In the last posting a review of the free rider problem,
relative to John Locke’s view of a social contract, was provided. In a few words: under Locke’s version of the social contract,
it is rational for a people to abide by the provisions of the contract, but
that at the individual level, it is also rational for a person to “cheat” on
the contract. He/she is, by so doing, a
free rider. The reader is invited to
click on that posting.
So, what
should those who support the social contract think of the free rider problem? Here, the thinking of Thomas Hobbes plays a
part.[1] He was also a social contract philosopher who
overall provided, one, a dire view of human nature, two, a dire view of human
interactions, and, three, supported a strong governmental leadership – a
leviathan.
To begin,
Hobbes points out that there are laws to prohibit the acts of a free
rider. Remember, a free rider is one who
does not fulfill the provisions of the social contract. He/she is not willing to give up those rights
that the contract demands individuals relinquish. For example, the contract calls on individuals
to respect others’ property – a notion invented by the contract. Well, a free rider, who benefits from this
provision (he/she owns property), is not willing to pay the cost of respecting
other people’s property and goes about stealing or damaging the property of
others.
How can the
society, so organized, fight this problem?
The society establishes a system of laws that attempts to define the lines
between the concerns of the society and the retained rights of the individual. It, for example, defines private property,
what constitutes stealing private property, and what sanctions will be enforced
for anyone who offends people’s rights to own and enjoy their property. Laws provide the suitable sanctions –
penalties – that will befall anyone who breaks those laws.
For the free
rider, then, he/she, who is wanting to break the law, if rational, will consider
the risk of breaking the law and getting caught. Now, this works most of the time. Research shows most people are risk averse and
will avoid bets in which the chances are well in their favor to win.[2] But “most” is not all. There will be those who are willing to take
on the risk and enjoy – or attempt to enjoy – the benefits of being a free
rider. And, unfortunately, crime does,
at times, pay.
One reaction
to this condition is for the society to invest highly in policing
services. This affects the probabilities
of catching free riders in their crimes.
But criminals can also invest in services and other assets to limit the
probabilities of being caught and, if caught, to avoid prosecution, provide
representation during any resulting prosecution, and/or minimize any
punishments that such prosecution might implement.
And, if the free rider happens to
have wealth or high income (a possible result from prior free ridership),
he/she can more readily hire such services in the form of legal and financial
representation. Of course, if there is a
general and well-known number of such incidences – of people getting away with
such offenses – then the risk factor can be generally seen as less risky and,
in turn, encourage more people to take on the risks involved with being a free
rider.
If this becomes common, then the society
begins to lose the benefits of the social contract – the functionality of the
contract is only maintained if there is a general acceptance of it. Too many free riders undermine the contract
that makes the whole societal system possible.
Therefore, even Hobbes realizes that
self-interest can not be the only basis for such a contract. Yes, a strong leader – a Leviathan or
sovereign – can help to insure law abiding behavior, but not guarantee it. A social contract must depend on individuals
to set aside this purely rational means of determining his/her behavior, “at
least on occasion.” Other considerations
must be at play to solicit the appropriate, pro-contract, behaviors so that the
contract can survive.
Those considerations are moral ones. But on what basis are people to be
moral? Well, why are they psychologically
prone to commit crimes; i.e., to be risk averse? Perhaps if one understands this psychological
perspective, those in authority can devise appropriate policies to meet the
challenge.
Hobbes hits on the immorality of
pride. He points out that pride leads to
beliefs that one is superior to others and undermines the original assumption
of the social contract theory. That is, natural
rights view holds that in nature, all are equal, and that that equality is not
sacrificed by the social contract. But pride
leads some, through a sense of superiority, to conclude that they are not
subject to the provisions of the contract – they are too good for such concerns.
The origin of this arrogance is a
notion that such a person has some intrinsic quality, some natural or God-given
gift that places him/her above others.
This belief, as identified in this blog, has been given the name of genetic
elitism. With it is the likely sense
that the person need not be restrained by the provisions of any social
contract, especially those elements that pose a hostile effect against that
person’s interests. A sure recipe for a free
rider bias.
Here is how
Sinopoli phrases the point of contention:
The laws of nature themselves need no
great act of reasoning to be discovered.
They are also the dictates of scripture and are summarized in the maxim
“Do not that to another, which thou wouldest not have done to thyself.” To abide by them, however, and thus to act in
a just manner, requires a willingness
“when weighing the actions of other men with his own,” to see that “his own
passions and self-love, may add nothing to the weight.”[3]
That is, a person weighs the pluses or minuses without putting
a thumb on the scale. But that is not
what the natural rights view is about; its about weighing one’s interests and
being able – through the exercise of one’s rights – to maximize one’s interests
and, perhaps, the interests of those one loves.
The construct lacks comprehensiveness,[4] it does
not account for all relevant situations.
Also, the
above indicates that even with natural rights one needs to transcend its
parameters and instill a sense of morality.
But what constitutes morality?
Here mere reference to a scriptural phrase does not address the potentially
complex questions moral dilemmas pose.
Moral values, for example, often compete among themselves in determining
what should be done in a given situation.
Here’s an
example: should an employer favor a more
talented candidate for a position or someone, who can do the job, and is in dire
need of the job? Which option is more
just? Or more to the issue of free
ridership: should all offenses against
the social contract be equally acted upon or should other factors make a
difference? Are all laws just? If not, can they be unjust even though there
was not injustice involved in their enactment?
What about cases of law-breaking to advance a greater good; i.e., cases
of civil disobedience?
This can be quite complex; it demands
a seriously thought out view of moral politics.
Daniel Elazar sees the study of politics as one of studying
competitive behavior to seeking public allocation of values and the other of
seeking a just way by which to arrange a polity’s public affairs.[5] Both aims are equally important and should be
based on a view of politics that comprehensively explains the complexity of
political calculations and the
complexity of what constitutes just allocation of values.
It
needs to be more proactive on the latter than what natural rights provides. Federation theory provides such a view. At least, as far as Hobbes’ account for these
issues, the natural rights view does not.
In the future, this blog will revisit this concern and report on Locke’s
position on moral calculations in a natural rights explanation.
[1] This posting relies on the account provided by Richard
C. Sinopoli. See Richard C. Sinopoli,
The Foundations of American Citizenship:
Liberalism, the Constitution, and Civic Virtue.
[3] Richard C. Sinopoli, The Foundations of
American Citizenship: Liberalism, the
Constitution, and Civic Virtue (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1992). Emphasis in the original.
[4] Comprehensiveness is one of eight criteria Eugene
Meehan identifies to evaluate explanations.
See Eugene J. Meehan, Explanations
in Social Science: A System Paradigm (Homewood, IL: The Dorsey Press, 1969).
