A Crucial Element of Democracy

This is a blog by Robert Gutierrez ...
While often taken for granted, civics education plays a crucial role in a democracy like ours. This Blog is dedicated to enticing its readers into taking an active role in the formulation of the civics curriculum found in their local schools. In order to do this, the Blog is offering a newer way to look at civics education, a newer construct - liberated federalism or federation theory. Daniel Elazar defines federalism as "the mode of political organization that unites separate polities within an overarching political system by distributing power among general and constituent governments in a manner designed to protect the existence and authority of both." It depends on its citizens acting in certain ways which Elazar calls federalism's processes. Federation theory, as applied to civics curriculum, has a set of aims. They are:
*Teach a view of government as a supra federated institution of society in which collective interests of the commonwealth are protected and advanced.
*Teach the philosophical basis of government's role as guardian of the grand partnership of citizens at both levels of individuals and associations of political and social intercourse.
*Convey the need of government to engender levels of support promoting a general sense of obligation and duty toward agreed upon goals and processes aimed at advancing the common betterment.
*Establish and justify a political morality which includes a process to assess whether that morality meets the needs of changing times while holding true to federalist values.
*Emphasize the integrity of the individual both in terms of liberty and equity in which each citizen is a member of a compacted arrangement and whose role is legally, politically, and socially congruent with the spirit of the Bill of Rights.
*Find a balance between a respect for national expertise and an encouragement of local, unsophisticated participation in policy decision-making and implementation.
Your input, as to the content of this Blog, is encouraged through this Blog directly or the Blog's email address: gravitascivics@gmail.com .
NOTE: This blog has led to the publication of a book. The title of that book is TOWARD A FEDERATED NATION: IMPLEMENTING NATIONAL CIVICS STANDARDS and it is available through Amazon in both ebook and paperback versions.

Friday, April 1, 2016

I CAN’T DO WHAT?

There was a time when smoking was still tolerated in congested areas, but the concerns over it began to cause policies among private businesses and public spaces to change.  Most enclosed areas, public and private, are smoke free zones today.  But before this became the norm, you could find smokers, puffing away, in any sort of business.  One private business was the airlines.  In the transitory period between no restrictions and total restrictions, airlines had designated rows on their planes allowing passengers to smoke and rows where they were not allowed to smoke.  Richard C. Spinoli[1] uses this example to illustrate a second incidence in which some accuse natural rights defined rights (what he calls liberal rights) creating selfish scenarios which are harmful to the community.  As with the “rights illusion,” of which I wrote about in the last posting, this purported possibility is cited as causing or enabling less than admirable social conditions.  Let me illustrate.

The scenario goes like this:  suppose a person books a seat on a flight that is one seat short of being filled.  He buys the ticket and boards the plane to find that all the smoke free seats are taken.  Since he has the “right” to a smoke-free seat, he demands it.  The only option for the airline is to order another plane in which our passenger will be the only one flying along with a crew.  That is, since the person has a right to x, a non-smoking seat, he demands x.  If the right did not “exist,” then the person would have sat there inhaling the unwanted smoke.  I agree that the example is ludicrous.  Worse comes to worst, the airline would buy the seat back, perhaps at a premium to the passenger.  But I am sure not even that solution would be necessary.  Spinoli reviews other alternatives, such as seeing if another passenger from the smoke free seats would be willing to change seats with our disgruntled passenger.  Such options are short-circuited due to our passenger insisting his rights be respected and, therefore, he demands a non-smoking seat be assigned, as opposed to exchanged, to him.  Since the airlines have so many options that would avoid such a scenario, I can’t take this example seriously.  For one, the ticketing agent ascertains whether the perspective passenger is a smoking passenger or not and indicates how many seats in each category are available.  Of course, eventually the airlines instituted a no smoking policy for all seats – problem solved.  But this general tendency still remains – or at least in the argument presented by Spinoli – since a person has a right, he/she will insist on it even if by doing so, others are negatively affected.

Of course, any such right can’t interfere with others’ ability to pursue their rights.  In those cases, the right does not exist.  The old adage goes:  your right to swing your arm ends where my nose begins.  An obvious example would be that you don’t have the right to steal someone’s property; to do so would interfere with that person’s right to own and enjoy his property.  But one can imagine legitimate cases when a right of one person, when exercised in a given situation, could make the quality of someone else’s condition less agreeable.  Does the natural rights view of rights and community encourage such situations?  Here is another case.  You are at a movie theater and a few seats over, someone begins using his/her smart phone.  The light is distracting.  The person has a right to use it and decides to exercise that right.  You have a right to see the movie in a reasonable environment:  no unnecessary noises, a relatively dark theater, acceptable volume level emanating from the speakers,[2] and so on.  In some large metropolitan areas, apparently this business with cell phones is still an issue even though movie theaters by and large have policies prohibiting the use of them during the showing of the featured film.  Here I disagree with Spinoli, I believe that living in the era of natural rights, there is a higher incidence of such disregard for the reasonable accommodations of fellow citizens.  The natural rights perspective encourages a “I have a right, and by God, I’ll do it” whatever “it” is and damn the consequences.  I have seen an increased level of such incivility during my lifetime – if it gets bad enough, death might seem appealing.

Here’s another bone of contention:  whether or not states should have helmet laws for motorcycle riders.  Such laws are uncommon in our land of the free; i.e., a positive law, one that tells you to do something.  In this case, we have an important difference.  Those who are negatively affected by the lack of such a law – that is, those not directly injured in some accident – are all of us who end up paying higher medical costs due to the treatment of uninsured cyclists who don’t wear helmets or other negative consequences due to higher incidents of brain damage.  On the other hand, those deprived of the right to go helmet-less are consciously affected by any law that mandates their use.  Would all this be alleviated if there were a more communal disposition among the citizenry?  Once cognizant of what is at stake, more people would readily, if not gladly, relinquish the right to have the breeze going through their hair and accept that the common good is enhanced by such a law.  That kind of reaction, for the most part, has been the case with mandating the use of seat belts in cars; I don’t hear much complaining over that requirement.

I would point out, though, that since I can readily list a few positive laws, it reflects the notion that we don’t have too many of them.  Yes, we have to file our income tax forms – a source of discord among so many, even though income tax allows us to have a more progressive tax code than would otherwise be possible.  But for the most part, the government through its laws enacts negative laws – laws that tell us what we can’t do.  Our liberal strain can be thanked for that.  But it can also be held responsible for a lot of our limited sense of communal responsibilities and a good deal of our incivility.  Oh, by the way, please turn off your cell phones at the theater; I, for one, appreciate it.



[1] Sinopoli, R. C.  (1992).  The foundations of American citizenship:  Liberalism, the constitution, and civic virtue.  New York, NY:  Oxford University Press.

[2] Just had the opportunity to see the film, The Artist, on HBO.  Volume is not an issue since it is a silent movie, a delightful silent movie.

Tuesday, March 29, 2016

NOT ALWAYS A CASE OF MORALS

A while ago, I shared with you a portion of a TV show[1] in which a parent returns home at an unexpected time.  The parent walks in on his daughter who is engaged in a compromising activity with her boyfriend.  Of course, an argument ensues, mostly between the parent and the daughter – the boyfriend is allowed to escape – and that argument is conducted in the language of rights.  I believe Richard C. Sinopoli[2] would judge the incident as an example of a selfish disposition found in societies and causing deleterious effects.  He would also claim that such events are not exclusive to liberal societies, but for some reason, are highlighted in that many feel that liberalism causes or enables such behavior.  The general problem is characterized by people seeing a good deal of our conflicts as expressions – or a lack of expression – of morality because the conflict is misconceived as offending a “rights illusion.”  That illusion is:  “[b]ecause rights are such an essential aspect of a liberal political morality, they may be taken to represent the whole of morality.”[3]  Sinopoli gives another example.  That situation is of a “barbecuer” who barbecues close to his property line much to the distress of his neighbor.  The distress is not only the irritation caused by the smoke and smells suffusing over the neighbor’s property, but also that the smoke negatively affects the neighbor’s flowers.  Two points:  one, the “barbecuer” is not breaking any contractual arrangements or offending any of the rights of others and his behavior offers an example of what is acceptable, at least from a rights perspective; he is behaving in a perfectly allowable manner.  And, two, beyond that, he is offering an example of what “good” behavior is.  If he continues to distress his neighbor, that’s just too bad; he is acting within his prerogatives.

Obviously, I am being a bit facetious; even the most diehard libertarian would not deem such behavior as good.  But under the natural rights view, why would this person be immoral or, if not immoral, exhibiting behavior one would consider less than good?  Liberalism doesn’t give us a clue.  Let me point to another basis by which to judge what is going on with both the parent and the “barbecuer.” 

Once the discussion in a complex society shifts to rights, the mind takes on a contractual frame of reference.  I have written about contracts as those agreements in which two or more parties agree to some exchange:  I’ll do x, if you do y.  If you don’t do y, I do not need to do x.  I might do x anyway, assuming the contract does not prohibit me from doing it, but that would be at my discretion.  Other than the provisions of any contractual agreements I might be a party to, I am free to act as I choose.  I would point out that the vast majority of interactions one has with strangers falls under the provisions of law or contract.  Think about it; if you’re walking in a mall and see all the people around you, you are under the provisions of the contractual arrangement that governs the mall.  Now let’s see these interchanges from another perspective.  What if instead of a contract, the people involved are still under the provisions of an agreement, but the agreement is not a law or a contract, but a compact.  Here, agreement does not refer to specific events such as barbecuing or how sons and daughters will behave in the house or anywhere else.  Instead, the agreement establishes relationships that are governed by general principles such as respect, reciprocal tendencies, trust, and, in well-functioning relationships, some degree of affection.  And this relates to what I have referred to before:  how do you see – define – fellow citizens that are not family, friends, or others in which there exists no special relationships?  Sure, a parent has a special relationship with a daughter, but not with a neighbor.  What is best here?  In a society in which the natural rights perspective dominates, we tend to fall into the contractual mode of exchange.  In a federal perspective, we tend to fall into the compacted mode of exchange, an exchange mode in which the object is to seek a win-win outcome without a punitive response for non-compliance.  Compacted agreements can have punitive provisions, but these are usually for serious offenses against the compact.  What is sad to me about the prevalence of a rights view is how often even family conflicts – where there are special relationships – surge toward contractual language.

Let me confess to “sinning” along these lines.  The other day I wrote a check for a significant amount of money.  I was paying the fees to attend a series of social events to which I am looking forward.  I needed to send the payment to another city so I placed the check in an envelope and along with two other pieces of mail took the envelope to my mailbox.  Sometime later, the mail truck came by, stopped at our box, and left our mail.  I went out to get the mail and noticed our mailman didn’t pick up our outgoing mail.  This perturbed me, so I took our outgoing mail and walked up the block to meet the truck as it was coming down the other side of the street.  I, unfortunately, through my tone, expressed my displeasure even though the mailman apologized.  I turned and walked back to my house.  Guess what?  My payment got lost in the mail.  I don’t bring this up as an example of someone not meeting his/her contractual obligation; I’m not sure that is the case.  It could just have been a coincidence – mail gets lost, albeit seldom.  But, perhaps if I had taken a different approach, a more compacted approach, I would have avoided paying a $32 stop payment fee.  Just saying.



[1] Romano, R. (n. d.).  Men of the certain age.

[2] Sinopoli, R. C.  (1992).  The foundations of American citizenship:  Liberalism, the constitution, and civic virtue.  New York, NY:  Oxford University Press.

[3] Ibid., p. 30.