Tocqueville,
in his visit to America in the early 1800s, noted that the role of
religion was salutary in that it served to moderate the competitive
nature of the nation's capitalist economy. During the week, an
average business person engaged in activities to maximize his or her
profit, but come Sunday, he or she heard Bible stories that
emphasized being honest and fair and being concerned for the poor.1
I believe religion still provides that necessary offset. Religion
does more than offer a balance to a purely economic/material
perspective. It, in terms of western religious tradition, strongly
provides a rationale for our dedication to equality. We are all
equal in God's eyes or so the religious tradition teaches. This has
been a powerful message over the centuries as western civilization
has drifted to an evermore democratic constitutional belief. But
there is an aspect of religion that I fear is a hindrance and that
limits our ability to count on it to provide for all our moral needs.
This is not a knock on religion; it is just that for purposes of
promoting a healthy democratic character, a people needs more than a
religious view. That is, religious morality or ethics is based on a
deontological view and such a view is wanting.
Deontology
is the study of moral obligation. Deontological views are views of
morality based on definite precepts, judgments as to whether a deed
is moral or evil. Precepts are claims as to whether an act is moral
or not based on a belief that is received – as in a religious
inspiration – or divine. As Philip Selznick puts its basic dictum:
“follow the precept no matter what the consequences.”2
This view of morality calls on people to study holy sources or
listen to those who do in order to derive what the precepts are.
This usually follows a process: a believer listens to a minister,
priest, or rabbi to learn what is moral. This message is usually in
the form of sermons or selected readings or religious counseling. I
would hold that such a role can inform our political views, but that
such a view, at a minimum, needs to be supplemented.
By
what? By a view which Selznick calls the consequential view. Here
the motto is “morality is made for humans, not humans for
morality.”3
The claim is that morality lies in acts that advance us toward
mutual well-being, advancement of the commonwealth. So, in order to
determine what is moral, one reflects on the consequences of a
planned act and if it is determined that the act will advance the
common good, it is moral; if it doesn't, then it is immoral. If it
leaves the common good alone, it is neutral. Lying, for example, is
not necessarily evil if the consequences of telling a lie advance our
common well-being. This form of thinking makes many uneasy. Isn't
this what tyrants tend to believe or tell their followers?
Part
of the consequentialist view is to study what, in concrete terms,
constitutes the common good. Selznick analyzes a concern for the
common good on two levels. On one level, a lower one, he identifies
as an attribute of the common good the promotion of a state of mutual
concern and warmth for one another. But on a higher level, he
expresses the following concerns:
A
moral order is effective if it succeeds in creating widespread
commitment to “deserving the desirable.” That commitment is an
aspect of personality. Hence we look to virtue and character as the
foundations of morality. To answer the question, Consequences for
what? we look above all to character-impacting choice.
“Consequences include effects upon character, upon confirming and
weakening habits, as well as tangibly obvious results.” …
The
creation of an integrated moral self, capable of exercising
self-restraint, expressing love, shouldering responsibility, engaging
in moral reflection, is the prime end or outcome that governs the
assessment of consequences. At the same time, character and
dispositions are causes of consequences. We judge character
by what it leads to and what we can rely on.4
Projecting
outward, such character commitments portray what a moral society is
like. It is a society inhabited by these character bound individuals
so inclined to participate in those aspects of life that promote and
actualize the qualities Selznick innumerates.
So,
lying is generally immoral because the consequence of people
lying, usually, is a common experience that makes trust unlikely and
without trust life becomes highly unproductive. Citing another
example, you might deontologically find abortion immoral, but
consequentially, what would be the results to our commonwealth if we
were to make them illegal? And yet on another plane, when we as
citizens consider morality as the relatively simple chore of
following precepts, we relinquish the role of participating in the
civic duty to reflect more seriously on the goodness or evil of
social policy for we minimize what policy choices mean in terms of
their consequences. Democracy demands the more active role in our
public deliberations.
So,
where does that leave us in terms of the relationship between the two
views? Do we have to choose between the two; are they mutually
exclusive? I believe that they are not. As a matter of fact, a
person who seriously adopts the consequentialist view soon finds out
that in practice there is not much difference between the two views.
When one looks historically at what types of acts and
motivations lead to a better commonwealth, he or she finds an
enormous overlap between those acts and motives and the precepts that
religions promote. This is especially true when one considers social
moral precepts; that is, precepts that address how we treat each
other, at least on a fundamental level. In both cases, lying is
generally a no-no. Divergence pops up when the act or motivation
relates to complex social issues such as abortion. Here, I believe
responsible citizens need to consider the morality of public policy
and implement both views: the deontologist view and the
consequentialist view. And how does one learn about such views? The
home and church are where one is primarily presented with the former;
the school is where one is primarily presented with the latter.
1Tocqueville,
A. de. (1969/1835). Democracy
in America.
(Translation by George Lawrence). New York, NY: Harper Perennial.
2Selznick,
P. (1992). The moral
commonwealth: Social theory and the promise of community.
Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Quotation on p. 32.
3Ibid.,
p. 32.
4Ibid.,
p. 34.
