There are times when our
government gets close and personal with us. I cannot think of any
time when this is more true than when our government drafts us into
military service or when the government, either at the federal or
state level, charges us with a crime. Now-a-days we have put the
draft into hiatus and most of us are never charged with a crime. I
remember when as a young man, I was in a car accident and was charged
with causing it. I was directed to go to court and I remember the
document stating the State of Florida vs. Robert Gutierrez. The
actual charge was driving too fast for the conditions. I remember my
emotional discomfort when I saw in black and white that I was pitted
against the State of Florida. I think that hurt more than the $25
fine – and that was despite the fact I was a poor college student
at the time and was facing expensive costs caused by the damage. As
bad as it is to be charged, how much worse is it when a person can't
afford legal representation? This wasn't an issue in my case, but
for serious accusations it is an issue of significant consequence.
It is our constitutional right to have representation by a licensed
lawyer. So, as the familiar refrain states, if you can't afford one,
one will be appointed for you.
Who assigns an indigent defendant
a lawyer? A judge does. Problem solved? Not really. Take the case
of George Stinney from the 1940s (a story much in the news these
days); he was a fourteen year old boy who was charged, tried, and
executed for the murder of two white girls – Stinney was an African
American youngster. His incarceration lasted 81 days, there was no
physical evidence of his guilt, the trial lasted two hours, and there
was no appeal filed by his court-appointed lawyer. The only
“evidence” there was was the fact that Stinney was seen with the
two girls on the day of the murders and that he had “confessed.”
There was no written account or a recording of the confession. There
was only the testimony of the police officers stating the young boy
confessed to the crimes. While this is an extreme case from a highly
segregated South, it is not unique. How unjust the criminal
procedure can be has been amply portrayed in our popular media. We
hear of a sufficient number of convictions that have been overturned
by DNA testing. My understanding is that nationally there are over
4,000 such cases to date. How many of those were cases initially
defended by court-appointed lawyers, I don't know. But the point
here is that the system is flawed enough and that we need to address
this area of concern. If we are serious about our claims of honoring
equality – we have stamps on which the word is boldly printed –
then we need to do what we can to minimize the chances of an
injustice occurring within our legal system. We need to keep very
clear in our minds what an injustice of this type means to those
victimized. It means, in terms of a faulty verdict, that a person is
condemned for a crime he or she did not commit and that that means a
person is doomed to years of imprisonment or even an undeserved
execution – a horrible consequence to consider. Yet we seem to
tolerate an unacceptable level of probability that such a result
happens and happens all too often. So if something – some change
in policy – can minimize this probability, we are constitutionally
obliged to pursue it.
Under this light, I found that
there is an experiment being conducted in Texas that deserves
mention. There, in Comal County, it has been determined that
court-appointed lawyers are a source of serious systemic injustices.
“The fundamental problem is that
[court-appointed] lawyers in this country are oftentimes beholden to
judges for appointments,” said Norman Lefstein [a Texas official] …
“The allegiance of the lawyer is not principally to client, where
it ought to be.”
The other problem is that clients
have no meaningful control over this important professional
relationship. It is hard to trust a lawyer you have not chosen and
generally cannot fire.1
These Texas officials addressed
these concerns by developing a conservative approach to the problem.
That is, they have begun issuing vouchers to defendants so that they
can purchase legal representation of their own choosing. The idea
for this policy originally was presented in a law-reviewed article.
The authors of this article are Stephen Schulhofer and David
Friedman. I believe that the proposal appealed to conservative
policy makers because of its reliance on a market solution. It has
been criticized by respectable experts – for example, Judge Richard
A. Posner, a federal appeal judge, fears that defendants could
paralyze a local legal system if they all begin to demand the same
lawyer or a select few number of lawyers. I personally don't see
this as a possibility since a lawyer can beg off a case if he or she
is overloaded with existing clients. A Comal official claims that
implementation of the policy can be regulated in such ways that the
main concerns can be addressed. One official stated that this will
not be a purely free market. It will be monitored and regulated. It
is believed by the officials who are implementing the policy that
there will be practical limitations so that the system will continue
to function under reasonable conditions.
I will not claim I know enough to
pass judgment on this option, but I believe that consideration for it
is justified. My main message here is that this is an ideal
“federalist” issue and has the makings of a powerful civics
lesson. It focuses on a condition that, as it is now experienced
around the country, puts in question any claim that our justice
system is run by the principle of equality. In addition, here is a
proposed policy option that, at least in terms of its stated
rationale, is meant to level the legal playing field. If it works,
it will put substance into the promise of the fifty year old Supreme
Court decision, Gideon v. Wainwright, which ruled that every
poor defendant is entitled to legal representation. Whether giving
these defendants the ability to choose their attorneys will rectify
the systemic problems such defendants face, only time will tell.
In any event, for civics
instructors this issue is a promising one, one that directly relates
to our national goal of instituting meaningful equality, one that is
suitable to analyzing actual and proposed solutions, and one that
reflects real, active concerns with ample local examples. It has the
promise of engaging students on a meaningful national problem.
1Liptak,
A. (2013). Need-blind justice. The New York Times,
January 5, Sunday Review section, p. 4. The facts related in this
posting regarding this Texas experiment are contained in this
source.