TALKING MORALITY

Topics that don't get much attention in our civics or government classes are, one, how citizens interact with each other and, two, how citizens should interact with each other. Part of the reason for this is that the language used in these courses has to do mainly with the structural makeup of our governmental institutions and of those institutions that interact with government. So these courses have units of study on such topics as the presidency and political parties and lobbying organizations. But on how citizen A treats citizen B or how citizen A should treat citizen B, there is little said. George Lakoff,¹ I believe, gives us one way to look at and talk about these very basic civic concerns.

Before describing Lakoff's proposed language, let me point out another obstacle in treating one of these topics. By addressing how citizens should treat one another, civics broaches the subject of morality. As I have pointed out before, this gets touchy – should our public instruction be about promoting moral messages? I have made it clear and have presented a justification for my position that yes, we do need to deal with moral questions in the classroom and that that treatment should be guided by a federalist moral code. Summarily, that code holds that, as a trump value, goodness lies in behavior and policy that advance societal welfare. This blog has dedicated significant space to describing and explaining this code and the reasons I have for promoting its use.

So, therefore, the language one adopts to deal with these two topics – how citizens interact and how they should interact – has a descriptive challenge and a normative challenge. Lakoff begins his treatment by pointing out that much of our moral thinking and visualizing is dependent on metaphors. Why? Because morality is not a tangible entity. It is ephemeral, but has definite and practical implications in our lives. It is a qualitative aspect of life and it is essentially difficult to mentally conceive of it directly. Metaphors allow us to give this quality a more definite sense and with it a language by which to communicate its elements and its effects on us. A metaphor Lakoff identifies in order to visualize and talk about morality is wealth.

By using wealth, we can first give morality a quantitative dimension. And we can also use the extended metaphor of bookkeeping to relate that aspect of morality which has to do with either doing someone a good or a harm – central attributes of morality. So, for example, we can say that if I do you a good, you might perceive the result of such a good as placing the burden of a debt on you. Now think about the last time someone did something good for you. Chances are you felt a sense of obligation to that person and were disposed to return that favor with a favor so as to balance the books. Of course, this is all a metaphor, but it does reflect actual emotions. It also brings into play, through the language the metaphor activates, moral considerations. Lakoff, in his analysis, focuses on two moral principles this language permits: the positive-action principle and the debt-payment principle.

The positive-action principle is the general notion that morality is adhered to by people doing good things for each other. We should do favors, look after each other, help those in need, be charitable in both our treatment of others and how we refer to one another, and be disposed to be generally helpful and supportive of others. You can probably think of other ways a person can live up to the positive-action principle. The debt-payment principle, on the other hand, refers to the moral disposition to pay back. This might be to return a favor for a favor or to pay back a harm with a harm. This is carrying the bookkeeping metaphor to its logical extension. If someone does you a good, imposing a debit on you, you are called upon to return an equally valued good; but if someone does you a harm, imposing a credit on you, you are in position to say, “I'll make him/her pay” for the harm done to you. Now this type of language opens discussion to such modes of interaction between people that can be described as reciprocation (a good for a good), retribution (an authoritative harm for a harm – as when a person is punished by a governmental entity for committing a crime or a parent punishes a child for misbehavior), revenge (a non-authoritative harm for a harm – as when a person spreads a damaging rumor about someone who hurt his/her reputation). The language can also be used to talk about altruism, turning the other cheek, Karma sense of universal justice (“what goes around, comes around”), and the like.

In terms of federalist concerns, this language opens a way of talking about those interactions that promote societal welfare and those interactions that hurt or diminish societal welfare. It also points to the development of augmenting conflicts in society – language that can describe the development of cycles of revenge (for example, the Hatfields and the McCoys). The language itself is fairly neutral as to which course of action should be followed, but does highlight certain implications and realities that one sees as resulting from certain social policies of groups, organizations, and government. For example, if large corporations use their financial resources to funnel income to advantaged groups, how are such policies viewed? Are they seen as an unjustified, inflicted harm on those not advantaged? And if so, will those latter groups seek retribution or revenge? What factors influence the reaction of these latter groups? These are moral questions due to the fact that they relate to societal welfare. But these are not just moral questions; they are also practical ones. The answers to them relate to the interests of those involved.

1Lakoff, G. (2002). Moral politics: How liberals and conservatives think. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.