NOT THE MUGGER, BUT THE LANDLORD

[Note:  This posting is a continuation of a report on the development of a civics unit of study.  This unit is directing students to formulate informed positions on a governmental topic:  ground rules overseeing tort law.  It is being developed in real time.  Writer wants to identify his basic source of information, the Great Course’s course, Law School for Everyone.[1]]

This blog has been of late looking at the tort concern over interpreting negligence, especially as this standard relates to the common law limitations placed on potential tort claims and represented by the saying:  no duty to a stranger.  While this “indifference” is applicable to most social interactions where harm befalls someone and others having no legal obligation to help, there are exceptions arising from established and legally recognized relationships.

This topic deserves the review of one more case, Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Avenue Apartment Corporation.  This 1970 case reflects what might happen to many people who live in large urban areas, especially during the years of the nineteen-seventies. 

Sarah B. Kline began renting an apartment some years before an unfortunate event occurred.  That is a mugger attacked her, stole from her, and caused her injury one day.  The attack took place in the common hallways of the apartment building.  She sued the owners of the apartment building and the relevant question was:  did the owners of the building have a duty to Kline and, therefore, liable in this case? 

This event is not a simple mugging.  To begin with, when Kline moved to this building, the neighborhood in which it was located had a great deal less crime.  Actually, the apartment building was what one might consider luxurious with a doorman, marble floors, and fresh flowers in the common areas very day.  But in the ensuing years the neighborhood changed, and crime became common.

Demand for the apartments fell and, while it is not known if rents decreased – part of the record seems to indicate they had – the owners of the building ceased providing a doorman.  Incidences of crimes in the building began to become common and the renters expressed their desire to reestablish the doorman-service.  The owners refused.  Where they now held negligent in Kline’s case?

Part of the argument for holding them liable was that if the elevator ceased to work, lessees would not be responsible to fix it; it would be up to the landlord to fix it.  Was this not comparable?  Wasn’t a safe building – along with elevator service – part of the assumed conditions a renter can expect when he/she signs a lease or pays the rent?  And would it not be more efficient if the common landlord took care of this problem as opposed to each tenant taking on the expenses of providing more protection?

The trial court – the federal District Court[2] – found in favor of the defendant – the owners of the building – but the plaintiff appealed.  One argument the trial court used to support its decision was to point out that a lessee balances what he/she spends on rent against any services or protections the building provides.  Kline made these calculations in her deciding to stay in the building.  In addition, she was a month-to-month lessee, and, therefore, she could of have moved at any time without penalty.

In addition, the defendant, the owners of the building, did not mug the plaintiff.  The mugger did.  So, the chain of causation, according to this trial ruling, ends with the mugger.  In effect, the trial decision could not see why the owners were liable for what someone else did.  As indicated above, Kline appealed this decision.

In the appeal decision, while noting this causation argument, the court did believe that a safe common area is basic to this sort of business.  Therefore, the federal appeals court reversed the decision.  The U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals found in favor of Kline and held the apartment building owners liable for her expenses, mostly due to medical care.

So, as a precedent, this decision further defines what related parties (related by contract) have in terms of duty for a given fault and for a given harm.[3]  Also, this decision helps to introduce the next subject to be addressed in this account.  That is causation.  It demonstrates one of various legal concerns related to defining and attributing causation.

Highly relevant to the concerns of this overall history, Edward K. Cheng states something very revealing about the inherent tension between the federated obligations among citizens and what common law has bequeathed this nation, the individualist view of legal obligations:

And in these cases, duty is not only all-important from a technical sense.  Duty also becomes fundamental because it defines the difference between law and morality, and because it implicitly adopts certain values, which can be quite controversial.  The no duty to a stranger rule undoubtedly celebrates rugged individualism and a desire for personal liberty, but it also sets aside values about community and regard for others, at least from the standpoint of legal obligation.

          It is this tension, between individual liberty and collective welfare, that makes the concept of duty interesting.  And it is because of this tension that the exceptions to the no affirmative duty rule have historically been a battleground for courts and tort scholars.[4]

This writer would replace the word, “collective,” in this quotation with the word “associational,” but beyond that, this quote summarizes what this history’s main point is.

What Cheng has to say reflects the inherent antagonistic forces a free nation must face. This nation initially opted, in its political ideals, for the more communal approach – at least as reflected in its espoused values – but of the last sixty to seventy years, has shifted toward the individualist perspective not just in its common behaviors, but in its espoused values as well.  And so, with that disparity noted, this account will next turn to causation and related legal concepts and principles.

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[1] Edward K. Cheng, “Torts,” Law School for Everyone – a transcript book (Chantilly, VA:  The Teaching Company/The Great Courses, 2017), 230-445.

[2] Apparently, the apartment building is in the District of Columbia, a federal jurisdiction.

[3] “Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Avenue Apartment Corporation,” Case Briefs, 439 F.2d 477, 1970 U.S. App. LEXIS 7831, 141 U.S. App. D.C. 370, 43 A.L.R. 3d 311 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 6, 1970), n. d., accessed October 3, 2018, https://www.casebriefs.com/blog/law/torts/torts-keyed-to-prosser/owners-and-occupiers-of-land/kline-v-1500-massachusetts-ave-apartment-corp/ .

[4] Edward K. Cheng, “Torts,” Law School for Everyone – a transcript book (Chantilly, VA:  The Teaching Company/The Great Courses, 2017), 230-445, 264-265.

GRATUITOUS UNDERTAKING

[Note:  This posting is a continuation of a report on the development of a civics unit of study.  This unit is directing students to formulate informed positions on a governmental topic:  ground rules overseeing tort law.  It is being developed in real time.  Writer wants to identify his basic source of information, the Great Course’s course, Law School for Everyone.[1]]

In continuing this account’s review of tort law, this posting begins with an everyday sort of experience.  Everyone has driven down a road, usually paved, and seen one of those white X’s indicating one’s vehicle is about to cross a railroad track.  The X is there to provide a warning.

Since there is usually no train approaching, one does not stop, but one might slow down a bit and make the effort to hear if one is.  If a noise is heard, one would probably slow down even more and see if a train is coming and one knows to yield to it since the train won’t stop.  After all, that train is much bigger and, if hit by it, it will cause a great deal of damage to the vehicle and poses the possibility of serious injury if not death.

Then there are those crossings, the ones that are on busy streets, where there is a signal or even a descending barrier to indicate a train is about to cross.  But those warnings didn’t always exist; there were trains in the thirties, but no such warnings.  Well, instead, in those days, there were, at some crossings, watchmen.

A watchman (this writer does not know whether there were watchwomen) spent most of his days in a hut or shanty.  The job of this person was to, upon knowing a train was approaching, get out of the hut and warn people the train was about to arrive.  It should be noted, this was a voluntary service that apparently had been offered for some time.  In other words, there was no law mandating this service.

One day around the year, 1930, in Cleveland, Ohio, Stewart, in his truck, approached the crossing and there was no watchman present and so Stewart proceeded to drive his truck across the tracks.  Low and behold, a train came and smashed the truck.  Stewart sued claiming negligence on the part of the Erie Railroad Company who set up the watchman hut and hired a watchman to man it.

The trial court found in favor of the plaintiff and that decision was upheld on appeal.[2]  In the decision, the court used the term “trick.”  That is, by providing the watchman service initially – and in this instance depriving it – the railroad in effect tricked Stewart.  The court found this to be negligence and sided with Stewart.

This case illustrates another legal concept, gratuitous undertaking.  What’s that?  A look at another case demonstrates it more directly.  In a famous, former New York department store, Gimbels, a woman began showing symptoms of a heart problem.  This came to the attention of a sales clerk that took the woman to a store infirmary.  The store personnel then ignored her for hours.  She suffered a heart attack and died.  As this history earlier described – e.g., Yania v. Bigan – if the store personnel left her alone and let her die, the store would face no liability. 

But by initially assisting her, they became responsible as the court found in this 1935 case, Zelenko v. Gimbel Bros., Inc.  From the record of the case, the court judge wrote:  “Holding that, although the defendant may have had no duty to assist a customer taken ill in his store, once he undertook to render assistance, he assumed a duty of reasonable care in doing so …”[3] 

The “undertaking” refers to the Gimbel’s employee ushering the woman to the infirmary, something no legal duty called for; and, therefore, that act was gratuitous.  But once it was taken, a duty was formed.  There are various reasons for this duty.  For one, by placing the woman in the infirmary, it precluded anyone else providing help and this constituted a negligence and, therefore, subject to a viable tort claim. 

The act also established a relationship.  And certain relationships do entail duties.  They are contractual relationships that identify duties or are inherent in the contract one assumes.  A lifeguard has a duty to save a drowning person, a doctor has a duty toward his/her patients, etc. 

This reminds one of the Costa Concordia cruise ship captain who abandoned his ship when it ran aground.  The accident resulted in deaths and injuries and it also resulted in Captain Francesco Schettino serving a prison sentence.  That case was not American – it was Italian – but it does illustrate this contractual obligation and how the captain did not meet it.

This topic deserves the review of one more case, Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Avenue Apartment Corporation.  In the next posting, this case will be highlighted.

[1] Edward K. Cheng, “Torts,” Law School for Everyone – a transcript book (Chantilly, VA:  The Teaching Company/The Great Courses, 2017), 230-445.

[2] “Erie R. R. v. Stewart,” Case Briefs, Erie R. Co. v. Stewart, 40 F. 2d 855, 1930 U.S. App. Lexis 3270 (6^th Cir. Ohio May 13, 1930, n. d., accessed September 30, 2018, https://www.casebriefs.com/blog/law/torts/torts-keyed-to-epstein/affirmative-duties/erie-r-r-v-stewart/ .

[3] “Zelenko v. Gimbil Bros., Inc.,” Case Text, 158 Misc. 904 (N.Y. Misc. 1935), n. d., accessed October 1, 2018, https://casetext.com/case/zelenko-v-gimbel-bros-inc .