In
the news of late, there has been an ongoing story regarding the
Senate of the United States. The majority leader of that body has
been threatening to change the rules of the Senate to put a crimp in
its filibuster practice – a change known as the “nuclear option.”
The filibuster is a procedural strategy by which a minority can
prevent a bill or presidential nomination for a particular
governmental position from being considered, debated, and voted for
yea or nae. In short, the filibuster permits a minority of senators
to stop what the majority wants to approve unless the majority can
get sixty out of the hundred senators to vote for cloture. A lot of
the coverage emphasizes the obstructive function the filibuster plays
in stopping legislation. One can reasonably argue that the current
use of the filibuster is seriously hampering the political system
from functioning; that is, through the excessive practice of the
filibuster, the Congress has not been able to address serious
problems such as high levels of unemployment. Whether this is true
or not, one can agree that carrying on a filibuster by a minority of
senators can effectively stop desired policy by the majority. Under
the current rules, many say, it is too easy to conduct a filibuster
and it does not extract enough of a cost on those participating.
How
does the filibuster rate as a federalist practice? One of the
attributes of a federated system I have identified in this blog –
particularly a liberated federalist system – is that its policy
forming process, through an appropriate structure – at the national
level, that would be the Congress – should seek as much consensus
as possible. This is especially true at the national level since the
resulting policy will affect a wide diversity of local conditions
across our national landscape. Consensus, by its very nature, means
that policy has to be acceptable to varying populations and
interests. This demands a narrow acceptable range of policies.
Proposed policies that are at significant variance from the mean of
political opinion should be discarded. So if a proposal can be
judged to be outside the main body of acceptable public policy, the
process is legitimately within its federalist bounds to obstruct the
acceptance of such policy even if the majority is seeking it.
Now
you might ask: how can the majority of elected officials strive to
implement policy outside the mean of public opinion? Don't these
politicians depend on getting votes from people to keep their jobs?
And won't those people look on these politicians with disfavor if
they are voting for unpopular legislation? The answers are yes in
each case, but it's not all that simple. In fact, it is complicated
on several dimensions. For example, look at our farm policy. One
might argue that socialism is unpopular in the US, but we regularly
vote for socialist policies. Our farm legislation, that calls on a
strong government presence in the agriculture industry, is very
popular among citizens who would otherwise vehemently be opposed to
socialism. They just don't see subsidizing farmers, particularly
large corporate farmers, as examples of socialism, but it is. All of
this suggests that a lot of what is favored and what is not is highly
subject to language manipulation. Effectively symbolizing what one
wants can be very useful in framing issues and in proposing policies
– useful to those who are seeking otherwise unpopular policies.
But
of course, all of this is subject to being subjective. What's
outside the bounds in one person's perspective is all-American in
another person's view. And all of this is starting to affect how we
see our government. While government and government officials are
generally no strangers to discontent among the citizenry, current
polls indicate a seriously low “favorability” toward our congress
and our congresspeople. One poll rates North Korea above the US
Congress. How does such sentiment affect a future possibility when
our congress has to pass legislation that calls for sacrifice? This
can be potentially a serious situation and Congress needs to be
highly sensitive to the effect low favor-ables have on its ability to
function under challenging crises.
Now
I might be making more of this than what is merited. The history of
bad-mouthing our congress is long and robust. But that does not mean
it should be an issue that our legislators should ignore. We all
know about Jimmy Stewart in Mr. Smith Goes to Washington
conducting a talking filibuster in the Senate. Many have called for
the re-institution of the talking filibuster. Sen. Rand Paul the
other day conducted one to showcase his opposition to the
confirmation of John Brennan as CIA director. There he stood for
hours until nature forced him to cease his symbolic gesture. Perhaps
that re-institution as a necessary form of filibustering – as
opposed to an opted form – will be the proper balance between
banning the filibuster and leaving things as they are. My point here
is not to go over all the ins and outs concerning the filibuster, but
to explain that one of the supportive arguments of the filibuster –
one mostly ignored – is that there is a sense that structural
elements that are in place to slow the policy making process are
elements to further the process's deliberative quality and to strive
to as much consensus as is possible. Hence, any options that are to
be considered in changing that process should be sensitive to, one,
keeping a meaningful level of deliberation and, two, encouraging
consensus. Both of these aims would be furthered by deliberative
processes that are not undue obstacles and by language that doesn't
aim at obscuring what is being sought, but is clear and aboveboard.
