A Crucial Element of Democracy

This is a blog by Robert Gutierrez ...
While often taken for granted, civics education plays a crucial role in a democracy like ours. This Blog is dedicated to enticing its readers into taking an active role in the formulation of the civics curriculum found in their local schools. In order to do this, the Blog is offering a newer way to look at civics education, a newer construct - liberated federalism or federation theory. Daniel Elazar defines federalism as "the mode of political organization that unites separate polities within an overarching political system by distributing power among general and constituent governments in a manner designed to protect the existence and authority of both." It depends on its citizens acting in certain ways which Elazar calls federalism's processes. Federation theory, as applied to civics curriculum, has a set of aims. They are:
*Teach a view of government as a supra federated institution of society in which collective interests of the commonwealth are protected and advanced.
*Teach the philosophical basis of government's role as guardian of the grand partnership of citizens at both levels of individuals and associations of political and social intercourse.
*Convey the need of government to engender levels of support promoting a general sense of obligation and duty toward agreed upon goals and processes aimed at advancing the common betterment.
*Establish and justify a political morality which includes a process to assess whether that morality meets the needs of changing times while holding true to federalist values.
*Emphasize the integrity of the individual both in terms of liberty and equity in which each citizen is a member of a compacted arrangement and whose role is legally, politically, and socially congruent with the spirit of the Bill of Rights.
*Find a balance between a respect for national expertise and an encouragement of local, unsophisticated participation in policy decision-making and implementation.
Your input, as to the content of this Blog, is encouraged through this Blog directly or the Blog's email address: gravitascivics@gmail.com .
NOTE: This blog has led to the publication of a book. The title of that book is TOWARD A FEDERATED NATION: IMPLEMENTING NATIONAL CIVICS STANDARDS and it is available through Amazon in both ebook and paperback versions.

Friday, September 4, 2020

THE LACK OF DEMOCRACY CHALLENGE, PART I

 

The last posting points out that voting statistics reflect how the electorate has been polarized for some time.  For example, it cited that in 1992, 63% of all registered white voters did not have college degrees, and that that percentage fell to 45% by the time of the 2016 election.  So, while the overall percentage of male vs. female voters voting for one party or the other stayed the same over the years (at least since the 1980s), the more substantial factors affecting why those voters vote as they do have changed.

And those changes have fed the polarization that is characterizing the current national political landscape.  Have the political parties been unaffected bystanders to these shifts?  Hardly.  And here a very important structural attribute of the system comes into play.  While the US claims to be a democracy, its lack of democracy has become a contributing factor to the advantage that one side of the grand divide enjoys and consequently adds to the underlying animosities.

An expert on American political processes, particularly voting, Jonathan Rodden, a Stanford political scientist, reports on the unique or nearly unique characterizations of the American system.[1]  He points out that in most democracies one wins office by garnering the most votes.  Even in America, social clubs, corporation elections for board members, union hall elections, collegiate Greek house elections, and so on, the party or person who receives the most votes, wins.  But not so for offices of the American government, at least in terms of the political parties involved and, in the case of the presidency, the person seeking the office.

Of course, the last presidential election demonstrated the case in the election of Trump.  Hillary Clinton did receive a majority of the popular vote, but the Electoral College decided otherwise.  Yes, in the individual other elections, the candidate with the most votes, wins, but if one reviews the results over geographic areas, one sees the group seeking one approach to policy being stymied systematically even though it has received more votes in those areas. 

And this is the case both at the national level and at the state level as well.  It seems to reflect an inherent problem with America’s version of its federal structure.  There, in case after case, the party receiving the fewer number of votes win time after time, at least in terms of the candidates of one party as opposed to the other.  

For example, Democrats in the various House of Representatives’ elections in 2012 received 1.4 million more votes nationwide than their opponents, the Republicans.  Yet, Democrats were awarded only 45% of the seats of that body.  This happens repeatedly.  It happened all the way back to ’02.  As a matter of fact, the Dems, to win control of the House in 1996, had to receive an overwhelming electoral victory as in 2006 and 2018 – so overwhelmingly, these elections are called “wave elections.”

How about at the state level?  It turns out that the undemocratic quality seems more pronounced at that level, particularly when one considers state legislatures.  One state often cited in this regard is Michigan.  Usually, the Democratic Party wins the overall vote.  In 2012, for example, its candidates convinced 54% of the electorate to vote for them in the elections for both houses of that legislature.  That equated to winning only 46% of the seats in the lower house and 42% in the upper house.

Similarly, the states of Virginia, Minnesota, Missouri, Ohio, Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania are cited by Rodden as other examples of this undemocratic result.  Of particular note is the Pennsylvania Senate.  Republicans there have held control for forty straight years even though they have lost the popular vote in about half the elections in those years.  Almost as noteworthy is the case of the Ohio Senate.

But back to the federal level:  In terms of the US Senate, since 1990, the Democratic Party outperformed the Republican Party in receiving votes in eleven of the fifteen races but held the majority only six times.  And here one falls upon one of the most undemocratic structural attributes of the national constitutional arrangement, i.e., the equal representation provision in the US Senate – each state, no matter how populated it is, has equal representation with two seats.

Now consider that.  While this provision guarantees that the big states can’t run roughshod over the smaller states and forces policy considerations to include the lesser populated areas of the country, it often prohibits that same government from addressing the more populated, usually more urban, areas of the country.  Stated another way, California with nearly 40 million people has the same voice as Wyoming with fewer than 600,000 people in 2020. 

Given, as mentioned earlier in this blog, how the urban-rural divide contributes to polarization, one can see how this underrepresentation of urban areas (a demographic feature of the more populated states) adds to the divisions since meeting the needs of the urban, more populated areas tends to be ignored by the national government.

While at the same time, the US House of Representatives’ districts and the districts determining representation in both the lower and upper house districts of state legislatures are drawn to have more or less equal populations, one wonders why Democrats can’t do better in securing their majority votes in those chambers.  Not only do they receive more votes, the party has more registered voters and that is substantiated by polls indicating the numbers of those claiming affiliation with that party. 

Yes, it does claim victories in state elections where the pure majority wins – such as in gubernatorial elections – but still cannot secure legislative seats comparable with its number of votes in those elections.  Why?  A simple and telling answer is gerrymandering.  That is the drawing of district borders to advantage one party over the other and those drawings occur every ten years, based on the preceding census count (which, in turn, happens in years ending in zero, e.g., 2020).

The strategy by which favorable election occur consists of those drawing the lines, that being the party controlling the various state legislatures, bunching up as many opposing registered voters into as few districts as possible.  And this usually assists Republicans by the fact that a high proportion of Democrats live in cities and are therefore already bunched up geographically.  But even with that assistance, gerrymandered districts turn out to have bizarre shapes to be able to accomplish the aims of this strategy.

This practice has been around so long, the name was a journalistic creation based on the name of James Madison’s vice president, Eldridge Gerry, that it has more or less become a science.  There is even special software to facilitate the process.  That process calls on sophisticated map drawings and manipulations and of the two parties, the Republicans enjoy far more experience in the practice. 

As a matter of fact, the effects of these undemocratic features have had profound effects and this blog will continue this overview in the next posting.  For most civics teachers, this posting does not instruct them about anything new, but it is offered as way of reviewing contextual information for what will follow as this blog aims to share more of Rodden’s findings.



[1] Jonathan Rodden, Why Cities Lose:  The Deep Roots of the Urban-Rural Political Divide (New York, NY:  Basic Books, 2019).

Tuesday, September 1, 2020

SOME DEMOGRAPHICS IN ELECTION YEARS

 

As the nation approaches the election, it is a good time to review the makeup of the electorate.  In the time leading up to the last presidential election, The Pew Research Center published information that indicated how the electorate was changing from the 1990s.[1]  The assumption here is that those changes between 1992 and 2016 have indicated certain patterns and the patterns are still in place.  If so, the 2016 information provides contextual background for the polarization this blog is currently addressing and will affect the upcoming national elections.

          For example, one telling figure informs one of how the non-Hispanic whites’ share of registered voters dropped from 84% in 1992 to 70% in 2016.  The Hispanic share just about doubled, but was still a single percentage figure, 9% (up from 5% in ’92).  During that time, the black percent increased from 10% to 12% and the mixed-race percent went up from 1% to 5%.  Altogether, non-white percent has shot up from 16% to 26% during those twenty-four years. Today, an estimate has it that the white population share is at 60.7% and there is a projection that that percent will fall below 50% by 2045.

          These kinds of shifts and projected changes have and will have political repercussions.  This blog, in its review of the growing polarization issue, has pointed out some of these.  In short, political analysis needs to recognize the makeup of both major parties and how it is changing.  Overall, the changes are more heavily pronounced on the Democratic biased side.[2]

That side in 1992 was 76% white, 17% black, and only 6% Hispanic.  In 2016, the percentages were 57% white, 21% black, 12% Hispanic, 3% Asian, and 5% “other.”  These numbers further support the descriptive generalization this blog has made – the Democratic Party is, relative to the Republicans, the diverse party.  Compare these numbers with the Republican/Republican leaning makeup:  in 1992, 93% white, 3% Hispanic, 2% black; and in 2016, 86% white, 6% Hispanic, and 2% black.

          Another shift of note in the electorate has to do with age.  Due to an aging Baby Boomer generation and the increased longevity among them, the median age of registered voters increased from 46 to 50 between ’92 and ’16.[3]   Adding to this shift is the added effect of the decreased birth rates in the subsequent generations since the Baby Boomer generation’s procreating years. 

Of special note is that the Republican/Republican leaning voters were relatively younger than the Democratic side back in ’92 but in ’16 they were a good deal older.  According to the Pew Center report, the GOP side was, in ’92, 61% under 50 (38% were 50 and older), but in ’16, 41% under 50 (58% were 50 and over).  For the Democratic/Democratic leaning side:  in 1992, 57% were under 50; and in 2016, only 42% were 50 and over.

How about in education?  In a time when Americans have generally become better educated (in 1992, 50% of voters did not have any college exposure, in 2016 that figure dropped to 33%), the percentage of four-year college degreed Americans increased from 23% in ’92 to 33% in ’16.  Added to that shift has been the relative proportion of how educated each side of the political divide has become. 

Republicans were the better educated electorate in 1992, but that changed significantly by 2016.  The numbers are:  28% of Republican voters had college degrees in ’92 compared to 31% in ’16 (with some college exposure, the percentage increase was 28% to 35%); 21% of Democratic voters had degrees in ’92 compared to 37% in ’16.  Or stated another way, the portion of Democratic voters that had no college experience dropped significantly from 55% in 1992 to 32% in 2016.

What has been the change among non-whites in terms of college education?  The change between ’92 and ’16 for this demographic can be viewed from different perspectives.  As indicated above, non-whites account for a larger portion of the voting population.  There are two categories of note:  non-whites with college degrees and non-whites without degrees.  Non-whites with college degrees went up (3% to 8%) and the category non-whites without degrees also went up (13% to 21%).

Further context:  in 1992, 63% of registered voters were non college degree holding whites.  That percentage fell to 45% in 2016.  But in terms of the share of all voters who were white and had gotten degrees that only edged up four percentage points (21% to 25%) between those two years.

Another demographic category experiencing a shift is religious membership.  Here, those who do not identify with any religion have increased in their percent from 8% in 1992 to 21% in 2016.  And that increase is found more often on the Democratic side.  That, in effect, widens the gap in terms of religion.  That side, the Democratic side, was noted for having 29% classifying themselves as atheist, agnostic, or non-affiliated in 2016.  It was only 10% in 1992.

As for Democrats or Democratic leaning respondents, in 2016, 11% were white mainline Protestants, 10% white Catholics, and 8% white evangelicals.  Together, these three groups had fewer percentages in 2016 than in 1992.  In terms of black Protestants, they constitute 15% of all Democratic voters.  Hispanic Catholic make up 6%.  These last two groups have not changed in terms of percentages since 1992.

On the Republican side, change has been very small.  To no surprise, they are more likely to be affiliated with a religion, and that likelihood is increasing.  There, 2016, the numbers were:  35% of Republican voters were white evangelical Protestants, 18% were white Catholics, 17% were white mainline Protestants, and 12% were religiously unaffiliated.  This last rate rose six points in the years between 1992 and 2016.

The Pew report states, “There has been little change in the share of all GOP voters who are white evangelical Protestants or white Catholics over the past two decades, but the share who are white mainline Protestants has declined 12 points.”[4]  This last bit of information further heightens what this blog is reporting, i.e., demographic factors seem to be feeding the polarization forces one finds among the electorate.

Surely, after the upcoming election has taken place and groups such as the Pew Center do their analyses of the results or any surveying they do, one can see if the assumption cited earlier bear out, i.e., that the trends the 2016 analysis discovered have continued if not increased in the subsequent years. 

If a civics teacher chooses to address these or similar numbers, students can probably add to any ensuing discussion by relating anecdotal information as to whether their home or neighborhood life resembles or stands in counter distinction to the trends the above statistics point out.



[1] “1.  The Changing Composition of the Political Parties,”  The Pew Research Center (September 13, 2016), accessed August 31, 2020, https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2016/09/13/1-the-changing-composition-of-the-political-parties/ .

[2] By Democratic biased side, the reference is to those voters who either vote Democratic or tend to vote Democratic.

[3] Readers should note these percentages refer to registered voters and not the population, as a whole.  According to one site, the current median age is 38.3.  See “United States Population,” Worldometer (n.d.) accessed August 31, 2020, https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/us-population/#:~:text=The%20median%20age%20in%20the%20United%20States%20is%2038.3%20years.

[4] Ibid.