THE VARIED TYPES OF RIGHTS

Let's consider rights. We all have them; we all want them, but what exactly are they? A lot has been written about them through the ages by very smart thinkers. So this will not be in any way an exhaustive treatment; it will be more like a short introduction of just its basic definition. Before I attempt to report on the more elementary aspects of rights, let me introduce the description below with a word on the importance of the topic.

As I have noted many times in this blog, our current view of governance and politics is one that emphasizes the rights of the individual. I have also promoted the idea that rights or what we call having them – liberty – is a quality under federalist thought that is based on equality. At a minimum, I have argued that equality based liberty is how we should conceptualize liberty and rights. But however we view it or act upon it, we do need to account for it and define it. Rights are too central to our civics and our republican philosophy of government to ignore them.

Donald S. Lutz¹ reports on the traditional view of what rights are. That is, rights have been viewed mostly as a claim: A has a right over B when he or she has a claim on B. If I own an object and you want it and we agree to exchange for a certain amount of money, and if I hand over the object, I have a claim (a right) against you for the amount until you pay me. If I hold that I have the right of free speech, that means I have a claim against government that, if honored, government has the responsibility not to legislate against my saying what I want. Of course, there are limits to just about any claim. If I, as the often cited example illustrates, yell fire in a crowded theater, I am violating the rights/claims of the other theater-goers to having a safe environment. Therefore, my claim is limited, in this case, to the demands of other people's rights.

Lutz, under this perspective, identifies six types of rights. They are right as privilege, right as duty, right as promise or contract (as the first example above illustrates), civil right, common law right, and natural right.

• Right as a privilege refers to the right of some, because of their position, to be treated in a certain fashion. We generally associate this type with nobility or monarchy where nobles and kings are granted deference due to their titles or positions in society. Of course, if such privileges are based on unearned advantages, we generally believe these rights are undemocratic. But even in democracies, certain rights of privilege are honored such as those protected by inheritance laws.
• Mirroring this first type is the second, right as duty, where a person holds the legal or socially defined responsibility to treat another because of the position that duty-bound person holds. So, for example, a parent is responsible to honor the claim of a son or daughter. We have little trouble accepting the legitimacy of this type of right as long as there is an element of voluntarism on the part of the party which has the responsibility to meet the claim. A parent, a king, a doctor, for example, all make the decisions that cause them to be the person with the responsibilities associated with the relevant role creating the associated right.
• Right as promise or contract has already been described above (in my exchange example) and I will only add here that there has to be an element of mutual agreement between the claimant and the one who has the responsibility to honor the claim.
• Civil rights have often been mentioned in the news. We all know of the Civil Rights movements which we mostly relate to the legal, economic, and social advancements of African-Americans and other groups. Here the claim is that one person needs to treat another in a certain way due to a law, edict, or dispensation issued by a mutually recognized authority or superior agent/agency, usually the government.
• Common law rights refer to claims a person has on others so that they act toward the person in certain, expected ways because they share a nationality such as American or English or Canadian. The English tradition, where common law originated, institutionalized these custom-based expectations through judicial decisions as opposed to written laws.

And then there are natural law rights. These are claims based on the notion that a person is a person and that suffices to merit the ownership of a claim. To some they are natural because of the belief that the claim either originates with God or nature and is bestowed on individuals. We own these rights regardless of what the civil laws include. So the claim is made that even in tyrannical polities, even if the government does not recognize these natural law rights, a person still has them. According to the “expression of the national mind,” what Thomas Jefferson described the Declaration of Independence to be, a polity that systematically violates natural law rights, has earned a legitimate rebellion against its rule; that is, the people, whose rights are being violated, have the right to overthrow that government. But, according to constitutional scholar, John Hart Ely,² the Declaration should not be interpreted as evidence that the founding fathers were uniformly believers of natural law or natural law rights. Instead the Declaration should be considered more as a legal brief where all sorts of backing are included to further an argument; in this case, an argument for a separation from the mother country.

If you are a reader of this blog, you know that I prefer the title natural rights construct for the prevailing mental construct that guides, more than any other perspective, the views of our governance and politics. It's the primary view that guides the inclusion of content making up our civics curriculum in our schools. The reason for naming the construct natural rights refers to the above description of natural law rights. With our current emphasis on individual rights that seem to exist for no other reason than we exist – maybe they are there because it is believed they come from God – we, to a great degree, have deleted from our consideration of rights what I believe are their social foundations. I have, in this blog, made that argument before, but let me just add the point that liberty and rights depend on social institutions to exist and survive. By neglecting the importance of the social element, we formulate unrealistic beliefs and expectations regarding rights.

Richard Dagger³ addresses these concerns. He distinguishes between claim-rights, as those described above, and liberty-rights. Liberty-rights can best be described with an example of how they function. Dagger offers the following situation: suppose you and I are walking down the street and we simultaneously see $10 on the ground. No one is around and there is no way to determine to whom the money belongs. All other things being equal, we both have a claim to the money, but not to each other or to anyone else. I guess, you can argue, that we both have the claim that we must not inflict injury on each other in an attempt to get the money, but that's about it. Sharing another example, we have a liberty-right to listen, in the privacy of our home, to the music we choose. When we dismiss all social elements entailed with rights, we make them liberty-rights and we attach no duties that are part and parcel of claim-rights. When one makes or insists on a claim-right, there has to be someone else to satisfy the claim; that is, the other person has a duty. If I claim I must be treated with equality, there must be others who recognize my claim and have the duty to treat me with that equality. But the language of liberty-rights is conducive to a notion that my rights are there because I exist and ignores any sense that I have duties to promote or respect the rights of others. Let me share Dagger's thoughts on this trend:

There is some reason to believe that [our appeal to individual rights] is growing out of control, however. … “[R]ights talk,” at least as it is spoken in the United States, threatens to impoverish political discourse “by its starkness and simplicity, its prodigality in bestowing the rights label, its legalistic character, its exaggerated absoluteness, its hyperindividualism, its insularity, and its silence with respect to personal, civic, and collective responsibilities.” Even some rights theorists now worry about “the escalation of rights rhetoric” that threatens either to overwhelm other valuable moral and political concepts and considerations or, by a process of conceptual inflation, to rob the appeal to rights of much of its value.⁴

Perhaps you heard of the recent case involving a car filled with young men who, being parked in front of a convenience store, were playing their music extremely loud. When a man complained, they ignored him, so he pulled out a gun and began shooting. The young men scattered, but one of them sitting in the back seat was hit and killed. The man was eventually arrested and the case is pending. He claims that the shooting was justified – he was standing his ground – while being threatened by the young men. I am not claiming these are all the facts. The incident happened over a month ago and the press has ceased reporting the developments of the case, but from these purported facts, I think we can get a sense of how our notion of our rights is “growing out of control.”

1Lutz, D. S. (1992). A preface to American political theory. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas.

2Ely, J. H. (1980). Democracy and distrust: A theory of judicial review. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

3Daggar, R. (1997). Civic virtue: Rights, citizenship, and republican liberalism. New York, NY: Oxford.

4Ibid. Quotation is on p. 24. The quoted portion within this quotation is by Mary Ann Glendon.

FREE SPEECH AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM QUESTIONS

I became aware of a situation the other day that, if considered in its basic aspects, reveals an issue that reflects whether the state can authoritatively implement policy which bolsters the good as opposed to the right. In case you have not read recent postings of this blog, I have made the argument that our government, as a matter of course, has become an institution that authoritatively has taken on a posture of neutrality when it comes to moral decisions. In the last posting, I traced the jurisprudence regarding the relationship between religion and government. In that case, the government has definitely taken a neutral role; that is, government does not promote or inhibit religion or the practice thereof. In the situation I recently heard of, we have another aspect of government having to decide whether enforcing or promoting the good or the right should be or must be the role of government.

Again, the good refers to those things, practices, ideas, and ideals that the majority of a jurisdiction believes to be moral. The right is the legal standing that puts a claim on government that states government is prohibited from certain policies. Stated another way, rights refers to the individual being able to do what the person wishes to do.

Well, what of this situation? Suppose there is a college that depends heavily on public funds from the city government in which the college is located in order to survive. The college's department of political science has invited two speakers, who in their public writings, have advocated a policy that if implemented would seriously threaten certain interests to which many in that city's population feel a close affinity. So concerned is this population that upon hearing of the upcoming presentation, many in the city applied pressure to willing members of the city council to threaten the college with a withdrawal of funding if the speakers were allowed to make their presentation.

The good in this scenario is what the majority or the majority's representatives believe should happen. That is, the speakers should be barred. The right refers to the college's choice to invite the speakers to say what they want to say. In short, the right is on the side of the speakers giving their presentation. The federalist position is bifurcated. On the one hand, it supports the legality of the local city government to do what it threatens to do – that the city should be able to spend its collected tax dollars as it sees fit. But on the other hand, it also asserts that the integrity of the individual, an entity within a federated community of the city or of the nation, would be violated on two counts. If the city council in effect cuts the funding or is successful in convincing the college to cancel the presentation, one, the rights of the speakers to speak freely and, two, the right of the student to go to an educational institution that enjoys academic freedom would be violated.

While different federalists or, for that matter, differing citizens might support either one side or the other in terms of this question, the case brings to bear this notion of the right and the good being at odds. Let me suppose that you don't know what the substantive issue was in this situation. I would guess that you might favor the rights of the college to present the speakers. Would it affect your opinion to know that the speakers are advocating a single state solution to the area that encompasses Israel and Palestine (the West Bank and Gaza) and that such a solution will, in effect, bring the Jewish state of Israel to an end? Does that affect your opinion on how this controversy should be decided? Polling tells us that Americans' support for Israel's military actions against Palestinians hovers around sixty percent.¹ So, perhaps you might side with the council members; perhaps not. But I think you can see how in this case many would agree with the idea that local government should use its authority to promote this good.

I think this case might be very useful in many civics classrooms, particularly if the student population of a school has a history of expressing opinions about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. I would present the issue as I have in this posting. I would first have students take a position on the issue of free speech and academic freedom without knowing what the substantive topic was. Then I would let the students know what that issue was. If students are pro-Israel and decide to take a pro-right position before knowing what the speakers advocate, knowledge of the speakers' topic might cause significant dissonance and motivate students to give the issue serious consideration.

For the record, I will express my opinion. I think the city council has every right and perhaps even the responsibility to voice its concern. The majority has the right to express its beliefs of the good. It should also have the right to decide how it, as a collective, will spend its money. But it is anti-federalist to block speech and academic freedom. It would be imprudent to let the majority satisfy its immediate, knee jerk reaction in such a way as to undermine its longer term goals of equality and liberty.

To give you the rest of the story, the controversy ended when the mayor, Michael Bloomberg, decided to remove any consideration of cutting funding to Brooklyn College. The speakers spoke and Israel still stands.

1See Politico article: http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1112/84036.html .

DRONES: A TOPIC FOR THE CLASSROOM

Events of the last week reminded me of a recurring challenge I believe many civics teachers meet all the time. Given the sudden concern with the legality and morality of drone attacks, a civics teacher might want to take advantage of the heightened interest and introduce the controversy into his/her classroom. But most of us, including civics teachers, really don't know that much about drones or their use. So, purposely not reading any material about drones, I want to review some of the questions I would ask of this area of concern if I were to introduce it into my classroom.

I would begin by jotting down all those things I know from simply seeing the news. I must admit I did view a segment on drones that aired on CBS' Sunday Morning, which aired yesterday. I know that drones are flying machines that fly without any personnel on board. They are “manned” from some remote location. At that location, if the drone is out of sight, it can be operated by someone viewing screens since the drone has one or more cameras on board. Drones come in a variety of sizes. Some are the size of a hummingbird; some are the size of a full-sized helicopter. The ones that are garnering all the attention are the size of a miniature plane or glider. They can be armed with missiles that can be fired and destroy a car or a small house. I know that those that advocate their use say they are capable of precise targeting. They say the drones save lives because, besides the benefit of not endangering the lives of pilots and other personnel who would be involved in flying conventional fighter planes, they also relieve the need to deploy infantry and other land forces in accomplishing many military objectives. I know that they can hover and use relatively very little fuel. I also know that they have been the cause of thousands of innocent victims who become collateral “damage” (difficult to name lost human lives as damage). I know that some of these lives include Americans who were singled out to be killed. I know that this latter fact has caused a controversy in that these individuals were not extended constitutional rights to which Americans are entitled, specifically due process ones. Due to this, the American Civil Liberties Union has filed suit in court against the government. Finally, I know that this development of drones is not only a military concern, but also has implications for domestic issues. Apparently, drones are being purchased by local police agencies and used to observe citizens. They have been used to investigate crime scenes, in real time. I know there is a concern that the technology can be and might already have been used to invade people's privacy. I know that the technology is being used by private entities such as photographers and other people who have an interest in acquiring aerial perspectives of areas. I think there is, in at least some areas, a licensing requirement to operate a drone for recognizance. That pretty much sums up what I know.

After establishing such a list, I review it and pass the information through a mental screen. That is, I think about what I know as it relates to the concerns contained in the mental construct which I have chosen to guide my efforts. As I have indicated in this blog, that would be the liberated federalist construct. Here, issues involving defense, human equality, liberty, privacy, and economies come to the fore. All of these are issues identified by our national compact – the US Constitution. Each of these would suggest questions that I would probably want my students to research, analyze, synthesize, and evaluate.

Let me use just one specific issue and run it through the process. I know that innocent victims are being killed by the use of drones. Here are a set of questions that I would identify for student study:

• Are the uses of drones responsible for the elimination of enemy personnel?
• If yes, to what degree are drones effective in this objective?
• Are drones responsible for collateral damage?
• If yes, to what degree; how extensive?
• Have American citizens been killed by the use of drones?
• If yes, to what degree?
• Are these citizens deprived of any of their rights?
• If yes, of which rights are they being deprived?
• Is there any historical precedence of the American government killing American citizens in conditions of war?
• If so, what were those conditions; how was the action defended; do those rationales apply to the deaths that have resulted from the use of drones?
• Are there current actions protesting the use of drones?
• If so, what are they and what are the arguments these protests put forth?
• Who are engaged in these protests; how are these individuals or groups considered (what are their reputations regarding the degree they are responsible in their protest activities)?¹

Current classroom treatment of such questions is benefited by the use of computers and the Internet. I would, after forming an original list of questions, begin to do some research of my own. Nothing is a substitute for a teacher being knowledgeable about the subject he or she introduces for study.

Of course, as the inquiry proceeds, I can open up class discussion and solicit further questions that students might suggest. Perhaps a student might ask whether there are any similarities or differences between Americans who join a terrorist group and those who joined the Confederate States of America's armed forces during the Civil War. After all, our central government killed hundred of thousands of Americans in that conflict without any regard to due process rights.² Such a question can delve into some very important aspects of the legal arrangements regarding what it means to be an American citizen and the rights that that status includes and under what conditions those rights are recognized or how they are limited in given situations.

Lesson preparations would then be ready for me to identify and provide materials – readings, visuals, expert individuals, field visits, and the like – and other elements of the instructional strategy I would employ. Issues such as availability of materials would have to be accommodated . With all this at hand, I would be ready to present my lessons on the use of drones.

1This is a tricky question. We don't want students committing a generic fallacy; that is, finding an argument to be false because of the person or group espousing it. Even the most vile are capable of making a logical argument.

2It should be remembered that the Lincoln administration never recognized the southern states as having seceded. The only concern for due process rights which came up and that I am aware of regarded the property rights of slave owners and such policies as those instituted by the Emancipation Proclamation.

MACHIAVELLI THE REPUBLICAN

For those of you who have any interest in political matters or world literature, I'm sure you are aware of the fifteenth century political writer, Niccolo Machiavelli. He is probably best known for a small book which was written to gain favor and perhaps gain employment from the head of an Italian principality. The book, The Prince, is generally described and, for good reason, as a “how to book” for anyone who would want to run a principality, especially a newly formed one. The book is filled with advice that we generally consider immoral or, in more generous language, amoral. So devious is the advice that today we use this Renaissance writer's name to describe an autocratic leader or a politician who is willing to do anything to advance his or her aims. We describe such a politico as Machiavellian. But, like most general assessment of this type, there is more to the story.

Despite the general perceptions of Machiavelli being the champion of autocratic and tyrannical rule, due to this quickly written work, scholars who study him know him as the promoter of republics but only where this type of government can be successful. Read what the translators, Harvey C. Mansfield and Nathan Tarcov, have to say about Machiavelli's thoughts as expressed in his more well thought-out book, Discourses on Livy:

In contrast [to The Prince], the Discourses not only includes reasoning about republics but recommends them over principalities. Machiavelli writes a chapter entitled “The Multitude Is Wiser and More Constant Than a Prince” in which he proclaims that people are more stable and have better judgment than princes, that their governments are better, and that the people are superior in goodness and glory. He adds that republics keep their word better than princes and therefore can be trusted more than princes. He also argues that the common good is observed only in republics, whereas usually what suits a prince hurts the city and what suits the city hurts him. So he concludes that “a republic has greater life and has good fortune longer than a principality.” The Discourses praises republican founders and their peoples for their goodness and virtue and their love of liberty, the fatherland, and the common good.¹

Such a description is far from the devious image most have of Machiavelli. But before we go overboard the other way, one of the Italian's concerns for republics is this notion of “goodness and virtue.” What he meant by virtue is not what we generally mean by virtue,² but beyond that, he had as a prerequisite for establishing a republic a populace that was not corrupt. This is the concern I want to address in this posting.

According to Machiavelli, if a populace is corrupt, it cannot sustain a republic. Let me stop here and define the term, republic. A republic is a form of government that mixes the three types of government that are possible: the rule of the one, the rule of the few, and the rule of the many. This three-fold categorization of possible polities comes from the ancient Greeks – Aristotle wrote about them. Each one can be a form supporting good governance. The problem with each is that it can descend into abusive government; it can evolve into tyrannies, oligarchies, or mob rule respectively. The idea of republics is to incorporate aspects of each type. We are a republic; we have in our government an aspect of the rule of the one, the presidency, the rule of the few, the Senate, and of the many, the House of Representatives. Each one aspect is there to check any abuses by any of the other aspects.

Machiavelli was a republican. But he was also a realist. His main concern was to have a polity that could live and sustain stability and peace, because only in those conditions can a polity advance and have the mutual trust that advancement demands; hence, the need for goodness and virtue among the citizenry.

So where are we, Americans, in these central Machiavelli concerns? Joseph E. Stiglitz comments on these qualities of character. I have the bias or belief that corruption begins at the top. I think Stiglitz agrees. He points out that, as demonstrated by the factors that led to our most recent financial crisis, that those at the top income brackets who garner their riches from manipulating money – as opposed to producing goods – used unscrupulous strategies to take advantage of unsophisticated borrowers into taking out imprudent loans. Through this and other methods, an unsavory result has come about:

But now that tacit agreement [of providing jobs for the middle class in exchange for bonuses] between the rich and the rest, which was always fragile, has come apart. Those in the 1 percent are walking off with the riches, but in doing so they have provided nothing but anxiety and insecurity to the 99 percent. The majority of Americans have simply not been benefiting from the country's growth.³

He goes on to point out that against this background of inequality and how we have gotten there, that due to this betrayal of the promise – of realistic chances at success and, short of that, an earned livelihood that pays the rent, puts food on the table, allows a modest vacation, and provides the means to send the kids to college – the values of the society, at all levels, have become compromised. “Much of what has gone on can only be described by the words 'moral deprivation.' Something wrong happened to the moral compass of so many of the people working in the financial sector and elsewhere.”⁴

To finish, let me bring Machiavelli back into this concern: is our republic in danger? Is there a connection between what Stiglitz is pointing out and the inability of our political system meeting the demands we collectively have? I will address this connection in a future posting.

1Machiavelli, N. (1996/1531 – published posthumously). Discourses on Livy. (Translators: Harvey C. Mansfield and Nathan Tarcov). Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press. Citation on pp. xx-xxi.

2My understanding of Machiavelli's use of the word virtue refers to a person's willingness to strive toward social goals. In his day, the word was highly associated with manliness or taking on responsibilities – to have the courage to “go for it.”

3Stiglitz, J. E. (2012). The price of inequality: How today's divided society endangers our future. New York, NY: W. W. Norton and Company. Citation on p. xvii.

4Ibid., p. xvii.

CONSERVATIVE CONCERN: PATRIOTISM

My last posting was about how some in the Republican Party are suggesting that the method used to select electors for the Electoral College should be changed. I determined that the proposal was both anti-federal and anti-democratic. It occurred to me that this blog, which has been dedicated to the question of which content should be contained in civics curricula, has been overly critical of the GOP. What can I say? After all, one of that party's leaders this week called it the “stupid party.” It has lost the popular vote in five of the last six presidential elections. But am I giving the impression that federalism, either in the traditional form or in the liberated form, the form I am proposing, is necessarily liberal in its orientation? Actually, if anything, I believe federalism has a conservative bias. If you are a recurring reader of this blog, I'm fairly certain you have judged me to be a liberal – to be honest, I am. But, as a federalist, I hold many conservative notions to be important. So my challenge, as I react in this blog to events in our political world that have relevance to civics, is to think about what conservative ideals and ideas further federalist thought. I need to give those thoughts some space in my postings.

From time to time, I will attempt to post arguments in which I present a conservative position that I think falls within the purview of federalist thinking. This posting marks my first effort.

Conservative thought, among other things, should be about conserving those beliefs that served us in getting our republic started. As I have tried to explain and describe, that tradition, which started with the Mayflower Compact, defines our commitment to the structural makeup of our national political endeavor. That commitment called on the formulation of political entities by bringing individuals together – to become federated with each other – and to form those entities, resulting in our state and national governments. Through these entities, the federated collective could formulate and implement social policy. I will not retell that story here, but I will argue that conservatives should promote the spirit behind those initiating beliefs.

How are they doing? Their ideological biases of late have fallen short in maintaining that spirit. While I understand the Republican Party has almost radicalized the ideal of individualism, I believe they should instead define individualism under the conceptual context of federated collectives. My sense is that under its current views, the GOP sees itself as the voice of business. I also understand why; big business pays its bills. I know that the Democrats also get dollars from those businesses, but as you compare the amounts between the two parties, one can see which party depends absolutely on those donations. Republican Governor Bobby Jindal of Louisiana recently commented that his party should let go of such attachment to the big players in the business world and pay more attention to entrepreneurs of small businesses.

But, be that as it may, even with Jindal's advice, the emphasis is still favoring those in power or those who strive to be in power. It neglects the other individuals of the collective or the collective itself. I often challenge myself to try to think of some policy that the current Republican Party advances, irrespective of the party's rationale, that doesn't in one way or another advance the financial interests of business owners or help to keep disadvantaged people from improving their financial situations. And while I often hear about how their policies will create jobs – and some do – I can't help noticing that the jobs created due to their policies seem to be low paying and accompanied by other policies that dry up those programs that help improve the competitive standing of the disadvantaged. Look at the jobs being created in Texas, a state which is politically controlled by Republicans and leads the nation in minimum wage employment.¹

I believe there is a way to glorify the individual without radicalizing his/her rights, prerogatives, ambitions, and interests. The individual in a collective obviously has responsibilities to that collective; we should not partake in advocacy that either forgets those duties or argues that they don't exist. Of further unease is a line of thinking that sees any concerns for those responsibilities as signs of socialist thinking. Here, I'm reacting to the constant drumbeat of such an accusation being directed at the President. An individual has status, roles, resources, and ambitions within the collective. Usually he or she has competitive realities with which to contend. But ultimately, the interests of the collective will determine how the individual fares. He or she needs to devise those strategies that balance personal goals and ambitions with the welfare of the collective.

Let me voice the same concern when it comes to labor and the Democratic Party. I feel that the Democratic Party, pre-Clinton, suffered from the same slanted vision when it came to labor unions. Since the unions were (and are) big supporters of Democratic politicians, those politicians had overly biased views when it came to labor relations with business management. For example, such views almost killed the auto industry where union workers priced their labor beyond reasonable levels so that American companies could barely compete against foreign automakers. Not only were wages out of whack, but the level of quality in the workmanship had become highly compromised. This biased view hurt the Democrats – and the labor unions – among the electorate and broke their majority standing that had been established during the New Deal years of the 1930s. It wasn't the only reason for the decline, but their labor positions significantly added to their loss of support. It allowed the rise of Ronald Reagan and Reaganism.

Any position, be it among leadership or follow-ship, that undermines the health of the collective involved, especially if it encourages a de-federation among the members of the collective, will accrue costs. Radicalizing the interests of any segment of a collective surely undermines the cohorts of any endeavor from feeling the bonds necessary to either establish or maintain federation among them. Those costs, if not addressed or allowed to grow, will debilitate the collective, be it a business, a school, a church, a family, or a nation.

And this consideration points the way for conservative thought. We count on conservatives to provide us with the thoughts, beliefs, proposals, and those messages of encouragement that glorify the central ethos of the collective. People don't join collectives to be exploited or mistreated, at least, not voluntarily. A collective that is made up of coerced members is not a federation. But an association that is based on a set of beliefs that enjoys the allegiance of its members can foster federated relations. The importance of those beliefs is based on the spiritual quality that the beliefs have through the life span of that arrangement.

They, the conservatives, are the ones who bolster the messages of patriotism, for example, when it comes to national unity. While non-conservatives might roll their eyes at such messages, somewhere deep down inside, those of good faith, be they liberals or not, have to admit that this whole ball of wax that we know as our nation, needs spiritual impetus in order to keep it going. You don't need to be God-fearing to understand or accept the sacredness associated with our national bond. Conservatives, by their very nature, are disposed to promote that understanding and acceptance. Federated conservatives help us remember our spiritual stake in the nation.

1See Luhby, T. (2011). Rick Perry's jobs boom: The whole truth. CNN Money, website: http://money.cnn.com/2011/08/12/news/economy/perry_texas_jobs/index.htm .

AN UNEQUAL PROPOSAL

There is an anti-federalist plan afoot. It is a plan that would more readily result in a minority of voters “electing” a president. As it is, we have had such results in the past. The last case was the selection of George W. Bush in the 2000 election. Since voters do not directly elect a president but choose a set of electors who serve on the constitutionally created entity, the Electoral College, the possibility remains that the winner could have fewer votes, nationally, than the losing candidate. While this is possible, such cases have been very rare. The first such case was the election of John Quincy Adams in 1824. Adams, according to his defeated opponent, Andrew Jackson, stole that election through a political deal. Besides the 1824 and 2000 elections, the elections of 1876 and 1888 resulted with the candidate with the fewer number of votes winning.

Why were these cases possible? The writers of the Constitution were not that keen on the average person having much say in selecting the chief executive. My interpretation, and not original with me, is that there were several factors involved in their decision to create the Electoral College. Besides having a reserved trust in common wisdom, the founding fathers did not see the office of the presidency being as powerful as it has become. The center of power was to be the Congress whose members represent citizens in the different areas of the country and whose main task is to determine, through the issuance of laws, what the government is to do. The job of the president was mainly to carry out the wishes of Congress. Yes, the presidency, from its beginning, was to take the lead in diplomacy and military matters. But for a young and isolated nation, these two areas of concern were not given the importance we give them today.

The other concern that led to bypassing the popular vote was to protect the integrity of the states, particularly the small states, that could be threatened by a chief executive who owed his (at the time only men where considered) selection to a national electorate. By allotting the number of electoral votes equal to the total number of representatives from each state in Congress – the number of representatives in the House and Senate – the relative strength in a presidential election between large and small states was narrowed a bit. Also, it was and is the case that there are more small states than large states. By counting electoral votes on a state by state basis, small states, collectively, can carry enough votes to make sure any candidate would not develop a platform that would be antagonistic to small state interests. Also, since each state has two senators, this, to a limited degree, limited the relative strength of one state as compared to every other state. This concern for states reflects the very federal ideal that each state is comprised of its unique people. Each has its own sense of people-hood. As individuals are equal, the founding fathers believed each “people” are also equal. We have lost this sense of people-hood, but we can still see remnants of it in the structure of the United Nations, for example, where in the General Assembly each state/nation has, no matter how large its size or population or how powerful, equal representation. This ideal is very federal. Whether it should still hold sway over the structural concerns of modern day America is up for debate.

For those who feel we are today enough of a single nation – that is, hold a visceral sense of one-ness – the argument for ridding ourselves of the Electoral College seems natural and obvious. Whether we should rely on a straight popular vote or manipulate how we select our electoral votes in order to bypass the Electoral College is a question under consideration. But there is another plan that I feel directly threatens our federalist values. It is one that is being promoted by the Republican Party in several states and has received support from national spokespersons of that party. The plan calls for determining each electoral vote not by the popular vote of a state but instead by the popular vote of each Congressional district. Most states today allocate all of their electoral votes to the candidate who wins a plurality of the vote in the state. So, for example, in Florida, if candidate X beats candidate Y, who comes in second by only one vote, Florida casts its entire 27 electoral votes for candidate X. With a bit of mathematical imagination, you can see why such a system at the national level could result in the loser of the popular vote winning the electoral vote and hence, the election. The proposed plan would base the electoral vote allocation not by who wins the state, but who wins each Congressional district within the state. With a bit more mathematical imagination, you can see that the possibility of a loser of the popular vote winning the election becomes more likely.

To explain these mathematical machinations would take more space than it deserves here, but to illustrate the point, if the last election occurred as these Republicans are proposing, Barack Obama, who received over four million votes (51%) more than Mitt Romney, would have lost the election.¹ Could that fact be motivating those who are proposing the change? What do you think? But besides having this political effect, what does this change represent to our constitutional make-up? Actually, on the face of it, not much. After all, the Constitution leaves it up to the states to determine how they will select their electoral votes. But of course, reality is never that easy.

First, such a change would counter a constitutional principle that has taken hold over the years. That is “one person, one vote.” This principle developed as a result of how state legislatures were formed in which rural areas were over-represented at the expense of the interests of urban areas. Finally, the Supreme Court mandated that states rearrange their representation models to adequately protect urban citizens. Summarizing its finding, the Court's decision has been described as issuing a “one person, one vote” principle. In terms of federalist thinking, this debate exposed a tension within that perspective in that federalism generally supports state's prerogatives. At a more fundamental level, though, that perspective is based on the ideal that governance is created at the behest of citizens, who are to be equal in terms of their legal status, coming together to formulate and populate a governmental entity to serve that citizenry – of, by, and for the people. The current Republican proposal will, in effect, disenfranchise millions of urban citizens. It is not a proposal that will prohibit people from voting, but it will in effect render the votes of millions of voters ineffectual. Basing elections on congressional districts, districts drawn to further political aims, will result in such a disenfranchisement. Proof for this assertion is found in the fact that the current House of Representatives, a product of the last election in 2012, is controlled by Republicans despite the fact that the Democrats received over one million votes more than the Republicans at the national level in those Congressional elections.

Whether we decide to keep the Electoral College or not is a very good issue to entertain in a civics class which is guided by federation theory. But of even more paramount concern is whether we should choose electoral votes based on Congressional districts. As it is, the current system, given that each state has equal representation in the Senate, under-represents the more urban states. Under-representation, in effect, disenfranchises people. Often those people, so victimized, besides being citizens who live in cities, are minorities since it is in cities where minorities disproportionally live. This is anti- federal; it is anti-democratic. Are we a nation ready to drift away from these principles that have served us so well in the past? I find it ironic that it is our conservative party promoting such a plan. I have pointed out that in midterm elections the turnout is smaller than in presidential elections; that those who vote in midterms are usually voters who more emotionally identify with one of the parties or who are upset by recently implemented polices. I think that if Republicans establish this method of choosing electors, they will anger those citizens who are disenfranchised. If they are adequately informed by the Democrats, they could very well make up a large block of angry voters. Given the proven ability of the Obama camp to organize, they might very well take out their anger on the Republicans in the 2014 midterm elections.

1The mathematics is based on the distribution of voters for one candidate or another over geographical areas. If the supporters of one candidate are concentrated in one or two Congressional districts and his/her opponent's supporters are spread over the other Congressional districts, even though the first candidate has a higher number of votes, the candidate who has a more spread out support can win with fewer votes.

COORDINATING AUTONOMY AND CIVIC VIRTUE

In order for human existence to have any sense of character or intrinsic worth, each person; each of us must have a certain degree of autonomy. We need to be able to make decisions about the challenges and opportunities that present themselves. We have to have a degree of liberty. Those who have given this quality of life serious thought have juxtaposed it against such concerns as civil stability and social responsibilities. There are those who argue that because of this promotion of self worth, liberty should be maximized – that all of us should have the highest degree of liberty possible. Others are not so sure. While liberty, for the above reason, is very important and necessary for a person's integrity, it cannot be a substitute or excuse for not exhibiting civic virtue.

Our Constitution has something to say about this whole concern. I think it is helpful to review this constitutional aspect from time to time. As one of its aims, the Constitution demands that we are to “promote the general welfare.” On their face, these few words communicate the idea that we, as a society, should establish an economic system that at minimum provides in real terms sufficient material means so that all can lead reasonable lives by the standards prevalent at a given time. The political scientist, Donald S. Lutz, through text analysis, has equated the term, “general welfare,” in the Constitution with what we today call the common good.¹ That is, this aim, specified in our founding document, challenges us to put those policies in place that provide the most good for the most numbers. I would equate this advocacy to that standard provided by utilitarians, but I do not believe the founding fathers believed in a goodness which is self-defined by individual preferences. Instead, I see the document setting up a balance among certain conditions reflecting the good. The meaning of goodness can be derived from what else the Constitution promotes: security, equality, liberty, religious freedom, freedoms of expression and association, stability, property rights, community, justice, and the like. We see these values expressed either directly in the Constitution or implicitly by the structure of government the document sets up. Furthermore, more specific values or conditions of goodness can be deduced from the more general values the Constitution contains. For example, stability and tranquility are furthered by a healthy population and by a reasonable distribution of wealth and income. But “common good” can be diminished if the people or the government seeks one aspect of the good at the unreasonable expense of other aspects. How we arrive at the balances among the demands, as long as the demands reflect constitutional values, is what one can consider a healthy political discourse. It becomes unhealthy when we seek to deny that certain values, such as a healthy distribution of income, are not part of the conversation or certain values are radicalized; that is, sought after at the expense of all other constitutional values.

If we take this balancing act to heart, we can see that individual autonomy (liberty) is not antagonistic to civic virtue. Richard Dagger² gives us a more in-depth analysis of the relationship between autonomy and civic virtue. At a more obvious level, there is the concern over corruption. Surely, our self autonomy can be seriously compromised by a system where there is widespread corruption. Even the rich and privileged can be victimized by a system in which there is little trust. We, as a nation, have toyed with high degrees of licentious attitudes and behavior. Our crime rates reflect this. “The best hope lies in 'the education of desire' or, more optimistically, in an appeal to 'the compulsion of duty'.”³ To some degree, we need to equate liberty with the more Puritanical sense that liberty means we are free to do what we should do, not necessarily what we want to do at all times. Under this conceptualization, we can easily visualize a role for civics education – one rooted in a moral base.

Another obvious connection between autonomy and civic virtue is the autonomy derived from an autonomous nation. Again, a country that is free in terms of both the freedoms it protects for its people and in terms of independence from outside forces, can maintain that freedom only through a populous that is willing and competent enough to protect that independence. Such a task can be accomplished only through a collective commitment not only for a sovereign state, but also for the idea and ideal of freedom itself. Again, civics education has a role: to promote patriotic feelings. This gets tricky. This role is not for promoting blind patriotism or nationalism – “my country, right or wrong, my country” – but a healthy disposition to favor the values we associate with democratic living, including a certain level of skepticism of public policy and public figures.

The final connection Dagger makes between autonomy and civic virtue reflects upon perhaps a false assumption we might hold about the human desire for freedom. We very readily believe that human nature strives for autonomy. To a degree this is true, but freedom contains its own challenges which can become burdensome to meet. Years ago, the social-psychologist, Erich Fromm, wrote about this sense of disconnection which accompanies “freedom from” institutional relationships – family, religion, work – and can lead one to be disposed toward associating with authoritarian ideas or an authoritarian leader.⁴ The reality is that in order to maintain a true allegiance to freedom, we must find our own individual ways to be free – to spontaneously integrate ourselves in order to act creatively within the roles we set out for ourselves. Both Fromm and Dagger emphasize that this development at the individual level demands the appropriate social connections.

The person who is completely dependent on others cannot be independent [as in lacking “freedom from”], yet even the independent person remains dependent on others in various ways. We are interdependent, in other words, and a proper understanding of autonomy and civic virtue leads us to recognize and appreciate this basic fact of life.⁵

Which various ways? By countless ways, but to name a few: providing the rule of law, providing the common defense, providing protection from diseases and disasters, providing education, and providing a general cultural promotion of individual rights. All this is done through communal institutions which are manned by willing and civic- minded citizens.

1Lutz, D. S. (1992). A preface to American political theory. Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press.

2Daggar, R. (1997). Civic virtue: Rights, citizenship, and republican liberalism. New York, NY: Oxford.

3Ibid., p.16.

4Fromm, E. (1941). Escape from freedom. New York, NY: Rinehart, Holt, and Winston.

5Op cit., Dagger, pp. 17-18.