THE DISCIPLINE OF REFLECTED ARGUMENT (pt. 3)

To date, this blog has reviewed three qualities or disciplines which characterize responsible argumentation.  The three are order, principle, and experience.  This posting will explain the remaining qualities offered by the social scientist, Philip Selznick.[1]  They are prudence and dialogue.

Prudence -  A shorten explanation for prudence is:  this discipline calls on a person to demand a critical review of any derived theories or models against ongoing experience.  It is what Selznick calls “practical wisdom” and while reason is end-centered, it favors the continuum of means and ends as when one looks beyond rules to the reasons for those rules.

If one is about formulating a legitimate, moral argument, that process, by its very nature, is one that seeks the truth.  When one starts the process without prejudging the result, has emotions under check, and is about searching the facts through experience, then one is looking for what is real. 

This process can also be one in which legitimate efforts at persuasion are attempted.  Therefore, there is a dual-purpose process in which one can pursue one or both aims: truth ascertainment and/or persuasion.  As earlier indicated, to be honest and effective, there are disciplines or concerns that the process should effectuate.  These concerns provide important context when considering prudence.

A person practices prudence in two domains.  One domain is the disposition to distinguish between rules as abstract ideals and their practical application in real situations.  The other is keeping moral aims targeted when pursuing policy which is often the product of argumentation.

Imprudent behavior occurs when one blindly imposes a rule in a way that disregards all the conditions a situation presents and applies the rule in a mechanical way.  Such imprudence forgets the reason(s) for the rule in question.

By looking at the purpose of a rule, and its value premises, judges make good their commitments to principled decision; by examining particular circumstances they take account of the inescapable uniqueness of human situations.  This is not a retreat from reason but a distinct mode of deliberation.[2]

For a rule to work, they must account for the issues involved within the situation(s) in which the rule is to be applied. 

A problem with ideologues and detached bureaucrats – in many cases – is this lack of prudence that leads to ineffective policy implementation and judicial tyranny.  A common experience by most is when a citizen deals with a bureaucrat either in government or some large corporation.  Blind rule-following often wrecks the purposes of the rules unnecessarily and leads to a loss of citizen or customer support for governmental or business practices.

The other domain follows this more practical claim.  It simply points out that in considering means and ends in the content of an argument, one should coalesce the two.  In a morally based argument, means and ends can be mutually supportive in that both are true to moral standards.  These, in turn, need to be transparent and defensible by submitting and explaining, when requested, these standards to moral critique. 

This blog has offered the federalist moral standards.  When so informed, one can judge how effective the advocate of an argument is in exercising the discipline of prudence.  For example, if a tax policy is geared to encourage increased economic activity by lowering costs of business, but loses sight of maintaining sufficient demand levels by consumers or potential consumers, the initial means-ends connection has disregarded the function of the first end to be the means to a more encompassing, desired end – a healthier economy for all.

And that leads to the last discipline,   

Dialogue – A shorten description is as follows:  This discipline calls for a person to honor diversity of ends in terms of both goals and understandings held by others.  This honor is acted upon by engaging with others in mutual efforts by honest agents toward seeking truth and/or prudent policy.  As such, it depends on a level of social capital or, at least, a proactive commitment to seek or establish social capital.[3]

Earlier, when considering prudence, one of its attributes highlights a concern over the ends of arguments; that is, when considering a contested point of policy or view, one should be cognizant of the “ends” the argued “means” are meant to target.  Oftentimes, ends, especially ultimate ends, seem to be assumed; many times, those assumptions differ in that they reflect differing or opposing ends. 

One can often detect these variances by the language each side uses.  For example, in the debate over abortion, one side will use terminology that speaks of the killing of “unborn babies.”  The other side does not counter this reference directly; instead it will speak of a woman’s right to control her body.  Neither side directly contradicts the other’s claim because such language gets to the ends of the argument. 

The anti-abortion side has, as its unstated ends, its desire to please a deity in that they hold the religious belief the fetus (there is no such thing as an unborn baby) has a soul.  The other sees this battle as one prong in the war for women’s equality.  Instead of getting into all that, argument tends to avoid such “messy” aspects and just assumes, in its arguments that its ends are above reproach.

But it is here that participants should argue and they should do so through dialogue.  One engages in such dialogue not necessarily to secure agreement.  Instead, one engages in this process to seek truth by seeing other perspectives, other trains of logic, and other instances of devout and honest commitment. 

It humanizes those with whom one disagrees and it does so not by avoiding strenuous debate and passionate exchanges, but by engaging in them.  That is part of it:  the passion, the emotions, and the rhetoric.  And yet, one can do all of this with civility.  But civility presupposes a general environment of basic trust; i.e., that those with whom one disagrees are honest, generally moral, and are pursuant of the common good.

Therefore, one can’t have dialogue – not of the type described here – with everyone.  As a matter of fact, dialogue, while it can be attempted in usual argumentation, will probably occur infrequently.  Why?  Because, the nation is not currently a society in which federalist values are generally seen as the ideal, much less an ideal by which people behave.  Instead, it has become a society in which self-interest has become predominant and the arbiter of what is ideal.

But this does not preclude a people from holding them collectively to some degree – or even individually – as an ideal that can be strived toward.  And so, one so disposed, can seek dialogue, attempt it, and engage in it whenever possible.  Federation theory is proposed as a way (or better stated, as part of a way) to seek a more general adoption of views supportive of the common good.

But even if dialogue were readily experienced, this does not mean such argumentation will lead to agreement.  Some opposing ends have been with societies since the beginnings of civilized life, if not before.  It would lead, though, to greater understanding, empathy, and respect among a population.

Although the risks are real, there is a place for the prophetic spirit, for passion and rhetoric, in communicative inquiry.  Without confrontation, unspoken assumptions may never be truly exposed to criticism and debate.  People may not really listen.[4]

And what of the demands of the classroom?  How does this dialogue work there?  The classroom can prove to be a very demanding place.  To begin with, students are a captive audience.  What is presented to them is mostly not of their choosing.  A process that relies to any degree on argumentation, much less the process suggested here, needs to be cautiously approached. 

Arguments over ends – what is usually treated as assumed contentions – will come to a screeching halt if the appropriate build-up is not laid out.  Premature attempts at such arguments can easily devolve into shouting matches.  If that happens, those who will also cease to listen will be the students who are sitting before the teacher and attempting to engage in such dialogue.

That completes a review of Selznick’s disciplines.  Beginning with the next posting, this blog will attempt to meld these disciplines with Stephen Toulmin’s model for logical argumentation.  In general, the aim should be to apply each of the disciplines outlined to date to each of the elements of Toulmin’s model.

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[1] Philip Selznick, The Moral Commonwealth:  Social Theory and the Promise of Community (Berkeley, CA:  University of California Press, 1992).

[2] Philip Selznick, The Moral Commonwealth:  Social Theory and the Promise of Community, 60-61.

[3] Robert Putnam tells us that social capital means having an active, public-spirited citizenry, egalitarian political relations, and a social environment of trust and cooperation.  See Robert D. Putnam, “Bowling Alone:  America's Declining Social Capital,” Journal of Democracy, January, pp. 65-78.

[4] Philip Selznick, The Moral Commonwealth:  Social Theory and the Promise of Community, 62.

THE DISCIPLINE OF REFLECTED ARGUMENT (pt. 2)

The last posting shared with the reader Philip Selznick’s[1] useful list of five qualities upon which reasoned arguments are based.  They are order, experience, principle, prudence, and dialogue; he calls them the five pillars of reason.  Here, this writer has preferred to call these qualities disciplines.  In the previous posting, the discipline of order was identified and described. 

A shorten explanation of the discipline, order, is: 

this discipline calls on a person to be able to functionally objectify the information relevant to the essence of an argument.  In turn, this discipline calls on the person to keep in check any emotions, rhetoric, prejudices, or inclinations that hamper an objective-based analysis and determination as to the value of the information.

          This posting reviews principle and experience.  The next discipline to be explained is principle.  Its shorten description is:

this discipline calls on a person to keep in focus ultimate goals of the argument-formation process.  “Reason is end-centered:  the fate of comprehensive or long-term objectives is always to be kept in mind, always open to intelligent assessment.”[2] 

In terms of a more extended treatment, principle leads one to detect a pragmatist bent to what is being described as Selznick’s qualities.  As such, at times, some might argue that the emphasis of pragmatic thinking radicalizes the practical and therefore, accuses it of being principle-less.  The whole notion is that pragmatism in its arguments utilizes means that will lead to ends and will, when attained, render those ends as new means to further sought after ends and on and on. 

Under such a mode of argumentation, there are no ultimate ends and thus no principles.  Selznick argues that this is but a parody of pragmatist philosophy.  He points out that its main proponents, John Dewey and William James, were much ensconced in seeking ultimate goals, in ultimate principles.  And those principles had to do with moral foundational ends such as justice.

They pursued those values – ends – that facilitate cooperation.  As has been argued, a pragmatic way to view principles of justice and fairness, liberty and equality are as essential qualities that allow, in continuous fashion, productive interaction between people.  It is when these qualities are not kept, that the motivation for discord occurs and, if not remedied, encourages serious discord that can be sustained for sufficient time to render disastrous consequences. 

But these are not the usual sought after ends.  In civic or governmental operations, usually people are engaged in seeking more immediate ends, such as whether they should construct a street or fix a water main or provide some governmental service.  It is only when they string together a long list of “shoulds,” logically, tying one to the other, that they will arrive at justice and fairness.  It is in this light that federation theory is offered with the trump value of societal welfare and key instrumental values such as liberty and equality. 

These are ultimate or near ultimate ends.  And these types of values – though often not at a conscious level or somewhat taken for granted – are the ends that govern and guide a people as to which issues are important and which resolutions are legitimate.  Therefore, principles which include these are essential parts of a good argument and when judging whether an argument has merit or not, one can ask about these ends, particularly when they are not stated or immediately discernable.  In other words, they are thought of when “something smells rotten in Denmark.”

The third discipline that Selznick shares is experience.  A shorten explanation is:  this discipline is the willingness to subject formed hypothesis to experience – empirical information.  This experience comes in varies forms but is most explicit when derived from experimentation.  Having said that, most citizens will not conduct experiments, but can review historical information from reputable historians, journalists, and other researchers who enjoy positive reputations among legitimate reviewers of such material.  It should be remembered by the reader; all knowledge is historical in nature.

In the case of civics, a more extensive view revolves around a question that is posed to students.  That is:  what is appropriate public policy either in the case of formulating new policy or reviewing already implemented policy?  People, in trying to answer this question, respond with various answers because they have varied interests and public problems and issues can be quite complex. 

And unlike the physical world, mistakes do not become so readily knowable or apparent.  It is amazing how often certain social conditions need to be experienced and certain reactive policies tried before humans can detect the errors of past policy attempts. 

For example, in the case of economic downturns, should the government engage in austere policies or promote, through public spending and borrowing, stimulus policies?  Even though economies continuously seem to go through economic cycles with serious downturns, people still have strenuous debate as to what the appropriate public policy should be.

Experience can be managed in several ways.  Science provides us a way that is conducted with a great deal of discipline.  When engaging in science, there are accepted and unaccepted ways of handling and recording experience.  These demands are usually supervised, in various forms, by professional organizations. 

But, as mentioned above, there are other forms of experiences that are also valid and often more efficient.  Take the person who has worked at a job or career for a long period of time, say years.  He or she develops a sense of what the job is about and, in the process and almost at a subconscious level, forms intuitive insights.  That person can tell you something is right or wrong about something related without being able to articulate why it is right or wrong.[3]

Such insights usually prove to be spot on.  Related to such abilities are examples of heuristic thinking.  These are “rules of thumb” one develops from not so formal processes, but purely from unreflective observations.[4]  This is a form of historic sources.

Of course, formal historic studies are a form of reported experience.  This is not the place to review all the advantages and disadvantages of historic study, but it should be noted that professional historians go through rigorous peer review, like scientists go through, which question the reliability and veracity of their work.  Again, this is supervised by professional organizations.  But no matter how formal one is, arguments based on experiences have the advantage over inspiration or emotions in that they can be tested by other researchers.

Future postings will point out that when formulating an argument, one specific skill will be to cite facts (or what is taken as facts).  This will be basically the reporting of experiences – they are the “wherefore-s” and “since-s” before the “therefore-s” in an argument.

In the next posting, the remaining disciplines, prudence and dialogue, will be explained.

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[1] Philip Selznick, The Moral Commonwealth:  Social Theory and the Promise of Community (Berkeley, CA:  University of California Press, 1992).

[2] Philip Selznick, The Moral Commonwealth:  Social Theory and the Promise of Community, 59.

[3] Michael Gladwell, Blink:  The Power of Thinking without Thinking (New York, NY:  Bay Back Books, 2005).

[4] See Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast, and Slow, (New York, NY:  Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2011).