Readers of this blog are aware that it is reporting on a book
from the late 1960s, Political Order in
Changing Societies (POCS).[1] That book was written by a respected
political scientist, the late Samuel P. Huntington. He became somewhat well-known among the
general reading public with his book, The
Clash of Civilizations, 1996 – it engendered a bit of controversy. The earlier book did not, but it made the
case for the importance of political institutions; something many today have seemed
to have forgotten.
In POCS,
Huntington offered a major argument:
when a lesser developed country (LDC) experiences relatively high
modernization (development), but at the same time has a relatively slow
development of political institutions, it will suffer from political
instability. Enough instability and the
political system of that polity will fail and, if that happens, it cannot
provide the services any country depends on to maintain order and to shepherd
economic activities.
These
possibilities can be very serious, particularly if the country already is
dealing with those challenges associated with getting an economy growing and
becoming viable within the expectations of the twenty-first century – after
all, it is within that economic environment that those nations must compete.
The last two
postings reviewed the general aspects of Huntington’s argument. They reviewed the role social mobilization,
social forces, economic development, political norms, and political stability
plays in the drama these countries face.
This posting reviews briefly the role certain types of political
institutions play in maintaining – or perhaps help establishing – political
stability. Those institutions are the
military, reforms, and political parties.
But first, a definition of political institutions is offered.
That is: organizations and
procedures which routinize political behavior into accepted forms. This posting will only briefly review Huntington’s analysis of these institutions because
the overall concern here is to demonstrate parallels between LDCs and advanced
countries in terms of how they both rely on institutions, but the demands are
different and, therefore, the affected institutions will reflect different attributes
even if there exists a parallel.
The
US, for example, and its current concerns over institutions has a different set
of factors. To meet those concerns, a
different set of institutions are called upon to meet the concerns; they become
crucial, such as the media. But in
looking at the relevant institutions LDCs utilize to meet instability, one
might extract useful insights.
The
first of the institutions Huntington highlights is the military. The military changes its function as an LDC
moves along a development path.
Initially, it serves a guardian role – above politics – but eventually
will probably be dragged into countering the rising influence of an urban,
middle-class becoming too powerful.
While an increase in power among these groups is inevitable with
economic development, things can get too lopsided at the expense of the peasant
population. This, at minimum, will
undermine the democratic quality of the polity.
In
this eventuality, there is a parallel with advanced countries. As those advanced countries in the past
number of decades have become more involved and dependent on global markets,
the urban elite has benefitted mightily.
And what has been the reaction in one advanced nation after
another? In many of those countries, the
rise of nationalism has resulted, mainly based on support from agricultural
areas or in areas where manufacturing jobs have been lost to cheap labor countries
(some being LDCs).
In
turn, that has caused virulent instability within these advanced countries’
internal, political environments. The
instabilities are currently threatening international agreements and
associations. Probably Great Britain
dropping out of the European Union (Brexit) is the most noted, but in the US
the rise of Donald Trump, a self-identified nationalist, can also be so
regarded.
And
that leads to the next institution, reforms or the accepted processes by which
to institute reforms. The reforms set out
to accomplish a straightforward goal: to
tamp down the inordinate advantages some groups might have over other
groups. While such a concern does not
present an existential challenge to an advanced nation – as might be the case
for an LDC – serious disruption can result if this institution, reforms, does
not function and function sufficiently effective.
Those
in charge of designing, fighting for, and implementing reforms have a tall order
to accomplish. To be successful, those so
charged have a difficult task. Be it in
LDCs or advanced countries, they need skill because reforms interfere with
immediate rewards by those who are advantaged by the existing conditions. In turn, those negatively affected by reforms
might enjoy high levels of power that reforms, beyond causing immediate pain,
might upset their power bases.
The
last of the “Huntington” institutions, political parties, refers to what a
previous posting described. That is the
funneling function; national politics funnels diverse desires, aims, goals,
interests, and the like into a set of public policies. In that process, those involved whittle away
those ambitions that simply do not have enough support, mostly by powerful
players.
An
array of actions is involved:
compromise, power plays, deceit, promises, deferred ambitions,
glad-handing, trades, on and on.
Political parties are those arrangements where these actions take place
at a national level. By the time parties
are involved, a lot politicking has gone on at more local levels. Parties are just about the last political
“locale” – before the actual governmental arena – where these actions occur.
But
a populist chief executive, where popularity is essential to garner votes, can
undermine the role parties should play.
What is that? Yes, parties are
about advancing self-interests – rare is the politician (party member) who
endangers his/her chances at reelection – but through negotiations, parties can
act to balance social forces.
That
is the case if no one in the mix has inordinate basis of power. But if the chief executive can bring to bear
opposing politicians in his/her respective party’s nomination process – in the
US that would be primaries. This can nullify
usual party-level negotiations and compromising. The chief’s opponents, in the US, can be “primaried.” Other systems have comparable possibilities.
A
popular head of a party that has gained the chief executive position – a
president, a prime minister – can pull off such a strong-arm position. If that chief caters, usually with the use of
rhetoric only – such policy positions that are interpreted as addressing
disadvantaged segments of the population – the above scenario is possible and
history has offered sufficient examples.
Huntington
favors two-party systems. Apparently,
given the overall funneling process, two parties serve the right amount of
funneling at the national level. Single
parties, without having sufficient competition, can become too oppressive and
indifferent to popular concerns. Sometimes
they are ideological and their ideology serves to rationalize dictatorial power-positioning. Multi-party systems undermine the need for
majority support in issuing policy or they over-compromise in their
negotiations and thereby undermine their effectiveness.
With
that, this blog ends this review of Huntington’s book. Overall, this writer feels the late political
scientist offered ideas and concerns citizens of advanced countries should
consider not only in dealing with LCDs, but to take note of how healthy their
respective polities are doing – disruptions, instabilities, and other norm
shattering events can have serious consequences. The need for strong political institutions
does not go away as countries become “advanced.” And civics students, this writer believes,
can understand the outlines of these concerns.
[1] Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968).
