Here goes, as promised in my last posting, a few (or more)
words on a general strategy type of change known as power-coercive.[1] Generally, these strategies are based on avoiding
what is anticipated as painful or disagreeable; that is, a set of change
strategies in organizational operations – be it in terms of goals/aims or
processes – that are deliberate and conscious.
These changes are on the part of a party related or associated with an
organizational entity and motivated by an understanding that not to change will
resort in enduring some pain or disagreeable consequence. These changes are spearheaded by a person or
group. They are in a position to
administer some sort of punishment if the party does not get the change it
wants and, therefore, the strategy can be called a power-coercive strategy. I billed this type of strategy as one that
promises to be efficient in instituting a desired change. By efficient, I mean the change will be
effective in a relatively short amount of time with minimal costs. I will explain that this billing is true only
if certain conditions are met.
In the last posting, I reviewed what is commonly called empirical-rational
strategies and that set of strategies is seen as fairly quick and efficient,
but it does not hold a candle to what is anticipated with the use of power-coercive
strategies. This is true if those
wanting to institute change enjoy a relatively powerful position within or over
the organization in question. If they don’t,
then the use of such a change strategy is possible, but it will not be as quick
and efficient and might, as a matter of fact, take a significant amount of
time.
When the change is by the powerful, though, they have
resources that do make a difference. Why? Because power-coercive strategies rely on
what I have termed, along with French and Raven,[2] coercive
power. That is, power – an ability to get
someone to do something that they would not otherwise do – is based on the belief
that those implementing the power can and will administer some sort of punishment
to the subjected party if the subjected party does not comply with what the
would-be power wielder wants done. It is
the sort of power one usually thinks of when the term power is used. You get someone to do something because not
doing it will result in that someone experiencing a consequence that is unpleasant
or even worse. You’ve seen untold number
of movies in which such power is central to the plot line. The Godfather
trilogy comes to mind. But does power
have to rely on punishment? Let’s read
on.
In the realm of change:
power-coercive strategies rely on the more powerful agents exerting
their wishes on the less powerful. In
real life, not the movies, exertion of power-coercive strategies takes place
without guns and sinister sneers; they are usually expressions or
implementations of legitimate authority.
That is, the person or group seeking the change has the authority, due
to organizational positioning or ascribed positioning by law, to exert the “commands”
that would institute the change. I should
add that such power is usually exerted to maintain what is, the status quo,
instead of trying to institute change.
But when it is change that is sought, such change efforts by
those in legitimate power positions are taken when a new set of authority
figures takes hold of an organization such as a corporation or a governmental
department or other bureaucratic entity.
Sometimes those in power want to institute a new direction that calls on
a certain level of change. Whether
change is emanating from a change in administration (usually with the election or
the selection of a new president, governor, or CEO) or a change in strategy by
those already in power, such changes are deemed legitimate due to the
legitimacy of the power positions of those seeking change. Even in such cases, what is in existence, the
ongoing set of realities, is usually very well entrenched. So change promises to be difficult. It helps to have authority on one’s side and using
authority, relying on power-coercive strategies, usually can result ostensibly
on implementing the desired change, at least on paper. By on paper, what is usually meant is that
the structural and verbal commitments upon which the change relies can be put
in place in a relatively short amount of time.
The problem is in the ensuing performance by those who have to carry out
the change. If the change objectives are
not really shared by this corps of workers, change, even with authority on the
side of the “changers,” can prove to be elusive.
But before I address these types of consequences, let me fill
in more of the details entailed with the power-coercive set of changes. First, there are modes of change for such
coercive moves. These are generally of
two types: political and economic modes. Political modes encompass the necessary
policy changes that support the operational changes that the change advocates
desire. This is dependent on the
procedural apparatus the organizational or governmental entity has in place and
the politicking in which both the advocates of change and those who oppose the
change(s) engage. This process is deserving
of its own analysis – rest assured, such questions have their own literature of
research that one can review. But,
whatever the result, assuming both sides follow accepted procedures of
politicking, the results of the conflict will be accepted, at least verbally. And then, second, there are economic
modes. Here, decisions over expenditures
will be instrumental. If those in
authoritative positions sense or know that there are recalcitrant rebels fighting
the desired change, decisions over budgetary allocations can and will
administer the necessary punishments to solicit compliance. This has proven highly effective in terms of
actual activities subordinates perform, if not the all-out devotion those
activities might demand. Those are the
sorts of actions that the more powerful can administer over the less powerful,
but do not explain what options exist for the less powerful entities who desire
and are willing to pursue change.
If the change advocate is less powerful (and assuming that
there exists enough of a cadre of malcontents, either within or without the
organizational structure in question who wish for change) what can those
desiring change do? Under these
conditions, this type of change is not short term; these strategies take a lot
of time. The most common avenue here is
for such a person or group to organize the discontented who is or are demanding
that change occur. This can take place,
as appropriate, within or without the organization or governmental entity,
within or without the legitimate channels of authority. For example, teachers who seek changes in
their working conditions might organize to engage in tougher labor actions such
as staging a strike or work stoppage – activities that are to some degree
illegal in a lot of states. The aim is not
to cause disruption for its own sake, but to seek a shift in the conflict from
confrontation to negotiation. This might
take on the air of legitimacy, even if the actions are illegal – albeit more
difficult – if the initial demands are seen, by the general public, as advancing
fairness and justice. Of course, if the
lesser powerful party has been viewed as being subject to authoritarian
subjugation, this adds to the image of any existing unfairness. If these conditions exist, then such options
as quasi or fully illegal means might cause the more powerful party to be
sufficiently hurt by the actions and, therefore, will be encouraged to negotiate. This result, being the aim of the change advocates
in the first place, will be considered a success. Needless to say, the fact that one might be
speaking of illegal or semi-illegal activity adds to the burden of those
seeking change as they must overcome expected allegiance for the law.
There are times, however, that one or two of the conflicted
parties might want, for whatever reason, to continue the conflict. If this is the case, then we are talking
about such a heightened conflict that one would question the ultimate aims of
one or both sides of the conflict. In
these extreme cases, expressed aims are simply not what is sought. Instead, what is sought is probably a more
institutional change that is or borders on revolutionary change. That is, they are either attempting to change
the system by destroying the ability of
the advocates to organize or overthrow the system.
In my next posting, I will review more specific
power-coercive strategies. I will
address the issue of having to depend on punishment; i. e., does one, even
under a power-coercive type of strategy have to depend only on punishment to
get results? These more specific strategies will stretch from those advocated
by Gandhi to Marx. The expanse of these
strategies is quite wide, but they are over a singular aim: inflict pain – physical, economic, or psychological
– to gain acquiescence to sought-after change.
[1]
Chin, R. and Benne, K. D. (1985).
General strategies for effecting changes in human systems. In W. G. Bennis, K. D. Benne, and R. Chin (Eds.),
The Planning of Change (pp.
22-45). New York, NY: Holt, Rinehart, Winston.
[2]
French, J. R. P. and Raven, B. H.
(1967). The bases of power. In. E. P. Hollander and R. G. Hunt (Eds.) Current perspectives in social psychology
(504-512). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
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