  In addition, the association ideally should be based on two qualities:  qualified majority rule and minority rights.  These are familiar to most people.

          In a more central sense of what an association is – what type it is – there are characteristics that establish the distinctive characteristics of the studied association.  Those would be the terms of the specific compact-al, covenantal, or chartered agreement among its members.  In this last concern, there are three characteristics which are fraternal ethos (or sense of partnership), elements of communal democracy, and a deliberative process by which decisions are made.

          Not all arrangements are associations; some are merely arrangements.  An association is an arrangement, making association a subclass under arrangement.  Associations need to be sufficiently federalist in their makeup – such as a sufficient sense of partnership among their members – to be so considered or defined as an association and not merely an arrangement.

          The final element of the model refers to the specific conditions that would be studied in an instructional lesson utilizing this model.  That is, a particular lesson would investigate a case in which the association is confronted by a politically challenging condition.  The study would apply an analysis of the situation based on the ideals presented by the model.

          Ideally, an association would produce some action that could be defended as a moral response and one which would portray the responsibility of the association to uphold the communal well-being of the community.  The condition studied is represented as an input to the association.  The ideal reaction by the association is illustrated by an output from the association.

          Hopefully, readers will have access to the graphic illustration of the model, but all of this will be described and explained in upcoming postings.  That material will review each of the above identified “interactions” among the elements of this model.  Again, readers without the illustration, this blogger believes, will be able to make sense of the model and how it portrays the ideas and ideals of the liberated federalist construct.  But, truly, feel free to purchase the book, Toward a Federated Nation, and look at page 230 for the graphic illustration.

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[1] Robert Gutierrez, Toward a Federated Nation:  Implementing National Civics Standards (Tallahassee, FL:  Gravitas/Civics Books, 2020), 230.

JUDGING LIBERATED FEDERALISM, XI

 

In the last posting, this blog introduced the last of four elements constituting the mental construct, liberated federalism.  Along with covenant or compact, equality, and communal democracy, the fourth element is covenant of reason.  This blog is sharing three aspects of this last element; the last posting addressed the first of these, critique of preferences.  This posting will turn to the other two:  claims of conscience and treatment of individual interests and, as with the other ideas concerning liberated federalism, it will rely on the theorizing of Philip Selznick.[1]

          As for claims of conscience, the liberated federalist perspective holds that an integral attribute of human dignity is the ability and rights to formulate the substance of one’s conscience.  But this right is not given blanket approval irrespective of its content.  A challenging distinction must be made.  This perspective holds that any set of beliefs is subject to a review of its justification in terms of existing moral systems.

          This does not mean that a particular set of such beliefs needs to precisely reflect an existing system; one can vary from such systems, but its premises should meet reasonable standards.  Beyond this test, there is a certain level of insulation granted to the person or group who has formulated these beliefs.  The risk is to abet evil beliefs.

          Toleration of diverse beliefs should not preclude vigilance against such evil.  Activities based on such evil, short of illegal ones, should be allowed, not out of a concern for dignity of those who harbor such beliefs, but out of a concern for the “slippery slope.”  When actions or beliefs are prohibited, where do the prohibitions end?  Hard rules need to be set up for this eventuality to protect society against the temptations to abuse rights in this area.

          In terms of the broader arenas of private interests, what elicit reflective morality?  For example, is the business world beyond any realistic expectation for decision making that is based on moral concerns or, as various commentators have pointed out, are American businesses restrained only by the fear of being caught in illegal activities? 

The liberated federalist perspective first recognizes the essential role that self-interest plays in the success of capitalism.  Self-interest is seen as a dispassionate view about what beneficial assets are possessed by a party and the potential opportunities presented to that party.  Self-interest is to maintain and advance those assets and opportunities.  As a disciplined motivator, it is a source of energy that capitalistic systems assume to be needed for success.

          But there is a difference between short-term self-interest and long-term self-interest.  Short term self-interest accounts for immediate benefits and costs.  It is analyzed by marginal analysis (that this blog described when reviewing the natural rights view).  Particular gains are usually the goal, and the consequences are narrowly defined. 

Long-term self-interest considers benefits and costs from a longer time perspective.  As such, the relevant concerns consider a wider range of benefits and costs.  The practical concerns of moral behavior are more readily taken into the calculations.  Interest in trust and cooperation, as long-term assets, become more viable.  That is, reflective morality, based on self-interest, has an opportunity to take place in the long term.  The challenge is to encourage the discipline needed to think in the long term.

          The Madisonian model stated that numbers of factions are important.  A few factions, say one or two of them, are likely to be in political environments that allow them to become highly powerful.  But when many compete, these factions do so for power assets preventing a few of them from taking control, and this is relevant to advancing the common good. 

It, the model, did not count on Americans being disposed to consider long term self-interest and relying on such consideration to encourage or be a source of desirable behavior.  Instead, Madison argued that the competition of factions in an extended republic (with many factions competing in their respective markets) was to yield outcomes with the highest possible good.

          The liberated federalist perspective does not dismiss a Madisonian solution as totally dysfunctional to that stated end.  As a back-up structural arrangement, it performs well.  But it cannot substitute for a generally socialized value that supports people, including businesspeople, engaging in long term self-interest calculations.  Such a socialized message depends on strong institutions at the local level, such as family, church, and schools.  Such a message should be an integral part of government and civic instruction at the secondary level.

          The next, and last aspect of the covenant of reason has to do with individual interest and the common good.  Is the community – common – good simply the sum total of individual goods?  Or is the common good of the community something beyond that total?  Due to the nature of people, “[p]ersonal well-being requires moral competence, which includes loyalty, trust, and other group-centered virtues, and it depends on group participation, nurture, and support.”[2]

          As such, the community is a real thing, apart from the individual, and it imposes vivid opportunities and restraints.  The individual might calculate to act against the interests of the community, as in avoiding taxes which pay for services from which the individual does not directly benefit.  But the long-term interests of that individual are served with an aspirational context of social integration in which there is connection between the person and a coherent social order (a long-term concern).  Individuals need to be instructed to be aware of these benefits. 

The coherent social order or common good is in the interest of individuals, but it is an attribute of the community or commonwealth.  As just indicated, it relates more to long-term concerns rather than immediate payoffs or costs.  In this, one can appreciate the difference of liberated federalism to more simplified forms of federalism (e.g., parochial/traditional federalism) or surely the natural rights view (both constructs extensively described and explained in this blog).

In addition to the Selznick elements that this last series of postings has reviewed, one general contribution of Daniel Elazar should be added; that is the cultural commitment to federalist values that one finds in the US.  This blog has repeatedly observed that this nation has drifted from a thoroughly federalist cultural position which was prevalent in this nation from its early history to the years after World War II.  But there are still remnants found today.

Of course, and serving as a very central example, the nation still has a structural proclivity for federalist arrangements in the nation’s government (central-state arrangement) as well as other institutions.  One of the major themes of this account of the succession of dialectic struggles is to regain, at the cultural level, a firmer commitment to the moralistic stance associated with federal-republican thinking.  In an ideal liberated federalist condition, therefore, a cultural commitment to federalist values would be a prominent quality.

These then are the elements of a liberated federalist model.  These elements need to be juxtaposed in order to comprise the resulting model.  The model proposed in the next number of postings will be presented as a fundamental construct for governmental studies at the secondary level.

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[1] Philip Selznick, The Moral Commonwealth:  Social Theory and the Promise of Community (Berkeley, CA:  University of California Press, 1992).

[2] Ibid., 536.