JUDGING LIBERATED FEDERALISM, XI

 

In the last posting, this blog introduced the last of four elements constituting the mental construct, liberated federalism.  Along with covenant or compact, equality, and communal democracy, the fourth element is covenant of reason.  This blog is sharing three aspects of this last element; the last posting addressed the first of these, critique of preferences.  This posting will turn to the other two:  claims of conscience and treatment of individual interests and, as with the other ideas concerning liberated federalism, it will rely on the theorizing of Philip Selznick.[1]

          As for claims of conscience, the liberated federalist perspective holds that an integral attribute of human dignity is the ability and rights to formulate the substance of one’s conscience.  But this right is not given blanket approval irrespective of its content.  A challenging distinction must be made.  This perspective holds that any set of beliefs is subject to a review of its justification in terms of existing moral systems.

          This does not mean that a particular set of such beliefs needs to precisely reflect an existing system; one can vary from such systems, but its premises should meet reasonable standards.  Beyond this test, there is a certain level of insulation granted to the person or group who has formulated these beliefs.  The risk is to abet evil beliefs.

          Toleration of diverse beliefs should not preclude vigilance against such evil.  Activities based on such evil, short of illegal ones, should be allowed, not out of a concern for dignity of those who harbor such beliefs, but out of a concern for the “slippery slope.”  When actions or beliefs are prohibited, where do the prohibitions end?  Hard rules need to be set up for this eventuality to protect society against the temptations to abuse rights in this area.

          In terms of the broader arenas of private interests, what elicit reflective morality?  For example, is the business world beyond any realistic expectation for decision making that is based on moral concerns or, as various commentators have pointed out, are American businesses restrained only by the fear of being caught in illegal activities? 

The liberated federalist perspective first recognizes the essential role that self-interest plays in the success of capitalism.  Self-interest is seen as a dispassionate view about what beneficial assets are possessed by a party and the potential opportunities presented to that party.  Self-interest is to maintain and advance those assets and opportunities.  As a disciplined motivator, it is a source of energy that capitalistic systems assume to be needed for success.

          But there is a difference between short-term self-interest and long-term self-interest.  Short term self-interest accounts for immediate benefits and costs.  It is analyzed by marginal analysis (that this blog described when reviewing the natural rights view).  Particular gains are usually the goal, and the consequences are narrowly defined. 

Long-term self-interest considers benefits and costs from a longer time perspective.  As such, the relevant concerns consider a wider range of benefits and costs.  The practical concerns of moral behavior are more readily taken into the calculations.  Interest in trust and cooperation, as long-term assets, become more viable.  That is, reflective morality, based on self-interest, has an opportunity to take place in the long term.  The challenge is to encourage the discipline needed to think in the long term.

          The Madisonian model stated that numbers of factions are important.  A few factions, say one or two of them, are likely to be in political environments that allow them to become highly powerful.  But when many compete, these factions do so for power assets preventing a few of them from taking control, and this is relevant to advancing the common good. 

It, the model, did not count on Americans being disposed to consider long term self-interest and relying on such consideration to encourage or be a source of desirable behavior.  Instead, Madison argued that the competition of factions in an extended republic (with many factions competing in their respective markets) was to yield outcomes with the highest possible good.

          The liberated federalist perspective does not dismiss a Madisonian solution as totally dysfunctional to that stated end.  As a back-up structural arrangement, it performs well.  But it cannot substitute for a generally socialized value that supports people, including businesspeople, engaging in long term self-interest calculations.  Such a socialized message depends on strong institutions at the local level, such as family, church, and schools.  Such a message should be an integral part of government and civic instruction at the secondary level.

          The next, and last aspect of the covenant of reason has to do with individual interest and the common good.  Is the community – common – good simply the sum total of individual goods?  Or is the common good of the community something beyond that total?  Due to the nature of people, “[p]ersonal well-being requires moral competence, which includes loyalty, trust, and other group-centered virtues, and it depends on group participation, nurture, and support.”[2]

          As such, the community is a real thing, apart from the individual, and it imposes vivid opportunities and restraints.  The individual might calculate to act against the interests of the community, as in avoiding taxes which pay for services from which the individual does not directly benefit.  But the long-term interests of that individual are served with an aspirational context of social integration in which there is connection between the person and a coherent social order (a long-term concern).  Individuals need to be instructed to be aware of these benefits. 

The coherent social order or common good is in the interest of individuals, but it is an attribute of the community or commonwealth.  As just indicated, it relates more to long-term concerns rather than immediate payoffs or costs.  In this, one can appreciate the difference of liberated federalism to more simplified forms of federalism (e.g., parochial/traditional federalism) or surely the natural rights view (both constructs extensively described and explained in this blog).

In addition to the Selznick elements that this last series of postings has reviewed, one general contribution of Daniel Elazar should be added; that is the cultural commitment to federalist values that one finds in the US.  This blog has repeatedly observed that this nation has drifted from a thoroughly federalist cultural position which was prevalent in this nation from its early history to the years after World War II.  But there are still remnants found today.

Of course, and serving as a very central example, the nation still has a structural proclivity for federalist arrangements in the nation’s government (central-state arrangement) as well as other institutions.  One of the major themes of this account of the succession of dialectic struggles is to regain, at the cultural level, a firmer commitment to the moralistic stance associated with federal-republican thinking.  In an ideal liberated federalist condition, therefore, a cultural commitment to federalist values would be a prominent quality.

These then are the elements of a liberated federalist model.  These elements need to be juxtaposed in order to comprise the resulting model.  The model proposed in the next number of postings will be presented as a fundamental construct for governmental studies at the secondary level.

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[1] Philip Selznick, The Moral Commonwealth:  Social Theory and the Promise of Community (Berkeley, CA:  University of California Press, 1992).

[2] Ibid., 536.

JUDGING LIBERATED FEDERALISM, X

 

To date, this blog, in introducing the construct, liberated federalism, has reviewed three of its elements:  covenant or compact, equality, and communal democracy.  Readers are invited to review the last set of postings dedicated to this construct and if they have not read them, are encouraged to do so.  These reviews have relied on Philip Selznick’s work and his treatment of those elements.[1]

          The last of the Selznick elements is the covenant of reason.  This covenant refers to the tacit cultural agreement to a participatory socialization, i.e., a taught morality based on reflection and engagement.  Authority under this type of morality must be justified with reasons which would be exercised by those involved.  This includes authority (legitimate role) in relation to processes or methods, and to ends.  The challenge lies around the ends.

          What objective standards can there be for reasoned ends?  That is the challenge concerning ends.  Ultimately, the commonwealth must decide upon those standards, and this presupposes “… a shared resolve to prefer and perfect dialogue and deliberation.  To this extent an element of historicity, of givenness and self-formation, is inevitable and indispensable.  But the covenant of reason is peculiar in this, that it is reflexive and self-critical.”[2]  That means all aspects of decision-making are subject to such criticism, even the decisions that formulate the ends as well as means. 

And in that vein, Selznick identifies three sources of resistance in fulfilling needed support of “reasoned” ends and means. 

 

·       One, they rely on normative reasoning – what people decide is worthy of pursuing.[3] 

·       Two, there is the argument that one should not aggregate a person’s goals and wants into communal rationality – its ambitions, aims, and goals.  Communities are their own entities, not a collection of individuals. 

·       And three, the concern, especially in natural rights guided nations such as the US, is that individual rights are endangered when communities endorse a certain set of moral choices.  Yet if one ranks communal welfare above individual preferences, the former should prevail when optional policy is considered.

 

Intrinsic with the liberated federalist perspective is the concern of congealing, to some degree, the diverse interests and purposes of a modern society.  The liberated federalism construct is not a call for complete integration of diverse groups; it is not a desire to eliminate divisive forces in the private sector and it is not expecting unquestioning civic virtue. 

Liberated federalism anticipates and encourages a multiplicity of interests in a healthy community.  Thomas Jefferson warned the nation of the lack of interests and factions; that if a lack exists, tyrannical rule is more likely, if not guaranteed.[4]  The search for a common good, according to this perspective, is to be done within such an environment of diverse interests, not against it.  Yes, what is contemplated – and acted upon – is a level of nuance, complexity, and, what’s the word, reality.

This view or element has a number of aspects; this posting will describe the first aspect and the posting to come will review two others.  The first aspect of the covenant of reason element is the critique of preferences.  This aspect is an expectation that choices will be subject, under the liberated federalism perspective, to critical review. 

Surely, in the present market conditions, consumers are not called upon to justify their choices.  Voters can make their choices in a similar manner without giving reasons for their preferences even though their choices have social consequences.  These arrangements are generally approved of by the assumption that people know what is best for themselves during normal life.

But there should be only the expectation that one’s choices are an indication of what is desirable either for the individual or the community; it is not a conclusive claim.  What is wanted should be subject to critical view.  By such a review, one understands that ultimately choices fall under a subjective domain; therefore, their justification does not make claims in the objective domain.

But once aims, goals, or targets are identified, objectivity can and should be utilized.  An “I want so and so because it will lead to so and so” statement is subject to objective analysis and judgment.  In the first instance, objective standards can be applied if the expected consequence is likely to occur or there is a probability that it will.  In the second instance, the application of standards by which one judges whether these aims are being realistically pursued can be subject to objectivity. 

Objectively derived standards, i.e., standards divorced from the immediate condition can be applied to determine if the consequence(s) is/are desirable for the person or the community.  Do behaviors realistically strive toward those aims that have been identified?  Do they approach communal desires is a question one can approach from an objective view.  This critical function should be obvious, but the application of economic and rationale models has obfuscated this benefit of reflective morality, Selznick points out.

That brings that first aspect, critique of preferences, to an end; next will be claims of conscience, the next aspect of covenant of reason, and then the third aspect, treatment of individual interests will be addressed.  With those two aspects “covered,” readers will be sufficiently prepared for the liberated federalism model.

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[1] Philip Selznick, The Moral Commonwealth:  Social Theory and the Promise of Community (Berkeley, CA:  University of California Press, 1992).

[2] Ibid., 525.

[3] While such goals, aims, targets are beyond objective review, they are not beyond moral review.  What a people want should be questioned as to the goodness or evilness, the rightness or wrongness.

[4] Thomas Jefferson, “From Revolutionary to Statesman/Notes on the State of Virginia,” in Great American Political Thinkers, Volume I, edited by Bernard E. Brown (New York, NY:  Avon Books, 1983), 307-331.

JUDGING LIBERATED FEDERALISM, IX

 

In its strive to attain a more community-based society, liberated federalism as a construct that describes and explains governance and politics, promotes communal democracy.  It is an attribute that finds a certain degree of challenge in establishing itself in modern America due to the diversity in the nation’s population.  That is, the more diverse communities are, the more difficult it is to find common messaging and shared aspirations that are essential elements of any community. 

At times, such diversification – often the product of immigration – might even stray into illegal practices that might be acceptable from which said immigrants might originate, but not here.  For example, according to Wikipedia, under certain conditions, forced marriages are practiced in various countries.  They are Syria, Sierra Leone, Uganda, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.[1]  That practice is illegal in the US.  

The question this posting addresses is:  how does liberated federalism address this eventuality?  A scholar who addressed the needs of a communal democracy, Philip Selznick,[2] provides sound advice for nations so challenged and would want to encourage high levels of communal democracy.

In order to find a workable solution to the diversity issue, he writes:  “[t]o sustain community as framework for the whole of life and for flourishing of multiple groups, a transition must be made from piety to civility, and from bounded to inclusive altruism.  Communal democracy with its moderated pluralism is the political expression of that transition.”[3] 

And the liberated federalist perspective presented in this account claims that a union of political elements at any level – local, state, or nation – must have a corresponding level of cultural congruence that legitimizes the efforts of that union and its authoritative decisions.  This requisite is often neglected when considering and reacting to recurring incidences of cultural conflict, especially those emanating from the nation’s efforts to deal with its varied population.

At times, incongruence might originate from cultural beliefs and/or practices that are “imported” with newcomers.  Here, as just alluded to, communal democracy faces an issue.  The minimal congruence a community expects does not have to extend beyond those efforts within the union’s legitimate mandate (being true to its constitutional arrangement), so that members within the commonwealth can ascribe to different cultural loyalties at sub levels.

That is what usually transpires, but there are cases when the variance does reach beyond legal boundaries and, when it does, it reflects strongly held culturally based prerogatives by those varying from this nation’s legal standards.  But when the federated union functions in accordance with its compact-al agreement, it should expect and be able to rely on congruent support, if not political support. For those authoritative decisions, the authorities are compelled to apply to not only conflictual situations, but to everyday life occurrences. 

This does not preclude any individual or group from attempting to influence a more generalized cultural position, but it does preclude activities that are antagonistic to the cultural claim upon which the authoritative, legally based policy is situated.  Should this level of cultural requirement be supported with coercive methods? 

Communal democracy should, as earlier stated in this blog, avoid such reliance on coercion.  Of course, activities that are promulgated by incongruent – to US customs – cultural claims and are illegal, should be subject to legal sanctions and, if necessary, coercive measures which are spelled out by law.

Short of that, the state is within its legitimate authority to use any persuasive methods at its disposal to encourage a more congruent cultural belief in support of its policies even if they contradict subcultural beliefs of affected immigrant or other culturally divergent groups.  This does not preclude that those agents charged with sustaining American value positions from using approaches noted for their understanding and sympathy for any resulting inconveniences.

Of course, members of such other cultural groups have equal rights to persuade a policy more in line with their cultural dispositions.  At issue is:  how serious is their variance from dominant culturally based policies or modes of behavior?  And how reasonable, ala US standards, are those offending cultural practices or beliefs? 

Again, what is called for is not mass antagonistic behavior in which the people act in unmediated and undeliberated fashion.  Instead, reasonable, and deliberate discussion should be the first reaction and might solve the issue before “things get out of hand.”  Again, as the saying goes, “one gets more flies with honey than with vinegar.”

At times, Americans act with more hysteria, with a lot of noise making, and less reflection.  They might even vote in a way that lacks sufficient consideration of the issues and is based on temporary emotional whims – is anti-woke-ism an example?  What communal democracy counts on is deliberative citizenship in which form, usually, Americans are known to act, at least in the long run.

Naturally, reflected compromise is possible in this latter mode of political behavior.  Representative democracy with its structures helps promote a deliberative process.  The deliberative mode, in turn, has as one of its most challenging chores establishing a community.  A communal democracy cannot be fashioned exclusively by the authorities, no matter what its structure.  It needs an infrastructure which includes the associational networks described in the previous posting.  In short, they, the associations, promote the people-to-people element that community demands.

And with that, this blog is set to address the next element of liberated federalism, the covenant of reason.  That will be the topic of the next posting.

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[1] See Forced Marriage, Wikipedia (n.d.), accessed July 5, 2023, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forced_marriage#:~:text=%22In%20conflict%20areas%2C%20women%20and,Democratic%20Republic%20of%20the%20Congo.  In the US they are totally illegal.  There might be arranged marriages in the US as long as no coercion is used to secure the marriage.

[2] Philip Selznick, The Moral Commonwealth:  Social Theory and the Promise of Community (Berkeley, CA:  University of California Press, 1992).

[3] Ibid., 521.

JUDGING LIBERATED FEDERALISM, VIII

 

Liberated federalism, the view that this blog promotes to guide curricular strategies in civics education, has as one of its elements the idea of communal democracy.  In turn, communal democracy is distinguishable from what the dominant view of today is.  That is the natural rights view, which promotes a democracy that is based on an electorate of individuals as opposed to a reflection of a community.  In this area of concern, Philip Selznick offers significant insights.[1]

In most day-to-day life, there is not much difference between the two perceptions, but over the long haul, the differences are significant.  For example, individualistic views rely on governance and administration of policy, both from the public and private sectors, to be bureaucratic.  The communal view strives, where possible, to rely on people-to-people services and orientation.  The US has come to accommodate the bureaucratic approach.  A more federated mode of administration would shift people’s expectations to the latter approach.

          That is, a post bureaucratic response to social demands and ills is central to a communal democracy.  It calls for policies by government that are sensitive to community resources and to their needs.  These are judgments that sense and accommodate the fact that communities differ, but that all of them need human interactions, not cold calculations of cost-benefit analyses.

          A classic bureaucratic solution to a social problem area was the decision to put urban police officers in patrol cars and to eliminate the neighborhood police officer.  Another example, the proposal of vouchers for school choice, also infuses the cold calculations of a market to meet the human, community problems associated with education.  These examples are only two in the “sea” of systemic solutions which make sense utilizing marginal analysis but are inefficient when measured by holistic community standards and by real human needs to interact with real people.

          Central to the federalist view is the intervening role of associations between the individual and the state.  These associations include such basic institutions as families and churches.  The aspect of communal democracy on which this reliance is based is on what Selznick calls political pluralism.  Here, the aim is to disperse power by allocating to these associations a certain level of autonomy.  The quality of democracy is enriched by the texture of its elements as expressed within the commonwealth and that these associations provide.

          They add a source of identity, provide a training ground for leadership, act to discourage impulsive actions, and function as a restraint on government.  “Federalism is the keynote, and the federated unities are major groups – religious, educational, economic, cultural, ethnic, political.  In this view, the effective participants in the political community are associations, not individuals.”[2]

          In the model this blog will present in a future posting, this view of effectiveness will play a central role.  But a word of warning is called for – albeit reluctantly:  As an aspect of communal democracy, this view can also be used as a justification for collectivist solutions.  Unfortunately, fascist or communist models can also employ this same rationale to bolster their claims and prescriptions to remedy perceived social maladies.

          In guarding against such applications, personhood must never be sacrificed for the aims and tactics of any association – be it political, social, and/or economic.  This does not preclude socialist policies but limits their vibrancy or encompassing provisions.  Association or organization is seen as a method, not an end, of individual welfare. 

In another area of concern, even under the auspices of a liberated federalist approach, communal democracy as an attribute of an association should not be employed to justify a status quo that entrenches the privileges of the elite class.  The nature of associations tends to protect their own internal, existing power distribution arrangements.  Therefore, the principles of a communal democracy need to be applied to policies that govern these associations, as in labor laws that regulate the internal activities of unions.

And one might ask:  with so much being placed on people being communal, does this leaning leave one unprepared for the actions of factions?  James Madison defines factions as “… a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.”[3]

First of note is Madison’s concern for the “aggregate interests of the community.”  That betrays the founder’s ultimate concern and his federated leanings.  But beyond that, he reveals between what Selznick calls democratic pluralism and oppositional pluralism.  Somewhat in counter position to democratic pluralism is oppositional pluralism. 

This Madisonian principle calls for the conflict between associations and factions to be the bulwark against arbitrary and authoritarian government.  This civil antagonism acts as a preventor of any single or oligopolistic – where the few rule – control of the government in which the interests of the general welfare would be sacrificed.

          Madison did not foresee the concentration of economic and political power that has ensued in the American arena.[4]  Selznick labels this Madisonian view as liberal pluralism or oppositional pluralism.  In this arrangement, the government is to find the equilibrium among these factions.

But irrespective of what the national or commonwealth interest might be, such concerns pose a threat to a federated polity and are enhanced by the existing concentration of economic power.  That is where a strong cultural, federated base is essential – a common belief in federated values.  And there lies an important role for civics education.

          Added to this concentration of power and wealth, America has also experienced the pluralization of its cultural base.  The Madison view was written under a significantly more, assumed homogeneous population.[5]  So, what one can say and be aware of is that the nation, demographically, has gone through significant changes and if for no other reason, earlier views of federalism need to be changed accordingly.  Adopting a vigorous view of democracy, one that is in tune with the nation’s population, is prudent if not necessary.

          With that consideration, communal democracy respects the minority’s value to cultural membership – however that might be defined during a given period.  It would find coercive assimilation unhealthy to its principles and would proceed to avoid it, if not prohibit it.  On the other hand, it would similarly look with displeasure at any cultural subgrouping that coerced its members into maintaining any person’s membership in a culturally based association.[6]

          The only insistence this view would hold, according to this blogger, would be that culturally, any messaging and other language orientating communication within the populous, if relevant, be in support of the nation’s constitutional principles (of which there is an array of foreign cultural beliefs that do not fall in line with such principles). 

Any other type of substantive messaging is open to how individuals wish to adopt and accept their personal relationship with any cultural preferences they might hold.  And with this disposition among Americans, it promises – as it has done so to this time – make life in this nation more interesting and enriching.  This posting will end with this note, but the next will continue in the vein.

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[1] Philip Selznick, The Moral Commonwealth:  Social Theory and the Promise of Community (Berkeley, CA:  University of California Press, 1992).

[2] Ibid., 518, emphasis added.

[3] James Madison, “The Advantages of Union,” in Great American Thinkers Volume I:  Creating America from Settlement to Mass Democracy, edited by Bernard E. Brown (New York, NY:  Avon Books, 1983), 218-252, 220.

[4] For example, Stacey Vanek Smith and Cardiff Garcia, “Companies Get Political,” NPR/WFSU (January 13, 2021), accessed July 1, 2023, https://www.npr.org/2021/01/13/956553990/companies-get-political#:~:text=Companies%20Get%20Political&text=They%20donate%20billions%20of%20dollars,aloof%20from%20the%20political%20scrum AND Robert L. Heilbroner and Lester C. Thurow, Economics Explained:  Everything You Need to Know about How the Economy Works and Where It’s Going (New York, NY:  Simon and Schuster Inc., 1982).

[5] At least as expressed by John Jay.  See John Jay, “Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence [Federalist Paper, 2],” in The Federalist Papers (New York, NY:  Signet, 2003), 31-35.

[6] Most commentary on this topic has been on forces in society that discourage or insist on abandoning cultural traditional beliefs or customs from foreign cultures.  Yet back in the late 1990s, Michael Walzer wrote of this bit of pressure in reverse, i.e., of foreign groups enforcing cultural modes to be insistent upon by immigrants.  See Michael Walzer, On Toleration (New Haven, CT:  Yale University Press, 1997).

JUDGING LIBERATED FEDERALISM, VII

 

Currently, this blog is describing and explaining its favored view of governance and politics – a view this blog suggests should guide the nation’s efforts in civics education.  It is a mental construct this blogger calls liberated federalism.  To date, the blog has reviewed a couple of its elements, that being covenant or compact[1] and equality.  Readers are invited to visit previous postings to see what has been described. 

The next element is communal democracy.  As with the other related postings, those dedicated to this construct, this account of communal democracy will rely heavily on the ideas of Philip Selznick.[2]  It includes the idea of the “consent of the governed” which is derived from the principle of rule by the governed.  This association was made early by the nation’s republican leaning founders. 

What the liberated federalist perspective stresses is that the rule and consent must be viewed as that emanating from a functioning community, instead of from an aggregate of individuals (as assumed in the natural rights perspective described earlier in this blog).  This other view – this shift – to a communal democracy entails four principles:  “the protection and integration of minorities, the moral primacy of the community over the state, the responsibility of government for communal well-being, and the social basis of political participation.”[3] 

And in that vein, in terms of the protection and integration of minorities, the decision-making process in a communal democracy respects the foundational notion that the process is a reflection of “the people as a whole.”  This notion stands in counter distinction to unrestrained majority rule, in which the majority has the right to do whatever it desires.[4] 

The more communal position identifies that there are individual rights, and that the system must guarantee the integrity of each person’s fundamental needs and interests.  Therefore, the majority is limited in its ability to legally acquire what it wants.  Hence, the idea that rights protecting individuals that is found in the Bill of Rights has its origins with this view of limited democracy or a communal democracy.

          In addition, the communal position is one of inclusion in terms of fundamental law, the formulating of constitutional provisions, and in the United States, overriding a presidential veto, for which a consensus must be expressed through representative bodies.  Those incidences of consensus demand the agreement of diverse groups by insisting on 60 percent, two-thirds or three-quarter majorities. 

In addition, there is no permanent majority.  Minorities in one issue can become part of a new majority in another issue.  And upon losing on some issue, minorities can exercise their rights to associate and rights of speech to convince others to join them to form a new majority.  Of course, such an environment invigorates a polity and promotes engagement and activity – hopefully for the better.

The covenantal or compact-al, federalist view is that majority rule is a form of representation, while sovereignty is best held by a people-in-community.  That is, the community, through the institution of majority rule as expressed in representative forms and limited as indicated above, will follow in the direction of the will of the people.  A majority, no matter how large, that is cohesive enough to bar the minority from meaningfully participating, acts to serve as a threat to communal democracy and as such, represents an impoverished form of the democratic ideal.

The second aspect of a communal democracy is the position of the moral primacy of the community over the state.  This tends to be downplayed by civics instruction under the reign of natural rights thinking.  Even though many descriptions of the social contract concept are often misrepresented in current secondary school materials, federalists prefer the term social compact, and a more communal view should be emphasized.  That would portray the continual character of such agreements beyond immediate conditions and render any transactional character as being case-specific, i.e., being attributes of a specific political contest. 

For example, in using a popular textbook – as a teacher is apt to do – it is likely to employ Thomas Hobbes’ description of the state of nature to represent all the views of that concept, including that of John Locke.  The state, according to Lockean theory, originates from preexisting communities, not from autonomous and endangered individuals.  By adopting Hobbesian language, it minimizes the essential role communities play in the formulation of societal origins.

“Whatever may be said of other aspects of his thoughts, this Lockean premise [the protection of fundamental rights of life, liberty, and property] does not entail a radical individualism”[5] as Hobbes’ account tends to do.  Instead, it is based on a view of a person entangled or enmeshed in a social context with relationships of family, friends, and commitments. 

The creation of law in generating a regime helps to perfect (and protect) the community; it does not create it.  The community already has its foundation to be moral through its kinships and resulting traditions that bolster its cohesion.  Morality is allowed to transcend the public and the private spheres of the community.  It also provides the way for the community to be “civilized.”

What results is a give and take between the rights and the moral claims of the community.  There are times when the moral claims preempt private rights, as in the time of war in which involuntary conscription is necessary and permitted.  In more ordinary times, compulsory education falls under this condition. 

On the other hand, there are rights that can be protected only with narrowly constructed laws; for example, laws that regulate the search and seizure of private property in the search for criminal evidence.  This balancing between rights and the prerogatives of government demands interpretation:

 

… the identification of fundamental rights is an aspect of constitution-making; and constitutions, whether tacitly accepted or explicitly adopted, must be interpreted.  Interpretation brings to bear prudential judgment, which requires appreciation for the diverse interests and values at stake in the life of a community.  Constitutional or common-law rights to life, liberty, and justice are authoritative premises for decision; they demand vindication; but their reach is not predetermined.  There is room for enlargement of rights as well as for their limitations.[6]

 

A communal democracy is also concerned with the responsibility of government in maintaining the democracy’s well-being.  All but anarchists believe government has the responsibility for providing services for the betterment of society, even if that expectation is limited to concerns dealing with the maintenance of the society in question.  The argument is not whether the government should provide services, but to what extent.

Historically, there is a tendency for empowered democracy to create a social democracy in which the expectation for governmental services rises significantly.  A social democracy is not synonymous with a communal democracy.  Experience has offered or demonstrated a number of cases where social democracies pursue policies that are extremely individualistic, as even some welfare programs have been, and, in turn, undermine the health of the community. 

For example, Selznick points out that in the United States, a centralized welfare state has diminished the viability of local welfare resources and has debased a sense of moral obligation in meeting the challenges of the impoverished.  Instead of vibrant efforts to deal with these problems, bureaucratic responses have deadened any spirit of liberation among the general populace.

This theme will be continued in the next posting by addressing how communal responses can address these challenges and maintain a vibrant sense for a communal democracy.

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[1] Covenants and compacts are sacred agreements.  Compact is the broader classification of which covenant is a subtype.  While compacts are sacred in the minds of those participating, covenants, in addition, call on God to witness the agreement.  The Declaration of Independence is a covenant while the US Constitution is a compact.  Of interest, the term, federal, is derived from the Latin word for covenant, that being foedus.

[2] Philip Selznick, The Moral Commonwealth:  Social Theory and the Promise of Community (Berkeley, CA:  University of California Press, 1992).

[3] Ibid., 503.

[4] For a cautionary argument lodged against unincumbered majority rule for the founding generation, see John Adams, “The Revolutionary as Conservative,” in Great American Thinkers Volume I:  Creating America from Settlement to Mass Democracy, edited by Bernard E. Brown (New York, NY:  Avon Books, 1983), 156-207.

[5] Selznick, The Moral Commonwealth., 507, emphasis in the original.

[6] Ibid., 510.