This blog, with this posting, continues its
presentation of a political model, liberated federalism, by describing and
explaining its last component, the studied association. To date, it has reviewed the other two
components, the community and participating entities. By doing this presentation, the model depicts
a liberated federal perspective of an arrangement of parties, be they
individuals or collectives.
Not
all arrangements are associations. The
term association, as used in this account and as Philip Selznick[1]
uses it, refers to those arrangements that are formal in that they are
initiated by a compact or a covenant. It
is an ideal union of entities with federalist characteristics.
Of course, the national, all-embracing
association is the federal union of the people and states of the United States
of America as designated by the United States Constitution, its compact. That association as well as the associations
that make up the state governments and the local governments are, in the ideal,
communal democracies as defined by Selznick.
The liberated federalist perspective views these public or private
associations (such as ideal corporations) as serious commitments by the
entities that comprise them.
The association has certain attributes:
One,
as stated earlier, is organized under the provisions of a compact or covenant
laying out its structure, processes, and to some degree, its functions.
Two,
a qualified majority rule provision that aims at broad range consensus before
acting.
Three,
a strong provision for guaranteeing the rights of minorities, be they
individuals or groups, within conducting its processes and distribution of
material values.
Four,
a clear purpose or set of purposes for its existence that is publicly stated.
Five,
a fraternal ethos that respects the dignity and integrity of each of the
entities that comprise it and a felt commitment of inclusion for those
entities.
Six,
a covenant of reason upon which its moral standing rests. The covenant of reason includes agreement
over a deliberative process of decision-making, a provision of critical review
of its decisions and actions, and a set of collective interests that reflects
its purposes as well as its standing as an association.
In addition, the association has an overarching
responsibility to uphold the communal well-being of the community in which it
resides. To review and further explain
these attributes, a short elaboration of each one follows.
The
compact or covenant refers to the formal agreement arrived at by the entities
involved. The entities of an association
formulate a compact/covenant by the drawing up of such an agreement. The agreement contains the elements
identified by Danial Elazar, identified earlier in this blog as it described
the model parochial/traditional federalism.
In order to review Elazar’s characterization of a compact/covenant, the
following two quotes are offered:
Covenantal foundings emphasize the deliberate
coming together of humans as equals to establish politics in such a way that
all reaffirm their fundamental equality and retain the basic rights … Polities
whose origins are covenantal reflect the exercise of constitutional choice and
broad-based participation in constitutional design. Polities founded by covenant are essentially
federal in character, in the original meaning of the term (from foedus,
Latin for covenant).[2]
And:
[The old covenants followed a recurring format
or model which was] … an historical prologue indicating the parties involved, a
preamble stating the general purposes of the covenant and the principles behind
it, a body of conditions and operative clauses, a stipulation of the agreed-upon
sanctions to be applied if the covenant were violated, and an oath to make the
covenant morally binding.[3]
But what about compacts?
Donald Lutz points out that the distinction
between a covenant and a compact is that a covenant calls upon God to witness the
agreement and a compact does not. In the
current more secular world today, the common form is to utilize a compact.[4] In either case, the formulation of the
compact or covenant calls for a bit of soul searching. It demands that entities involved seriously
consider the consequences of such an act, due to the nature of the commitment
involved.
The entities must be fairly certain that they
share enough moral understanding, commitment to founding values, and philosophic
principles in relation to the purposes of the union so as to handle the inevitable
internal disagreements and conflicts. In
addition, there should be at least some minimum level of emotional commitment
among the entities since the union will most likely be for a significant amount
of time.
Therefore, compacts and covenants should not be
drawn up for frivolous reasons. As Elazar
describes these unions, the commitment is for the duration of the concerns
involved. In terms of a national union
and institutional arrangements as marriages, the commitment is perpetual or for
a lifetime.
The next identified attribute, qualified majority
rule, holds that a raw majority rule arrangement in collective decision-making format
should be avoided. One problem with such
an arrangement is that there is a possible, if not probable, danger to
minorities. Majority rule should be
limited by constitutional parameters or provisions, as stated earlier in this
blog in regard to equality. Each
minority and each individual is entitled to protection from the majority.
Basic rights, as identified by the Bill of Rights,
serve as an appropriate starting point. Citing Selznick again, the reciprocal
advantage characteristic of this model – its reciprocal nature – calls on a
meaningful reality that (1) allows an opportunity to improve one’s position significantly,
and (2) sets up a cooperative mode of social interaction.[5]
This posting’s review will end here. Next, this blog will address the purpose or
set of purposes a covenant or compact sets out for a people to achieve. This might, for good reasons, remind readers
of the Preamble of the Constitution, the set of purposes the founders
identified in the nation’s founding compact.
[1] Philip Selznick, The
Moral Commonwealth: Social Theory and
the Promise of Community (Berkeley, CA:
University of California Press, 1992).
[2] Daniel J. Elazar, “Federal Models of (Civil) Authority,”
Journal of Church and State 33
(Spring 1991): 233-234.
[3] Ibid., 244.
[4] Donald S. Lutz, The Origins of American Constitutionalism
(Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State
University Press, 1988).
[5] Selznick, The Moral
Commonwealth.
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