ORIENTATION CHOICE

You might think of the content of this posting as getting into the weeds of civics and social studies education. I hope you don't. My intent is to give you a bit of insight as to the options that civics educators – teachers and material developers – have when planning what approach they intend to take as they meet the challenges of their jobs. What I have to say here actually pertains to all social studies educators as well as educators in other fields (minus the references to social science content). My efforts are inspired by the work of Alan Tom. He wrote a paper many years ago which gives us a useful language as to the basic options these educators have as they address their subject matter. His paper identifies four basic goal oriented approaches. He arrives at these four orientations by posing two questions: What type of issues should social studies' lessons emphasize? And, what type of knowledge should social studies' lessons emphasize? Let me explain.

In terms of the first question, Tom offers two options. They are descriptive issues and proscriptive issues. An educator who chooses descriptive issues feels his/her main goal in the classroom is to present to students the content his/her subject offers in describing reality, either as it is now or how it used to be. On the other hand, an educator who chooses proscriptive issues feels that his/her main responsibility is to have students deal with visions – or ideals – of what reality should be or should have been. To give analogous expectations, if we want to be told about how the world is, we might turn to journalists, but if we want to get some take on how the world should be, we might turn to a minister. So one can view this choice as one in which an educator decides whether he/she is more like a reporter or a priest. My experience tells me that most teachers view themselves more like a reporter than a rabbi.

In terms of the second question – with what type of knowledge should his/her students be concerned – there are two options: product and process. Those who choose product see themselves imparting conclusions; for example, Columbus sailed the ocean blue in 1492 or cleanliness is close to Godliness. Of course, these examples are offered only to illustrate the type of knowledge this choice entails; we would hope that teachers and material developers who choose product select more powerful conclusions. For those educators who choose process, their lessons would emphasize having students learn those processes by which conclusions are derived. This educator is not so interested in imparting content of the subject matter – its conclusions – but on how that content is discovered or reasoned.

With these two questions answered, the educator falls into one of four categories. I want to point out that these categories are ones of emphasis. By claiming an educator is of one orientation is not to say that he/she does not venture into one of the other orientations. It simply means, he/she will, through instruction or materials, dedicate more effort and concern over the demands associated with the category he/she favors. Let's look at each of the four categories.

• Descriptive/Product: This educator will emphasize the facts, concepts, generalizations, theories, etc. of his/her subject matter. He/she will want to make sure that he/she is imparting the subject's substantive content. Descriptive/Product in civics or social studies calls for an emphasis on understanding social phenomena. This, of course, will be calibrated so as to meet the sophistication of the students. In terms of the challenge this choice presents to the teacher, he/she needs to be able to gauge sufficiently well the level of abstract thinking his/her students can handle successfully. This is not easily done, especially in a class with more than twenty students, but that is the life of a public school teacher. Of the four categories, my experience tells me that most educators hold this orientation.
• Descriptive/Process: This choice calls for civics and social studies educators to have their students engage in research projects or lessons to become familiar with and practice the protocols of social scientists. This opens up lessons to a wide variety of activities that students could perform. This could include survey research, experiments, analysis of historical documents, analysis of gathered data from such sources as the US Census or opinion survey services. Here, the emphasis is on the methods by which understanding of social phenomena can be formed.
• Proscriptive/Product: This category includes those teachers who want to instill the values of some reference group. The reference group could be one that promotes religious views on morality, a political ideology, or an agenda of some interest group or faction. This promotion can vary from messaging that is direct and unambiguous or it can take the form of more subtle approaches. The methods used in this category can also include practices educators call the “hidden curriculum.” To give you a simple example, the use of bells in school reinforces the value of punctuality along with providing the practical signaling of classes beginning and ending.
• Proscriptive/Process: Educators who fall into this category will emphasize lessons in which his/her students engage in techniques of valuing. The main effort is to have students develop mental processes that employ logic as students are called on to reason through value dilemmas. As opposed to Proscriptive/Product category, this approach does not aim at having students incorporate a set of moral or political perspectives. Instead, students are to develop their own values over situations in which costs will be incurred by whatever choices they make in the dilemmas they are presented. The students are expected to defend their choices and to show consistency as the teacher questions the student. This approach is often compared with what is known as the Socratic Method.

I present these categories with parents in mind. If you are a parent, hopefully these categories will help you ask questions of the social studies teachers to whom your children are assigned in school. Remember, the categories are not exclusive designations. They simply identify the possible orientations which teachers will tend to favor. All teachers, for the most part, exhibit some of the traits associated with each of these options. For example, I can't think of a teacher who would not promote honesty as a value students should hold, but that does not mean these teachers fall within the proscriptive/product option. To determine where a teacher stands in relation to these categories, a parent would have to ask the teacher a set of appropriate questions. The effort to do so can be useful in understanding the teacher's philosophy. The parent will be more disposed to understanding the teacher's expectations. The same can be said of a parent reviewing the textbook used in civics or other social studies classes. What is interesting and possibly counterproductive occurs when there is a teacher coming from one orientation using a text based on another orientation. In most social studies classes, at least in public schools, teachers don't choose the textbook they use. They simply are given the text and have to coordinate their efforts with the structure, content, and activities the text contains. What usually happens is that the teacher simply follows the orientation of the text. As a matter of fact, most teachers view their jobs through the prism of one of these orientations, usually Descriptive/Product, and are unaware that a choice has been made.

COUNTING ON OUR PRINCIPALS

There was a delightful story on the TV show, Sunday Morning (June 1), describing the workings of “one room” schoolhouses in today's America. Apparently, there are quite a few of these around the country. They're limited to rural areas. They are situated in schoolhouses, small in size, big enough to service up to, roughly, thirty students. One teacher runs the show – no principal, no counselor, no registrar; you get the picture. One of the teachers interviewed says she has a teacher's meeting with herself where there is pure agreement with any decisions that are made. What I found most appealing about this approach to education was the absence of bureaucracy. Not only are decisions readily made, but students are not exposed to an officious staff who are there to meet impersonal job roles. They are, instead, exposed to expectations that regular schools do not provide – such as cleaning up the place. While we are talking about only one relatively small building and a limited staff per school, this is not education on the cheap. One room schools are just as expensive to run, on a per student basis, as regular school settings are. As has always been the case, these classrooms have various grade levels in the one class and the students have the same teacher, assuming there is no turnover, year after year. A student who goes through the experience, as indicated by the one student interviewed who did and is now in a regular high school, got just as rigorous a course of study as in a regular school. An interesting aspect of this type of learning is that students eavesdrop on lessons that are meant for older students and, by so doing, get useful hints as to what awaits them in the years to come. The one aspect that seems to be a drawback is, once a student finishes eight years of the one room setting, he or she is thrown into a regular high school with thousands of students. This calls for the student to go through an adjustment period.

Could such an arrangement be tried in large cities? Perhaps the district can convert an ample sized apartment, such as a city situated doctors' office, to accommodate twenty or so students. The “school” can service the kids of the neighborhood who can, in turn, readily walk to school. Such an effort would have to be manned by specially trained teachers. Perhaps keeping track of students, on the district level, would be a nightmare. But the students have the potential to form meaningful bonds with the same teacher over the years. Oftentimes, inner city kids lack this kind of adult relationship. They can potentially identify with that teacher and become close, and this, in turn, can add motivation for the student to do well – to please this nurturer. Will such an arrangement work? I think it is something to think about and perhaps worth trying in limited numbers.

The Sunday Morning story reminded me of a bit of advice I have voiced in this blog several times. There are no “silver bullets” out there that will fix what's wrong with education. Education is a complex business. But Americans seem to be determined to find that silver bullet. So if one reform needs to be tried, then let me take a stab at it. It's fun to think in these terms and perhaps what is suggested here offers some insight into what set of changes should be implemented.

I asked myself: what one educational factor, if changed, would have the most effect on schooling? Most people would point to teachers. As a former teacher, believe me, I do not underestimate the value of a good teacher. But in terms of having the most impact on this institution, I look to the principal.

The leader at a school site, if allowed to be a leader, I believe could have the most effect on how a school is run – either for better or worse. But if the principal becomes the focus of our change efforts, how should we conceive of that position? Regardless of what changes we are willing to try, I believe how we view principals has to be changed. But such changes need to be done in the right context. First, let me state that whatever exact changes are made, parent, teacher, and community representatives should be brought in to discuss those changes. I envision changes being entailed in the contract a principal would sign; they would be spelled out as the exact job description and listing of expectations. What I am offering here is a broad outline of what the principal-ship should look like.

A principal's contract should reflect the demands of a particular school and the community the principal serves. Any school, no matter what the income level of the families served are or other resources the school has, should aim at having the vast majority of its graduates go to college. Why? Because of the demands of our economy. Without a college education today, chances are that an individual will be stuck with employment that will not provide a reasonable level of income to support a family and allow the person to prepare for an adequate retirement. So if this is a general condition, for each school, those charged with hiring a principal should develop, as part of a contract, criteria for judging a school's effectiveness along the lines of this overall goal and the population the school serves. Further, these criteria should be analyzed so that performance can be measured with high levels of sophistication over a five year period, the life of the contract, so that evaluators can see whether the school improves at a reasonable rate. Short of that, this progress should be reasonably measurable on a yearly basis so that a principal can receive formative evaluations that point out where a principal needs to improve. Of course, if a yearly evaluation points to a situation in which the school is seriously heading in the wrong direction, then it can be used to justify dismissing the principal before the five year contract period is completed.

With that, the process of interviewing candidates for the position can begin. Questions asked of these prospective principals should concern how that person sees him/herself and the school staff advancing the school's performance toward the identified aims. The candidate should be able to give a good developmental picture of how progress will occur and what state the school will be in after the five years are over. The prospective principal should be able to describe and explain his/her approach to the job as a detailed philosophy he/she would bring to the position.

Once hired, a principal should be given a great deal of autonomy. The person should be able to hire the staff, beginning with the assistant principals – this responsibility is something school district officials like to hold onto in order to reward or punish administrators throughout the district. Oftentimes, assistant principal positions are given to those incompetents whom district officials don't know where to place. The principal can then hire the teachers he/she feels would help in meeting the aims outlined for the school. While the supply of teachers, at any given time, limits the choices a principal has, he/she can look for, as best he/she can, those prospective teachers who buy into the philosophy the principal has. The conditions of employment for teachers and staff members should include the provision that continued employment is contingent on performing in accordance with the principal's philosophy. Why do I emphasize this element? I see this aspect as a way to promote, if not guarantee, consistency in the experiences the students have in the different classes they attend. Enhancing the consistency that students experience, I believe, is critical to successful instruction but is often disregarded in running schools. I will explain why shortly.

I believe the success of any school would be enhanced by running the school according to federalist principles. But that's me. While I cannot claim that that is the only way to meet success, I do believe that creating a viable community among administrators, teachers, other staff members, students, and parents increases the probabilities that the school will meet expectations of all of its stakeholders. From personal experience, I believe my high school was run by such an approach though the word federalist probably did not occur to any of the people involved. While I was there, that school was successful even though the income level of the school was not very high. It was a Catholic school, so one can consider the school having a built-in unifying philosophy – at least as compared to most public high schools. And while all of the teachers did not belong to the religious order that ran the school, most did. They were members of the order's regional district and were trained in the same teacher training facilities. They followed the philosophy of the founder of the order and reflected also the ideas of St. Thomas Aquinas. My point is, there was consistency in the instruction I received and I, therefore, never questioned the legitimacy of any one teacher. But if a student is meeting up with inconsistency, then when challenged, it becomes too easy for that student to question what a teacher is trying to do. Consistency means that expectations range within limited boundaries. It guards against some teacher being too easy and others being too unreasonably hard. It also helps in establishing the guidelines by which teachers can be evaluated. A student, under this mode, knows what's up. Let me be clear; I am not saying teachers have to agree or believe a particular political view or ideology or agree on social issues. As a matter of fact, diversity in these areas is probably preferred. But in terms of educational philosophy, agreement should be sought.

After the five years, the principal's contract is up and the person, if he/she wants to continue, goes through the process again. Others should be allowed to vie for the position, but an incumbent would probably have an advantage, assuming the identified aims and goals set out five years before have been reasonably met. A change of principal can be very disruptive – given a change at the top could lead to mass changes in the school's personnel. But opening up the process to this degree could protect a community from being stuck with a person who is not performing sufficiently well.

Under this system, other considerations, in terms of prospective principals, should be kept in mind. The person should see being a principal as a lifelong position, not as a step toward a “downtown” job. In order to facilitate this, a bonus system could add incentives. If the school is performing according to predetermined goals and aims, the principal should be given generous bonuses over the years this is accomplished. The district might also consider a bonus lump sum designated for the school so that the principal can distribute it among the staff as he/she sees fit. The district should be on guard against cheating or fudging the numbers. Outside evaluators should be used. This form of compensation would add a degree of power the principal can use to motivate staff and give, for example, a teacher a more tangible sense if he or she is doing a good job.

So, this is how I would change this one factor – my silver bullet. Would it be enough? Short of a comprehensive approach to solving school problems, I do believe addressing the way we look and treat principals would have the most “bang” for our efforts. On what expertise do I base this position? Twenty-five years of classroom experience and a few graduate level courses in administration inform my thinking, but that doesn't make me an expert. What I do feel fairly certain about is that a principal, more than any other person on a secondary school campus, does establish the tone and mood of that school. I have had good principals and I have had awful principals and all of my co-workers knew the difference.

A VALUES APPROACH

This posting is the last of a set of entries which is dedicated to the topic of values education. If you have not read the two previous postings, it would probably be best to go back and do so, although I believe this posting stands on its own. To date, I have presented two instructional models on how values can be treated in the classroom – they're procedural approaches to addressing what it means to say liberty is when a person has the right to do what he or she should do. This latter concern reflects how federalists see liberty and, as someone who is promoting a version of federalism, I foster such a view if only as an ideal. Of course, this view of liberty flies in the face of the natural rights view which states: liberty is the right to do what one wants to do as long as what one does does not hurt others or prevent others from having the same rights. In case you have missed my bias, I do believe schools have a role in promoting values. Therefore, what I am promoting is counter to the prevalent, natural rights view. For me, the question is not whether to deal in values education, but how it should be done.

For example, should a school make a list of values and say, “We're about promoting these values”? There is an approach that basically does this. There have been school districts around the country that have adopted a model proposed by Thomas Lickona.¹ In this model, some process is established locally to devise a list of values,² such as respect for fellow citizens and honesty, then garner a majority support for the list, and incorporate it into the district's curriculum so that the values on the list can be “taught” to the students of that district. This is similar to the widely advertised strategy that the First Tee program, a national golf instructional program, has instituted. I do have some concerns over this approach. I noticed that none of the formulated lists I have become aware of have such values reflecting critical thinking values or “questioning authority” values. Beyond that, the approach does not address the eventuality that any value on such a list, no matter how commendable it is, will come into conflict with another value on the list as it is applied in real life. For example, one such conflict occurs when a person has to decide whether to spend more time doing work related activities or meeting child rearing responsibilities at home. Dilemmas in life are caused by such conflicts and a curriculum that does not address value conflicts does not prepare students for such situations.

But then again, the aim of such approaches is not for students to “think” about these things, but to accept a line of thinking. Some might call that indoctrination. That has to offend true advocates of the natural rights perspective. And we see that contention in today's headlines. Over the past years, the First Lady, Michelle Obama, has been promoting healthy foods in our school lunchrooms and the elimination of unhealthy foods from vending machines installed on our school campuses. On the face of it, how can anyone protest this effort or the value upon which such an effort is based? One can ask this especially when we have had an obesity problem among the nation's youth. Yet there has been a constant drumbeat against Obama's efforts, describing them as government interfering with child rearing decisions. That is, this “governmental” initiative is trying to interfere with individuals deciding for themselves what it is they or their children will eat for lunch. Some of this is just plain political shenanigans, but the glimmer of seriousness this reaction might express reflects a bias toward natural rights values. Schools, under this predominant view, have no business trying to instill any values with the exception of the value entailed with the unencumbered rights to choose on an individual basis – no matter how immature the person is.

For a federalist, there are two tugging conceptual forces at play. As with Raths' approach to values education, a federalist would be concerned with a student being able to define what he or she believes in – a central element of having a positive self-image, a view of who one is. Only this kind of person – a person who actively is about determining his or her own values – can be an active member of a federated union, a person who knows, appreciates, and can act in fulfilling his or her responsibilities within that association. On the other hand, as with the Oliver-Shaver approach, a federalist has an overarching value orientation that is shared by the other members of the association since no association– be it a social group, a sports league, a family, a local jurisdiction, or a nation – exists without valued aims and goals. Whether that orientation follows Gunnar Myrdal's American Creed or the federalist moral code offered in this blog or any other moral orientation, it provides a guide to what value issues should be studied and what questions that study should utilize.

So, the efforts that constitute values education need to incorporate both the concerns of the Raths' model and those of Oliver and Shaver. Such an effort might be an affront to Rath's view, in that by adopting an overall value orientation, instruction would favor a certain values and limit, to some degree, the free-wheeling nature of that model. On the other hand, using Raths' language in carrying out instructional value discussions with students does not offend the aims of Oliver and Shaver. When I started this series of postings, I cited Maurice P. Hunt and Lawrence E. Metcalf's work and their conception of value assertions – I used their outline of three possible forms of value assertions to organize these postings. They go on to offer their own approach to values education. They combine both Raths' and Oliver and Shaver's ideas. Hunt and Metcalf's approach is similar to these two approaches in that it has the students (1) know the nature of the problem presented to them in class, (2) know the consequences of the problem and/or decision alternatives, (3) bring out the relevant student values, (4) justify value choices according to some philosophy of life. Their criterion for choosing value conflicts is to choose values that students already hold and devise a lesson that presents them with contradictory value assertions. This, in turn, causes dissonance and motivates the students to engage in defending the values they hold. By so doing, the student clarifies his/her values which might lead to strengthening those values or, upon reflection, changing or modifying them. In any event, the student will be more conscious of what he or she believes to be the good. I will not rehash Raths' and Oliver and Shaver's models to explain the overlap among their efforts and that of Hunt and Metcalf – you are invited to read the last two postings which will make it quite clear where the concepts of these models are similar. I will leave this concern with a call for educators to breathe new life into values education – no matter what the approach. Even with the shortcomings of the Lickona approach, it is better than what is currently more in vogue: an abandonment of dealing with value issues in the classroom.

1Lickona, T. (1991). Educating for character: How our schools can teach respect and responsibility. New York, NY: Bantam Books. For a shortened version of Lickona's ideas, see http://www.Scholastic. com/teachers/article/ect-interview-thomas-lickona-phd-talks-about-character-education .

2Lickona suggests honesty, compassion, courage, kindness, self-control, cooperation, diligence or hard work .

TRUE VALUING

I am in the midst of presenting in this blog a set of postings that addresses the question: what does it mean to say a person should have the right to do what one should do? In terms of federalist thought, this question is important because it reflects how that view of governance and politics views liberty, at least as an ideal. Such a view of liberty places, for educators, guided by a federalist perspective, squarely in what is known as values education. That is, by emphasizing what one should do, as opposed to what one wants to do, this view of liberty brings to the fore an analysis of values and valuing. In that light, I have over the past two postings presented three assertion statements that model the possible ways a person can express a value. They are:

• P likes X, because X leads to state Y;
• P likes X, because X is entailed in Z; or
• P likes X, because he/she simply likes X

In the last posting, I reviewed the second of these assertion types. I want to now focus on the first assertion type.

The more utilitarian assertion type points to those value statements in which a person seeks or favors an object or action that leads to some other desired object or action. For example, I like writing this blog because by doing so, among other reasons, it stirs in me my love of teaching; it reminds me of my days in the classroom. That doesn't make you my students; I wouldn't impose that role on you, but the very act of explaining something is enjoyable to me. Therefore, the blog is a vehicle to some state of mind or emotion. I believe that an instructional model in values education that is amenable to this type of assertion is the model offered by Louis E. Raths and his collaborators.¹

Raths' model for clarifying values does not offer questions that teachers might ask of students so that they might inquire into what it is they should value – it presumes that students have already formed values or dispositions favorable to some object or action – nor as a way to solicit the students' interests in the topic of specific value issues. The emphasis, instead, is to have students consider certain ways in which they think and feel about the likes they have. That is, they learn to form true values that they can accept for themselves and that they, in turn, are happy with their related choices.

As such, Raths' approach can theoretically include the first value assertion type outlined above. By categorizing it under the first type, I am not claiming that it dismisses value assertions that are derived from philosophic, ideological, or religious beliefs. A value assertion can seek to reflect those types of concerns, but the distinction is that the value in question does not need to be entailed in one of those conceptual systems. Raths' approach allows for value choices that lead to satisfying the demands of a conceptual system instead of being, of necessity, entailed to some aspect of a conceptual system. Here is an example: if I behave in a loving way toward my neighbor, my motivation can be entailed in my religious beliefs, let us say Christian beliefs. But what if my true motivation is that I want the people I know to think of me as a Christian? This latter motivation reflects a means to an end; that is, how I am perceived. As such, the value choice, acting in a loving way, is not entailed in an overarching value, Christianity, but in a way to seek a valued goal or objective, a Christian reputation. In this way, Raths' approach is more open-ended and does not necessarily lead a person to a predetermined value orientation. In turn, as I hinted above, the approach can be more utilitarian and relativistic. Again, Raths' approach does not preclude value assertions based on an overarching value system, but it does not depend on such a commitment.

Part of the appeal of this approach to values clarification is that it can in no way be considered a method by which to indoctrinate students to a set of beliefs. His written account of his approach voices the concern that so many institutions in our society are geared toward indoctrinating others. When one reviews a lot of the communication that occurs around us, we can detect some form of “selling” something to customers, clients, patients, or, I'm afraid, students. This is not necessarily a nefarious practice – the attempt to indoctrinate might be motivated by altruistic motives. The problem is that by being influenced in this way by others, we have become more prone to avoid developing a true sense of self or a sense of commitment to self-defined principles or goals. By taking a more generic view of values, a teacher who applies Raths' model is implementing a strategy aimed at getting students to learn how to form his/her own values. How does his model do this?

First, Raths defines a value as the product of a process. In turn, that process consists of the following steps: (1) choosing freely without any form of coercion; (2) choosing from alternatives; (3) understanding available alternatives by identifying and evaluating the consequences of each; (4) cherishing and prizing the choice one makes; (5) affirming the choice; (6) acting upon the choice; and (7) repeating the action when confronted with similar situations. Taken seriously, such a process places a stringent standard on what can be considered a value. When a person goes through such a process honestly, then we can say that person has a value – or stated more descriptively, he/she has formed a value. This is more meaningful than to merely state that P likes X.

Raths views a person's ability and willingness to value in this way as an element of psychological health. Short of this, a person lacks values about those things in which he/she is concerned. So while Raths does not have much to say as to what those values should be – the “Z” factor brought out in my last posting – he does have a challenging approach about what it takes to form a value, even if that value is something most of us see as unworthy of the designation.

In terms of my concerns with liberty, this model gives us insight into what a person needs to do, both psychologically and behaviorally, in order to decide what “one should do.” To speak of some “should” without consideration of the value(s) involved is meaningless. I believe the value of Raths' approach is to give us a language by which to judge whether students are truly valuing the positions they claim on any issue. The approach can be used in developing value questions. For example, students can judge how much a politician values, a la Raths, those things he/she says he/she values. Is the politician willing to act in accordance with some proclaimed value? How about in terms of the politician's consistency in times when the choice is favorable to the politician and in those times when it is not? With this type of analysis, students can study an array of politicians and perhaps begin to make generalizations about what motivates them or, at least, motivates most of them.

So, while Raths' model does not exclusively relate to the first type of value assertions, it does accommodate them. As such, for more pragmatic discussions over value choices, this approach to values clarification can be of great utility. What remains in my treatment of values discussion in the classroom is some theoretical attempt at melding together the treatment of overarching values, as provided by the Oliver-Shaver model, and the intensity of valuing, as provided by the Raths' model. My next posting will address this topic.

1Raths, L. E., Harmin, M., and Simon, S. B. (1966). Values and teaching. Columbus, OH: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Co.

BELIEVING IN “Z”

In this posting, I want to pick up on the topic I introduced in the last posting. In that posting, I asked the question: what does it mean when one says that liberty is present when a person has the right to do what he/she should do? I have offered this view of liberty as a sort of ideal that liberated federalism posits and as an alternative way we should consider liberty in civics classes – at least as a discussion topic. By placing liberty in the frame of “what one should do,” we think of it in a different way from what is proposed by those who abide by the natural rights view. The natural rights view, the dominant view, sees liberty as having the right to do what one wants to do as long as what one does does not hurt anyone else and does not preclude anyone else from having the same right. In the last posting, I introduced this topic by sharing some basic ideas regarding valuing since “what one should do” is a moral question that, in turn, revolves around values. One acts morally when one is either forced to do so or one does so out of one's own volition. It is this latter mode that relates to the federalist view of liberty. Under this construct, certain assumptions are made. At some point, one needs to analyze what those assumptions are and ask how realistic they are. Does one formulate values that reflect moral reasoning or selfish ends? This type of question hits directly at the distinction between the natural rights view and that of liberated federalism.

In that previous posting, I stated that there are basically three types of value assertions:

• P likes X, because X leads to state Y;
• P likes X, because X is entailed in Z; or
• P likes X, because he/she simply likes X

I explained each of these assertion types. The first simply means that one likes something because by getting it or doing it, some positive consequence will result. The second simply states that one likes something because that something is entailed or part of a philosophy or ideology or religious belief. And finally, the third means that a person likes something because he/she just likes it. The first two types are considered rational and the third is considered irrational. Please; if you would like to read more about this, look at my previous posting (So You Say You Like Something, 5/19/14).

I also indicated that in this posting I will delve into two educational theories on values education. In part, I chose the theories I present because they focus on one type of value assertion over the other. The two theories have been around for quite a long time. Both originated during the 1960s and are part of the “values clarification” movement that has since been heavily criticized. But I think they are of value as a means to look further into values education and identify some issues involved in getting students to look at the concern: “what one should do.”

The first theory, the Jurisprudential approach, was first offered by Donald Oliver and James Shaver.¹ Their approach emphasizes the second assertion type – P likes X because it is entailed in Z. The Jurisprudential approach is highly dependent on a particular instructional protocol. The teacher, under this approach, first has students read or otherwise become aware of a case study – a short narrative that contains as part of its story people faced with a dilemma. In each case study, the dilemma – a situation in which someone is faced with a choice that has no positive consequence – reflects a condition that challenges the human dignity of one or more of the subjects in the case. So, for example – and here I am depending on my memory – an Eskimo family in the wilds of the northern Arctic region is faced with the decision of abandoning the grandmother – a practice which is sanctioned by the culture of the people depicted – or continuing to allow the grandmother to trek through the harsh conditions the family is facing. Leaving the older woman will mean her death and having her stay with family threatens all the other members of the family. What should they do?

One might ask at this point: why present this case? According to Oliver and Shaver, they were influenced by the work of Gunnar Myrdal, a Nobel laureate economist. Myrdal was the chief researcher for a Carnegie Foundation study of the treatment of African-Americans during the years leading up to the study's release. In that study, Myrdal contends that America has a sense, well enshrined in its culture, that goodness in social and public policy should be based on a commitment to liberty, justice, equality, and fair treatment for all people. He summarized this commitment, its concern for human dignity, as the American Creed. Running in the face of all this is the attitude most Americans at the time had toward African-Americans:

There is no doubt that the overwhelming majority of white Americans desire that there be as few Negroes as possible in America. If the Negroes could be eliminated from America or greatly decreased in numbers, this would meet the whites' approval – provided that it could be accomplished by means which are also approved. Correspondingly, an increase of the proportion of Negroes in the American population is commonly looked upon as undesirable.

White prejudice and discrimination keep the Negro low in standards of living, health, education, manners and morals. This, in its turn, gives support to white prejudice. White prejudice and Negro standards thus mutually "cause" each other.²

Since these attitudes toward blacks are in direct contradiction to the American Creed, he coined the term describing this dissonance as the American dilemma. Hence, Oliver and Shaver took up this idea of using dilemmas to construct those experiences that students would be faced with when presented with situations that challenged, to the degree they shared in the American Creed, their values. How do they, for example, come down on the survival needs of an old woman compared to the survival needs of a whole family?

In the classroom using this approach, the students begin to argue how a course of action that addresses an appropriate dilemma should occur. They take a stand on a preferred action and answer questions derived from concerns over the ultimate concern, the American Creed. This all happens in discussion format in which not only teacher questions are used, but also those of students in a give and take manner. By participating, students are not told what to believe, but clarify their values in relation to a more overarching value or value structure such as the American Creed. For a variety of reasons this approach – the Jurisprudential approach – has been attacked by more fundamentally leaning religious groups and other conservatives. For example, is leaving the old woman in the icy surroundings a way to “sell” euthanasia or more currently, fictitious “death panels?” I believe that the fundamental concern of these critics is that students should have a more direct approach, one that aims at instilling unambiguous values. Usually those values reflect patriotic – in some cases, nationalistic – and religious beliefs.

The group that presented the Jurisprudential approach further assisted teachers and curricular material developers by couching useful classroom questions into three categories. They offered these categories so as to facilitate discussion and analysis: definitional questions, fact/explanation questions, and value questions. In each of these, students are held to certain communication requirements that keep the discussion on rational grounds. Value discussions easily deteriorate into emotional outbursts and other loud-mouthed assertions that aim at hurting opponents in emotionally laden debates.

Using this approach, we gain insight into the process which one needs to go through to develop a set of values that is logically consistent and defensible in terms of the terms used, the facts or explanations used as warrants for any stated positions, and value statements that can be shown to be consistent with proclaimed, higher ordered values. In using the Jurisprudential approach, the higher ordered values – the Z in our model – is the American Creed. The overlap of the American Creed and the moral code proposed in this blog is significant. Both have a sense that human dignity is central to defining moral standards. I will forgo the differences here, but I believe both are vehicles to focus on social and political issues that are important and fundamental toward societal health.

In my next posting, I will write about another value theory based on the aim to have students clarify their values. This other theory is offered by Louis E. Raths and his collaborators. By engaging in clarifying values, students have the opportunity to gain, hopefully, a better understanding of what it means to determine “what they should do.” It is a way to understand this aim from a procedural perspective.

1See http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/3054239?uid=3739600&uid=2129&uid=2&uid=70&uid=4&uid=3739256&sid=21104205421883 for a more extensive overview of the Jurisprudential approach which is also known as the Oliver-Shaver approach.

2Taken from Wikipedia article, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/An_American_Dilemma:_The_Negro_Problem_and_Modern_Democracy#American_Creed .

SO YOU SAY YOU LIKE SOMETHING

One recurring message of this blog is the distinction between the natural rights view of liberty and that of the liberated federalism view. At the risk of sounding repetitive, I summarize the difference with the following comparison: the natural rights view states that liberty means a person has the right to choose his/her course of action as long as the choice does not hurt someone else or deprive someone else of the same prerogative. On the other hand, for the liberated federalist position, the view of liberty lies in the right of the person to do what the person believes he/she should do; that is, the right to be a moral person. Given that even the most selfish and self-centered person tends to believe he/she is not immoral, then what does it mean to believe in having the right to do what one should do? What, in practical terms, distinguishes what one wants to do from the right thing to do?

This is a more complicated question than it appears to be. To answer, one needs to delve into moral theory. To begin with, and this is a topic I have previously addressed, one assumes that individuals truly have the ability to make such choices – that we truly have free will. I will not address this prerequisite condition here, but assume that, yes, for practical purposes, we do have free will or enough of a free will to make our question over the right thing to do worth asking. I will begin addressing the “right thing to do” question here by reviewing some basic ideas associated with moral thinking.

Let us start with the connection between values and morals. While morals have to do with the good, what we value is simply those things we want in the form of things or conditions either now or in the future. We can judge prior conditions according to our values, but we can't change what has already happened. So, from the perspective of determining behavior – the “to do” part of our concern – we are interested in how values affect us in the present or in the future. Yes, we can value that which is immoral. Few, though, actually see what they value as immoral; we have the ability to rationalize our choices to convince others and ourselves that what we want is moral. But alas, just look around; what people rationalize as good is often not moral. So, given the possibility that our values are not moral, if we strive to be moral, we need to analyze our values in an objective fashion. It helps to garner the opinions of others, especially those who do not have an interest in what we are reviewing, and listen to what they think of our choices. That's why I like the ethics column in the New York Times Magazine – I recommend it. As for this posting, let's look at some basic ideas concerning values.

Maurice P. Hunt and Lawrence E. Metcalf¹ (later in Byron G. Massialas and Jack Zevin²), identify three types of value assertions. Let me present them in the following three statements:

• A person likes something (P likes X) because that something leads to or acquires something else or provides a state of being. This line of thinking is judged to be rational.
• P likes X because that something is entailed in something else, such as a philosophy, an ideology, or a religious belief. While one might question the rationality of the “something else,” the value in question, “X,” is also considered a rational choice.
• P likes X because P simply likes X. This is judged to be irrational.

Let me comment on each of these. Briefly, the first of these ways of valuing is considered utilitarian in nature. A person likes or does something because it will lead to a goal or object he/she cherishes. For example, this might take the form of a student valuing his/her attendance at college because the education the student is receiving will lead to a degree and, in time, to a better job, higher pay, higher levels of work satisfaction. At least, those are goals that education can facilitate. In the second statement, the person seeks, ultimately, an association between what is valued and, to some predetermined sense of goodness, an ideal or a set of ideals. These philosophic, ideological, or religious ideals are non-empirical in nature. For example, a person likes his/her neighbor because the person is a member of a religion that holds such sentiments as moral (or not having them as immoral) and, as such, an emotional state one should hold. Both the first and second statements are considered logical systems in that they relate to some consequence. Behaving in accordance with the resulting value position leads to something, something that is desired. But the third statement is something else.

The third statement is illogical for it has no reason for existence except for its implied bias. For example, why does a person favor vanilla ice cream? He/she does so for no particular reason; the person just does. For an educator who is trying to deal with some controversial issue in discussion, a student who utters such a value statement and can't provide a reason should not be uncontested when such a value leads to social conditions that affect others. For example, if the question arises of who should win the upcoming election and the student says Jones but cannot give a reason, that student should be further pushed to come up with a reason. After all, the winner of an elected position will have a role in determining public policy that will affect many other citizens. But if the assertion does not affect others, then the student's comment need not be challenged. We all have our irrational preferences. I do like vanilla ice cream – especially with a little Grand Marnier poured over it – but when it comes to Wendy's Frosties, I'll go for the chocolate.

But I digress. The thing is that different social studies theorists have favored one approach to valuing over the other. In my next posting, I will briefly review two of them. For this posting, I want a review of these approaches to valuing so that we might come to a better sense of what it means to “do what one should do.” There is no greater responsibility a civics teacher has than to get his/her students to seriously question their motives about their social actions. In choosing a liberated federalist view to guide a teacher's strategies in the classroom, the teacher is taking a more proactive approach than that encouraged by the natural rights view. By leaving it up to the individual to decide what is moral without at least some reflection, is simply unjustified and irresponsible. My contention is that under a natural rights regime, the effort to get this sort of reflection is simply too muddled and undirected. It leads to instruction that is too apt to be without any guidance whatsoever. To pursue such instruction is at best naïve and at worst abandoning one's responsibilities. On the other hand, liberated federalism has guidance baked into its elements – most notably, in its professed value hierarchy.³

1Hunt, M. P. and Metcalf, L. E. (1968). Teaching high school social studies: Problems in reflective thinking and social understanding. New York: Harper and Row, Publishers.

2Massialas, B. G. and Zevin, J. (1967). Creative encounters in the classroom: Teaching and learning through discovery. New York, NY: John Wiley and Sons, Inc.

3I have written extensively in this blog of a proposed moral code I developed. See, for example, posting, Implementing Federalist Moral Code in the Classroom, December 16, 2011. The proposed moral code is based on federalist ideas and ideals.

THE FACTOR OF NATIONALISM

In my posting, Grading the “End” (April 14), I gave my take on John Mueller's judgment of the Fukuyama Thesis which proclaims the “end of history.”¹ By the “end,” Francis Fukuyama was foreseeing a lack of major conflict – such as liberalism vs. communism – that has marked much of what has constituted our history on this planet. The philosopher Hegel's theory of history was based on such conflicts. Mueller's article was meant to evaluate Fukuyama's Thesis using the subsequent events within our nation and the world since the thesis was first published (1989). I promised in the prior posting that I would revisit this topic because what Mueller has to say relates to two forms of liberalism: the more pure form fostered by the mental construct, the natural rights view, and the approach supported by the liberated federalism construct – a view this blog has promoted.

While my prior posting addressed the expansion of liberalism at the expense of other ideologies, this posting looks at the “challenge of nationalism.” That is, does a rise in nationalism present a threat to ideological agreement among nations? Does extreme advocacy of national ambitions provide motivation to promote or heighten conflicts between nations or within nations made up of varied nationalities or ethnicity – such as we are currently seeing in east Ukraine? It is possible that conflicting ideological claims can be but a mask of sorts, a rationale for deep seated hatreds that have existed for centuries between nationalities or ethnic groups.

Let me, for those not so familiar with the terminology, review the meaning of nationalism. My first thought when I see or hear the term is the following adage: “my country, right or wrong, my country.” This saying encapsulates the feelings we associate with extreme nationalism. It is an irrational devotion to one's nation no matter what its leadership is about. Of course, infamous leaders in history counted on prevailing nationalism in their nations to garner support for their nefarious deeds. The twentieth century will probably go down as the century when nationalism ran amok. The more one studies, for example, the motivations that led to World War I, one can appreciate how destructive a force nationalism can be and how tragic. But, as I elaborate below, there are degrees of nationalism and it is helpful to investigate what varying levels of this emotion can mean for a nation and its people.

So, we have relatively recent history demonstrating the role nationalism has played in producing “history” as Fukuyama uses the term. What about now? Does the presence of nationalism threaten the ideological peace we have been experiencing since the fall of communism?

A turn of events that brought up the nationalism factor was the breakup of Yugoslavia. There, we saw nationalist groups go at it and shatter the domestic peace the communists were able to maintain while they held power under Marshal Tito. Once he died, nationalistic forces began their destructive activities. But were these conflicts what they appeared; were they initiated by ethnic groups who wanted to separate from the other ethnic and national groups? Was the villainous force nationalism? Mueller reports that the conflict in Yugoslavia was actually started by demagogic pols with ambitions. They, in order to stir up an unstable political environment, began stoking ancient hatreds among small bands of “opportunistic predators.” Mueller describes the predators as criminal and bandit gangs. Nationalism did have a role in the conflict getting out of hand, but not as a force advocating disunity. Instead, it was the lack of nationalism, particularly among Yugoslavia's army, that sealed the fate of this relatively young nation. The armed forces refused to fight and therefore there was no adequate force to quell the violence.

It was less a clash of civilizations [ideological traditions] than a challenge of thugs, in which ethnicity or nationalism became something of an ordering or sorting device that allowed people to determine which gangs were more or less on their side and which ones were out to get them.²

Mueller points out that if the clash of civilizations – that is, the clash of ideological traditions between the East and West – were the underlining foundation of the Yugoslavian civil war, then the cessation of violence in 1995 should have been short- lived since the area is right on the “fault line” between the civilizations. Yet this has not been the case; peace has prevailed and the area has flourished.

Mueller further points out that nationalism has been a force for advancement. He cites Germany and Poland as countries that needed national pride to encourage the sacrifices necessary in order to meet the challenges that the fall of communism presented. In Germany, the case with which we are more familiar, lives were significantly affected by the dismantling of communist rule in East Germany. By all reports, today Germany is leading Europe in terms of its economy and other social conditions. The BBC reports: “Germany rebounded to become the continent's economic giant, and a prime mover of European cooperation.”³ In no small measure, national pride, not to the degree of irrational obsession but to the degree that a healthy desire to work toward national advancement, is prevalent.

It is this latter degree of nationalism that liberated federalism strives to encourage. I prefer the term patriotism instead of nationalism when referring to this unifying function. It is a sense of partnership in a national endeavor, writ large, that a civics program should aim to approach, not through propaganda or coercion, but through appropriate investigations, discussions, and emulations. It is the function of liberated federalism to suggest the questions that lead students to consider those aspects of national concerns related to societal welfare. It is the assumption that if students are asked to investigate and reflect on appropriate questions, they will derive the appropriate sense of nationalism or good old levels of patriotism.

1Mueller, J. (2014). Did history end? Assessing the Fukuyama thesis. Political Science Quarterly, 129 (1), Spring, pp. 35-54.

2Ibid., p. 42.

3See http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-17299607 .