In the last posting, it brought to the attention of the
reader a 1968 book[1]
by the late political scientist, Samuel P. Huntington. Part of the that account included
Huntington’s major argument in that book.
That is: when a lesser developed
country (LDC) experiences relatively high modernization (development), but at
the same time has a relatively slow development of political institutions, it
will suffer from political instability.
In this relationship, students of development can measure modernization/development
by rates of social mobilization.
The posting
then defines key terms associated with this relationship. Beyond, but including, social mobilization
and political institutions, they are economic development, political norms, and
political (in)stability. The reader, if
he/she has not read that posting, is encouraged to do so.
This posting
picks up on that description, but first a reminder. The purpose of going back to Huntington’s
book is that given the current American political scene, one can see parallels
between the challenges LDCs confronted then and now and challenges this nation unfortunately
is experiencing. Today, it seems basic
political institutions are under attack.
If so, what does that mean? What
can the consequences be?
The major link
Huntington seems to have argued is that development, more specifically its
accompanying political development, means higher levels of political
participation in the form of increased group demands and accompanying political
action.
Economic advancement, which defines the
central element of development, in relation to the realities of developing
nations (often lacking in economic assets), causes unrequited expectations
which are voiced directly into the political system because they lack the
necessary institutions to peacefully handle these demands. One way one can visualize political action in
relation to demands within a nation is to use the analogy of a grand funnel.
If one thinks about it, no two persons
share exactly all their political desires and aims. There is, in any nation, a great variety of
what is wanted. The activity one calls
politics acts to funnel that diversity into a coherent set of policies. In the US – or any advanced nation – there
are a set of institutions (organizations and procedures which routinize
political behavior into accepted forms) that function – in various degrees – to
funnel demands. They include
neighborhood groups, interest groups, and political parties.
In advanced countries these are well
established and defined both on paper (law and other documentations) and in
people’s minds. But if a polity does not
enjoy having or, if having, not having sufficiently established institutions,
this funneling process does not occur sufficiently. And the one thing any economic development
causes is rising expectations. If these are
unrequited, a basic precondition for instability has been set.[2]
Political order or stability can be
viewed as a continuum. That is, a
reality of degrees in which where the ratio of institutionalization to
participation is high, that system creates a civic polity; but a ratio
relationship which is low, creates a praetorian polity, a polity seeking an
advanced status, but not having achieved it.
To quote Huntington: “Political stability … depends upon the ratio
of institutionalization to participation.
As political participation increases, the complexity, autonomy,
adaptability, and coherence of the society’s political institutions must also
increase if political stability is to be maintained.”
Those falling short, one can describe
as praetorian societies and in danger of failure. They are those societies in which private
claims cannot be channeled peacefully (not funneled), and personal – as opposed
to institutional – power becomes the basis for conflict resolution. The question here is: can this sort of imbalance affect advanced
nations as well, not with rebellion, but with levels of instability that make
normal politics more difficult to accomplish?
After the relationship between
political institutions and political participation are reviewed, the book
explains how certain social forces can lead a political system out of the
praetorian status into the civic one. This
account (in upcoming postings) will describe the roles that military rule,
reforms, and political parties have in helping to create the necessary
political institutions and in controlling the effects of development.
These forces can enhance political
institutions’ ability to (1) reflect power distribution while attracting and assimilating
new social forces; (2) balance any advantages output agencies (bureaucracies)
have over input agencies/factions (interest groups); and (3) regulate
succession. A lot of this comprises the
below-the-radar governance that is important, but attracts little attention –
one just tends to assume this stuff goes on on a regular basis.
But to varying degrees, these
concerns can be detected, from time to time, in advanced countries. For example, according to Michael Lewis, the
transition between the Obama Administration and the Trump Administration,
output agencies were seriously undermanned and, in turn, has had their
advantages heavily compromised in favor of well-positioned factions.[3] What can go wrong?
[1] Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968).
[2] There is a famous overall explanation for rebellion
or internal disruptions that relies on this very relationship. It is called Davies “J” Curve. See John T. Jost and Avital Mentovich,
“J-Curve Hypothesis,” Encyclopeadia
Brittanica, accessed February 11, 2019, https://www.britannica.com/topic/J-curve-hypothesis
.
[3] Michael Lewis, The
Fifth Risk (New York, NY: W. W.
Norton & Company, 2018).
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