The years following World War II are important in developing
an understanding of our current political outlooks. It was during that time when the nation
shifted in its prevailing view of government and politics. Most of that shift seemed to be mostly at a subconscious
level, the results not manifesting themselves more consciously until the 1960s
and ‘70s.
There are many factors responsible, but one of them was truly hidden
from Americans of the time. Not until
years later have we been able to get a clear enough picture to be able to make
some sense of what transpired. The
narrative describing the shift makes for good drama and some of it has been the
subject of histories, novels, and movies.
Unfortunately, in real life, the consequences of some of the changes
caused many casualties, including fatalities, in the hundreds of thousands. In large measure, these developments changed
not only how Americans see government and politics, but also how they feel
about them. Ironically, the
policy-makers responsible for some of the worst consequences attained what they
wanted, not through successful attainment of their aims, but through their
failures. After all, they came from very
conservative stock and their goals revolved around a diminished role of
government in the lives of Americans.
Of whom do I write?
Well, they were mostly from the mid-West, a cadre of bureaucrats and
politicians who originated from isolationist and religiously inspired
folk. They were the descendants of those
who fought against American involvement with European, much less any other part
of the globe, political entanglements.
This same reluctance, though, did not extend to trade. They, mostly representing the growing
agricultural interests of their region, were keen on expanding markets for
their products. This included not only
harvested crops, but also mechanical equipment that was emanating from their
newly minted factories. And let us not
forget the steel their foundries were producing. So, entanglement was inevitable even if they
did not see it. And surely, such
avoidance did not prevent our eventual entrance into two world wars.
After World War II, the folly of this ostrich type of
behavior was beyond obvious. Just about
everyone, because of Pearl Harbor, became internationalists. But being internationalists had to be an
approach that mirrored the same prejudices that preceded the turn. It would have to be one that reflected a Calvinistic
orientation in which good and evil is easily defined.
No man represented this outlook more than John Foster Dulles,
the secretary of state in the Eisenhower administration. He, in turn, was supported by his brother, Allen
Dulles. Allen was put in charge of a new
bureaucratic entity that grew in importance and beyond the initial idea for its
creation, the CIA. These two men played
crucial roles in this shift in the perspective of how the US was to act on the
international stage.
Let me share with you an extended quote that I believe
captures this shift and I will follow it with my take on its importance as to
the overall effect it represents on our collective views of government and
politics.
Because [in the Cold War] the enemy
was cruel and totalitarian, we were justified in responding in kind. Our survival demanded it. There were no restraints on the other side;
therefore, there should be no restraints on us.
The men who were the driving forces
of this new philosophy, the Dulles brothers, Beetle Smith, and their various
deputies, as well as the President himself, were from a generation profoundly
affected by the vulnerability of an isolationist America to attack by foreign
powers – as Pearl Harbor had proved.
They worried endlessly that the very nature of democracy, the need for
the consent of the governed, made this nation vulnerable to a totalitarian
adversary. Therefore, in order to combat
the enemy, the leaders of the democracies would have to sacrifice some of their
nation’s freedoms and emulate their adversary.
The national security apparatus in Washington was, in effect, created so
America could compete with the Communist world and do so without the unwanted
clumsy scrutiny of the Congress and the press.
Given the nature of the Cold War and
domestic political anxieties, the national security apparatus gradually grew
richer and more powerful, operating under a separate set of laws (on occasion,
it would become clear, under no laws at all).
In any crisis, if there was an element of doubt about legality, it was
best to press ahead because that was what the other side would do. The laws for the secret regime were being set
by our own sworn adversaries, who, we were sure, followed no laws at all.
The key men of this world, the real
insiders from the CIA and the other semicovert parts of the government, soon
developed their own culture and customs … [1]
And to bolster this sense of entitlement were two early
successes in which the CIA was responsible for two illegal coups: one in Iran and one in Guatemala – two nations
in which the ousted leadership had supposed ties to Communist leadership in
Moscow (ties that have never been verified).
What they might have threatened were commercial interests in the United
States. In short, the stated purposes
for our aggressive acts seem, in hindsight, to be highly questionable.
But perhaps more damaging to our more traditional views of
governance, the posture, assumptions, and activities of these covert agents
were to undermine our sense of republican governance, of citizenry oversight
and participation. The acts led to a view
of government, not as an extension of ourselves, but one of agency apart from
ourselves: a consumer mentality that is
highly non-federal in its orientation. This
whole development became one important force in undermining our traditional
views of politics and governance; a rotting effect to our democratic ethos.
Historically, the above events paved the way to
oversimplified estimations of global developments. It led to overstretching in Vietnam, where we
could not distinguish between Communism as a monolithic threat and the
nationalistic strain in an enemy willing to sacrifice all for the integrity of
its homeland. In that conflict, our costs
were over 58,000 US dead and a total count of over a million, not to mention the
wounded. But we won the Cold War and,
compared with the world wars, at a fraction of the number of deaths. And, as I alluded to above, the conservatives’
goal of diminishing Americans’ trust in government, as revelations of what went
on keep becoming public, has diminished the trust beyond their wildest
hopes. From a federalist perspective,
one can view those years following the Second World War as crucial to
understanding what happened to our old assumptions of what our government stood
for and could be counted on to be and to do.
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