An advocate of natural rights continues his/her presentation[1] …
In summarizing the political systems model, this blog left readers in
the last posting with the notion that that model avoids prescriptive language. In addition, it does not purport to recreate
all the components of government.
Instead, it is a model, an abstraction of the entire governmental
entity. But in terms of the needs of a
citizenry – the governments’ consumers – the model is delineating enough to cover
the “waterfront” while ignoring any prescriptive concerns.
That is, in utilizing
this model, students of governance and politics are not exposed to any
messaging that promotes the type of citizen they should be. Its use directs its explanatory efforts
without guiding them to what constitutes idealized citizens. It respects the users’ rights to determine
their own roles a priori as to what any aims or goals they might aspire.
Therefore, the power of
the construct is not teleological in any sense other that defending personal
rights. Instead, its strength lies in
providing a practical approach which is available for the use of the potential
political participants, if participation is the option they choose. Under that perspective, the systems construct
provides powerful insights as to the parameters and processes accessible and
functional to participants.
In terms of precision, Eugene
Meehan’s next question of viability, vis-a-vis social science models,[2]
the construct does not guarantee to potential users that it will be as precise
as they need it to be. Application of
the construct needs to be experienced by active participants. And with practice, it will most likely
perfect – i.e., extend its functionality – in its use. This, though, is beyond the scope of
secondary education, though discussion of its use by secondary students can
address this practical concern.
Perhaps case studies can
be read and analyzed in classroom work, but the lack of maturity, reference,
responsibility, and genuine interests on the part of students would most likely
limit the usefulness of such attempts.[3] As an adult, actively engaging in political
conflicts, familiarity with systems descriptions will probably give people, including
those secondary students, an advantage that others without such knowledge would
not have. That is, the objective and inherent
“clinical” perspective can and does offer citizens a no-nonsense view of
governance and politics.
Does this construct have
the same control over the set of situations it is explaining? In the sense of generic explanations, it
does. This is, as stated in the previous
posting, an approach which allows students of politics to formulate a more
specific theory for a government, an agency, or the political situation with
which that citizen has a concern. In
that sense, the construct has reliability.
Also, the components of the model are used in a similar manner no matter
the level of government or agency under consideration.
This construct does provide
a one-to-one correspondence with those factors which consumer-citizens can
avail themselves of in that it gives users a more in-depth appreciation of the
complexities involved in political frays.
For example, when citizens forward demands, they might be assisted by an
appreciation of how those demands affect various functions.
That is, the applications of the construct to particular
governmental entities or sub-entities that deal with specific issues, will
elicit the viable structures, processes, and functions in related political
situations. As such, they encourage
citizens to look beyond the immediate factors or conditions that their desires
or activities might affect or by which they might be affected, to broader
political landscapes.
For classroom use, once
the more prevalent structures, processes, and functions of overall political
systems are identified by curricular developers, instructors of secondary
students should present and explain them in their classroom presentations. They can further contextualize these
components by highlighting how they operate in actual political challenges.
Through the instructional strategies of the
essentialist school of thought, the students in turn should learn them as working
components to their knowledge base. In
this way, their knowledge will enjoy an isomorphic reflection of the most
viable factors – structures and processes – in the political arena.
Not only does the political
systems construct have the structural-functional model as a spin-off, but there
have been, as listed in the last posting (and will not be repeated here), several
other theoretical models that owe their origins to this more general
model. Compatibility with other models
is strongly established by the historical role that political systems played in
the 1950s and 1960s in encouraging the establishment of these different models
of analysis in political science.
It still holds a central
position among those political scientists who argue for the discipline to be,
but for a qualifier, a more scientific/positivist field of study; that qualifier
being that systemic studies should concern themselves with social issues that
have broad, current concerns in a society.
This spirit is captured in the following,
Discussions
on political economy [a sub area of concern] sought to adapt “grand theories”
to specific local circumstances and linked economic transformation to mental,
social, and political change, thus making “backwardness” more than just a sum
total of economic facts.[4]
Or stated in line with the concern here, be it political economy or any
other political topic, systems is currently normative enough to address those
issues over which citizens invest emotional energy.
Also, of concern in
regard to classroom use, is whether this construct is compatible with varying
ideologies of the political spectrum. Does
it accommodate or allow citizens/students from the broad array of political
biases to benefit from its use? To
answer that question, one is encouraged to find sufficient commonality among
those with varying ideological positions.
According to Michael Sandel, Immanuel Kant’s philosophic reasoning
offers such a common stand.
If the arguments derived from Kant’s
philosophical position augments justice, and sanctifies, as a primary value, individual
rights – the focus of political systems research – one has a common point upon
which to base a theoretical foundation.
Sandel writes,
From a
practical political point of view, the positions of Rawls and Nozick are
clearly opposed. Rawls, the
welfare-state liberal, and Nozick, the libertarian conservative, define between
them the clearest alternatives the American political agenda has to offer, at
least where issues of distributive justice are concerned. And yet, from a philosophical point of view,
they have much in common. Both offer
instead [of utilitarianism] a rights-based ethic said to secure the liberty of
individuals more completely. Although
Nozick’s account of rights owes much to [John] Locke, both appeal to Kant’s
precept to treat every person as an end and not merely as a means, and seek
principles of justice that embody it.
Both deny that there exists any social entity above or beyond the
individuals who comprise it.[5]
Therefore, the political systems model that emphasizes the behavior of
individuals in its analysis is highly compatible with the current range of
popular ideological positions. It can
also be judged as neutral in the ongoing political battles the adherents of
those ideologies conduct with their opponents.
And here is a good place
to break. The next posting will introduce
the methodologies this construct favors or upon which it relies in guiding
political studies – not necessarily guiding classroom instructional strategies. As for Meehan’s concerns, an advocate of
behavioral/positivist studies – those based on political systems model or one
of its “off-springs” – argues that this construct holds up well.
[1] This presentation continues
with this posting. The reader is informed that the claims made in
this posting do not necessarily reflect the beliefs or knowledge of this
blogger. Instead, the posting is a representation of what an
advocate of the natural rights view might present. This
is done to present a dialectic position of that construct. This series of postings begins with “Judging
Natural Rights View, I,” August 2, 2022.
[2] Eugene Meehan in the mid-twentieth century. He provides the following list of criteria by
which one can evaluate or ask questions of any theory, but given its thrust,
they seem most applicable to scientifically derived theories. The list is: Comprehension, Power, Precision, Consistency
or Reliability, Isomorphism, Compatibility, Predictability, Control. See Eugene
J. Meehan, Contemporary Political Thought:
A Critical Study (Homewood, IL:
Dorsey Press, 1967).
[3] This area of concern is not limited to the US. See Gema M. Garcia-Albacete, “Promoting
Political Interest in School: The Role
of Civic Education, Research Gate (October 2013), accessed September 7,
2022, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/257924763_Promoting_political_interest_in_school_The_role_of_civic_education.
As
for the US, this concern has been an item of concern for many years. For example, see John J. Patrick and John D.
Hoge, “Teaching Government, Civics, and Law,” in Handbook of Research on
Social Studies Teaching and Learning, edited by John P. Shaver (New York,
NY: New York, NY: MacMillan Publishing Company, 1991), 427-436.
[4] Balazs Trencsenyi, Maciej Janowski, Monika Baar,
Maria Falina, Michal Kopecek, “The Political Implications of Positivism,” in Modern
Political Thought in East Europe: Volume
I: Negotiating Modernity in the “Long
Nineteenth Century (February 2016), accessed September 7, 2022, https://academic.oup.com/book/7012/chapter-abstract/151355070?redirectedFrom=fulltext. Again, a more
historical perspective – that is from some years ago – see John G. Gunnell,
“Political Theory and Political Science,” in The Blackwell Encyclopaedia of
Political Thought, edited by David Miller, Janet Coleman, William Connolly,
and Alan Ryan (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell
Publishers, 1987), 386-390.
[5] Michael J. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of
Justice (New York, NY: Cambridge
University Press, 1992), 66-67.
