Some years ago, verging on fifty, Samuel P. Huntington wrote
a fairly influential book, Political
Order in Changing Societies (POCS).[1] In that book, he offered an analysis of what
factors affected the aims and goals of lesser developed countries (LDCs). With the conflicts in southeast Asia of that
time (the sixties), there seemed to be a bit of interest over the challenges LDCs
faced – challenges that still exist today.
Communist attempts to spread their
influence among those nations probably spurred a lot of interest here in the
US. With the fall of communism, at least
that communism that emanated from the Soviet Union and a more virulent Red
China, concern in the US has waned a bit.
But it is felt here that what Huntington wrote about those countries,
does seem to have relevance today. It gives
one not only understanding of what can or should happen to LDCs, but perhaps what
is happening or should happen in the US.
This posting
and, at least, the next posting will review Huntington’s book and draw from it
what might give one understandings over current American realities and their
significance. At first, the review will describe
that book’s content as it dealt with the LDCs’ issues. Overall, POCS is a systems analysis of what
Huntington saw was the most pressing problem LDCs faced; i.e., their ability to
govern.
His study
assumes that any analysis of an LDC should be contained within the boundaries of
that LDC. It should also question that
nation’s political system’s ability to meet the social/political/economic
requisites necessary to stave off decay, that could eventually lead to systems
failure. In other words, for LDCs that
are in the midst of developing, their efforts are on a time clock; can they
accomplish sufficient development before their system fails bringing its
efforts to a crashing end? It turns out,
development unleashes disruptive forces.
And what are they aiming to develop? That would be becoming a society with a
self-sustaining economic system, sufficient equalization of economic
distribution, and sufficiently democratization of political processes. In other words, how much like the Western
democracies of North America and Europe can they imitate or resemble.
So far, a more current reading of
this study suggests two criticisms one can lodge against the book: one, it “unwisely” limits its view to only
internal factors – perhaps paying an unjustified blind eye to the manipulation
external elites and powerful nations have on the politics of LDCs – and using
capitalist nations of the West to be the model for these nations to follow – irrespective
of their varied cultures, geographic conditions, or historical narratives. But with that in mind, one should move on.
What Huntington seemed to be after was
his hope that subsequent emperical studies of LDCs would identify those factors
that lead to political conditions in which polities can govern. In that, he made a further assumption: development or (another proWestern term)
modernization creates new social forces within societies and, in turn, they
cause disruptive influences which makes necessary adaptations hard to
accomplish. It was Huntington’s
observation that success in adaptation, at that time, was rare. Instead, one could expect, in those nations,
instability.
So much so, that Huntington saw
stability as the essential prerequisite to development or modernization. Stability was his measure of a polity’s
ability to govern, and, therefore, he held it as his major focus – his major
dependent variable or condition. He seemed
to be warning: get this wrong and all
else is a waste of time; development will not happen.
Yet, both on the part of developed
nations who are playing a role in LDC development and indigenous parties
involved in that process tend to be insensitive to or not sensitive enough to the
implications of Huntington’s advice.
These players, Huntington judged, were missing the mark for they were
not addressing the essential requisites and that neglect landed up only
furthering disruption.
He identified a complex social
fabric. Events that on the surface seem
prudent and positive, prove not to be; while, events that intuitively seem
dysfunctional, turn out to be essential.
For example, what usually is disruptive, violence, at times proves unavoidable
and useful. Where economic development,
seen as an independent goal, can be of obvious use, but at the same time proves
to be disruptive. And then there is
corruption – at times, believe it or not, a potential substitute for revolution
or rebellion – is almost synonymous with instability. Complexities abound.
The central argument posed by
Huntington was that relatively high modernization (development) progressions,
which can be measured by rates of social mobilization and economic development,
but is accompanied with relatively slow pace in the development of political institutions leads to
political instability. To digest what
Huntington meant, one needs a clear understanding of his major ideas.
An understanding of modernization or
overall development calls one to appreciate what its essential attribute
is: social mobilization. The term, social mobilization, refers to a
process. That process is felt or
observed when traditional economic, social, and psychological commitments no
longer hold, forcing people to attach themselves to new values, attitudes, and
most importantly to higher economic expectations.
In other words, it is large scale transformative
change at a national level. Readers of
this blog, hopefully, can appreciate, from past postings, how difficult that is
to accomplish at the level of an organization, much less a nation. Yet, Huntington claimed that that needs to
occur for a nation to modernize.
As for the other ideas: Huntington saw the idea of higher economic
development as mainly a nation being able to produce higher quantities of
material output, usually manufactured goods.
LDCs usually already produce high quantities of agricultural goods and/or
minerals. The problem is: the land used for those activities are owned
by the elite few who tend to be very rich and as such have a vested interest in
maintaining the status quo.
Political institutions are
organizations and procedures which routinize political behavior into accepted
forms. People accept these forms and
they are usually referred to as political norms. An example of this could be when two cars
happen to run into each other, the police come out, ask questions, perhaps take
pictures, make sure everyone is alright, and so on. That is what is expected in, say, the US; a
policeman taking a bribe from the luxury car driver is not expected and defies
a political norm, as well as a law.
Laws, in turn, are expected to be upheld. These are not universal norms; in many, if
not most nations, elite privileges are the norm.
Where corruption is common,
priveliege is expected to go to those who own or control desired assets –
money, land, property, power (both legitimate and illegitimate forms), etc. The point is:
to establish stability – i.e., high levels of expectations and their realization
– a nation needs well-ensconced political institutions that are counted on to
counter disstabilizing events and conditions.
And that leads to the last of these
ideas, political instability. It can be
characterized by violence, social group conflicts, corruption, and bureaucratic
inefficiency. It also leads to the
tie-in to current political concerns in the US.
No, America is not an LDC. It is
a developed country – some might consider it the most developed. But can Huntington’s concerns cast any light on
what is happening in the politics of America today? This blog will pursue this question in the
upcoming postings.
[1] Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968).
No comments:
Post a Comment