I have in these postings written about a relationship among
citizens that exists in an ideal federalist arrangement; that is, of a sense of
partnership. What I have not done is
give this idea much substance other than to express that people in a partnership
see the arrangement as one in which the advancement of one partner is the
advancement of all partners. It follows
the call of the Three Musketeers: one
for all and all for one. Of course, this
is the ideal and, in its truest sense, not a reality that can be achieved in a
society of any size where interests are constantly in competition. Actually, we wouldn’t have it any other
way. Competition in the real world
promotes excellence as one competitor tries, for the sake of earning some
limited resource, to outdo the others so as to win the resource. In business, this is profits, but it can also
include status, recognition, and other rewards.
But even here, an understanding that such competition advances the
common interest can give resulting relations a hue of federation in knowing
that the advancement of the common good advances all citizens even if the short-term
results can be disappointing as one loses a sought-after compensation or other positive
result.
In a way, all this is a bit of irony. Trying to do in your opponent can elicit a
focused attempt to better someone else, but by doing so, the advancement of
society is gained and even the “loser” can benefit by such a turn of
events. Consider the Wright brothers
winning the competition to be the first to fly.
Yes, they won the competition at the expense of their competitors, but I
am sure that their competitors benefitted by living in a world that cracked the
secrets of flying, or at least their children or grandchildren did. The point is that even if one ascribes to a
federalist view of ideal citizen relations, that does not mean one condemns or
even bad-mouths competitive contests among citizens particularly in the realm
of economic activity. What one would
expect is that any associated behaviors in this competition are conducted under
fair rules of engagement – rules that would truly advance the common benefit
and give each competitor the fullest, yet equal, opportunity to win the
competition.
Many values contribute to this ideal; one is trust. Let me explain. To begin with, this language provides
metaphors that are useful in explaining this irony. To an audience “raised” on natural rights
imagery, placing trust as a sort of medium of exchange, one can illustrate
basic relationships. It also allows a
civics teacher to metaphorically speak in market terms; terms that while metaphoric,
are true to what federated expectations are.
I have stated that trust is earned, at least by prudent people. This is the case if one is the dispenser of
it or the receiver of it. Yes, we do
give others the benefit of the doubt in most social and economic transactions –
one can probably add political to this list – but if the stakes become at all
meaningful, one is dealing with a level of trust that has to be felt and such
levels should only prudently be extended to those who by their past behaviors
have demonstrated trustworthiness. As an
earned quality, one is dealing with a level of morality or goodness by some
shared standard. Even among thieves, one
hears about a code of “honor among thieves.”
So, the first relevant metaphor is one of accounting.
Trust, in this view, represents moral credit, an asset not
yet earned, per se. Using George Lakoff’’s description of this
relation (as I did in a posting from last May, Due Sentimentality):
When
you do something good for someone, you give something of positive value to him
[or her] and what you get in exchange is “credit.” Credit for acting morally can
accumulate. It is a form of capital. …
To
place your trust in someone morally is to give him [or her] advance moral
credit, credit he [or she] will repay you by acting morally. If someone that you place your trust in acts
very immorally, then you “lose trust” in him [or her], that is, you lose the
moral credit that you gave him [or her] in advance as prepayment for acting
morally. He [or she] is “discredited”
and “morally bankrupt.” “Trust” is a
prepayment of moral credit for future moral action. But in general, people do not trust just
anyone. To be trusted, a person has to
“build trust,” to establish a history of being trustworthy, a moral credit
rating.[1]
And with this basic understanding of trust, we have the
introduction of justice, at least from this angle of “exchange.” Justice can be seen as those developments in
which moral accounts are settled, as in people getting what they deserve and in
the process cancelling moral debts.
Lakoff points to the idea Martin Luther King used in his
March on Washington speech when he claimed that the blacks who were marching in
Washington to “cash a check” and that
within the history of our nation, the African-American race had not been
treated with justice in this basic exchange of trust between blacks and the
nation. What is the exchange? As stated by a Supreme Court justice, the
exchange is implicit with citizenry: allegiance
as expressed by performing one’s duties as a citizen – a partner – for the
protection of one’s rights as a citizen.
Rights are categorized as being of several types, e. g., life, liberty,
property, but also the right to participate in the collective decision-making
processes of the polity among other rights.
And what of the duties? What are
they? Let me offer a list: to obey the law, to defend, when called upon,
the security and interests of the nation, to engage in one’s economic
activities that while providing compensation, are aligned with the common good,
willingly and conscientiously performing civic requirements (e. g., jury duty),
and beyond the base line provisions of the implicit covenant or compact, assist
and support legitimate familial and communal endeavors. Under the language of the exchange, rights
are property which can be earned or inherited.
So the exchange takes on a formulated structure. Someone has a right, someone has a duty, and
this reflects the exchange.
Rights need protecting or, in some cases, a medium by which
they are experienced. The main agent to
see that they are protected or providing the medium of expression is
government. This service is not
free. We pay for that service by paying
taxes. Generally, fewer taxes means
fewer rights. By viewing taxes through
this perspective, one adopts a counter natural rights language; a prevailing
language espoused by self-appointed natural rights spokespeople such as Grover
Norquist, who is famous for holding Republican representatives to never raise
taxes. In the natural rights language,
taxes are castigated as being anti-rights.
They are a form of tyranny, despite the fact that the US has some of the
lowest effective tax rates among developed nations. While the language proposed in this posting,
a more federated view, taxes take on the role of monetarily allowing the
flourishing of rights among the different segments of the population, of the
partnership. Of course, the language
does not promote an unbridled level of taxation, but it does support reasonable
levels so as to protect and promote a level of rights that justly corresponds
to the exchange between rights and allegiance.
So what is the result of not honoring King’s check? What happens if allegiance is met with
deficient protection and promotion of rights?
We have theft, if either the appropriate levels of rights or duties is
not forthcoming, there is stealing. If
this stealing is pervasive, there is an immoral system and certain implications
become real. First, these notions of
exchange and moral debt do not just appear among our social relations or within
our conscious view of things. Those
functions are satisfied by institutions – the family, the schools, the
churches, our businesses, our government – and so a community or nation depends
on institutions to defend and promote the resulting supportive values related
to the exchange. Another implication of
this exchange is that those who benefit most from it have more duties and that
this heightened sense of duty is a moral claim.
It is so moral that we have codified in law as with a progressive taxes
code. To the extent that we promote laws
that shield the more (most) benefited from rendering the higher rate of duty –
as with implementation of a flat tax – such policy is immoral; it’s
stealing. Therefore, if those who
benefit more accrue political power and use that power to avoid accompanying
duties, they are engaging in immoral political action.
Of course, such language is speaking metaphorically; equally
metaphorically as when one refers to taxes as a form of tyranny. Speaking more objectively, one can have taxes
so high that they are tyrannical, but one can also have such low taxes among
favored or advantaged citizens that one can objectively describe the situation as
stealing. At least, that is how I judge
the actions of some corporations that enjoy the protection of the US government
while keeping enormous amounts of cash off-shore to avoid (?) taxes. When the rates become so lopsided, one can
legitimately ask: is there stealing going on?
[1] Lakoff, G. (2002).
Moral politics: How liberals
and conservatives think. Chicago,
IL: The University of Chicago Press, pp.
55-56.
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