On the other hand, ask him/her
whether it is bad to take what doesn’t belong to him/her or to lie about
someone else in a defamatory way. Would that
be bad and immoral? As Jonathan Haidt
points out, there is among people high degrees of agreement over what is good
and moral or bad and immoral.[1]
But he also
adds that they disagree on how they arrange their values in terms of their
political beliefs.
[Haidt] has developed a theory of
moral foundations that says that all human beings endorse the same list of
moral values, but that people, of different political stripes believe that some
of these values are more important than others.
In other words, liberals may have somewhat different moral foundations
than conservatives.[2]
If one looks and listens to current
political discourse, the judgement here is that one hears a heighten tendency
to apply inordinate moral judgement to what at other times would just be
disagreement over policy. For example,
one does not just object to business regulations, but takes umbrage to how they
immorally offend one’s liberty. Or one
can see a policy to address poverty as being counterproductive. He/she will be readily accused of being
unchristian in his/her attitude toward the destitute.
Due to this heightened opinion relative
to moral standards, a person is apt to become uncompromising when related
issues are considered, discussed, or debated.
Uncompromising people are less likely to compromise. Yet a federal system, more so than, say, a
parliamentary system, counts on people compromising.
The structure
of a federal system assumes that policy should be derived from people
congregating. Within those assemblages,
they argue and debate, but they are counted on to give and take. But if each issue or question betrays
conflicting views of morality, well, solutions allude the parties since none of
the sides can succumb to what is perceived as immoral. In such an arena, the participants would do
well to make the effort to “see” or better stated, understand and appreciate
how the opponent or opponents define the issues.
And this calls
for the participants to develop skills; that is, can they, first, handle
dilemmas and, second, pose the argument(s) in terms of narratives. A word on each of these skills is helpful.
Dilemmas are
problems in which the options a problem presents reflect valued options, but
the reality does not allow for the eventuality of all possible options. A person faced with a dilemma must choose to
not only accept something wanted (or less unwanted) for something less wanted
(or more unwanted) but to forgo the other option(s).
One can either go to the movies on a
given afternoon or go to the ballgame, but not both during the same hours. Such decisions can be difficult since
something wanted is sacrificed or something unwanted must be accepted. In the extreme this can be highly dramatic
and life-shattering.
Probably, in
terms of drama, a well-known dilemma was the one Sophie – in Sophie’s Choice[3]– faced
when she had to choose one of her two children to save from certain death at
the hands of sadistic Nazi, concentration camp guards. This dilemma falls not in sacrificing
something wanted, but of sacrificing something more unwanted, the death of both
of her two children and herself. Thankfully,
such incidences are rare and just about everyone handles the dilemmas they face
with reasonable skill – some people are better than others.
That is, most dilemmas are solvable
and within the boundaries of civil life.
Yet, while the stakes vary, the structure of the decision remains. But there is another skill. Can a participant of a dilemma think of
narratives that incorporate the values under contention so that they can see/imagine
how the other side(s) perceive what’s at stake?
And further, can such an analysis help deflate the dispute to be less
moralistic or virulent and more practical and subject to prudence – that is, determining
what works for as many people as possible?
Here is but
one way the natural rights view can and is counterproductive. If every party to a dispute is imbued with
the notion that he/she has every right, irrespective of the interests and needs
of others, to determine his/her own, isolated path – perhaps even respecting
others the same latitude – that person will be less likely to see the dispute
from the perspective of others.
When such a morality – or morality like – is primarily
aimed inward – toward the “me” – aims and goals are more likely to be couched in
terms of moral prerogatives. They take
on that air of commitment and certitude.
A more “my way or the highway” disposition is taken. And therefore, less likely for the person to
even entertain a compromise.
But if a
person becomes used to approaching dilemmas from a more social perspective,
holding an understanding that others have not only strong convictions over an
issue, but that the convictions might harbor moral level claims and understandings,
then perhaps the debate can progress with empathy and even sympathy when
appropriate. And ideally, if both sides
can see the conflict as being less than of a moral caliber question and,
instead, understand it as an exercise in prudence, perhaps a compromise can
more readily be achieved.
Parents are
known to approach their children’s dilemmas with narratives when their kids deal
with a sibling or friend. Johnny and
Joanie might want the same piece of cake – the last one – and that reminds mom
of the last time she and dad wanted the same thing, but only one could have
that thing. How did they settle the dilemma
or dispute? “I get it this time; you get
it next time” or vice versa?
Young children can readily imagine such a narrative. As they grow older, the narratives probably
need to be more complex and more nuanced.
Likewise,
civics teachers can approach societal conflicts using this approach. Perhaps, parties to a tort action, for
example, can be analyzed as an arbitration exercise. The teacher can opt to relay the narrative
elements of such a dispute but have the class role play it as an
arbitration. A good case would be one in
which the parties first see the contention from a moral perspective, but
through the process can downgrade it to a more practical problem that affects
the participants.
In one such case, one party makes a
claim against another because he/she was injured by the accidental discharge of
a legally owned weapon. There is no
negligence involved – it is a purely accidental incident. One-party questions the presence of the
weapon where the accident took place.
The injured party says the weapon should not have been at a place where
people were simply socializing. The
other party states that he/she had the right to have the weapon.
Both look initially at the issue from the moral right to maintaining a safe environment or, on the other side, from the moral right to exercise a Second Amendment right. Can such positions be arbitrated? This ability seems more and more foreign in a society well-entrenched with a natural rights perspective.
Can the teacher have students prepare two arguments for the opposing side from the one they hold? One argument uses a moral argument, the other uses a practical argument. First, the student needs to have, at some level, an understanding between the two. The exercise can end with the student then offering his/her position which can be compromised. The results might prove to be interesting.
Both look initially at the issue from the moral right to maintaining a safe environment or, on the other side, from the moral right to exercise a Second Amendment right. Can such positions be arbitrated? This ability seems more and more foreign in a society well-entrenched with a natural rights perspective.
Can the teacher have students prepare two arguments for the opposing side from the one they hold? One argument uses a moral argument, the other uses a practical argument. First, the student needs to have, at some level, an understanding between the two. The exercise can end with the student then offering his/her position which can be compromised. The results might prove to be interesting.
Perhaps, civics classrooms, which
confront a person early on, can provide the opportunity for the related skills –
to identify the dilemma and to pose it in a narrative – so that they can work
toward being more amendable to conducting constructive conversations. The overall skill is to be compromising when
the issue is not really a question of good and evil, but of the more likely
question, what is better than …
[1] Jonathan Haidt, The
Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are
Divided by Politics and Religion (New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 2012) AND Timothy D.
Wilson, “The Social Psychology Narrative – Or – What Is Social Psychology,
Anyway?” in Thinking: The New Science of
Decision-Making, Problem-Solving, and Prediction, ed. John Brockman (New
York, NY: Harper Perennial, 2013),
99-114.
[2] Timothy D.
Wilson, “The Social Psychology Narrative – Or – What Is Social Psychology,
Anyway?”, 113.
[3] William Styron, Sophie’s Choice (New York,
NY: Random House, 1979).
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