THE NATURALISM OF AUTONOMY

Most youngsters are bound to confront bullying of one sort or another. This is a definite problem and one parents and school personnel need to look out for and address. The victims of bullying are certain to feel something is wrong with such encounters. It brings up a very natural feeling on the part of a victim: I shouldn't be treated in this way. He or she might not have the words, but surely the person will probably feel that he or she has a ''right” not to be so treated. But who is to say that this is correct? From where do rights come?

One of our key founding documents, the Declaration of Independence, claims that liberty, the condition in which a person has rights, is bestowed upon us by God. Such a belief is given the name, natural rights. It is a claim based on a belief that cannot be proven: how do we know that rights come from God or nature? Thomas Jefferson, the author of the Declaration, doesn't even try to prove the claim; he simply states that the condition is self-evident. I just viewed a film clip in which the bishop from South Africa, Desmond Tutu, claims that his freedom comes from God. One can readily ask: if this is true; if it is so obvious, why did it take so much human history to elapse before a political system developed which held this belief as a foundational principle?

Of course, the notion of rights had already made some inroads in the political beliefs of Great Britain, but the American expression was, to date, the most clearly stated advocacy for institutionalizing rights based on constitutional guarantees and a formal legal system. Yes, the history of the development of freedom and rights can be traced to ancient Greece and even further back than that, but as a formal well thought-out institutional system of guarantees, history needed to wait for the American and French Revolutions. Since the ideal of rights was so slow in evolving and since there are so many places in the world that still do not have legal systems that honor the rights of its citizens, more current thought about rights questions how natural they are.

Rights become an issue only when a person is either the subject of indiscriminate punishment from another person or group or faces the choice of whether to do something he or she doesn't want to do in order to avoid an expected punishment at the hands of another party. For example, if a bully begins to punch another kid, this kid has a right not to be treated in such a way. Or, if that bully threatens another kid with physical harm if he doesn't give the bully his pocket change, the victim has a right not to be so threatened. Most cases in life in which questions of rights arise are due to one party exerting coercive power or threatening to exert such power on another person or group. The government resorts to this type of power to secure desired behaviors from its citizens. You might have experienced this while driving your car under a certain speed so as to avoid being ticketed. Not all types of coercive power are illegitimate. In order to define which cases are legitimate or not, the question of rights comes into play. Our nation is currently debating the rights Americans have concerning the ownership of certain types of weapons and the process by which people gain ownership of those and other weapons. Does government have the authority/the power to control that ownership and regulate the purchasing process by which weapons are bought?

Are there other exertions of power in which rights are not an issue? Yes. A person might do something he or she does not want to do for a variety of reasons. All power interactions do not relate to questions of rights. All them, though, occur when an individual does something other than what he or she wants to do because of some other person's or group's influence; this is the exertion of power by the second party over the first. But not all such interactions are examples of coercive power – power that is effective due to an expectation of some punishment. For example, you might want to continue smoking, but you stop because a doctor tells you to stop. While you might stop in order to avoid a punishing disease, the trigger for your decision is due to your belief in the expert opinion of your doctor – a case of expert power. Other forms of power that do not rely on the expectation of a punishment include referent power, reward power, and legitimate power.¹ In each of these other types of power, rights are not involved because the reasons you choose to behave as you do are not based on an expectation of illegitimate uses of coercive power. Are all such cases that emanate from government legitimate? No. And that is the job of the courts to determine if the law and the process by which punishment is to be or has been administered is legitimate according to the standards of our laws including our constitution.

With narrowing the type of situations in which rights become an issue, are we closer to determining from where rights come? I believe so. The academic, Richard Dagger, introduces a more conducive human attribute that one can more readily link to a natural origin.² That is, Dagger introduces the attribute, autonomy. According to this scholar, this state of being is viewed as one in which one can associate a sense of consciousness that one does not necessarily associate with freedom or liberty. Given this notion, I believe that this is more self-evident, since it brings into play decision-making. All this talk of power above assumes that the individual is striving to do what he or she wants to do. Here “wanting” needs a closer look. By highlighting what one wants to do, I mean it in its ultimate sense. That is, it includes times when we seek immediate, long term, gratifying, sacrificing, or any other type of aim or goal. Autonomy is the right to act according to such decisions. It is self-evident that we want to do what we want to do. And autonomy is the state in which one is not prohibited from behaving in ways that emanate from self-governing choices. Only humans go about this process consciously and, therefore, we as humans naturally seek this ability to self-govern our behavior.

Does this preclude a sense of natural rights? It does to a certain extent. It narrows our sense of the natural only to the extent it is seen as an ability to govern ourselves but not to protect, for natural reasons, specific rights. For example, one would question if one has a God given right to free speech: is freedom of speech a natural right or is it a civil right? Civil rights are rights established by civil authority – government. The advantage of naming a right civil as opposed to natural is that civil rights are formulated through reflection and that reflection is of historical analysis. Does it somehow diminish the importance of a right if it is designated as civil as opposed to natural? I suppose many would feel that it does. But in my mind, it does not. Here is a principle which, if accepted, will regulate how we socially and politically interact. It does not depend on a belief in God. It is formulated by a process of reflection and it is placed into law by design. It presupposes that upon reflection we understand the full or near full implications of not honoring the right. It also more readily lends itself to limitations where the exercise of the right interferes with the rights of others. It cannot be dismissed by a new interpretation of religious doctrine or religious text. It is more readily placed on a consequential view of morality: if we don't respect these rights, we can expect the quality of our society to be negatively affected – just look at historical case studies that demonstrate the consequences.

Last, it reflects the act of assenting or consenting. We are all equal in our consent. We are all equal in our need for autonomy – to be our own person. That that need is conscious within us cannot be denied. Even if one chooses a life of obedience, as in a religious life, the person consents to it.

1French, J. R. P., Jr. and Raven, B. (1967). The bases of power. In E. P. Hollander and R. G. Hunt (Eds.) Current perspectives in social psychology (pp. 504-512). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

2Dagger, R. (1997). Civic virtue: Rights, citizenship, and republican liberalism. New York, NY: Oxford.

STEUBENVILLE CONCERN

Early on in this blog I made the argument that the levels of civility and criminality of this nation, when compared to our historical levels, are high and that that unfortunate state of affairs reflects poorly on our civics education efforts. A recent case, while anecdotal, illustrates my concern.

The case I am referring to is the rape case in Steubenville, Ohio. In this case, two local high school football players were charged and convicted of rape. Rape is a heartbreaking and emotional disaster for the victim and the victim's family. Unfortunately, rape cases are too frequent to attract much attention. In terms of both actual numbers and rates of reported cases, the United States ranks very high when compared to other nations.¹ How this compares to our historical levels I don't know, but I would guess that current levels are not lower. Beyond the obvious problems with this crime is getting a handle on how often it occurs since victims are often reluctant to report it. This is due to shame or, since perpetrators too often can be family members or husbands, concern for the resulting animosities such reporting can induce.

But in terms of my concerns in this blog, the facts surrounding the Steubenville case are particularly relevant. Apparently, the guilt of the two boys was secured because they and others, using mobile phones and social media, made this crime so public. And since the two boys were (are) local heroes due to their football prowess, the girl who was victimized by the sex crime was further victimized by being the subject of abuse for “causing” all the problems visiting these young men. News reports seem to indicate that such feelings were amply shared by members of that community. The town has a population of fewer than 20,000. I can only guess that pride in the football team is deeply felt by town members and that the facts surrounding the case are probably causing high degrees of dissonance. But to not be able to see beyond the superficial importance of a local high school team, superficial when compared to the seriousness of the rape, one must question the expressed priorities of many members of this community.

Given the geographic location of the town and the fact that the town is described as economically strapped, I imagine that the town has been hit by the exit of manufacturing in what we call the “rust belt.” Of course, if this be the case, it explains, not excuses, an obsession over a successful local team. The condition adds context to the reaction that community members are expressing over the fate of these two young men. Also adding context is the fact that the young lady who was the victim was highly inebriated and can't remember what happened that night. But such conditions did not seem to affect the judge's decision.

Judge Thomas Lipps expressed concern over the nature of the crime:

I came in early this morning and I closely examined all the evidence and I re-read all the text messages that were admitted in this case. Many of the things that we learned during this trial, that our children were saying and doing, were profane, were ugly, with alcohol consumption shown as a particular danger to our teenage youth … .²

The convicted, Trent Mays, 17, and Ma'lik Richmond, 16, seemed truly sorry for their actions after the verdict was rendered and before the sentencing was announced. So pathetic was their behavior that it elicited sympathy for them. Of course, this reaction caused another counter-reaction which basically cried out for people not to forget who the true victim was – a sixteen year old girl.

All of this is damning. It holds the two young men in an obviously despicable standing. But I and others believe it reflects a serious shortcoming in so many others. And it is this latter aspect of the case which draws my attention. Judge Lipps and, later, the state's attorney general voiced the concern that the case highlights profound shortcomings in how we instill in our young people the perceptions and attitudes regarding sex and basic human dignity. State Attorney General Mike DeWine was so concerned that he announced he will be convening a grand jury to investigate the case to seek out others who might have committed crimes. His decision to call the grand jury seems to be influenced by the social media evidence the trial utilized. In a statement he said,

A grand jury is an investigative tool that is uniquely suited to ensure fairness and to complete this investigation. And this community needs assurance that no stone has been left unturned in our search for the truth … . Rape is not a recreational activity. We, as a society, have an obligation [to] do more to educate our young people about rape. They need to know it is a horrible crime of violence. And it is simply not ok.³

And there lies the civics education angle as well as demands on other parts of the school curriculum.

1See web cite http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rape_statistics .

2Red, C. and Thompson, T. (2013). Steubenville rape case: Victims hope one day to forgive Trent May & Ma'Lik Richmond, who were found guilty in rape of 16-year-old by Ohio judge. Daily News, March 17, http://www.nydailynews.com/sports/steubenville-high-school-football-players-found-guilty-rape-16-year-old-judge-article-1.1291087.

3Ibid.

CHOICE OR DUTY

I have, at various times in this blog, mentioned that an earlier view of liberty in our national history was the notion that we should be free to do what we should do and not what we want to do. You might have attributed such a notion to a more religiously anchored popular view. And if you have, you would be mostly right – at least according to my understanding. But apparently there is another basis for such a view. The other contention is that while people have choices in terms of their behavior, they have no choice in terms of their conscience and beliefs.¹

The theory is that you as an individual are exposed to information as you go through life. That information is processed and from it your inner voice, your conscience, draws conclusions as to what is good and what is evil. These are your moral beliefs. There is no intent in the process; it just happens. Your intent enters when you decide to either behave in accordance with that conscience or not. So when the right of religion is considered, the right refers to the duty you feel in terms of the dictates which constitute your conscience.

Madison and Jefferson understood religious liberty as the right to exercise religious duties according to the dictates of conscience, not the right to choose religious beliefs. In fact their argument for religious liberty relies heavily on the assumption that beliefs are not a matter of choice. … In this assumption Jefferson echoed the view of John Locke, who wrote in A Letter concerning Toleration (1689), “it is absurd that things should be enjoined by laws which are not in men's power to perform. And to believe this or that to be true, does not depend upon will.”²

If we have no choices in this realm, we therefore have an inalienable right to our beliefs. Such a view of beliefs and conscience is foreign to our modern ear.

The modern view is that of the natural rights mental construct. Central to the construct is the belief that the individual has the right to determine what values, including moral ones, he/she adopts. This strongly indicates an ability to do what Jefferson, Madison, and Locke believed was impossible. More critically, it undermines the function of beliefs. They, as being beyond choices, reflect more centrally our essential self, our identity. Once one accepts that one has the ability to choose values, beliefs, the content of our conscience, one prescribes a transitory, potentially changeable aspect for oneself – changeable by the whims of events and times. In the eyes of our traditional forefathers, on the other hand, that part of us becomes so much a part of who we are that a conscience is central to our being.

Does all this have a practical angle? Take the case of Thornton v. Caldor, in which a Connecticut law allowed for individuals to select which day of the week they could observe the Lord's Day. What the law did was allow Jews to observe the sabbath on Saturday by allowing them to take the day off from work. The rationale was that people don't choose what day of the week their religion selects as the day of their observance. The Supreme Court struck the law down. In its opinion, it furthered the notion that this whole issue falls under the realm of choices. Some workers are Christians, some are Jews, and some don't believe in any religion. To give workers the right to choose what day they can take off would be to allow them an unreasonable choice to the detriment of their employers. Whereas the more traditional view holds that this matter is the exercise of a duty, Jefferson would view that a Jew didn't choose to be a Jew and didn't choose to value observing the sabbath on Saturday. The choice comes into play when a Jew decides to observe the sabbath or not; whether or not to abide by the duty his/her religion holds sacred. Surely, the law could have been worded better, but the case illustrates the distinction between choice and duty. The inability of the court to settle on one or the other principle has led to contradicting decisions by the courts.

I believe this whole notion is fundamental to our civic expectations of citizens. How do our civics students perceive their role as citizens? Are they having the experiences that enable the development of a sense of duty toward the commonwealth? These are basic questions civics educators need to address.

1Sandel, M. J. (1996). Democracy's discontent: America in search of a public philosophy. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. This whole concern is taken from Sandel's book.

2Ibid., p. 65.

PRECEPTS OR CONSEQUENCES

Tocqueville, in his visit to America in the early 1800s, noted that the role of religion was salutary in that it served to moderate the competitive nature of the nation's capitalist economy. During the week, an average business person engaged in activities to maximize his or her profit, but come Sunday, he or she heard Bible stories that emphasized being honest and fair and being concerned for the poor.¹ I believe religion still provides that necessary offset. Religion does more than offer a balance to a purely economic/material perspective. It, in terms of western religious tradition, strongly provides a rationale for our dedication to equality. We are all equal in God's eyes or so the religious tradition teaches. This has been a powerful message over the centuries as western civilization has drifted to an evermore democratic constitutional belief. But there is an aspect of religion that I fear is a hindrance and that limits our ability to count on it to provide for all our moral needs. This is not a knock on religion; it is just that for purposes of promoting a healthy democratic character, a people needs more than a religious view. That is, religious morality or ethics is based on a deontological view and such a view is wanting.

Deontology is the study of moral obligation. Deontological views are views of morality based on definite precepts, judgments as to whether a deed is moral or evil. Precepts are claims as to whether an act is moral or not based on a belief that is received – as in a religious inspiration – or divine. As Philip Selznick puts its basic dictum: “follow the precept no matter what the consequences.”² This view of morality calls on people to study holy sources or listen to those who do in order to derive what the precepts are. This usually follows a process: a believer listens to a minister, priest, or rabbi to learn what is moral. This message is usually in the form of sermons or selected readings or religious counseling. I would hold that such a role can inform our political views, but that such a view, at a minimum, needs to be supplemented.

By what? By a view which Selznick calls the consequential view. Here the motto is “morality is made for humans, not humans for morality.”³ The claim is that morality lies in acts that advance us toward mutual well-being, advancement of the commonwealth. So, in order to determine what is moral, one reflects on the consequences of a planned act and if it is determined that the act will advance the common good, it is moral; if it doesn't, then it is immoral. If it leaves the common good alone, it is neutral. Lying, for example, is not necessarily evil if the consequences of telling a lie advance our common well-being. This form of thinking makes many uneasy. Isn't this what tyrants tend to believe or tell their followers?

Part of the consequentialist view is to study what, in concrete terms, constitutes the common good. Selznick analyzes a concern for the common good on two levels. On one level, a lower one, he identifies as an attribute of the common good the promotion of a state of mutual concern and warmth for one another. But on a higher level, he expresses the following concerns:

A moral order is effective if it succeeds in creating widespread commitment to “deserving the desirable.” That commitment is an aspect of personality. Hence we look to virtue and character as the foundations of morality. To answer the question, Consequences for what? we look above all to character-impacting choice. “Consequences include effects upon character, upon confirming and weakening habits, as well as tangibly obvious results.” …

The creation of an integrated moral self, capable of exercising self-restraint, expressing love, shouldering responsibility, engaging in moral reflection, is the prime end or outcome that governs the assessment of consequences. At the same time, character and dispositions are causes of consequences. We judge character by what it leads to and what we can rely on.⁴

Projecting outward, such character commitments portray what a moral society is like. It is a society inhabited by these character bound individuals so inclined to participate in those aspects of life that promote and actualize the qualities Selznick innumerates.

So, lying is generally immoral because the consequence of people lying, usually, is a common experience that makes trust unlikely and without trust life becomes highly unproductive. Citing another example, you might deontologically find abortion immoral, but consequentially, what would be the results to our commonwealth if we were to make them illegal? And yet on another plane, when we as citizens consider morality as the relatively simple chore of following precepts, we relinquish the role of participating in the civic duty to reflect more seriously on the goodness or evil of social policy for we minimize what policy choices mean in terms of their consequences. Democracy demands the more active role in our public deliberations.

So, where does that leave us in terms of the relationship between the two views? Do we have to choose between the two; are they mutually exclusive? I believe that they are not. As a matter of fact, a person who seriously adopts the consequentialist view soon finds out that in practice there is not much difference between the two views. When one looks historically at what types of acts and motivations lead to a better commonwealth, he or she finds an enormous overlap between those acts and motives and the precepts that religions promote. This is especially true when one considers social moral precepts; that is, precepts that address how we treat each other, at least on a fundamental level. In both cases, lying is generally a no-no. Divergence pops up when the act or motivation relates to complex social issues such as abortion. Here, I believe responsible citizens need to consider the morality of public policy and implement both views: the deontologist view and the consequentialist view. And how does one learn about such views? The home and church are where one is primarily presented with the former; the school is where one is primarily presented with the latter.

1Tocqueville, A. de. (1969/1835). Democracy in America. (Translation by George Lawrence). New York, NY: Harper Perennial.

2Selznick, P. (1992). The moral commonwealth: Social theory and the promise of community. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Quotation on p. 32.

3Ibid., p. 32.

4Ibid., p. 34.

UNDERLYING CIVICS MESSAGING

Teachers of civics need to develop a professional appreciation for the subconscious nature of how individuals hold political beliefs and attitudes. George Lakoff is but one noted cognitive psychologist who has written extensively on this topic. I recently was thumbing through one of his books and for some reason, a recurring ad on television came to mind.

In a current advertisement for Fed Ex, the mailing/shipping firm, there is an apparent rock band sitting in a hotel room watching TV when its manager bursts in expressing anger at the fact that the media has photos of the band members carrying their golf clubs around. He wonders how he can sell the group as a dangerous bunch of young men when people see them with the clubs – somehow the image of danger and golf engenders dissonance. They need to portray hate. One of the group claims he doesn't hate golf. Solution: get Fed Ex to ship the clubs directly to the golf course. The manager then commands: now learn how to destroy a hotel room and proceeds to smash a vase full of flowers on the floor before storming out of the room. One of the band members finishes the ad by stating he will get water for the flowers.

Why do I think of this ad? I know it's a joke. I know the intent is merely to draw our attention to the message that Fed Ex, for a price, will ship your golf clubs to just about anywhere saving you the hassle of lugging them on planes and taxis and the like. But the message reflects, to some degree, reality. If it didn't, it wouldn't be funny. And what message is that; to what aspect of reality does it allude? The reality is that there is a portion of our population that finds it okay to destroy hotel rooms. Now in real life who pays for that destruction? If and when a rock band destroys a room, either the band pays for it, a publicist pays for it, or a hotel eats the cost as the price for the attention it is getting. But who pays for it when the culprits are a bunch of fraternity brothers having a wild weekend? Even if the destruction is not extensive but enough to be noticed, one can make the claim that such behavior is encouraged by the antics of rock bands and other popular icons demonstrating their disdain for property and authority.

Now, if a teacher walks into a classroom and asks how many students are dying to destroy a hotel room, I doubt hands will shoot up in the air. And truth be told, the attitudes and motivations that lead to such behaviors are probably not conscious. But they do set the stage for how, to some degree, the world is seen. And the part of the world most affected by the attitudes expressed in the ad is the civics world. It has to do with rights and laws and economic and political values and morals. Yes, I'm making too much of the ad. I just felt it illustrated what Lakoff''s book is about.

What people will tell you about their worldview does not necessarily accurately reflect how they act. … If you ask a liberal about his political worldview [for example], rather he will almost certainly talk about liberty and equality, rather than about a nurturant parent model of the family. But … such directly political ideas do not meet our adequacy conditions; they do not explain why the various liberal stands fit together, nor do they answer the puzzles or account for topic choice, language choice, and modes of reason.¹

As opposed to the Fed Ex ad, there was the Sunday Morning, CBS program, segment² that highlighted a high school basketball game in which a player of one team purposely threw the ball to an intellectually challenged “player” of the other team, who was put in at the end of a game to have his moment. He usually works as the team's equipment manager and with a love for basketball has been a sort of spiritual leader of the team. Up to the point when the opposing player threw him the ball, he had missed several attempts at scoring, but this time, having a clear shot, he made it. He had his two points. What civics attitudes, ideals, and values were demonstrated on that high school gym floor? They were the kind which I want to see demonstrated in my neighborhood and community. How about you? 

 

1Lakoff, G. (2002). Moral politics: How liberals and conservatives think. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press. Quotation on pp. 36-37.

2Aired on March 3, 2013.

VOTING RIGHTS CASE REFLECTS FEDERALISM

In a current case before the Supreme Court, one that is challenging the 1965 Voting Rights Act, certain federalist issues are being considered. I believe that the manner in which the case is being argued by complainants picks up biased federalist views that do not represent federalism in a complete and totally honest way. The argument reflects the “state's rights” view of federalism. While such an argument does engender legitimate federalist concerns, it ignores other relevant aspects of federalism that I believe are more central to its ideas and ideals. Yes, federalism argues for respecting the entities that make up a federalist arrangement, but it also argues for the integrity of the agreement by which the entities have federated themselves in first place.

Specifically, the case in question has been brought up by a county in Alabama. Alabama, according to the 1965 legislation, has been identified as a state with a history of significant discrimination against African-Americans in terms of voting. That state, through state and local laws, devised a variety of schemes to, in effect, deny blacks the ability to vote. Such schemes as poll taxes and literacy tests were used toward this end. Attempts by the federal government to void such laws were met by state officials devising new strategies to maintain the discriminatory practices. To meet this challenge, the Voting Rights Act established the legal requirement that those officials need to clear, ahead of time, any changes in their voting laws. The clearance is be issued by the federal Justice Department. In this way the Department could pass judgment on the constitutionality of the proposed changes and, by so doing, head off any new attempts to prevent blacks from exercising their right to vote. I will conclude this quick review of the law by pointing out that the media has repeatedly gone over this factual information.

Shelby County, the Alabama county bringing the case to the Supreme Court, claims that by not treating all the states the same, the law ignores the constitutional requirement of equal protection under the law. The law and its requirements apply only to those states and parts of other states that have the type of history I described above. Many of the states so identified, such as Alabama, are in the South where it is well known that states have a past of extreme discrimination against African-Americans. But my concern here is not so much with the strength or weakness of Shelby County's claim, but with the bad “rep” federalism gets from such “state rights” cases.

Here is what is ignored about federalism: Federalism is a political philosophy that is based on republican ideals. It calls for the formation of government by people or groups who have a central and shared sense about how they can come together and form that government based on a set of shared ideals, aims, goals, needs and desires. The entities, be they people, groups, or both, pledge that they will hold to all of the stipulations of the agreement. The pledge is in perpetuity or for a stated length of time. The agreement spells out the demands and expectations each entity promises to keep. The agreement also establishes the structure of government that is meant to facilitate the attainment of those shared ideals, aims, goals, needs, and desires. In the case of the United States, a federated union, the agreement is our constitution.

As part of that constitution, there are the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments. They are known as the Civil War amendments since they were ratified shortly after the Civil War ended and are considered the codification for the reasons the war was fought. In short, they were to make the former slaves full-fledged citizens of the US. In the case of voting rights, the Voting Rights Act was an attempt by Congress to assure that all of the states, including those that have a documented history of, in effect, defying that agreement, live by the agreement. The Act is a federalist reaction to a history of making a mockery of the sacred, federal agreement that is our constitution.

Of course, this argument does not address the question of the case. Shelby County claims that beyond being treated differently, the problem of denying blacks the right to vote no longer exists to the degree that justifies this “discriminatory” treatment. For the record and based on what I have heard in the media, I disagree. But my attempt here is to present a more comprehensive and honest view of what is meant by federalism. Why? Because federalism is too important to our system of governance for us to have a muddled view of what it means. It is not a means to deny any citizen his or her right to vote. It instead stands for an active and involved citizenry and that includes voting.

JUST SOME NUMBERS

I have made the point in this blog that a society that promotes economic inequality belies any political philosophical claim that that society believes in equality. Why? Because financial resources are a political resource in any political system and that includes a republican democracy like ours. Money buys access; it buys influence; it buys communication accessibility. All of these are political advantages for the person or group that has the dollars to spend. I believe that this is self evident, but those who question any policy that addresses these inequalities as “punishing the rich” either does not believe in equality, as a political ideal, or is just being naïve about political realities.

Assuming you agree at least minimally with my contention, here are some statistics about how the American distribution of income and wealth has shifted in the last several decades. These stats are offered by Joseph E. Stiglitz,¹ Nobel prize winning economist.

In 2007, the top 1 percent earned on average an after tax income of $1.3 million a year. The bottom 20 percent earned on average an after tax income of $17,800. Breaking it down to a week, the top 1 percent earned 40 percent more money than the bottom 20 percent earned in a year. What the top 0.1 percent earned in a day and a half equates roughly with what the bottom 90 percent earned in a year. The top 20 percent got higher pay than the bottom 80 percent. During the last thirty years, the bottom 90 percent of wage earners have had a growth in income of 15 percent while the top 1 percent saw their income rise almost 150 percent. The top 0.1 percent during that time saw a 300 percent increase. Leading up to the financial crisis, the lower and middle income earners, while their incomes moved relatively little, saw their “wealth” increase as the equity in their real estate ownership rapidly increased. Of course, everyone found out that this increase was a mirage when the real estate bubble burst. While all segments of the population were hurt by the bubble bursting, the upper income and wealth group was able to recover fairly quickly. That was not the case for lower income and wealth groups. The wealth ratio between the top 1 percent and the rest in terms of wealth is that they own 225 times more wealth which is double the ratio that prevailed in the years 1962 or 1983. As for income derived from capital, the top 1 percent enjoys 57 percent of all such income in our economy.

Stiglitz summarizes the situation as follows:

The simple story of America is this: the rich are getting richer, the richest of the rich are getting still richer, the poor are becoming poorer and more numerous, and the middle class is being hollowed out. The incomes of the middle class are stagnating or falling, and the difference between them and the truly rich in increasing.²

Not only do these facts affect the quality of our democracy, but our democracy is issuing policies that not only enable the disparities, but also help it along. Stiglitz makes the point that during the thirty years after World War II, a war that brought Americans together in common cause, policy was aimed at closing the disparities. It worked. But since the “Reagan revolution” the policy trend has turned 180 degrees. Hence, we face the reality the above numbers reflect.

1Stiglitz, J. E. (2012). The price of inequality: How today's divided society endangers our future. New York, NY: W. W. Norton and Company.

2Ibid., p. 7.