REGULATED CONDITION

This blog is currently describing and explaining two forms of equality.  It is doing this to point out how a liberated federalist model is “activated.”  The liberated federalist model is a representation of how federation theory views idealistic governance and politics.  This model has three components:  community, entity, and association and the reader can check out the last eight postings of this blog for a description of these components and how they become activated.

In terms of this posting, the context is that this model focuses on ideal politics as an association, a federalist collective of entities, engages to respond to a political challenge.  As such, it is event specific; that is, it draws classroom study to analyze how idealistically an association should deal with a political challenge and, through that view, see what actually happens.

Since a political challenge, especially if the association is a government, is highly likely to be over an issue relating to equality, the current effort in this blog is to describe what that entails.  To do that, a clear presentation of what equality means is essential, not only in terms of its overall meaning, but how it is defined in its two forms:  baseline equality and equality of treatment. 

          Since no area of concern is more apt to activate the model than an issue concerning equality, this more extended treatment is called for.  Therefore, this blog has defined equality, a la federalist values, shared its importance, and provided a view of its related social implication.  It did the same for one of its forms, baseline equality.  

In this posting, it will build on its description of equality and proceed to explain its other form:  equality of treatment or regulated equality.  Specifically, it will report on the definition of regulated equality and comment on its importance.  The next posting will look at its social implication.

Definition – To get at what equality of treatment means, one cannot just plunge into a definition.  One needs to revisit baseline equality or equal treatment.  Even after defining baseline equality, it is helpful to place some parameters on equality no matter what economic or political arrangement exists.  Even though, on its face, there is the simple notion that equal treatment means everyone is treated the same, one cannot avoid asking:  is this possible?

With further thought, one is faced with the realization that there are some situations in which even just societies tolerate and enforce inequality or unequal treatment.  Upon reflection, one can readily see and understand these situations.  This can be simply demonstrated by looking at two types of such situations.

The first situation is demonstrated by a simple example that makes the point that there are times that demand unequal treatment.  To wit, the law doesn’t allow blind people to drive automobiles.  Perhaps technology in the future will find a cure for blindness or invent cars that can be “driven” automatically without the need of a sighted driver.  According to news accounts, this latter possibility is right around the corner.  But to date, such solutions do not exist and, therefore, this type of inequality remains. 

There is also the case of unequal treatment that is enforced because a sought-after product or service is too expensive for some.  This is a type of inequality, but one can legitimize it in that any good or service is limited – scarce – and needs to be rationed by some method.  The pricing system is a form of rationing.  It is easily supported by a capitalist rationale.  The central point is, as these two types of situation point out, one cannot have total equality.

So, even in a system of laws and customs that adopt solely an equal treatment approach to equality, there cannot be total equality.  With that in mind, this account returns to an earlier claim.  In describing baseline equality, it made the connection between equality and liberty. 

Liberty, under federation theory, is about having those rights to do what one should do, at least in the ideal.  What needs clarification, regarding this form of liberty, is by what standard one judges whether something should be done or should not be done.  Such an inquiry will assist at defining regulated condition.

It was pointed out in the last posting that this determination of what should be done can be complex.  Since one can eliminate the possibility of pure equality, everyone treated the same in all conditions, one already has a sense that distinctions need to be made in how equality is established and maintained.

With that in mind, it is useful to inquire as to what restrictions to pure equality exists under a federalist view.  This blog has presented a federalist moral code.  The trump value of that code is societal welfare.  In other words, what a citizen should do or should not do are those actions that when done or not done bolster the welfare of a society – at least according to federalist values. 

Putting this idea in less idealistic language, generally, what people should do is to align their self-interests in such a way as to not go against – abuse – the common good.  Ideally, what is valued most is for an entity to advance the common good, but at a minimum, the federalist, moral standard is to not abuse it.  In extreme cases, this can be backed with law, but in most cases, social expectations – norms – can secure general adherence. 

How is equality related to this common good?  In terms of regulated condition, it adds to what was pointed out in the last posting to be missing from the baseline form of equality.  That is the concern for dignity and integrity of each member of society.  This is a nuanced difference between regulated condition and equal condition.  To help describe this distinction, conveying a telling story is helpful.

Imagine a father with two sons.  The sons have both been stricken with a serious disease.  In the case of one son, the disease is potentially fatal; in the case of the other, it causes a high degree of discomfort.  The father has medication, but only enough for one dosage.

This dosage is enough to cure the disease, but the entire dosage must be administered for the medication to be effective.  The father cannot get any more of the medication.  To which son does the father give the medicine?  How does he make this difficult decision?

Both sons are equally loved and equal in the eyes of the father – he wishes he had the disease instead of either of his sons.  But even if he did care for one more, does that make a difference?  Does he flip a coin?  Does he have the sons race for the medicine and whoever gets to it first gets the dosage?  Or does he raid each of his son’s piggy banks and whoever has more money wins?  Or finally, does he tally how well behaved each son has been and determines which son has merited the medication?

Of course, he doesn’t do any of these things; he gives the medicine to the one whose life is in jeopardy and thanks whatever power that both sons are not fatally threatened.  This solution reflects the thinking and feeling of regulated condition or equality of treatment.  Yes, both sons are not treated equally in the strictest form, but both are treated equally in terms of some normative standard.

If the conditions were reversed, the other son would get the medication.  As it is, as a price for this form of equality, the discomforted son will just have to continue being discomforted.  But both sons, in this short anecdote are given equal consideration regarding resources, assets, and other entitlements along with being treated with integrity, dignity, and respect. 

This then is the definition of equality of treatment or regulated equality:  It is a treatment of each entity in which the person or group possesses a baseline equality (integrity, respect, and dignity) and the right to equal consideration, considering the entity’s needs, in the distribution of resources or other entitlements.  This mirrors the previous definition for equality given earlier in this blog and based on federalist values and, in turn, federation theory.

Importance -  A desire for equality in general, especially if it is emotionally felt, leads to the aspiration for creating a commonwealth in which all its members can enjoy equally a “regulated condition” form of equality.  When held by a society, regulated condition is categorized as a fundamental right; equal condition (equal treatment), on the other hand, is a derivative right.

Regulated condition is based on an equal evaluation of everyone’s welfare.  In pursuing this essential right, to the extent it exists, dissimilar treatment for people in different categories can be condoned and even seen a reasonable and necessary.  One doesn’t allow blind people to drive because in holding everyone’s welfare equally, the practical realities call for dissimilar treatment.  Dissimilar treatment, though, must be justified.

The need for justification is particularly demanded when, due to some historical developments, arbitrary categories were – and might still be – established and maintained for determining a difference in treatment.  Here the inequality was not based on equal consideration of human dignity, but on its opposite.  That is, the inequality was to promote the interests of some groups above others or to advance some misguided belief in genetic elitism.

In those cases, historical events or conditions established some grounds in which circumstances show that a level of disrespect to the dignity and welfare of certain groups existed (and they might continue to exist today).  In our history, the most obvious example is that of slavery and the treatment of African-Americans.  Also, a group treated in similar fashion is the indigenous people.  Hence, we have immoral inequality in terms of these two groups and others.

“The objective is fairness based on moral equality, not consistency for its own sake”[1] – and meeting this objective as an instance of regulated condition or equality of treatment is a federalist aim.  In other words, government should treat people differently if to do so would be to respect and advance the ideal that everyone has intrinsic worth.  And this is where the above referred distinction between simple baseline equality and equality of treatment is felt and observed.

Such a case would, in the name of equality, call for providing assistance to someone who has been subjected to unequal opportunity as is the goal with affirmative action.

This can meaningfully give substance to a moral equality standard; i.e., give treatment to people as equals, but within the parameters of a federalist moral code.  And this can mean dissimilar treatment.  Selznick argues that this dissimilar treatment is not meant to downgrade people, but to raise them to create a community in which all are ideally well-born to some reasonable, minimal level.[2]

A study of government in the nation’s schools should include inquiry and debate about the connection between the social equality that either exists or doesn't exist in fact and the moral equality which is advocated by this element of the liberated federalist model.  In addition, inquiry should be extended to ask what this element of moral equality would promote or prohibit as policy in either the public or private sectors of the commonwealth.

What remains in describing regulated condition is the social implication of this form.  That will be the topic of the next posting.

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[1] Philip Selznick, The Moral Commonwealth:  Social Theory and the Promise of Community, 491.

[2] Ibid.

BASELINE EQUALITY

The context of this posting was adequately given in the first few paragraphs of the last posting.  To repeat that description, here is how that posting began:

The last series of postings presented, described, and explained the components of a liberated federalism model.  The components are the community, the entities, and the association.  This is an idealistic model – how governance and politics should take place – and its normative quality is defined by federalist values.  Those values revolve around the concern for societal welfare.  Its function is to help guide civics educators in their choice of instructional content.

What remains in this presentation of the model is to comment on how it is “activated.”  The model focuses on an event, when a polity is confronted with a political challenge.  What this and the following postings will address is the substantive issues that usually pose the political challenges an association is likely to encounter, especially when the association is a government.

After that introduction, the posting went on to describe how federation theory views equality.  It offered the following definition for equality:  a belief that despite inequality in personal attributes, such as talent and other resources, each person is entitled to equal consideration of his/her well-being, that all have an equal right to maintain their dignity and integrity as individual persons.  As such, equality has a normative quality since it reflects a respect for being human beyond the biological aspects.[1]

The posting goes on to state that equality, as an element of federation theory, has two forms:  baseline equality and equality of treatment.  The purpose of this posting is to provide a definition for the first of these forms, to make a statement as to its importance, and to indicate the social implications baseline equality form has.

Definition – Baseline equality relates to liberty.  Oftentimes, equality and liberty are presented as opposing ideals, but as federation theory defines them, equality is related and gives context to liberty.  In terms of baseline equality, this aspect refers to the minimal level of equality to which each person is entitled.  This aspect is constitutionally defined.  In relation to this is the jurisprudential development of the Fourteenth Amendment regarding its provision of equal protection[2] and to some degree, due process provisions is relevant.

Importance – This notion of equality adds to the value of liberty.  Its addition is limited to the notion that liberty need not be fixated on the concept of the individual sovereignty.  As noted earlier in this blog, individual sovereignty is the way the natural rights construct defines liberty.  Federation theory instead links liberty to a certain reality, one that is based on the observation that we are all mutually dependent on a communal existence. 

Natural rights’ definition of liberty invites individuals to adopt any value orientation, be it based on religious beliefs, communal concerns, or self-interest; individuals are free in law and expectations to choose whatever basis to determine how they will define their lives, especially in terms of moral commitments.  Hence, that construct sees the individual as sovereign.

Many, if not most, people use a basis of short term self-interest to make these life-defining decisions.  This leaves the interests of the community wanting, which hurts the health of the commonwealth and in the long run the interests of the individual.  This is not a logical result of individual sovereignty, but it is the actual result one can readily see in societies that adopt the natural rights perspective as the dominant view of governance and politics.

Social Implication – Under natural rights’ view of liberty, such a result is determined to be just the way things happen to be.  Perhaps there is a degree of regret, but it is believed among its adherents to just be the price one pays for liberty.  And that view leads to policy biases that shy away from communal based policies; these more socially oriented policy choices are judged as intrusive to individual prerogatives.

Federation theory uses another basis, a more communal perspective.  One might ask:  is it a collectivist perspective or a socialistic view?  Selznick writes concerning the effects of historical actions in relation to the rights of the individual and the interests of the commonwealth:

The constitutional doctrine of equal protection does not ignore or erase differences of talent, achievement, contribution, or good fortune.  It is not a device for leveling gradations or for making society more homogeneous.  It is, however, a path to community.  Equal protection speaks above all to membership, and membership presumes that all who belong share a core identity.  This identity is wholly compatible with rich diversity so long as that diversity does not undermine equality of membership.  The most serious threat to such equality is division based on moral stigma.  Whatever its source, whether it be a certain racial or ethnic origin or level of native intelligence, the effect of moral stigma is to rank some people as intrinsically less worthy than others.  Vindication of moral equality, in the face of strong impulses toward moral hierarchy, is the primary mission of equal protection of the law.[3] (Emphasis in the original)

With such a view of equality, the individual is free – he or she has liberty – to do what he or she should do.

And when one considers what one should do, one introduces a moral approach at least in terms of civic affairs.  Within a community, the expectation is created that all members can fully participate or else there can be no meaningful commonwealth.  Self-interest is not forgotten, but it is tempered with a realization of a communal reality of mutual interests that does make itself felt if only eventually.

This view is counter to the individual sovereignty view espoused by the natural rights construct.  A distinction should be made between those self-interests based behaviors that offends contractual arrangements (an agreed exchange of something for something else) and those that offend understandings within a compact arrangement (an agreement based on a solemn pledge to create and/or advance a collective, an association). 

Many see the former view leading to the behaviors causing the 2008 financial crisis.  Those actions were moral and legal under a natural rights view, they did not offend contractual obligations; but they did offend the federalist provisions of mutual interests and acted against the common good for short-term profit.

Selznick continues that there is not just an expectation of being protected against abuses of power, but equality includes a whole range of duties and rights attached to membership.  While these rights and duties might be bound by limited resources and options – an individual might not possess those levels of assets that others have – they are what make membership meaningful.[4] 

That is, the level of duties and rights are affected by the amount of assets and resources a person has at his/her disposal.  Generally, the more someone benefits, the more his/her duty is.  Rights for the advantaged citizen might be further restrained by being subject to certain policies such as a progressive tax rate.[5]

In terms of federation theory, this notion of liberty needs to be fleshed out.  For one thing, in everyday life, one would not be able to distinguish it from the natural rights view of liberty.  In most cases, one is not talking about a sort of liberty that deprives a person from making life-defining decisions or from enjoying the added entitlements a higher income or wealth level can afford. 

What is being promoted is a public expectation that first takes seriously what can reasonably be demanded from citizens.  This public sphere also provides a language that can be utilized to legitimately evaluate how effectively citizens meet the obligations and duties of being citizens.  And this evaluation considers the various benefits citizens can secure.

A rule of thumb that apply to this sense of liberty is to simply state that everyone can pursue his/her self-interest if a person does not define those interests in such a way as to counter the common good.  Admittedly, at times that might call for significant reflection.  Why? Because often such judgements are difficult and complex.

They are often not even a function of law, but of social norms and other expectations.  For example, many of the super-rich today have chosen to bequeath their fortunes to charitable efforts after their deaths.  Should this be a federated expectation?  It is a legitimate question to ask under the tenets of federation theory.

The next posting will address the second form of a federated equality, equality of treatment or what this account prefers to call regulated condition.

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[1] The reader is invited to check out the previous posting (July 11, 2017 entry).

[2] Mark V. Tushnet, “Equal Protection,” in The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court, ed. Kermit L. Hall (New York NY:  Oxford University Press, 1992), 257-259.

[3] Philip Selznick, The Moral Commonwealth:  Social Theory and the Promise of Community, 489.

[4] Ibid.

[5] As the nation has become more ensconced in a natural rights perspective, calls for a flat tax have become more strident.

FEDERALIST EQUALITY

The last series of postings presented, described, and explained the components of a liberated federalism model.  The components are the community, the entities, and the association.  This is an idealistic model – how governance and politics should take place – and its normative quality is defined by federalist values.  Those values revolve around the concern for societal welfare.  Its function is to help guide civics educators in their choice of instructional content.

What remains in this presentation of the model is to comment on how it is “activated.”  The model focuses on an event, when a polity is confronted with a political challenge.  What this and the following postings will address is the substantive issues that usually pose the political challenges an association is likely to encounter, especially when the association is a government.

This model was initially deemed to be a synthesis mostly between the constructs of the natural rights perspective (with its cherished regard of liberty) and the critical theory construct (with its regard for equality).  Both liberty and equality are highly regarded values in the federation theory values structure.  In both cases these values are defined differently by federation theory.  Previously, this blog distinguished how liberty is defined by federation theory – as the freedom to do what one should do.

With this posting, this account presents what equality means to federation theory.  The theory agrees with critical theory that more political challenges emanate from concerns over equality issues than from other issues.  Even issues that on the surface seem unrelated to equality, upon a closer analysis, can be traced to an equality concern.  For example, issues regarding the environment.

Much of the abuse of the environment stems from vested interests being allowed to follow policy streams that do damage to the environment.  Such is the case with pollution being the by-product of manufacturing, mining, and other business activities that enhance profits.  Equality issues are issues that relate to either uneven distribution of societal assets based on economic activity or other bases for unequal treatment such as racism, sexism, ageism, or on prejudices stemming from sexual preferences. 

What follows is a review of how the construct views equality.  Federation theory has a definite position concerning this issue.  This is an account of how the construct defines it, how it sees its importance, and how it determines its social implications.  This posting addresses the first of these concerns; following postings will look at the other two concerns.

Definition – Equality, according to federation theory, refers to the belief that despite inequality in talent, wealth, health or other assets, the entailed value calls for equal consideration of all persons’ well-being, that all have an equal right to maintain their dignity and integrity as individual persons.  As such, equality has a normative quality since it reflects a respect for being human beyond the biological aspects.

Philip Selznick quotes Bernard Williams on this point:

That all men [and women] are human is, if a tautology, a useful one, serving as a reminder that those who belong anatomically to the species homo sapiens, and can speak a language, use tools, live in societies, can interbreed despite racial differences, etc. are also alike in certain other respects more likely to be forgotten.  These respects are notably the capacity to feel pain, both from immediate physical causes and from various situations represented in perception and thought; and the capacity to feel affection for others and the consequences of this …[1]

Factually, Selznick points out, the judgment is made from the behaviors of humans, that homo sapiens are equal in their ability to make moral choices.  There exists no elitist standing in this regard; each is humbled by this leveling attribute; each is subject to moral indiscretions; each can realize fully his or her own capacities as a person.[2] 

These attributes, assuming the person in question is of normal mental capacity, are what lead to meaningful self-respect and a sense of empathy that allows each to reach out to others.[3]  In terms of the formulation of the compact that initiates the existence of a federalist arrangement, be it a community, an association, or a government, the fact that all entities can equally consent to its creation, does allow for them to be federated.[4]

Importance – In this newer version of federalism, equality takes on two forms:  baseline equality and equality of treatment or what this writer calls regulated condition.  Equality, as identified in one of its basic national covenants – the Declaration of Independence – is a requisite to any resulting covenant or compact including any subsequent constitutional agreement.[5]  This is so because equality has a strong moral component in both religious and secular thinking and its absence has proven highly deleterious to social relations.

If nothing else, experience has shown the evil that follows its disregard, particularly in relation to ensuing travesties to human dignity and to the conceptions of personhood.  Please note that with federation theory, equality and individualism take on mutually supportive functions.  This relationship will become more meaningful as baseline equality is reviewed in the next posting.

More ambitiously, equality acts to encourage a collective to make decisions from an idealistic frame of mind, to formulate reflected and felt policy, including its constitution.  That is, the people committed to a covenant or compact are strongly encouraged and enabled to formulate a constitutional model that reflects deeply held cultural proclivities.  While a federated union does not insist on a singular cultural basis for all social interactions, it does depend on a cultural foundation of support for its basic constitutional values.[6]

Remember, at the constitution forming stage, a people are coming together to form a union from a basis of consent, not coercion or tradition.  And beyond the formulation of a constitution for governance, the same sense and value motivate the creation and maintenance of a commonwealth or society (the community) in question.[7]  That is these constitutional values have a wide berth within the polity.

What is being promoted is more an ideal than a legalistic concept.  Yes, there are legal aspects to this as in “rights to human dignity,” but part of the problem with the natural rights perspective is to reduce all political ideas to contractual ones.  It loses the more generalizable relations and emotions that are unavoidable in political relationships.

When applied to civics, a contractual view of the subject matter becomes sterile and unapproachable.  As one reads about baseline equality and regulated condition, what is being described is not so much mandatory relations, but idealistic ones that can organically form if citizens begin to see each other as partners in a commonwealth.

Equality fulfills a central function within the overall conceptual structure of federation theory.  By moral equality, Selznick postulates the principle that all persons have the same intrinsic worth by identifying two levels of this attribute:  baseline equality and regulated condition.[8]  As noted earlier in this account, within this construct, equality is a means by which a community can be formulated using a federal organizational form.

Equality provides a “path to community” in which the members of a formulated union are held to be equal in certain important aspects:  moral decision-making, dignity, participation, and consent.  These qualities are not contractual, they are constitutional; they constitute the nature of the entity.

This blog has presented five different views regarding equality that have been held by Americans.  These five views are genetic elitism, earned elitism, equal condition, regulated condition, and equal results.  This set of views is important, it is a context the nation’s history has provided and should be kept in mind since all of them have adherents in the nation’s current political mix.  None of them have been forgotten.

Federation theory incorporates a regulated condition (equal opportunity/limited reward) view of equality or what Selznick calls equality of treatment.  Here is a description of this view that can also serve as a definition for a regulated condition: 

Individuals who enjoy superior human assets (e.g., intelligence, physical dexterity, humor, etc.) do so because of effort for the most part, but also are “blessed” in having been exposed to favorable conditions – a la the concerns expressed by philosopher John Rawls.[9]  Their superiority entitles them to above normal consideration, but limited only to areas associated with their earned accomplishments.  This view can be summarized by the phrase, equal opportunity/limited rewards.

Any entitlements (rewards) are time limited as a recipient must continue to demonstrate his or her worthiness and said rewards, other than status, must be purchased.  Monetary rewards – compensation or other forms of income – are paid in exchange for the individual’s labor and are calculated by reasonable standards to represent that labor’s contribution to the welfare of the society.

Reward relies generally on market forces but can be manipulated (regulated) to reflect what is deemed as the accrued social contribution by the individual and other societal needs.  This regulation is carried out through mostly taxes or minimum wage provisions.  This orientation allows the individual to negotiate his compensation, but this process is regulated in some fashion – either by law, by custom, or some other expectations which are broadly accepted as being legitimate. 

As stated above, this orientation of equality holds that some individuals enjoy superior human assets due to their efforts but only in part.  It takes on the arguments of Rawls – especially the notion that individual assets are to a great degree the product of factors beyond the control or responsibility of the individual.[10] 

By doing so, the role of community is highlighted and nurturing forces are recognized as having a significant effect on what a person can accomplish.  Notice that there is no ascribing worth or higher or lower status due to race, nationality, ethnicity, age, gender, or sexual orientation. 

Also, any special considerations, based on income or class, are purchased in an open, albeit regulated, market arrangement.  There are two forms of this equality:  baseline equality and regulated condition.  These will be described and explained in the next postings.

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[1] Philip Selznick, The Moral Commonwealth:  Social Theory and the Promise of Community, (Berkeley, CA:  University of California Press, 1992), 483-484.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Donald S. Lutz, The Origins of American Constitutionalism (Baton Rouge, LA:  Louisiana State University Press, 1988).

[5] Ibid.

[6] Robert Gutierrez, “A Case for Centered Pluralism,” Curriculum and Teaching Dialogue 5, no. 1 (2003):  71-82.

[7] Phillip Selznick, The Moral Commonwealth:  Social Theory and the Promise of Community.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Chandran Kukathas and Philip Pettit, Rawls:  A Theory of Justice and Its Critics (Stanford, CA:  Stanford University Press, 1990).

[10] Ibid.

INITIATING THE POLITICAL PROCESS

With the last posting, this blog completed reviewing the elements of a liberated federalist model for governance and politics.  This is an idealistic model and meant to guide the choice of content material for a civics curriculum.  The elements reviewed are the community, the entities, and the association.  What remains is a description of what spurs the model into “operation.”

What puts the model in “operation” occurs when an arrangement or, more ideally an association, is confronted by a politically challenging condition.  A politically challenging condition is one that threatens to negatively affect or positively provide the opportunity to advance the political interests of the arrangement/association.  Political interests are defined, for the purposes of the model, as events or situations that affect the societal welfare of the polity.

That is, the condition is efficacious in the association maintaining, increasing, or creating social capital and civic humanism.  Social capital and civic humanism help define the trump value for federalism within the tenets of federation theory.  That value, as just indicated is societal welfare. 

This blog has, over significant number of postings, described and explained the mental construct, federation theory.  The reader who is new to this blog is invited to hit the archival feature of this blog and begin with the posting for May 23 of this year for that account.[1] 

As for the activation of the model, it is the perception of a challenging condition that stimulates the activities identified in the previous posting.  As such, this model draws attention to both the conflictual nature of politics and the consensus side as well.  Thomas Patterson points out the dual nature of politics, the one being conflictual, the other being the efforts to attain consensus to devise a better way of life.[2] 

Daniel Elazar sees the study of politics as one of studying competitive behavior to seeking public allocation of values and the other of seeking a just way by which to arrange a polity’s public affairs.[3]  The former lends itself to a more quantitative approach to the study of politics, the latter allows and encourages a more qualitative approach as it ventures into normative issues.

To the extent that federalist ideals are met, the ideal association is successfully able to issue a moral response.  Morality is defined as the resulting condition from a process that is true to federalist values.[4]  An alternative way to define morality is to designate any behavior that abides by the values of societal welfare (advancing social capital and civic humanism) as being moral.  A short hand term that capture this concern is:  seeking the common good. 

This model, therefore, is concerned not only with the realities of distributing resources and assets, but also with the moral or just processes and decisions that mark this nation’s politics in both public and private arenas.  In so doing, the utilization of the model in developing instructional material in civics ensures a moral element in that instruction; a turn that has been argued in this blog to be sorely missing in the nation’s classrooms.[5]

There are countless sources from which to choose political challenges.  But perhaps the one source that seems to be the fountainhead of more issues than any other is equality.  As such, this synthesis between natural rights and critical theory is this acknowledgement that at the center of most political discourse is the intrinsic conflict among the various economic and social classes and designations.  But unlike Marxian views, equality is defined differently.

Federation treatment of equality is a compromise between how natural rights defines it – summarily described as equal condition – and how critical theorists define it – summarily described as equal results.  The next postings – perhaps three of them – will delve into this compromise.  It is that important.

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[1] For a more complete account the reader can go further back, but the May 23 posting begins a renewed description of liberated federalism perspective which is a newer version of federalism.

[2] Thomas E. Patterson, We the People, (New York, NY:  McGraw-Hill, Incorporated, 1998).

[3] Daniel J. Elazar, “Federal Models of (Civil) Authority,” Journal of Church and State 33, Spring (1991):  233-234.

[4] Phillip Selznick, The Moral Commonwealth:  Social Theory and the Promise of Community, (Berkeley, CA:  University of California Press, 1992).

[5] James D. Hunter, The Death of Character:  Moral Education in an Age without Good and Evil (New York, NY:  Basic Books, 2000).

THE ASSOCIATION

To continue, from the previous postings, describing the components of a liberated federalist model, the third component is the association.  To date, this blog has described the two other components:  the community and the entities.  Associations are a type of social arrangements.  Not all arrangements or collectives are associations.  Some are.

The term association, as used in this blog and as Philip Selznick[1] uses it, refers to those arrangements that are formal in that they are initiated by a compact or a covenant and operate significantly within the ideals contained within federation theory. 

Of course, the national, all embracing association is the federal union of the people and states of the United States of America as designated by the United States Constitution, its compact.  That association, as well as the associations that make up the state and local governments are, in the ideal, communal democracies as defined by Selznick.  Any collective, public or private, can be so judged if it meets to a significant degree federalist ideals as described and explained in this blog and alluded to below:

·        One, it is, as stated above, an organization formulated under the auspices of a compact or covenant that lays out its various provisions.  Ideally, that agreement should be in writing, but a verbal, binding agreement can meet this requirement.  That agreement sets out certain structural requirements:  a qualified majority rule, a strong provision for guaranteeing the rights of minorities and individuals, and a clear purpose or set of purposes for its existence that is publicly stated.

·        Two, it has a fraternal ethos that respects the dignity and integrity of each of the entities that comprise it and an emotionally felt commitment of inclusion for those entities.

·        Three, it has a covenant of reason upon which its moral standing rests.  The covenant of reason includes a deliberative process of decision-making, a provision of critical review of its decisions and actions, and a set of collective interests that reflects its purposes as well as its standing as an association.

·        And four, the association has an overarching responsibility to uphold the communal well-being of the community in which it resides.

To review these attributes, a short elaboration follows:

The compact or covenant refers to the formal agreement between the entities.  The agreement contains the characteristics identified by Daniel J. Elazar.  To review his characterization of a compact/covenant, here is a definitional account of a covenant and another quote that further describes the common structure of a covenant:

Covenantal foundings emphasize the deliberate coming together of humans as equals to establish politics in such a way that all reaffirm their fundamental equality and retain their basic rights ... Polities whose origins are covenantal reflect the exercise of constitutional choice and broad-based participation in constitutional design.  Polities founded by covenant are essentially federal in character, in the original meaning of the term (from foedus, Latin for covenant) ... [2]

And:

[The old covenants followed a recurring format or model which was] … an historical prologue indicating the parties involved, a preamble stating the general purposes of the covenant and the principles behind it, a body of conditions and operative clauses, a stipulation of the agreed-upon sanctions to be applied if the covenant were violated, and an oath to make the covenant morally binding.[3]

Donald S. Lutz points out that the distinction between a compact and a covenant is that a covenant calls upon God to be a witness to the agreement and a compact does not.[4]  In either case, the formulation of a compact or covenant calls for a bit of soul searching.  It demands that the entities involved seriously consider the consequences of such an act due to the nature of the commitment involved.

In addition, there should be at least some minimum level of emotional commitment among the entities for the agreement and each other since the union will most likely last for a significant amount of time.  Compacts and covenants should not be drawn up for frivolous reasons.  As Elazar describes these unions, the commitment is for the duration of the concern involved.  In terms of a national union and such institutional arrangements as marriage, the commitment is in perpetuity.

The purpose or set of purposes for the formation of the arrangement is spelled out in the compact or covenant.  To justify the sort of commitment called for under a compact arrangement, the purpose or purposes need to be of sufficient importance.  Importance can, at a minimum, be measured by the number of people affected by the activities of the association and the importance ascribed to that effect.  For example, a school staff with its responsibilities make it a suitable arrangement for such a commitment by those who work there, but seldom are.[5]

The qualified majority rule attribute holds that a raw majority rule arrangement in collective decision-making should be avoided.  One problem with raw majority rule involves a lack of concern for minorities.  Majority rule should be limited by constitutional (structural) parameters, as previously stated in this blog regarding equality.  Each minority and individual is entitled to protection from the majority and its potential abuses.  Basic rights, as identified by the Bill of Rights, serve as an appropriate starting point.  But on a more human level, this concern is emotionally felt among all entities of the association. 

On a more “practical” level, a member of the majority today can easily and eventually be part of the minority at some future time.  The reciprocal advantage, highlighted earlier in this blog, is actualized by a respect for the rights of entities, whether they are in the majority or the minority.  Since the situation in the future can easily be reversed, there is a practical and self-serving aspect to this reciprocity.

The attribute of fraternal ethos can best be seen as a “partnership” among the entities.  That is, fellow participants are genuinely held in high regard and a mutual concern for each other’s well-being and success is felt.  Under a partnership, a benefit for one, under the experiences of the union, is a benefit for all, at least in the long run.  Or, as Tocqueville points out:  “self-interest rightly understood.”

The final attribute of an association is a covenant of reason.  This attribute is the foundation for making possible the actualization of moral actions by the association.  This foundation is first anchored in the deliberative process by which decisions are made by the association.  The process is – and remember, this model is concerned with political activity and other political matters – identifiable. 

The steps of the process are as follows: 

·        challenges are perceived;

·        affected self-interest is identified;

·        (logically simultaneously) a review of ideals takes place;

·        relevant knowledge is reviewed;

·        a reflected moral mission is formulated;

·        an action strategy is selected;

·        an evaluation components (formative and summative) is selected;

·        a decision to act is made;

·        action is initiated;

·        and the actions (strategy) are evaluated against federalist values. 

This is how this construct views politics.  The process by which to study associational politics utilizes historical and social science literature (along with other sources such as poetic literature – novels, short stories, poems, etc. – and other artistic materials).  These activities are presented in a logical sequence, but they do not have to be carried out in that order except for the last three steps which would naturally be at the end of the process.

Another aspect of this attribute is that it operates, as much as possible, in a transparent fashion.  That presupposes an association that has collective interests and, whenever possible, is open and forthcoming with information regarding these elements.  Of course, this attribute can be restricted by competitive considerations as with proprietary information of a business or by concerns for national security facing the central government. 

Those, then, are the attributes of an association and with that the summation of the elements that makes up the liberated federalist model is completed.  What remains is certain event factors that theoretically puts the model in “action.”  That topic will be addressed in the next posting.

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[1] Philip Selznick, The Moral Commonwealth:  Social Theory and the Promise of Community, (Berkeley, CA:  University of California Press, 1992).

[2] Daniel J. Elazar, “Federal Models of (Civil) Authority,” Journal of Church and State 33, Spring (1991):  233-234.

[3] Ibid., 244.

[4] Donald S. Lutz, The Origins of American Constitutionalism, (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1988).

[5] As pointed out in a previous posting, staff relationships are defined by formal contracts, not a compact or covenant.