FACTORS AFFECTING A PERSON’S LIKELIHOOD TO CHANGE

The last few postings have been about change, as in the case of organizational change.  The aim is to share some ideas associated with making profound change in a school’s curricular efforts.  Specifically, the aim is to have schools abandon, as a guiding construct, the natural rights perspective and adopt federation theory.  The last set of postings looked at types of change strategies:  rational-empirical, power-coercive, and normative-re-educative strategies.  Let me share with you how Robert Chin and Kenneth D. Benne summarize the difference between empirical-rational strategies, the most commonly used type, and the normative-re-educative type that is most closely conducive to federation theory:

[W]hat we have called rational-empirical approaches depend on knowledge as a major ingredient of power.  In this view, men [and women] of knowledge are legitimate sources of power and the desirable flow of influence or power is from men [and women] who know to men [or women] who don’t know through processes of education and dissemination of valid information.

Normative-re-educative strategies of changing do not deny the importance of knowledge as a source of power, especially in the form of knowledge-based technology.  … In addition, exponents of normative-re-educative approaches recognize the importance of noncognitive determinants of behavior as resistances or supports to changing – values, attitudes, and feelings at the personal level and norms and relationships at the social level.  Influence must extend to these noncognitive determinants of behavior if voluntary commitments and reliance upon social intelligence are to be maintained and extended in our changing society.  Influence of noncognitive determinants of behavior must be exercised in mutual processes of persuasion within collaborative relationships.  These strategies are oriented against coercive and nonreciprocal influence, both on moral and on pragmatic grounds.[1]

Excuse the length of this citation, but I feel the authors capture quite well what the differences of the two approaches are and I find this distinction revealing in that I associate rational-empirical strategies as being in congruence with natural rights thinking and normative-re-educative strategies in congruence with federalist theory thinking.  And with these three approaches – also including power-coercive – described and somewhat explained above and in the preceding postings, I want to next shift our attention to the individual being called upon to change.  What are the challenges from the perspective of that person (the planned-for); what are the dynamics occurring within that individual as he/she is asked or expected to change?

In keeping with the general tenor of this blog, I will address this other perspective as a case of a political change, one in which the person is being subjected to a political confrontation; that is, a situation in which the person is either asked or expected to make certain changes within his/her organizational role(s).  In essence, what is generally being asked when one is considering organizational change – in our case, change within a school – is aiming a chosen strategy that will have individuals change their course of action from what it is now to a different course of action in the future.  At times, these can and are likely to be changing an established course of action – the way things have been done in a particular school over a significant amount of time.  One wants to implement a change with the least amount of cost and, if done under the auspices of a federalist mode, one in which the planned-for will submit to the change out of his or her own accord; then what is sought is not only a change of mind, but also a change of heart.  Let me add, the particulars of what is changed is not a priori determined, but is developed in collaboration between the planned-for and the change agent.  That is, the approach, under such a goal, will be of the normative-re-educative category.  In short, in order to accomplish this, the process used will have to “get into his/her/their head(s)” and that includes not only what a person believes to be true, but also what a person believes should be true.  Whatever is chosen as the specific strategy, therefore, will have to account for an array of factors.  In this posting, I want to give a broad overview of what these factors are.  This will be limited to a run-down of the list of factors I believe are influential in such a change.

I will present these factors in a logical order.  One should not read into this order any claim that the decisions people make in adopting any change of mind and heart follows this order.  It is merely presented this way to assist in your understanding of what I am trying to communicate and, more important, in my attempt to get a handle on what goes on with a person who is so subjected.

The first set of factors is what I call contextual inheritance.  This is made up of two elements:  social-cultural inheritance and genetic inheritance.  Simply, social-cultural inheritance has to do with the cultural tradition in which the individual has been socialized with its array of norms, customs, cultural narratives (including ethnic, racial, religious, and national traditions), values, and other cultural legacies that relate to the challenges of change the individual is confronting.  On the other hand, genetic inheritance includes all those biologically determined forces impinging or otherwise influencing the individual’s decision-making processes.  For example and very important, genetically determined level of energy a person brings to life and its challenges will animate or depress the entire motivational outlook a person brings to a particular demand for change.  We vary, among ourselves, in how energetic we are about work, relationships, likes and dislikes.  This whole genetic inheritance is popularly referred to as how a person is “wired.”  Both the social-cultural and the genetic elements set parameters on how one is disposed to act.

The second set of factors is something I have already described and explained in this blog: the mental domains that influence the individual in his/her decision-making.  The domains are the ideal (how reality should be), the real (how reality is), and physiological (drives and other bodily influences – which are obviously, highly dependent on how we are “wired”).  Of course, what is actually real will deviate from how the mind “knows” the real, even in cases when the perception is stronger than a belief and is held as knowledge.  Our ability to “know” the truth is less than perfect; that means, we, ultimately, construct what we consider to be true.  The other condition affecting our mental images of the ideal, real, and physiological is that many, if not most, of these images are either subconscious or non-conscious.

The third set of factors is the emotional dispositional filter.  This mental orientation is not a product of reality, but of feelings.  Such emotions as anger, love, loyalty, trust, humor, comradery, and the like will be significantly influential in the decisions we make, including those that are political in nature.  In a political situation, it is not necessary to identify the exact emotions that are triggered in a given confrontation, but what is important is that whatever emotions are brought to the fore will lead to one of several dispositions.  These include a solo disposition, an allying disposition, and/or an antagonistic disposition.  So, for example, if the emotion felt is anger over some political confrontation, this emotion might lead to an antagonistic disposition.  The overall disposition a person feels in reacting to a confrontation, itself, can be based on one, two, or all three of these more specific dispositional reactions.  So, one might be disposed toward antagonism, but to be expressed by the individual without any assistance from others; i.e., a solo disposition.  In another situation, it can be antagonism in coordination with others.  In a third situation, it can be just plain antagonism without any thought or motivation to seek being alone or being in alliance with others.  Under such a situation, if an opportunity arises to act antagonistically, the person might take it, whether it is done with others or not or whether it is acted upon openly or not.  In general, therefore, the particular disposition for a particular situation can be one, two, or all three of these more specific disposition types.

The fourth set of factors is the intended mode of action chosen by the individual.  This is the simplest of the factors; there are only two possibilities.  A person, when confronted with a situation, can either demand something politically or support someone or something politically.  Those are the only two modes of political behavior.  But whether the mode is demand or support, each has four optional types:  individual acts in pursuing immediate self-interest, individual acts in pursuing long term self-interest, collective acts pursuing immediate self-interest, or collective acts pursuing long term self-interest.  While there are shades among these options – an option can be intermediate self-interest – the general thinking, planning, and intent is to either be immediate – what is good for me now – or have long term self-interest – what is good for me, let’s say, a year from now.

And the fifth and last set of factors affecting the decision of an individual – which will affect the consequences of whatever action is taken – is the interactive tenor one adopts.  Here, the choices come directly from transactional analysis and they are a “parent” interactive tenor, an “adult” interactive tenor, or a “child” interactive tenor.[2]  The “parent” tenor is demanding and authoritative.  The “adult” is reasonable and calculating.  The “child” is feel-good seeking and immediate.  Each of these is more complex, but these short descriptions, I believe, give you a good sense of what each tenor generates in the form of behavior.

I will stop here for now.  I still want to describe further, in upcoming postings, what this model indicates: the attributes of the dynamics when these factors are in “action” as in when an actual decision-making process is transpiring.  Also, one would benefit from understanding the anticipating consequences of each of these factors “doing their thing” in actual confrontations.  When all that is reviewed, I will then revisit a topic I have written about before:  the distinction between theory-in-use and espoused theory and how levels of “internal consistency” and congruence affect how likely the individual (the planned-for) will productively engage in change.

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[1] Chin, R. and Benne, K. D.  (1985).  General strategies for effecting changes in human systems.  In W. G. Bennis, K. D. Benne, and R. Chin (Eds.), The Planning of Change (pp. 22-45).  New York, NY:  Holt, Rinehart, Winston.  Quotation on p. 39.

[2] Here the classic source is Harris, T. A.  (1973).  I’m ok, you’re ok.  New York, NY:  Avon Books.  In this text I am changing the terminology from that of Dr. Harris.

IN THE PROFOUND, SIMPLE DOES NOT EXIST

To continue my present effort, reviewing three strategy types of social change – mostly organizational change – I want to add to what has been described as normative-re-educative strategies.  To date, I have, in terms of this type, offered some ideas that John Dewey, Kurt Lewin, and Sigmund Freud contributed and that have been incorporated by change theorists.[1]  In this posting, I want to go back to the Deweyean spirit of active learning and further develop the notion of the problem-solving focus option one can operationalize in implementing a normative-re-educative strategy.

When focusing on problem-solving, there are two tracks one can embark upon:  human problem(s) or technical problem(s).  Actually, there is a third track in which both tracks are combined, known as sociotechnical problems.  In modern society, one is hard pressed to encounter a purely human or technical problem – technology has become so ingrained in the course of our daily living.  Overall, after such a problem or set of problems is identified, the general idea is to convert that awareness into a set of questions or processes:  data collection, planning, invention, tryout solutions (testing), evaluation, and feedback.  This is a very general overview of what kinds of activities follow.  As emphasized in previous postings, the aim is to work through these processes armed with institutional support and in a collaborative mode.

Kurt Lewin’s work capitalizes on these foundational elements and, through what the change pioneer calls action-research, provides a bit more meat to this general overview.  One, he recommends data collection concerning organizational functioning and feedback.  This entails processes of interpretation as planned corrections are performed by managers in collaboration with data collectors – usually change agents.  Two, he calls for training of managers and other organizational staff members who are dealing with the identified and researched difficulties.  Three, he advises developing methods by which affected parties accept feedback.  This can prove difficult and time consuming as honest feedback will often challenge internalized norms, values, and beliefs about the organization or, more important, life itself.  Four, Lewin advocates the training of internal change agents for which I can add several reasons.  Internal staff members are known, potentially trusted, and seen as “one of us.”  These qualities can ease collaboration efforts.  They are also knowledgeable about the organization in ways external agents cannot be.  Whoever conducts the necessary research of the organization, their aim is to scan operations to detect problems, diagnosing them to identify changeable factors – not all factors are changeable – and move toward collaborative solutions.

To focus on the human angle a bit more, there is an overall aim to build up the persons involved.  To do so, there is a genuine assumption that people are or potentially are creative and life affirming and that this aspect of them, if not detectable, is being thwarted by existing conditions.  The work of change agents includes eliminating or, at least, ameliorating those conditions.  Here, the work of Abraham Maslow can be useful.[2]  By attempting to encourage the subjects (the planned-for) to seek higher levels of motivations, one can address these thwarting conditions.  This calls on agents to identify where on the hierarchy of needs each of those individuals is and being knowledgeable about how to move them along to higher levels.  The processes involved with such work usually demand some sort of intervention and can take the form of personal counseling, group training, laboratory work, or two-person or small group setups.  Success includes the persons achieving greater self-clarity over task demands and personal challenges which thwart moving toward self-actualization.  If an addressed condition is truly dysfunctional yet established, change will likely combat defenses because the condition is supported by an equilibrium or equilibria among those involved.  By stressing some “moral” set of goals, such as those emanating from federalist values, one can determine the dysfunctional quality of the consequences resulting from continuing those established conditions.

Added features of this type of change approach include a few other aspects.  While focusing on a group’s problem-solving approaches, there is a reliance on creativity – there are no a priori solutions.  The actual process will entail conflict management in which changes in norms, policies, and relationships will be targeted.  This might call for forming informal organizational structures that exist within the formal arrangement.  This is done to satisfy personal and interpersonal needs which are not accepted by the formal structure.  This type of strategic move needs to be done advisedly and sensitively.  Such moves can be easily misinterpreted honestly or mischievously by threatened parties.  The rationale of such a move – and this should be communicated to all involved – is to attempt to be more productive by not wasting energies on accommodating the unattended needs which the informal structure is addressing.

Overall, normative-re-educative strategies can be sold as an attempt to re-new the efforts of the organization.  They are not an easy option, but to meet profound needs, “easy” simply does not exist.

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[1] As reported in Chin, R. and Benne, K. D.  (1985).  General strategies for effecting changes in human systems.  In W. G. Bennis, K. D. Benne, and R. Chin (Eds.), The Planning of Change (pp. 22-45).  New York, NY:  Holt, Rinehart, Winston.

[2] If you happen to be unfamiliar with Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, he theorized that a person advances through different levels of needs.  Advancement is dependent on satisfying lower levels before advancing to higher levels.  One does not do this consciously; we are “wired” to proceed in this fashion.  The list of needs are, in order of advancement, physiological needs, safety needs, social needs, esteem needs, self-actualization needs.  Most people are seen as being held up at some level before reaching and satisfying the self-actualization need level.

A SET OF CHANGE STEPS

If the general opinion is that our schools are falling short of their mission – to educate our youth so as to meet the challenges of adulthood – then change in those institutions should be central to our concerns.  I have set out to address social change and, in so doing, have shared with you a set of general strategy types that aim at instituting change.  They are empirical-rational strategies, power-coercive strategies, and normative-re-educative strategies.  Presently, I am in the midst of describing and explaining the normative-re-educative strategies.  In my last posting, I introduced this type and reviewed one of the iconic thinkers, John Dewey, whom the authors Robert Chin and Kenneth D. Benne cite as a major contributor to the development of this general type.[1]  In this posting, I want to pick up where I left off and add the thoughts of two other reputable thinkers and researchers, Kurt Lewin and Sigmund Freud.  Let me first place these contributions in a framework; that is, from their work, we can design a general approach to change planning.

Chin and Benne suggest the following:  With a commitment to include the change subject in planning and implementing phases, first, identify needed change, second, identify range of needed actions, third, find ways to act collaboratively, fourth, make apparent any unconscious or subconscious elements that are problematic and need to be addressed deliberately, fifth, selectively incorporate any relevant – and deemed useful – behavioral knowledge and technique components.  A few overarching elements should be kept in mind when following such an overall approach:  information concerning norms, values, and attitudes are crucial, relationships both internal and external to the organization might need to be changed, and people technologies (e.g., organizational plans) might be as, if not more, important than thing technologies (e.g., computers).  And a last bit of warning: manipulation should be seriously avoided.  Any conflicts in goals, aims, values, in order to be productive, need to be worked out openly and honestly.

Kurt Lewin introduced what might seem a bit obvious today, but was quite new back in the mid ‘40s when he engaged in his pioneer work.  He emphasized the need to have researchers, educators, and activists work in close collaboration.  The general approach known as action research is first attributed to Lewin.  His main aim was to address normative change, not just cognitive change or perceptual change.  In order to seek and accomplish such change, it becomes imperative that planning and implementation include the efforts of those who are to be the subject of the sought after change.

Sigmund Freud’s work with the subconscious is also critical to the normative-re-educative strategies because such mental content is influential in identifying, reacting, and evaluating any attempts at meeting problematic conditions.  Subconscious and even unconscious beliefs and values must be, first, identified, and, second, openly dealt with in order to overcome their dysfunctional aspects.  A second contribution of Freud is his therapeutic model; that is, his advocacy for the direct intervention of the therapist in the lives of his or her patients.  In the case of organizational change, that would be the direct intervention of the change agent in the organizational life of the client.  In the context of this posting, the organization would be that of the school and the change agent would be specially trained teachers and other staff members that would take on the challenge of planning and instituting change at the school site with, of course, the knowledge and support of administrative officials such as district officials, the principal, and assistant principal in charge of curriculum.

Before ending this posting, let me share what Chin and Benne identify as the two main options in normative-re-educative change efforts.  They are a focus on problem-solving and an awareness of existing norms, values, and attitude.  Given the context I have provided and based on my own experiences working in schools, I would suggest that what should be centered upon if one wants a school staff to institute a federalist mode of operation is a problem-solving focus.  Without engaging in any manipulative activities – change agents should be upfront about their goals and aims – by dealing with problems, one can adopt more of an evolving strategy than an abrupt policy dictum.  Again, based on my experience, I would say most teachers are aware that their assigned schools are not as productive as they could be.  If this general awareness can be mutually analyzed and specific problems can be identified, then the whole change process can begin by addressing problem areas felt by many in the school community.  By doing so, the process can be defined as a succession of practical and mutually desired efforts at meeting and improving less than optimal conditions.

In my next posting, I will look at more specific methodologies associated with normative-re-educative strategies.  I would like to emphasize before ending this entry that what is being considered here is a fundamental change for a school and that what now exists in a school is seen by most of a staff as not only how things are, but how things need to be.  It is just what a school site is in terms of its social relationships and expectations.  This is particularly true of staff members who have not worked at many different schools much less in different communities.  These individuals have little to no comparison by which to judge the soundness of how their current school operates.  There are even those on a school staff who see what is as what should be.  As I mentioned above, a lot of the motivation and rationale for such a position is based on subconscious beliefs, attitudes, values, and norms.  They do not change readily and, for some, will never change.  Success, under such conditions, is not guaranteed.  But the effort is worth it; a federalist school will enable, more readily, a federalist civics curriculum.  As such, a change in this direction will prepare those students to become better citizens.  That is the main argument of this blog.

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[1] Based on the theoretical work:  Chin, R. and Benne, K. D.  (1985).  General strategies for effecting changes in human systems.  In W. G. Bennis, K. D. Benne, and R. Chin (Eds.), The Planning of Change (pp. 22-45).  New York, NY:  Holt, Rinehart, Winston.

BEYOND REWARD AND PUNISHMENT

The last two postings of this blog reviewed and cursorily explained two general strategies for change in social environments.  To add context:  in this blog, I am currently looking at the question of implementing change in organizational entities.  To do this, I am reviewing some selected social science literature to help me express what it takes to successfully institute sought after change.  My overall concern is to address which organizational elements have to change in order to have a specific organization, a school, become a place that is run in a federalist fashion.  That is, a fashion in which the staff, students, and related community members, especially parents, are collaborating in the various processes that make a school run.  This is beyond what usually exists today in which there are structural elements for collaboration, but true collaboration is missing. 

My ultimate concern is that a federalist based curriculum in civics is enhanced, if not made possible, by a school community that lives its organizational life under the guise of federalist tenets.  This is based on the idea that there is such a thing as the “hidden curriculum.”  A hidden curriculum is composed of those aspects – either in its structures, processes, and/or functions – of an educational organization that is not part of the formal curriculum but, nevertheless, has an educational effect on the students of that school.  Usually, this teaching process occurs as students experience the specific modes of operation and other distinguishing aspects of the school they attend.  For example, how teachers of the school co-operate with each other or don’t co-operate sends messages, usually unintended, to students about how workplace expectations exist in the real world.  These behavior patterns very often teach students, and those types of messages that compose the hidden curriculum are just as influential as the content in textbooks or lectures, if not more so.  “Do as I say, not as I do” is a fool’s notion.  What we do in front of young people has equal, if not more, power over how they see and know the world.  The point being:  if a civics curriculum is set to use federation theory as its guiding construct by which its content is chosen, that choice would be enhanced if the school, in its operations, adopts an overall federalist approach in how it runs its business.  Given the dominance of a natural rights view of politics and governance – including the governance of organizations – schools today are in need of social change if they are to be run more in the mode of federalist principles.  It is this latter concern that necessitates those committed to federalist theory to look at and become familiar with change theory.

This posting follows a set of postings that reviewed two overall strategy types dedicated to instituting change:  empirical-rational strategies and power-coercive strategies.  This posting will begin to address a third general type, normative-re-educative strategies.  As with the other postings, this one will rely heavily on the work of Robert Chin and Kenneth D. Benne.[1]

I sort of introduced some of the ideas of the normative re-educative strategies when I described more specific forms of the power-coercive strategies in my last posting.  There, I pointed out that if, in using power-coercive strategies, the aim were to institute complicated and/or long developing change, power-coercive strategies would have to be supplemented with normative-re-educative ones.  This proviso indicates the first assumption one makes when selecting a normative-re-educative strategy:  the sought after change is profound and/or extensive.  In turn, this situation calls for more than merely seeking changes in knowledge, information, or intellectual rationales.  What is needed instead, or in addition, is a change in the way the subjects of the change value, feel, or hold relationships; i.e., what is sought is a change in the normative orientations that are present in the existing environment which can be within and/or without the organizational space.  Change is dependent on getting some or all of the people involved to “see,” to some extent, that space differently – a tall order indeed.

Chin and Benne, in their presentation of these normative strategies, depend on several iconic social thinkers:  Kurt Lewin and Sigmund Freud, on whom I will report in my next posting.  But before sharing some of their thoughts, let me mention another contributing source: John Dewey. 

This philosopher/educator’s contribution is the notion that people are not passive learners.  They learn from doing and as such, one needs to take into account the active learning processes that are derived from a person interacting with his/her environmental resources.  People are constantly anticipating and attempting to further or thwart developments in their social environments.  They are not simply receptors of the physical and social dynamics around them.  This is probably heightened when one is considering social environments, as in organizational life.  In this sense, intelligence is social.  More broadly, a person trying to engage or otherwise deal with that social reality must recognize the existence and influence of a normative culture which is made up, in part, of norms, habits, and values.  Over time, these become internalized by the individuals involved.  In turn, if meaningful change is sought, these elements have to be accounted for if success is to be achieved.  Such elements transcend the rational and are usually a product of heavy emotional investment – often beyond the conscious level and into the subconscious level of those so invested.  This, among those involved, goes beyond reason to an “intelligence” which has its own modes of invention, development, and testing procedures.  This is what is referred to when one hears, “we have our ways of doing things.”  These can be major obstacles to change and is what being “institutionalized” means.  Such entrenched factors, internalized factors, cannot be merely forced out by legal coercion or a system of marginal rewards and still maintain the integrity of the organization – such as a school.  The subjects of change have to first, need to feel the need to change – and feel it honestly – and then go about the often painful process of change which can be disorienting and threatening on many levels.  Normative-re-educative strategies are about dealing with this level of change.

I will next look at the contributions of Lewin and Freud.  Needless to say, of the three types of strategies, the one most inclined to institute the changes necessary to truly form a “federalist” school is known as normative-re-educative.

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[1] Based on the theoretical work:  Chin, R. and Benne, K. D.  (1985).  General strategies for effecting changes in human systems.  In W. G. Bennis, K. D. Benne, and R. Chin (Eds.), The Planning of Change (pp. 22-45).  New York, NY:  Holt, Rinehart, Winston.

SO YOU’RE NOT A NAIL

I want to continue the topic I introduced in my last posting: power-coercive change strategies.  Basically, this type of change is a type that depends on subjects doing what someone, a change agent, wants them to do in order to avoid experiencing a punishment.[1]  This punishment can take the form of a physical, financial, emotional, reputational, or other type of harm.  As I indicated toward the end of the last posting, this effort will look at more specific power-coercive strategies.  They are non-violent, political power, and Marxian approaches.

Those change strategies that are referred to as non-violent have a rich history over the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.  We first encounter the idea of non-violent change strategy in the writings of Henry David Thoreau in the mid-1800s. But its first application can be noted in the work of Mahatma Gandhi as he led the movement that eventually broke the imperial hold that Great Britain had over India.  That movement finally secured India’s independence in 1947.  Since then, here in the US, the civil rights movement, under the leadership of Martin Luther King, applied many of the strategies inspired by Gandhi in the 1950s and ‘60s.

There are two prerequisites to this approach:  one, the conditions that are to be changed need to be seen as unjust or extremely unfair by significant numbers within the relevant population and, two, the groups or organizations (private or public) in which change is sought have to be susceptible to some loss which is also, in some way, accessible to the change faction who can use it as leverage.  So, in the case of the early civil rights movement, a bus boycott in Montgomery, Alabama proved effective in giving the movement a much needed symbolic victory and was first to put into prominence a young King who was elevated to lead the protest.[2]  If the goal is simply to implement a change – change agents satisfied with a change that might not be accepted emotionally by those who have to live with the change – then a power-coercive strategy is good enough.  But if the change advocates depend on a moral value rationale for their efforts, they might also want those subjected by the change to have a change of heart.  They might want to create a collaborative relationship with the subjects.  If so, then power-coercive will not be enough.  Initial change will then have to be followed up with a normative-re-educative strategy (the subject of my next posting).

The second type of power-coercive strategy is the political power approach.  Political power strategies are those that are administered by those in authority.  Let us assume, for the purposes of just looking at the dynamics of this type of strategy, that the change agent is someone in authority and that authority is accepted as legitimate.  Here, the punishment element can take on several guises.  They can be sanctions, fines, loss of monetary rewards such as grant moneys, or even imprisonment.  But these types of changes are usually not so clean and simple.  Usually, if the change is significant, provocative, and/or multidimensional, then follow up is needed.  For example, such a change might need training so that the subject will have the skills to implement and perform the change to satisfactory levels.  In those cases, it is not just a matter of some underling verbally agreeing to do something differently, but having to engage in time consuming and unpleasant activities in order to learn a skill or otherwise arrange for restructuring or some other movement of personnel.  If one adds reluctance of any kind on the part of the subject, one is considering a costly transitional process.  This is not only costly, but dependent on a certain level of willing cooperation.  Again, one is probably talking about instituting a normative-re-educative addition to the initial change process.

The third strategy type one can consider under the power-coercive category is the Marxian approach.  This approach presupposes that in the location in which the change is sought, there exists an established intellectual “field.”  That is, those involved are under the view promulgated by those in charge, the elites.  This field is controlled by class-based elites (it might be elites who are defined as being ethnic, gender, nationality, age, or sexual preference based).  In controlling the field, the elites define the parameters of the field.  They determine what is legitimate or not.  Marxian aim is to change this very reality; i.e., the effort is to fundamentally inflict a social change so that those who are being abused by the existing order will adopt a new class (ethnic, gender, nationality, age, or sexual preference) consciousness.  I wrote of this process of change in earlier postings when I described and explained the basic argument of Paulo Freire in his book, Pedagogy of the Oppressed.[3]  Those who advocate this strategy speak of holding, through this type of consciousness change, truer democratic values.  Whatever it is considered, one would augment the implementation of changed policy in which a heavy dose of normative-re-educative efforts to engender the type of consciousness which is being sought.[4]

As you can detect, when we talk about any extensive plan of change, a coercive form of power seems to fall short.  In each of these three more specific approaches, change, in order to be meaningful and lasting, needs to be supplemented by normative-re-educative processes.  My next posting will take a close look at this other type of change.

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[1] Based on the theoretical work:  Chin, R. and Benne, K. D.  (1985).  General strategies for effecting changes in human systems.  In W. G. Bennis, K. D. Benne, and R. Chin (Eds.), The Planning of Change (pp. 22-45).  New York, NY:  Holt, Rinehart, Winston.

[2] Actual change in the bus service that had discriminated against African-Americans was accomplished by a Supreme Court decision that ordered the desegregation of the Montgomery buses.

[3] See blog posting, Teaching Aim of Critical Pedagogy, May 11, 2011.  Available upon request.

[4] This type of “education” is not as heavy-handed as it might sound.  You are encouraged to look at Freire’s approach to education to see what is being considered.  This is not to say that in countries where Marxists have taken power that they have not used drastic and very authoritarian modes of re-education.

THE STAGE FOR THE POWER-COERCIVE

Here goes, as promised in my last posting, a few (or more) words on a general strategy type of change known as power-coercive.[1]  Generally, these strategies are based on avoiding what is anticipated as painful or disagreeable; that is, a set of change strategies in organizational operations – be it in terms of goals/aims or processes – that are deliberate and conscious.  These changes are on the part of a party related or associated with an organizational entity and motivated by an understanding that not to change will resort in enduring some pain or disagreeable consequence.  These changes are spearheaded by a person or group.  They are in a position to administer some sort of punishment if the party does not get the change it wants and, therefore, the strategy can be called a power-coercive strategy.  I billed this type of strategy as one that promises to be efficient in instituting a desired change.  By efficient, I mean the change will be effective in a relatively short amount of time with minimal costs.  I will explain that this billing is true only if certain conditions are met.

In the last posting, I reviewed what is commonly called empirical-rational strategies and that set of strategies is seen as fairly quick and efficient, but it does not hold a candle to what is anticipated with the use of power-coercive strategies.  This is true if those wanting to institute change enjoy a relatively powerful position within or over the organization in question.  If they don’t, then the use of such a change strategy is possible, but it will not be as quick and efficient and might, as a matter of fact, take a significant amount of time. 

When the change is by the powerful, though, they have resources that do make a difference.  Why?  Because power-coercive strategies rely on what I have termed, along with French and Raven,[2] coercive power.  That is, power – an ability to get someone to do something that they would not otherwise do – is based on the belief that those implementing the power can and will administer some sort of punishment to the subjected party if the subjected party does not comply with what the would-be power wielder wants done.  It is the sort of power one usually thinks of when the term power is used.  You get someone to do something because not doing it will result in that someone experiencing a consequence that is unpleasant or even worse.  You’ve seen untold number of movies in which such power is central to the plot line.  The Godfather trilogy comes to mind.  But does power have to rely on punishment?  Let’s read on.

In the realm of change:  power-coercive strategies rely on the more powerful agents exerting their wishes on the less powerful.  In real life, not the movies, exertion of power-coercive strategies takes place without guns and sinister sneers; they are usually expressions or implementations of legitimate authority.  That is, the person or group seeking the change has the authority, due to organizational positioning or ascribed positioning by law, to exert the “commands” that would institute the change.  I should add that such power is usually exerted to maintain what is, the status quo, instead of trying to institute change. 

But when it is change that is sought, such change efforts by those in legitimate power positions are taken when a new set of authority figures takes hold of an organization such as a corporation or a governmental department or other bureaucratic entity.  Sometimes those in power want to institute a new direction that calls on a certain level of change.  Whether change is emanating from a change in administration (usually with the election or the selection of a new president, governor, or CEO) or a change in strategy by those already in power, such changes are deemed legitimate due to the legitimacy of the power positions of those seeking change.  Even in such cases, what is in existence, the ongoing set of realities, is usually very well entrenched.  So change promises to be difficult.  It helps to have authority on one’s side and using authority, relying on power-coercive strategies, usually can result ostensibly on implementing the desired change, at least on paper.  By on paper, what is usually meant is that the structural and verbal commitments upon which the change relies can be put in place in a relatively short amount of time.  The problem is in the ensuing performance by those who have to carry out the change.  If the change objectives are not really shared by this corps of workers, change, even with authority on the side of the “changers,” can prove to be elusive.

But before I address these types of consequences, let me fill in more of the details entailed with the power-coercive set of changes.  First, there are modes of change for such coercive moves.  These are generally of two types:  political and economic modes.  Political modes encompass the necessary policy changes that support the operational changes that the change advocates desire.  This is dependent on the procedural apparatus the organizational or governmental entity has in place and the politicking in which both the advocates of change and those who oppose the change(s) engage.  This process is deserving of its own analysis – rest assured, such questions have their own literature of research that one can review.  But, whatever the result, assuming both sides follow accepted procedures of politicking, the results of the conflict will be accepted, at least verbally.  And then, second, there are economic modes.  Here, decisions over expenditures will be instrumental.  If those in authoritative positions sense or know that there are recalcitrant rebels fighting the desired change, decisions over budgetary allocations can and will administer the necessary punishments to solicit compliance.  This has proven highly effective in terms of actual activities subordinates perform, if not the all-out devotion those activities might demand.  Those are the sorts of actions that the more powerful can administer over the less powerful, but do not explain what options exist for the less powerful entities who desire and are willing to pursue change.

If the change advocate is less powerful (and assuming that there exists enough of a cadre of malcontents, either within or without the organizational structure in question who wish for change) what can those desiring change do?  Under these conditions, this type of change is not short term; these strategies take a lot of time.  The most common avenue here is for such a person or group to organize the discontented who is or are demanding that change occur.  This can take place, as appropriate, within or without the organization or governmental entity, within or without the legitimate channels of authority.  For example, teachers who seek changes in their working conditions might organize to engage in tougher labor actions such as staging a strike or work stoppage – activities that are to some degree illegal in a lot of states.  The aim is not to cause disruption for its own sake, but to seek a shift in the conflict from confrontation to negotiation.  This might take on the air of legitimacy, even if the actions are illegal – albeit more difficult – if the initial demands are seen, by the general public, as advancing fairness and justice.  Of course, if the lesser powerful party has been viewed as being subject to authoritarian subjugation, this adds to the image of any existing unfairness.  If these conditions exist, then such options as quasi or fully illegal means might cause the more powerful party to be sufficiently hurt by the actions and, therefore, will be encouraged to negotiate.  This result, being the aim of the change advocates in the first place, will be considered a success.  Needless to say, the fact that one might be speaking of illegal or semi-illegal activity adds to the burden of those seeking change as they must overcome expected allegiance for the law. 

There are times, however, that one or two of the conflicted parties might want, for whatever reason, to continue the conflict.  If this is the case, then we are talking about such a heightened conflict that one would question the ultimate aims of one or both sides of the conflict.  In these extreme cases, expressed aims are simply not what is sought.  Instead, what is sought is probably a more institutional change that is or borders on revolutionary change.  That is, they are either attempting to change  the system by destroying the ability of the advocates to organize or overthrow the system.

In my next posting, I will review more specific power-coercive strategies.  I will address the issue of having to depend on punishment; i. e., does one, even under a power-coercive type of strategy have to depend only on punishment to get results? These more specific strategies will stretch from those advocated by Gandhi to Marx.  The expanse of these strategies is quite wide, but they are over a singular aim:  inflict pain – physical, economic, or psychological – to gain acquiescence to sought-after change.

Note:  Due to travelling requirements, this entry was posted on October 13, 2015, at around 11:30, Central time.  Due to the account being established in the Eastern time zone, the posting date, as recorded with Blog Spot, is October, 14, 2015.  Sorry for not meeting my self-imposed deadline of a Tuesday (the 13th) posting date.

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[1] Chin, R. and Benne, K. D.  (1985).  General strategies for effecting changes in human systems.  In W. G. Bennis, K. D. Benne, and R. Chin (Eds.), The Planning of Change (pp. 22-45).  New York, NY:  Holt, Rinehart, Winston.

[2] French, J. R. P. and Raven, B. H. (1967). The bases of power. In. E. P. Hollander and R. G. Hunt (Eds.) Current perspectives in social psychology (504-512). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

MARGINAL OVERSIMPLIFICATION

Our collective awe over how science and technology have affected our lives is noteworthy.  I note, for example, as I walk in a mall or other areas where there are a lot of people, how many are carrying and using hand-held devices that hook them up to global information systems.  A marvel indeed.  It is not surprising, therefore, to see how intrusive that worldview of science and technology has been on how we see human behavior and human problems including those that manifest themselves in group or other collective settings.  Our reliance on those disciplines to show us how to better our social relations seems prudent and not so far-fetched.  But, as with any scientific and technological approach, certain assumptions are made when we study human behavior.  We need a starting point since, as with any segment of reality, complexities abound and in order to get a handle on those complexities, we need to assume some things.  We should, as best we can, be mindful that we operate under any such assumptions and calculate how they might affect our analysis of what we observe is going on, what we determine is wrong, and what we decide we should do.

Implementing change in our social venues is no different.  If we want to approach changing some social dynamic, be it ongoing, episodic, or highly occasional, certain assumptions are inevitable.  In the history of such efforts, a leading strategy – the empirical-rational approach – has adopted the assumption that humans are rational and that they will choose to behave in such ways that offer the highest level of reward while minimizing costs.  Further, those determinations are done on the margin; that is, they take the following form:  if I do X, it will marginally improve my condition over what is and it will cost me Y amount more than what I am expending presently.  That is, we determine whether marginal benefit is greater or less than marginal cost.  Economists treat this as comparing marginal revenues – how much more money will be attained – and marginal costs – how much more money is expended.  If marginal benefit (marginal revenue) is more than marginal cost, then it is rational to do X.  If marginal benefit is less than marginal cost, then it is rational not to do X.  Now substitute a proposed change for X – say hiring one candidate for a job over another candidate – and you get the rational considerations assumed by strategies classified as empirical-rational strategies which are identified by the authors Robert Chin and Kenneth D. Benne.  They claim that this category of change strategy is the type most commonly employed.[1]  If one makes such an assumption, the main work of change agents that ascribe to this type of strategy is to acquire, analyze, and distribute the scientific/technological information that facilitates such calculations.  This can be done so that clients, students, or patients can go about making the determinations over proposed change(s) that this type of assisting professionals (consultants, teachers, or medical practitioners) proffer.  Procedurally, this strategy includes such activities as diagnosis, education, and evaluation as a professional studies the problem area, devises change options, educates the subject, and evaluates the implemented change activities.  Less than acceptable results indicate a lack of appropriate knowledge and the need to do more research.  As such, the assumption itself is not questioned.

One might ask:  what usually interferes with implementing needed change or with the success of an implemented strategy?  One often cited cause is wrong personnel.  Fitness for the job is often considered lacking.  Solutions, therefore, are often hiring new people or rearranging the roles of existing employees.  This bias can be a cover of sorts to act out biases for existing conditions instead of a way to implement change.  In any event, as for working toward curricular change, the object of my interest in addressing this concern, this option of changing personnel is not readily available for a variety of reasons.  What we generally find is that this strategy, empirical-rational approach – is apt to work more readily when considering “thing technologies” – e. g., computers, TV, or other electronic tools – as opposed to “human technologies.”  The hang up seems to be that with human related change, a lot more is going on than merely the simple calculations of marginal benefits and marginal costs.  This is what Chin and Benne have to say when commenting on specific curricular change of a particular effort:

When we assess this situation to find reasons why such researches have not been more effective in producing changes in instruction, the answers seem to lie both in the plans of the studies which produced the materials and designs and in the potential users of the findings.  Adequate linkage between consumers and researchers was frequently not established.  Planned and evaluated demonstrations and experimentations connected with the use of materials were frequently slighted.  And training of consumer teachers to use the new materials adaptively and creatively was frequently missing.[2]

More is going on than with the aforementioned calculations of marginal benefits and marginal costs.  There are role considerations, considerations based on reputational factors, held biases over curricular content, ongoing social chemistry within the classrooms, and the like.  “Field testing” of curricular materials is a tricky business and yet we are talking about a very limited domain of change, whether a set of materials will be used or not in the instruction of some content.  To change an entire approach to a subject area or to how we run a school would promise to be way beyond the conceptual parameters of a marginal benefit vs. marginal cost calculation.  Why?  Because benefits and costs in such a proposed change encompass a very large set of relevant factors that are often very difficult to measure or even identify.

What we do know is that some content will be taught and some manner of operation will be in play in a given school at a given time.  “What is,” in these domains, is usually there as a product of the evolutionary forces that affect a given school.  I had the opportunity to work on a faculty that opened a school – a brand new school.  While there, I often stopped to consider that, as different situations popped up, there was not an established way to handle them.  We, as a faculty, were creating “the way.”  It was a weird experience.  And yet, we as a group of workers at that new school were establishing the way that probably still influences how things are done there today more than thirty years later.  Changing those elements incurs a cost, some costs being quite high.

So, if one does want to institute a new curriculum, especially if that newer curricular choice entails some changes in how the school staff sees itself, how it runs administratively, and how it considers itself along democratic measures, one cannot see such a project as simply another change effort.  These types of changes go way beyond empirical-rational considerations.  They will not be accomplished overnight. 

Oh, excuse me; there is another approach to change that touts a fairly quick and efficient process.  I will, in my next posting, address the power-coercive approach.  As with empirical-rational approach, power-coercive does offer some useful ideas, but the level of its comprehensiveness will be questioned.  As for empirical-rational, I do appreciate the basic assumption.  We do act on the margins.  The problem is, when it comes to human interaction, we simply can’t simplify what constitutes benefits and what constitutes costs, especially at the margins.

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[1] Chin, R. and Benne, K. D.  (1985).  General strategies for effecting changes in human systems.  In W. G. Bennis, K. D. Benne, and R. Chin (Eds.), The Planning of Change (pp. 22-45).  New York, NY:  Holt, Rinehart, Winston.

[2] Ibid.  Citation on p. 28.